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Abstract 
My dissertation offers the definitive account of the history of national communism in Soviet 
Latvia. I define national communism within the context of the concepts of Russification and 
Sovietisation. I provide an assessment of the contention of the school of Latvian historiography 
that Russian migration to Latvia was due to an official policy of Russification. 
 I found that in the wake of Joseph Stalin’s death, leadership rivals Nikita Khrushchev 
and Lavrentii Beria cooperated to formulate a new nationality policy in the Soviet Republics in 
1953, demonstrating the manipulation of nationality policy as a feature in the power struggle. I 
argue that it was in this context that Latvian national communism originated rather than its 
previously assumed emergence in 1956. In contrast to previous scholarship, I insist that the 
national communists operated as an identifiable faction within the Latvian Communist Party. I 
investigate the political rise of the national communists between 1953 and 1958, examining and 
evaluating each national communist policy including their controversial language and residency 
laws, and I uncovered new evidence of autarkic national communist economic plans. I identify 
their policies as nationalist and, ultimately, incompatible with Soviet socialism despite the 
partial liberalisation of the Soviet Union under Khrushchev. 
 My dissertation uses complementary new evidence from Latvian and Russian archives 
to support and radically expand upon the theory of recent Western scholarship that an alliance 
of Stalinist hardliners in Moscow and Latvia, rather than Khrushchev, conspired to purge the 
Latvian national communists in 1959. This throws into question the causes of the other purges 
in nine republics between 1959 and 1961. Finally, my project augments our understanding of 
how the Soviet Communist Party functioned, particularly by showing precisely how the 
relationship between Moscow and the Soviet periphery relaxed before the Latvian purge but 
became strained again afterwards.  
My dissertation offers the only comprehensive history of national communism in Soviet 
Latvia. In their attempt to wrench more autonomy from the centre, the Latvian national 
communists presented the greatest challenge to Moscow from the Soviet Republics in the 
Khrushchev era. 
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Introduction 
 
Latvian national communism epitomised the 1950s Thaw in the Soviet Union. A cultural 
reawakening took place, which celebrated pre-Soviet Latvian cultural achievements. Ordinary 
Latvians relished this uncertain but tangibly liberalised atmosphere. Many in Latvia, as 
elsewhere in the USSR, breathed a collective sigh of relief at the repeal of Stalinism’s 
arbitrariness. Bold and energetic leaders in the Latvian republic sought to use these new 
circumstances to renegotiate with Moscow the demarcation of autonomy vis-à-vis the centre. 
The Thaw, initiated by Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev, was part of a tactical masterstroke 
designed to outmanoeuvre his enemies, but it also brought real change to the USSR.  
The Thaw relaxed the repressive bonds holding the Soviet Union in its Stalinist shape. 
It offered Eastern Europe and the Soviet republics the opportunity for limited experimentation 
with economic and political decentralisation. Yet, the Thaw was malleable and the original 
bounds vaguely delimited by Khrushchev were quickly exceeded as socialist states and Soviet 
republics used the greater flexibility proffered by Moscow to explore different avenues to 
Socialism. In Hungary, Poland and Latvia this translated into ‘national communism’, an 
inherently national (and therefore treacherous) road to socialism implicitly separate from 
Moscow. It was only because of the Thaw that national communism was allowed to flourish. 
The ad hoc nature of Soviet reform in the 1950s ensured that these experiments with national 
communism rapidly developed into more determined calls for autonomy (or freedom in 
Hungary’s case), which overtook Khrushchev’s designs and proved incompatible with the 
Soviet system. The Soviet government was unable to cope with more than a ‘tweaking’ of the 
system. By comparison, Latvian national communist reform was radical. It was for this reason 
that the Latvian national communist Thaw closely resembled the greater Thaw project, both 
encountering concerted Stalinist resistance, eventually culminating in the purge of the Latvian 
national communists in 1959 and Khrushchev’s own removal in 1964. 
Latvia was absorbed into the Soviet Union in summer 1940 following the 1939 
agreement between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union (the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact) to 
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divide Eastern Europe between them. The invasion of the USSR by Nazi Germany on 22nd June 
1941 brought the Sovietisation of Latvia to an abrupt halt, however following Germany’s 
defeat, Latvia was reincorporated into the Soviet Union by the advancing Red Army in 
September 1944. The immediate post-war period in Latvia was characterised by a mass influx 
from the USSR. Thousands of ethnic Latvians (the so-called ‘Latovichi’) who had resided in the 
USSR during the interwar period returned or migrated to Latvia. They were the backbone of the 
Latvian Communist Party’s (LCP) small indigenous cadre, dwarfing the few hundred partisans 
and underground Latvian communists who survived the German occupation, which included 
many future national communists.1 A majority of Latvian Party members and government 
personnel were composed of Slavic migrants sent to staff the republic and facilitate 
Sovietisation. 
Latvia possessed a historical Russian community comprising 10.6% of the population in 
1935.2 Latvians treated these Russians, who arrived before 1940 differently, calling them ‘our 
Russians’ because they integrated into Latvian society and learned the Latvian language. 
Between 1940 and 1945, Latvia suffered a demographic collapse: the Soviets deported 15,000 
people from Latvia in June 1940, while 120,000 fled to the West. In total, war deaths and other 
losses are estimated at 600,000, leaving just 1.4 million people in Latvia in 1945 (70% of the 
1939 population).3 In addition to Slavic administrators, enormous waves of Slavic workers 
migrated to Latvia due to severe labour shortages in the early post-war period. In the Stalinist 
post-war years, the ethnic Latvian population fell from 83% in 1945 to approximately 62% by 
1953.4 Slavic migration into Latvia peaked between 1947 and 1949 but continued until Stalin’s 
death in 1953 when political turmoil caused anxiety about migrating to Latvia.  
After the war, Stalin’s nationality policy in the Western borderlands was based on 
coercion. Upon his death, Stalin bequeathed a Latvia in which Sovietisation wrought a dramatic 
remaking of the political, economic, and social system and a sharp alteration of Latvia’s 
                                                      
1 When Latvia was absorbed into the USSR in June 1940, there were just 967 members of the Communist 
Party, Romuald Misiunas and Rein Taagepera, The Baltic States: The Years of Dependence, 1940-1990, 
(Berkley: University of California Press, 1993), 359. 
2 See Appendix A, Table 9. 
3 Andrejs Plakans, The Latvians: A Short History, (California: Hoover Institution Press, 1995), 155; 
Misiunas and Taagepera, Years of Dependence, 354. 
4 Misiunas and Taagepera, Years of Dependence, 112. 
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demographic make-up but failed to co-opt the population; insurgency was rife in rural areas, and 
the Party remained overwhelmingly dominated by Russians. The Latovichi retained their 
ambiguous stance on national issues. In this context, the Latvian national communists emerged 
to challenge the status quo in summer 1953. For the subsequent six years they fostered a 
measure of popular support, a ‘Latvian Thaw’, that was previously unseen in Soviet Latvia and 
not witnessed again until the independence movements of the late 1980s. As academician Jānis 
Stradiņš puts it, under the national communists ‘Latvia regained its self-confidence’.5 
This dissertation examines many themes: nationality policy, centre-periphery relations, 
specifically the relationship between Moscow and Riga, and the workings of high politics in 
Riga and Moscow. The Party and those persons who occupied leading positions within it made 
the most important decisions on policy and its implementation. As such, it is important to take a 
close look at the Party and those in command by focusing on Latvian high politics. In many 
ways, this is also a case study of the Khrushchev era. My thesis covers seven of the twelve years 
that Khrushchev dominated Soviet politics. I explore Khrushchev’s rise and many of his 
policies and problems, external to Latvia, in relation to their impact upon Latvia: nationality 
policy, the 20th Party Congress, de-Stalinisation, the sovnarkhoz reforms, Khrushchev’s 
education reform, and his vacillation on decentralisation and the Latvian purge.  
In my thesis, I ask and attempt to answer the following key research questions: Were 
the Latvian national communists nationalists? To what extent were the national communists 
successful in enacting their reform programme? Did Latvian national communism affect 
decision-making in Moscow, and if so, how? Does Latvian historiography offer an objective 
and reliable view of the events covered in my thesis? Who caused the purge of the Latvian 
national communists and how was it achieved? The overarching question I ask is how did a 
faction, which succeeded in gaining dominance over its republic’s leadership, challenge 
Moscow in a bid to renegotiate the centre-periphery relationship? 
 
                                                      
5 Round Table: ‘Nacionālkomunisti 1959 gada notikumu kontekstā: Apaļā galda diskusija “Latvijas 
Vēstures Institūta Žurnāla” redakcijā’, Latvijas Vēstures Institūta Žurnāls, 71 (2009), 153. 
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i. Historiography and Sources 
As one would expect, Latvian historians, both émigré and those who lived in Soviet Latvia, 
contribute the majority of the historiography. This historiography, however, is fixed squarely 
within the Latvian paradigm of treating the USSR as an occupying power and views Moscow as 
monolithic and uncompromising in all circumstances. Following the Latvian purge in 1959, 
there were articles published in Western newspapers suggesting a purge had taken place. 
Afterwards, the only mention of the purge appeared in the samizdat (dissident publication) 
‘Letter of 17 Latvian communists’ written by Berklavs and his associates, which was smuggled 
out of the USSR and published in the West in 1972.6 The letter was rebuffed in the USSR as a 
forgery and made little impact in Latvia.7 
In the perestroika period, Latvians began to re-examine their history as a Soviet 
republic. Discussions about the national communist period, particularly the Latvian purge, 
exploded in autumn 1988 as Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev’s glasnost policy took 
effect. In this new atmosphere, there was an upsurge of public and academic interest in the 
purge, especially because the political struggle took place behind closed doors. Historians began 
publishing on the subject for the first time. Editors filled newspapers and journals with articles 
about national communism. Elderly national communists emerged from obscurity, and 
described national communism’s role in Latvian history in interviews and serialised memoirs 
published in popular news organs.8 The pages of Literatūra un Maksla (Literature and Art), for 
example, were an astoundingly open discussion forum from 1985. The contributions of Vilis 
Krūmiņš, Eduards Berklavs, Voldemārs Kalpiņš and Indriķis Pinksis, hitherto pariahs, provide 
invaluable insight in their published recollections of the period. Krūmiņš alone published seven 
articles and interviews between 1988 and 1990. In 1998, Berklavs published his autobiography. 
Memoirs are not always accurate and rarely objective. However, in a study of high politics they 
provide a useful supplement to archival evidence and assist in our understanding of the subtexts 
                                                      
6 ‘Protest Letter’ by 17 Latvian communists, (http://www.letton.ch/lvx_17com.htm). 
7 Andres Küng, A Dream of Freedom, (Cardiff: Boreas Publishing House, 1980), 175. 
8 Memoirs, interviews and articles by national communists appeared in both Latvian and Russian 
publications: In the Latvian daily Cīņa (Struggle); the Latvian literary journal Literatūra un Māksla the 
journal Latvijas likteņgadi (Latvian Years of Destiny); the Party journals Karogs (Flag), Liesma (Flame) 
and Kommunist Sovetskoi Latvii (Communist Soviet Latvia), and the youth publications Sovetskaia 
molodezh’ and Padomju Jaunatne (Soviet Youth), among others. 
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of official documents and newspaper articles. They reveal opinions formed on the basis of 
subtle policy shifts, personal relationships, and changes in behaviour. Once discussion became 
permissible, these leaders were desperate to present their interpretations of history, thirty years 
after the suppression of all mention of national communism in the USSR. Many attempted to 
justify their position in jettisoning national communism to save themselves from the purge. 
Some, including Berklavs and Krūmiņš, went on to join or form independence movements 
during the last years of the USSR. 
In many respects, glasnost permitted national communism’s return to Latvia. There was 
strong support among the population, who believed it was step towards greater democracy, 
special status for Latvia in the USSR, and later autonomy. In the late 1980s, the LCP underwent 
a re-examination of itself. At the May 1988 and January 1989 plenums, the LCP resolved to 
‘restore an objective picture of the July plenum 1959’ and considered revoking the July 
plenum’s decisions, which marked the beginning of the purge.9 In 1989, the LCP sent two 
Latvian historians to Tashkent to conduct an interview with Nuritdin Mukhitdinov, dispatched 
by the Presidium in June 1959 to investigate charges of nationalism in Latvia. Mukhitdinov 
participated in the pivotal meeting that decided the national communists’ fate, and was the only 
surviving full Presidium member from 1959. This little known interview appeared in a 1990 
edition of Kommunist Sovetskoi Latvii. 10  Public clamour for information about the 
circumstances surrounding the purge compelled the Latvian bureau to request that the Institute 
of History gather all available material about the July 1959 plenum concerning the purge. In 
February and June 1989, in an unprecedented move, the bureau ordered the plenum’s stenogram 
published uncensored in Kommunist Sovetskoi Latvii. By 1990, the Latvian bureau was in the 
midst of a struggle between a new generation of national communists and those loyal to 
Moscow, eventually splitting into two parties. At the 25th LCP Congress in April, the pro-
Moscow faction scuppered attempts to repeal the July plenum’s decisions. They determined 
there had been ‘an insufficient level of research’ on the subject. Furthermore, the discussion 
                                                      
9 ‘Iz arkhivnykh fondov: Stenogramma 7-ia zakrytogo Plenuma TsK KPL 7-8 iiulia 1959’, Kommunist 
Sovetskoi Latvii, 2 (1989), 87. 
10 Nuritdin Mukhitdinov, Interview with Lubova Zile and Valdis Blūzma, ‘1959 god v Latvii: vzglyad 
izvne’, Kommunist Sovietskoi Latvii, 5 (1990), 85-93. 
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became, as Daina Bleiere puts it, ‘a political weapon’ in the struggle against the LCP’s 
reactionary wing.11 As the Party fractured in 1990, the loyalist faction refused to declare the 
July plenum’s decisions null and void, but the founding congress of the Independent Latvian 
Communist Party did so.12 Public interest in Latvia about the purge waned after independence, 
but resurfaced with Latvia’s opening of Soviet archival holdings in the late 1990s. This led to a 
flurry of publications on the subject by Latvian historians Daina Bleiere, Ilga Apine, Gundar 
King, Irēne Šniedere, Jānis Stradiņš, Ilga Kreituss, Heinrich Strods and Jānis Riekstiņš, who 
defined the Latvian interpretation of national communism according to Latvia’s politically 
charged narrative of the Soviet period.  
Russian historical literature tends to repeat the static rhetoric of the Soviet period, 
maintaining that Latvia absorption into the Soviet Union was popular and legitimate. Ludmilla 
Vorob’eva’s Istoriia Latvii ot Rossiiskoi imperii k SSSR (The History of Latvia from the 
Russian Empire to the USSR) is a prime example of this practice. The great exception is Elena 
Zubkova’s book Pribaltika i Kreml’ (The Baltic and the Kremlin), which provides a rich 
analysis of events in the Baltic republics between 1945 and 1953. 
 The first in-depth study on the national communists in Western historiography is 
Michael Widmer’s 1969 unpublished Harvard Ph.D. thesis. Widmer’s exhaustive study of 
newspaper articles, the only sources available before the 1980s, puts the Latvian nomenklatura 
under scrutiny. 13  Widmer draws conclusions from leadership changes and statistical 
information, and makes many pertinent observations considering the lack of reliable material 
available at the time. Yet, because he lacked archival access, and because his primary source 
was the Party newspaper Sovetskaia Latviia (Soviet Latvia), which was controlled by arch-
Stalinist Arvīds Pelše’s Department of Propaganda and Agitation (Agitprop), his analysis was 
incomplete. Widmer’s thesis was also a product of the Cold War era. For example, he states in 
his introduction that ‘the fundamental aim of the Soviet regime is to destroy the national 
                                                      
11 Daina Bleiere, ‘Nacionālkomunisms Latvijā: Historiogrāfija’, Latvijas Vēstures Institūta Žurnāls, 46 
(2003), 111-12. 
12 Valdis Blūzma, ‘Pirmais akmens’, Latvijas Jaunatne, 1st May 1990. 
13 The nomenklatura was an index or list of key positions in government to which only Party members 
could be appointed. The nomenklatura covered the most important positions in industry, agriculture, the 
soviets, schools and higher learning institutions. 
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identity of the Latvian people’.14 Widmer assumed that public support emboldened the national 
communists to the point that ‘Moscow could not long tolerate [the national communist] 
challenge, especially when it became apparent that events in Latvia were gaining momentum 
and developing certain features of a full-scale movement’. This obscures the subtleties of power 
politics, which triggered the purge.15 Widmer’s great mistake is attributing the Latvian purge to 
Khrushchev, but considering the lack of sources, this is understandable. With a greater range of 
sources such as archives, memoirs and interviews, historians are now able to better analyse the 
complexities of the Latvian purge to reach a different conclusion. Questioning the precise 
origins of the purge is imperative because if the purge originated in Latvia then it contradicts the 
predominant Latvian historiographical school. 
 There have been very few English language works published on Soviet Latvia thus 
far. The existing historiography covering Latvia mainly consists of general works that lump the 
republic in with the other Baltic States and tend to focus on Latvia’s incorporation into or exit 
from the USSR or isolated events from the period covered by my thesis. Even fewer modern 
publications in English examine the Latvian national communists. Articles by Geoffrey Swain 
and William Prigge’s 2015 monograph Bearslayers are the only current examples. Prigge’s 
study is unique because he conducted two interviews with the 89-year old national communist 
leader Eduards Berklavs in 2003, shortly before the latter’s death. Such a rare insight into 
Berklavs’s actions and motivations is an extraordinary resource. 
 Prigge’s work relies on Latvian archival sources but includes very little material from 
Russian archives, which is crucial to understanding central processes and reactions to events in 
Latvia. The LCP CC (Central Committee) archive in Latvia provides rather limited insight into 
centre-periphery relations between Riga and Moscow, but materials in the CPSU CC archives in 
Russia, included in my thesis, significantly improve the picture. Though many decisions were 
resolved verbally in private meetings or over the telephone, the complementary use of these 
archives offers a more reliable assessment of Khrushchev’s intentions and motivations.
 Among the post-Soviet republics, few countries provide as rich a source base as Latvia. 
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This is due to almost unrestricted access to archival documents, a range of published sources, 
numerous published interviews with leading national communists and their opponents, and 
memoirs. Studies of Latvia enhance our understanding of how the Soviet system functioned to 
an extent rarely found in the former Soviet Union. 
 
ii. In search of a definition of national communism  
The theory of ‘national communism’ is oxymoronic. By its very nature, communism is 
incompatible with national aspirations because of its basic tenets, the socialisation of the means 
of production and the Party’s dominance. The conditioning of communism and its limitation by 
national considerations is the antithesis of classical Marxism.16 National communism means an 
‘independent road to socialism’ in contrast to the orthodox Soviet-style socialism dictated by 
Moscow. By implying there were other paths to communism, it was a rejection of the Kremlin’s 
own strategic imperatives. These other socialist paths during the construction of communism 
should account for the individual characteristics and conditions of each republic in which they 
are attempted, hence the ‘national’ element.17 National communism cannot be called ‘National 
Socialism’ because that term is already taken. In this section, I will ask what was national 
communism, and how did the Latvian variant develop, and why? 
Between 1953 and 1968, indigenous politicians in a number of Eastern European 
republics became increasingly sensitive towards national concerns. Walther Kemp identifies the 
growing concern of leaders with national issues, which led to more intra-party disagreements 
about the characteristics of ethnic conflicts. This was the case in Latvia, in which the intra-party 
split was largely along national lines. Kemp describes this as ‘a short step from domesticism or 
localism (mestnichestvo) to national communism. Leaders wittingly and unwittingly created a 
political atmosphere, which heightened the sense of national consciousness among their elites 
and populations - which, because of the dynamics of nationalism, took on a political 
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component’.18 Therefore, Kemp finds national communism to be the political expression of 
identification with national concerns. 
 National communism existed in various forms in post-war Eastern Europe. It was first 
detectable in Yugoslavia under Josip Broz Tito who practiced an independent form of 
communism following his ‘Informbiuro’ split with Stalin in 1948. The other examples of 
European national communism all occurred inside the Soviet bloc. The reconciliation between 
the USSR and Yugoslavia following reciprocal visits between Khrushchev and Tito in 1955 and 
1956, and the Soviet declaration in October 1956 on ‘the Principles of Development and Further 
Strengthening of Friendship and Co-operation between the Soviet Union and other Socialist 
States’ indicated that the USSR would recognise there were alternative paths to communism. 
This encouraged the development of Hungarian and Polish national communism in 1956. Such 
declarations, however, proved hollow because national concerns and Soviet socialism were 
fundamentally incompatible: Moscow was unable to cope with the destabilising influence of 
ideological divergence, as the crushing of the Hungarian Uprising in November 1956 
demonstrated. Poland, however, was not invaded, and ‘Polish October’ survived, though it was 
gradually eroded. There were no further instances of national communism in Eastern Europe 
following the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968. The suppression of 
Aleksander Dubček’s Prague Spring finally subdued attempts to create a national variant of 
communism that could coexist with Soviet socialism. The subsequent ‘Brezhnev Doctrine’ 
explicitly limited the sovereignty of the satellite states and ensured that the Soviet’s ‘real 
existing socialism’ remained the only road to communism.19 
National communism was a term for Eastern European states (excluding Yugoslavia) 
that wrested limited independence from the Soviet Union. It is rarely applied to republics in the 
USSR. Latvia is the exception. The national communists never referred to themselves as such. 
The moniker was first applied by an émigré newspaper in August 1959 in London.20 The 
national communists received various epithets: King calls them ‘autonomists’ in light of their 
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economic policies, in German they are known as the ‘national democratic movement’, and Uldis 
Ģērmanis calls them ‘Berklaviešu’ (‘Berklavists’).21 According to Thomas Hammond, national 
communism implies that Marxism can and should be adapted to local conditions, as interpreted 
by the local leader’.22 Like other national communist leaders, Tito, Imre Nagy, Władysław 
Gomułka and Dubček, who shaped and personified their varieties of socialism, so too future 
national communist leader Eduards Berklavs was central to the formation and development of 
Latvian national communism. 
An important distinction that separates national communism from other terminology is 
that its proponents wanted to maintain the one-Party system. In Latvia’s case, this meant 
remaining within the USSR and not attempting to gain independence. Instead, they wanted to 
exert autonomous control over various aspects of life in Latvia such as migration and the 
economy; enthusiastically supporting efforts at the centre to decentralise the Soviet system. The 
Latvian national communists were committed activists who were not against Latvia’s 
membership in the Soviet Union; rather, they were instrumental in the Sovietisation process in 
Latvia in 1940-41, loyal to the USSR in wartime and in its aftermath, and that they were ‘true 
believers’ in the Soviet socialist model. As Aldis Purs puts it, however, ‘they became 
disenchanted with the Russian face of [socialist] construction’.23 Ilga Apine defines national 
communism as ‘opposition with a national hue’ and argues that it was the Latvian response to 
Moscow’s chauvinistic national policies.24 Latvia’s national communists objected to the priority 
accorded to the interests of the centre over the republics. In the late 1980s, in interviews, 
memoirs and publications the national communists defined national communism as ‘an attempt 
to improve the system, to make it more humane, more appropriate to the Latvian nation’s 
interests’.25 The national communists wanted their own socialist transformation according to 
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Latvian conditions and without the ‘assistance’ of post-war Russian functionaries dispatched to 
Sovietise Latvia, who were generally unwilling to learn Latvian and understand Latvian culture 
and customs.26 National communism was a form of resistance to official policy. It was not 
opposition to the regime as such; it was opposition to the official line on national politics, which 
they perceived as favouring Russians.27 It is in this context that the national communists sought 
to build ‘socialism with a Latvian face’ or as Alfrēds Bērziņš puts it, ‘to blend communism with 
the interests of the Latvian nation’.28  
From the Latvian perspective, because the national communists’ were committed to 
Latvia remaining part of the USSR, they were viewed as collaborators despite their attempt to 
improve the lives of ordinary Latvian citizens. In the early 1990s, Berklavs was accused of 
collaboration in several articles in the press, for example, Oļģerts Dzenītis’s article published in 
Rīcība on 26th March 1993. Even in the late 1980s, national communists Benjamiņš Treijs and 
Pavel Cherkovskii were still against Latvian independence. In the 1950s, the national 
communists would not have benefitted from Latvia becoming independent, as they were in 
control of the Latvian Party. In the 1980s, however, as disgraced old men, the independence 
movement offered them the opportunity to reinvent themselves as dissidents who battled 
Moscow in the 1950s. The populace and most Latvian historians accepted this portrait of the 
national communists in the late 1980s.29 Yet, this position has not been fully re-examined since. 
The national communists continue to be venerated. In 1995 and again in 2000, the Latvian 
government awarded Eduards Berklavs the Order of Three Stars. On 15th June 2014, on 
Berklavs’s centenary, a plaque was unveiled at his former house on Brīvības Street followed by 
a commemoration with speakers who knew him. This nostalgia, however, ignores the 
complexities and complicity of national communists in maintaining the Soviet system in the 
1950s. 
Latvian national communism was much closer to the Polish variant than Hungary’s 
non-Leninist, ‘Titoist’ style of independent communism, though the national communists drew 
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inspiration from Albania, Yugoslavia, and Hungary. According to the Hungarian leader Imre 
Nagy, ‘The inner tension in Hungary is caused by the [Soviet] leadership’s opposition to ideals 
of national independence, sovereignty, and equality, as well as Hungarian national feeling and 
progressive traditions’.30 Nagy’s call for a restoration of the socialist values of non-interference 
in internal affairs, sovereignty and equality was attractive to Latvia’s national communists. 
Yugoslav politician turned dissident Milovan Djilas correctly predicted that national 
communism would clash with Stalinism and this is precisely what occurred in Latvia in the late 
1950s. 31  This is because national communism sought to redress Stalinist hegemony, to 
undermine the Stalinist ‘old guard’ of functionaries and with national communism as the engine 
of de-Stalinisation, return to Leninism, to the true principles of the revolution as the national 
communists perceived them. As Widmer puts it, the national communists were the ‘heirs to the 
tradition established by the Latvian Bolsheviks fifty years earlier’.32 The national communists 
were communists according to their interpretation. The national communists did not refer to 
Marxism. Their relationship with Marxism was filtered through Leninism because Lenin, not 
Marx, was the primary ideologue of the CPSU. They saw themselves as Leninists, cherry-
picking the Lenin they wanted, the Lenin who espoused decentralisation and autonomy within 
the framework of Soviet socialism. Ultimately, national communism in the Soviet bloc failed in 
every instance because national concerns could not be used as the foundation to reform a rigid 
system that proved incapable of accommodating national aspirations.33 
 
iii. The Migration Debate 
It is important to consider the causes of Russian migration to Latvia. The question is whether 
migration was an official and centrally directed policy, as claimed by Berklavs and many 
Latvian historians, or if it was voluntary. The answer to this question determines whether Latvia 
underwent deliberate demographic Russification or whether it was a side effect of other 
                                                      
30 Kemp, Nationalism and Communism, 141. 
31 Milovan Djilas, New Class, (London: Thames and Hudson, 1957), 184. 
32 Widmer, ‘Nationalism and Communism’, 256. 
33 As an example of the Soviet system’s inability to withstand reform, Apine points to the classic case of 
the collapse of the USSR under Mikhail Gorbachev when another serious attempt was made to reform the 
system; Apine, ‘Vai Latvijā’, 4. 
  21 
processes. Anatol Lieven supports the notion that Russians were motivated to migrate to Latvia 
in search of a better life. He writes, ‘economic opportunity and higher living standards sucked 
in workers, especially those young and unmarried, from all over the union’.34 New arrivals were 
mostly young Russians seeking social advancement by moving to Latvia because of its higher 
living standards and attractive Western influences. The advertisement of good jobs with wages 
substantially higher than the Union average through the All-Union agency Orgnabor 
(Organised Recruitment), attracted workers from across the USSR. This, coupled with a 
reasonable supply of consumer goods, appealed to a broad spectrum of Soviet society: workers, 
managers, specialists, Party personnel and military retirees.35 The employment of the majority 
of incoming young proletarian Russian speakers is consistent with the idea that they migrated to 
Latvia for its industrial employment options and higher living standards.36  
Some historians, Thomas Remeikis for example, argue that these employment trends 
were desirable from a colonial perspective and were deliberately orchestrated, for example, 
through the better advertisement of jobs in Leningrad or Moscow than at the location where 
labour was needed.37 According to Juris Dreifelds, throughout the 1950s and 1960s Soviet 
officials continued to offer huge incentives for Russians to move, especially to farm 
communities. ‘Such inducements promised to new rural settlers included grants for each 
member of the family, cost-free moving, provisions on arrival, and a suspension on taxes and 
rents. Other incentives were choice of the best cows as well as construction and relocation 
credits of five thousand rubles’.38 Despite Dreifelds’s claims, Russian migrants predominantly 
settled in urban areas. 
Undeniably, new arrivals were privileged by the Soviet system both politically and 
materially, for example, in prioritisation for housing, which contributed to deteriorating 
relations with the indigenous population. According to Rasma Karklins, ethnic relations 
                                                      
34 Michele E. Commercio, ‘Russian Minorities in Latvia and Kyrgyzstan’, Problems of Post Communism, 
51 (2004), 28. 
35 Misiunas and Taagepera, Years of Dependence, 185; Juris Dreifelds, ‘Latvian National Demands And 
Group Consciousness Since 1959’, in George Simmonds (ed.), Nationalism in the USSR and Eastern 
Europe in the Era of Brezhnev and Kosygin, (Detroit: University of Detroit Press, 1977), 143. 
36 Ole Norgaard, The Baltic States After Independence, (Brookfield: Edward Elgar Publishing, 1996), 
174. 
37 Thomas Remeikis, ‘The Impact of Industrialisation on the Ethnic Demography of the Baltic Countries’, 
Lithuanus, 13 (1967), 34. 
38 Dreifelds, ‘Latvian National Demands’, 143. 
  22 
problems between Russians and Latvians revolved around a clash of identities, perspectives and 
interests. Latvians had a strong notion of being ‘the proprietors of their republic and of being 
entitled to a dominant socio-economic and political role within their native environment’.39 
Thus, Latvians identified emotionally only with their republic as a homeland and not the wider 
USSR. For Latvians, the Russian presence was not only ethnically and culturally alien, but 
politically oppressive as well. This contrasts sharply with Russian self-identification with the 
whole USSR as their homeland, combined with the state-sponsored predominance granted to 
the Russian people and language, as well as conscious or unconscious chauvinism, which 
produced widespread resentment among indigenous Latvians. 
Other historians believe it was official policy to move reliable and loyal ethnic groups, 
the Slavic peoples, to the periphery to guard against nationalism, especially in the ‘new’ 
republics incorporated into the Soviet Union in 1940. Karklins supports this ‘security’ notion, 
arguing that ‘Soviet authorities relied not only on the support of a rotating security elite sent to 
the non-Russian republics, but also on the loyalty of the more permanent mass of Russian 
settlers’.40 
The Latvian government-sponsored documentary source volume Policy of Occupation 
Powers in Latvia 1939-1991, published in 1999, embodies the most extreme but generally 
accepted theory in Latvia that demographic change in Latvia was predetermined by Moscow. 
The chapter entitled ‘Colonisation and Russification’ edited by Jānis Riekstiņš, the strongest 
proponent of this theory, argues that the arrival of demobilised officers and soldiers was part of 
an effort to colonise Latvia. Riekstiņš also argues that industrial growth was deliberately 
designed to facilitate an influx of workers to staff factories.41 Riekstiņš partially subscribes to 
the security theory by noting that through ‘the influx of immigrants, the Soviet leadership 
sought to attach closer the occupied Baltic States to the Soviet Union’.42 Yet, conspiracy 
theories that Moscow wanted to swamp Latvia with Slavs to deliberately facilitate the 
Russification of Latvians raise more questions than they answer. Why were there no 
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concentrated efforts to ‘colonise’ recalcitrant Lithuania or Transcaucasia and why has no 
‘smoking gun’ been discovered in either the Latvian or Russian archives? Riekstiņš attempts to 
explain the latter question by claiming that ‘during the totalitarian regime many essential 
instructions were given and decisions adopted only verbally - they were intentionally not fixed 
in documents’.43 Naturally, evidence of this practice is lacking. Policy of Occupation Powers 
attempts to provide evidence of a manufactured migration policy with a selection of documents, 
but the choice of such documents, the researchers admit, ‘most openly and clearly characterise 
the essence of the regime’, which casts doubt on the volume’s objectivity.44 The book appears to 
have an ulterior political agenda because of its government sponsorship and foreword by then-
President of Latvia Guntis Ulmanis. It represents the official stance of the Latvian government 
on the Soviet occupation. Unsurprisingly, Berklavs repeatedly alleged that there was a 
conscious plan for the Russification of Latvia through colonisation.45 In the 1972 ‘Protest 
Letter’, Berklavs and his disciples offer a similar interpretation to the authors of Policy of 
Occupation Powers. The letter implicates Moscow in stage-managing the influx of Russian 
migrants arguing that industrial enterprises were expanded against the dictates of economic 
rationality: ‘Construction workers were recruited outside the republic, raw materials were 
transported from the Urals or the Donbass... specialists and workers were likewise brought in, 
but the output was shipped out of the republic’.46 
Prigge challenges the views expressed in the ‘Protest Letter’ and Policy of Occupation 
Powers, one of the key tenets of post-Soviet historiography in Latvia. He takes issue with the 
theory that the Soviet government forced Latvian industrialisation, intentionally creating a 
labour deficit, which required imports of Slavic manpower. Instead, Prigge incisively argues 
that industrialisation in Latvia was connected to its history as an integrated region of the 
Russian Empire (Latvian industrialisation was financed by Baltic Germans in the 19th Century). 
This argument helps answer my question, was the purpose of industrialisation in Latvia to 
deliberately change the republic’s demographic makeup? When Latvia was separated from 
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union with Russia in 1918, the loss of its evacuated or destroyed industrial base led to Latvia’s 
evolution into an agrarian republic. Prigge highlights the continuities with Latvia’s industrial 
development after its incorporation into the USSR, particularly because Riga offered similar 
economic advantages to the Soviet Union as it did in the Russian Empire. The labour gap and 
consequent mass migration of Slavs to Latvia, while useful for Soviet authorities, was in fact a 
by-product of these industrialisation trends.47 Prigge’s reassessment suggests that Latvia’s ‘re-
industrialisation’ was financed by the Soviets. The Latvians self-style their history by making 
1918 (the year of Latvian independence) a ‘Year Zero’ but describe 1940, the year of Latvia’s 
annexation, as an aberration. Post-1940 economic development, however, had many similarities 
with pre-1918 Latvia. If anything, interwar Latvia’s economy was the aberration. 
I am unconvinced by the Latvian argument that there was a concerted and deliberate 50-
year campaign of demographic Russification in Latvia orchestrated by Moscow. Migration 
between republics and intermarriage between the Soviet peoples facilitated conditions for 
Sovietisation because it eroded ties between individuals and their native republics with their 
pre-Soviet traditions. It offered a more practical path to the creation of a Soviet identity than 
lofty pronouncements by Soviet leaders of the creation of a Soviet people, of a rapprochement 
between peoples, or their fusion. Undoubtedly, therefore the presence of large numbers of Slavs 
in Latvia was convenient and desirable for Kremlin leaders unable or unwilling to correct a 
deficient Stalinist nationality policy. Yet, Moscow offered incentives and encouragement for 
Russians to migrate to Latvia, but because of economic concerns rather than colonial ones. 
The migration issue holds particular contemporary relevance. Twenty-First Century 
Latvia is comparable to independent Ukraine, with a large Russian majority in its south-eastern 
districts. Latvia contains the highest percentage of Russians in any country outside Russia.48 
Discussion about this topic is highly sensitive because of the Soviet legacy of the sizeable 
Russian population in Latvia, with Russian resentment towards the titular nationality creating 
tensions surrounding issues of citizenship and Latvian language competency, and reciprocal 
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nationalist resentment from Latvians towards Russians. Finally, Latvian historiography is 
riddled with the standard narrative about the Soviet period elaborated above. Therefore, it is all 
the more imperative that there is third-party historical writing on the subject. 
 
iv. Latvian National Communism 
My thesis is structured chronologically. Chapter One examines the formation of the national 
communists in the context of the power struggle in the wake of Stalin’s death. I argue that 1953, 
rather than 1956, was the year Latvian national communism emerged. I discuss at length the 
authorship of the new nationality policy, the so-called ‘New Course’, which developed as a 
reaction to Stalinism and the failure of Sovietisation. I argue that it was not only the nationality 
policy of Minister of Internal Affairs Lavrentii Beria, but that Khrushchev was heavily involved 
in the policy’s formulation. Beria and Khrushchev attempted to exploit the untapped potential of 
the long-dormant korenizatsiia (indigenisation) policy. This chapter questions how this revived 
nationality policy affected Latvia and culminated in the June 1953 Latvian Party plenum. 
Furthermore, I show how the national communists made political capital out of the leadership 
contest between Beria and Khrushchev. At the June 1953 plenum, national communists 
emerged to castigate Russian dominance of the Party. I argue that although korenizatsiia began 
to spiral out of control in summer 1953, as in the 1930s, forcing the authorities to re-impose 
some controls, the ‘New Course’ in Latvia endured beyond 1953, despite its official suspension. 
Chapters Two and Three focus on the period between 1953 and 1959. I investigate the 
controversial legislation the national communists enacted, with an evaluation of each initiative’s 
implementation. These chapters are divided between the activities of the national communists 
during their rise between 1956 and 1957 in Chapter Two, and their undertakings once they were 
in control of their Latvian leadership between 1958 and early 1959, including resistance to 
diktats from Moscow in Chapter Three. Chapter Two analyses the composition and modus 
operandi of the national communists. I make the case in Chapter Two for the national 
communists to be considered a definite faction within the Latvian Party leadership, contrary to 
Latvian historiography. After defeating Beria, Khrushchev faced a new power struggle with the 
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other members of Stalin’s inner circle. At the 20th Party Congress in February 1956, he 
accelerated de-Stalinisation by denouncing Stalin’s cult of personality and ushering in the Thaw 
in an effort to outmanoeuvre his Stalinist opponents. I also advance the idea that the Thaw 
initiated by Khrushchev at the 20th Congress empowered and inspired the national communists. 
In Chapter Two, I argue that the national communists opportunistically took advantage of 
Khrushchev’s Thaw and used it to further their aims. I find that the Congress offered the 
national communists the necessary Leninist ideological armour to initiate their own reform 
programme. The limited liberalisation provided by Khrushchev’s Thaw allowed the national 
communists to conduct their own concurrent ‘Latvian Thaw’, encouraging a resurgence of 
Latvian cultural identity including the release of previously banned works from the interwar 
period and public support for environmental concerns. In Chapter Two, I examine and evaluate 
national communist polices before their political dominance of the Latvian Party. These 
included cultural policy, media campaigns, the language law, which required knowledge of 
Latvian for Party, government functionaries and service sector personnel, and the imposition of 
regulations restricting immigration to protect Riga from further influxes of Russians. 
Chapter Three (1958-1959) details the continued political rise of the national 
communists and their takeover of the Party following the January 1958 ouster of the Russian 
Second Secretary installed by Moscow. In this chapter, I argue that Khrushchev’s 1957 
sovnarkhoz (Regional Economic Council) reforms encouraged the national communists to 
develop their own economic policy. Their central aims were the rebalancing of the economy 
towards the domestic market and consumer goods production, while limiting the growth of 
industries requiring large inputs of external labour. I argue that national communist economic 
plans were elaborated in a controversial research plan created by national communist Pauls 
Dzērve, the existence of which has been repeatedly denied. I evaluate the impact of national 
communist economic policy against claims by their opponents that they intended to isolate 
Latvia. In Chapter Three, I examine how the national communists, at their zenith, emboldened 
by the Thaw and control of the Party, championed resistance to Khrushchev’s education reform, 
how a Latvian public campaign over environmental concerns defeated All-Union interests, and 
why national communist cadres policy encouraged the Party’s ‘Latvianisation’.  
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Subsequent chapters primarily engage in discussions about the battle between the 
national communists and the Stalinists grouped around Arvīds Pelše within the leadership, and 
the unique challenge to centre-periphery relations presented by the national communists. 
Chapters Four and Five examine the origins and process of the purge of the national 
communists from March to July 1959. From 1957, national communist policies disturbed 
Russian economic and political vested interests and galvanised an alliance of opposition. This 
opposition comprised the Soviet military based in Latvia (angered by residency restrictions and 
loss of housing privileges); disaffected Stalinists, Russians and Russian-Latvians in the 
leadership grouped around Stalinist Arvīds Pelše (because of de-Stalinisation and the national 
communists’ political takeover and reforms); the bureaucracy (due to the Latvian language law 
and Latvianising cadres policy) and conservative leaders in Moscow (concerned about the 
national communists’ nationalist programme). Yet, the national communists were 
enthusiastically de-Stalinising and therefore they enjoyed Khrushchev’s favour. The ‘loyalist’ 
alliance reacted by developing a strategy to draw Moscow’s attention to ‘nationalist abuses’ in 
Latvia through a letter-writing campaign and several high profile confrontations over 
Latvianisation and the dismissal of Russian personnel. Chapter Four examines how the national 
communists were undermined by the results of a commission sent in May 1959 to investigate 
charges of nationalism following the letter-writing campaign. From the perspective of 
conservative leaders Aleksandr Shelepin, Vladimir Semichastnyi and Mikhail Suslov in 
Moscow, Latvian national communism was an experiment in decentralisation and korenizatsiia 
that should never have happened. To them national communism represented a resurgence of 
nationalism in the republics, created enormous enmity, resistance and instability inside Latvia 
and in Moscow, and needed to be crushed. Historians often view Kremlin politics in monolithic 
terms. In Chapter Four, I show that this is inadequate, and instead present a complex web of 
shifting alliances that influenced Moscow’s policy. 
In Chapter Five, I forensically examine the circumstances that preceded the purge of the 
national communists in summer 1959 and seek to disprove the theory that Khrushchev ordered 
the purge of the national communists. Khrushchev vacillated over how to deal with the national 
communist affair but ultimately could not save Berklavs. Instead, the opposition alliance in 
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Latvia carried out the purge after the national communist faction disintegrated under pressure 
from Moscow. This culminated in the July 1959 plenum, in which Pelše purged Berklavs and 
brought the ‘Latvian Thaw’ to an end. Nonetheless, the national communists created a faction of 
sufficient strength and scope to pose one of the most far-reaching challenges to Stalinism of any 
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Chapter One: The ‘New Course’ and the 
June 1953 Latvian Party Plenum 
 
Joseph Stalin’s death on 5th March 1953 was the catalyst for a renegotiation of the relationship 
between the non-Russian Soviet Republics and central authorities in Moscow. Ambitious 
protégés of the late dictator scrambled for support in the periphery in the ensuing power 
struggle. Contenders to succeed Stalin needed to strengthen their support bases in the Union 
Republics if they hoped to make a successful bid for the leadership. The leadership contest was 
a protracted one involving the formation and breaking of alliances among the competitors. The 
initial leadership struggle was between Minister of the Interior Lavrentii Beria and the new First 
Secretary Nikita Khrushchev. Surrounded by the hostility and suspicion of his colleagues who 
controlled the Party and State apparatus, Beria logically decided if he were to succeed Stalin 
then it was necessary to replace that apparatus wholesale.49 Beria’s strategy was to break with 
Stalinism and offer the republics’ communist parties a measure of control over their own affairs. 
In Latvia, this increase in decision-making caused the most radical reaction of any republic, 
particularly with regard to nationality relations. The LCP debated its new powers at the June 
1953 Latvian Party Plenum, which became the first milestone on the road towards Latvian 
national communism.50 
 For the first time since its incorporation into the USSR, national elites were able to 
represent Latvian interests. Gerhard Simon suggests it was this generation of non-Russian elites 
who first contributed to the Soviet system’s destabilisation, in part owing to protectionist 
policies in their republics.51 Historians consider Beria’s nationality policy a leading factor, but 
due to insufficient case studies on individual republics, we barely understand how the power 
struggle played out in the periphery. Gerhard Simon and Jeremy Smith have considered the 
general effects of Beria’s changes in central nationality policy on the republics, but only in brief 
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articles. Russian language specialists on the Baltic Republics Elena Zubkova and Tynu 
Tannberg make detailed contributions, though they assess the Baltic Republics collectively. 
Consequently, analysis on Latvia receives but a few pages in their respective books. Moreover, 
Zubkova and Tannberg utilise Moscow archives exclusively, omitting crucial Latvian responses 
to central directives. Latvian historiography on the subject remains limited, but all publications 
maintain the same argument: Latvia’s leaders sought to redress the ethnic power balance in 
Latvia permitted by Beria’s so-called ‘New Course’ only to have these attempts thwarted a few 
weeks later once the immediate power struggle in the Kremlin ended. Most of the 
historiography excludes any mention of Khrushchev’s role. This chapter offers a ‘third way’, 
demonstrating that the policy was co-authored by Khrushchev but officially associated with 
Beria and therefore it was temporarily discredited after Beria’s fall. This chapter aims to answer 
the question what Latvia’s role in the power struggle between Nikita Khrushchev and Lavrenti 
Beria’s power in 1953? In Latvia, contrary to Latvian historians’ assertions, the ‘New Course’ 
was merely slowed down and the basic provisions remained in force. Other historians identify 
the beginnings of national communism in Latvia in 1956 or 1958, but I contend that events in 
summer 1953 drew together those like-minded individuals who created Latvian national 
communism. 
 At the 12th CPSU Congress in 1923, Stalin identified Great Russian Chauvinism as the 
most serious threat to the success of the Party’s nationality policy. From this point, the 
korenizatsiia policy was introduced. Primarily, it consisted of promoting representatives 
from Soviet Republics’ titular nationalities into local government, management and 
the nomenklatura of corresponding national entities. By the mid-1930s the policy had made 
considerable strides towards indigenising the apparatus of the Soviet Republics to the extent it 
was felt the policy might have exceeded its bounds and begun to oppress Russians within the 
republics. The policy was quietly curbed and purges of the republics’ leaderships ensued. In 
1953, despite nine years inside the USSR, the Baltic Republics remained restive. Stalin’s 
neglect of local cadres in favour of Russians in these republics compounded the problem and 
represented a political conundrum that any would-be successor needed to address. Despite the 
reversal of korenizatsiia 20 years previously, the weight of the republics’ representation in Party 
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and state institutional structures ensured support from the republics was too important for any 
contesting candidate to ignore. Simon contends that no one could succeed Stalin without the 
wide support, or at least benevolent neutrality, of the periphery. Furthermore, political 
contenders would have to make concessions to secure that support. Therefore, non-Russian 
elites, who wanted a greater role in government and society, made themselves assets in the 
succession battle.52 
 Beria had long held a pro-nationalities position. He most fully elaborated this at the 19th 
Party Congress on 5th-14th October 1952. Beria specifically designed his speech to portray 
himself to minority cadres as their friend. According to Charles Fairbanks, Beria alone referred 
to the Union Republics as ‘independent’, and as ‘nations’ on eleven occasions. Beria 
condemned ‘Great power chauvinism’ and ‘national oppression’, and lambasted the Tsars for 
‘conducting all work in institutions in Russian’.53 He emphasised the need for native languages 
teaching and a ‘highly developed system of higher education to ensure the training of national 
cadres of specialists for all spheres of the economy and culture’.54 
After Stalin’s death, Beria’s efforts to reinforce the authority of the titular nationalities 
at the local level dovetailed with moves to strengthen his own position at the centre.55 Beria and 
the other candidates made only tentative moves in spring 1953, attempting to gauge the political 
environment and opponents’ potential weaknesses. In Latvia, much remained the same. As 
future national communist Vilis Krūmiņš wrote in his memoirs, ‘there was no doubt that 
changes should occur after the death of the “Great Leader”’. ‘But’, he noted, ‘change did not 
begin immediately’.56 An LCP bureau resolution on 14th April demonstrates continuity with 
Stalin’s nationality policy. The resolution criticised the implementation of an October 1951 
Education Ministry decision on language learning in the republics’ schools: ‘The educational 
organs and individual Party committees still do not value Russian - the exceptional meaning of 
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the language of Lenin and Stalin for the overall development of Latvia’s culture’.57 The 
resolution mentioned that there were 1,553 Russian-language teachers and 1,311 Latvian-
language teachers in schools, yet the complaint was about an insufficient focus on Russian 
despite the fact that there were more Russian instructors than Latvian. Therefore, the bureau 
resolved to organise training for 75 further Russian-language teachers. The resolution’s 
language was characteristic of the late Stalin era, emphasising the primacy of Russian. 
Moreover, there was no attempt to challenge the decision. Instead, the bureau resolved ‘to pay 
particular attention to teaching the Great Russian language as it is significant for raising the 
level of Latvian national culture’.58 The first perceptible challenges to the Stalinist status quo on 
the Union level appeared in the press from April. A contributor to Literaturnaia gazeta 
(Literary Newspaper) noted that ‘being diverted to Russian nationalism’ was as despicable as 
diverting to ‘local nationalism’.59 
 
1.1 The Memorandums and the Authorship Debate 
In most of the historiography, particularly Latvian, Beria is assumed the sole author of the new 
nationality policy that would become known as the ‘New Course’. Yet, Beria was not the only 
leader hoping to cultivate non-Russian support. Khrushchev’s political machinations were 
crucial to the outcome of the contest for peripheral support. Aware of Beria’s initiatives, 
Khrushchev sought to deflect them and make his own mark on the formulation of nationality 
policy. Khrushchev outlined his policy in three separate Presidium resolutions. The ‘New 
Course’ was, in some ways, similar to the process of initiating korenizatsiia in the 1920s, the 
rivalry between Beria and Khrushchev in 1953 comparable to that of Leon Trotsky and Stalin in 
the 1920s. On Beria’s orders, the Interior Ministry (MVD) gathered materials and information 
on the situation in the most troublesome republics and prepared reports on each. He first 
circulated a memorandum about the situation in Lithuania on 8th May before presenting the first 
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of these resolutions as a note about Western Ukraine to the Presidium on 16th May.60 The 
memoranda revealed unjustified deportations and repressions against ethnic groups who were 
not involved in anti-Soviet activity. Western Ukraine and Lithuania were dealt with first 
precisely because resistance movements in those regions were strongest. Latvia followed 
because the situation there was not nearly as pressing. According to Pavel Sudoplatov, a close 
associate of Beria’s within the security services, ‘Beria suggested the republics establish their 
own systems of medals and awards to build local pride. He stressed the need to encourage the 
spread of native cultural traditions and languages’. Sudoplatov describes how this led to some 
awkward moments. ‘The newly appointed Minister of the Interior of Lithuania, in all innocence, 
forwarded to Beria a memorandum in Lithuanian, creating uproar in the secretariat since 
nobody could read it’.61  
At this point, in May, Khrushchev became involved in the process by requesting that the 
CC collect information about the situation in the Baltic Republics. From this point, policy on 
the Baltic Republics was constructed along two lines: one emanating from the CC as directed by 
Khrushchev, and the other from the MVD according to Beria’s designs. Beria’s own report on 
Lithuania was not formalised as a CC resolution like the one on Western Ukraine. The 
document was revised over May, and on 25th May, Khrushchev received a copy. Apparently, 
Khrushchev was dissatisfied and the next day presented an adapted version as a resolution to the 
Presidium. Zubkova, however, admits that because power sharing within the collective 
leadership was unclear it is difficult to say whether Beria directed Khrushchev to work on the 
document or whether he acted on his own enthusiasm.62  
1.1.1 Khrushchev’s role 
On 8th June, Khrushchev complemented the resolution on Lithuania by circulating a draft 
memorandum to the Presidium on the situation in Latvia. It combined information provided by 
both the MVD and CC. According to Zubkova and Tannberg (historians who emphasise 
Khrushchev’s involvement), Party Organs Department Chairman, Yevgenii Gromov, compiled 
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the report under Khrushchev’s supervision.63 On the one hand, Beria’s analysis of the situation 
in Lithuania informed Gromov’s report. On the other, however, Gromov incorporated aspects of 
Khrushchev’s document on Lithuania from 26th May. Thus, Beria and Khrushchev, together, 
formulated the central tenets of the ‘New Course’ in their respective documents about 
Lithuania, and further developed it in their memorandums about Latvia and Estonia. Tannberg 
alleges that after the note on Lithuania, Beria was no longer involved in drafting the documents 
about the Baltic Republics, and that Khrushchev was solely responsible for drafting the report 
about Latvia.64 Yet, this does not explain why the MVD collected its own data on Latvia. Nor 
does it account for it being Beria who delivered the final, collaborative version of the report to 
the Presidium on 12th June. Instead, Beria worked on his own appraisal of the situation in Latvia 
and the result was a collaborative effort.65 
 In his 8th June report, Khrushchev noted that between 1950 and 1953, censors in Latvia 
confiscated more than 155,000 letters expressing negative opinions about the Soviet regime. 
Latvians complained about ‘arbitrariness’ and ‘misuses of power’, particularly religious 
repression and the pervasive use of the Russian language in all spheres of life.66 In the 
document, Khrushchev provides examples of these abuses; interestingly among the deficient 
local leaders listed, there was not a single person with a Latvian surname.67 Khrushchev’s report 
underscored an unsettling legacy of Russian control over state institutions in Latvia. Only 8 out 
of 66 large industrial factory directors were Latvian and just 6 of 47 Machine Tractor Stations 
(MTS) directors were natives. In State Bank departments, only 20% were Latvian managers, 
and Latvians represented only 37% of district and city prosecutors.68 Khrushchev explicitly 
criticised the overuse of Russian in Latvia in his report, noting that even in schools with Latvian 
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student majorities, Russian was often the language of instruction.69 He found similar conditions 
in office work in general, including all official Party and state meetings and correspondence. 
Khrushchev concluded that this was due to the ‘misuse of Soviet national policy’ but admitted 
no central responsibility, instead accusing the Latvian Party leadership of ‘serious mistakes’.70  
 Though Beria initiated the ‘New Course’, Khrushchev made a substantial contribution 
towards the finished product. Beria provided a face for the programme while Khrushchev 
operated behind the scenes. Unlike his memorandum on Lithuania, which commented on 
religion, national personnel and language policy, Beria made no mention of economic problems 
(an area where Khrushchev considered himself particularly proficient). Khrushchev wrote about 
the dismal failure of collectivisation, which devastated Latvian agriculture. In 1952, of 1,437 
kolkhozy (collective farms), 398 did not pay workers with money, and in 238 workers received 
only 500 grams of grain per workday.71 Consequently, large numbers of Latvians fled the 
kolkhozy (18,000 people fled in 1952), reminiscent of the mass flight from Soviet kolkhozy in 
1928.72 As collectivisation in Latvia withered, agricultural output fell to just 77% of its 1940 
level, compared to 85% for Lithuania and 88% for Estonia, while private plots accounted for 
74.8% of production (excluding grain) despite 90% of farms being collectivised.73 For the 
Presidium, these figures reinforced the failure of Sovietisation in another sphere of Latvian life. 
 In his report, Khrushchev did not miss the opportunity to indirectly criticise Beria as 
security services chief. Khrushchev began by discussing post-war guerrilla tactics in the Baltic 
Republics. He exposed the disquieting reality that large-scale repression of the armed resistance 
movement failed to achieve Sovietisation. During the decade 1945-1955, up to 12,000 ‘Forest 
Brothers’, organised into some 700 bands, carried out 3,000 raids on uniformed military 
personnel, Party cadres (especially in rural areas), buildings, and ammunition depots. According 
to official statistics, 1,562 Soviet personnel were killed and 560 wounded in the conflict.74 Beria 
saw the armed resistance as the cause of instability within the Baltic republics, which had 
                                                      
69 Beria’s reports list comparable categories and similar figures for the respective republics. 
70 RGANI f.5, op.30, d.6, l.25. 
71 RGANI f.5, op.30, d.6, l.25. 
72 RGANI f.5, op.30, d.6, l.25. 
73 Misiunas and Taagepera, Years of Dependence, 362, 369; Geoffrey Swain, ‘Deciding to Collectivise 
Latvian Agriculture’, Europe-Asia Studies, 55 (2003), 39. 
74 Plakans, The Latvians, 155. 
  36 
inhibited the Sovietisation of the region. Instead, Khrushchev viewed the insurrection as a 
symptom of the poorly implemented Sovietisation process. He went on to explain that there was 
support for the resistance movement ‘from some part of the population’. Khrushchev 
characterised these disappointing results, as he had in his 26th May document on Lithuania, as 
the MVD’s failure. Their mistakes and misinterpretations included ‘full use of punishment 
measures and repressions, often involving innocents’.75 Similarly, in placing the blame on MVD 
personnel and tactics, Khrushchev implicitly criticised Stalinist practices. The task of combating 
resistance was assigned only to the security organs, which relied on repression and violence to 
achieve results; little attention or time was devoted to uncovering the initial causes of 
discontent. Khrushchev concluded that this was because the security services were formed of 
Russians, rather than local cadres. In February 1953, only 17.5% of Ministry of State Security 
(MGB) employees and 6% of its leadership were Latvians. Not a single employee in eight 
districts knew Latvian.76 Khrushchev proposed a new strategy, rejecting punitive Stalinist 
methods and emphasising inclusive indigenous recruitment. Beria incorporated this concept 
within his own plan for Latvia. He was anxious to end the embarrassing partisan struggles that 
had blighted Soviet control over the Baltic Republics. Beria ordered the co-opting of locals into 
the security services, with the aim of increasing their efficiency. This represented a new strategy 
in the fight against the nationalist partisans, and became a pillar of Beria’s new nationality 
policy. 
 On 12th June, Beria presented a final version of the report on Latvia to the Presidium, 
where it was adopted as a resolution. Beria launched his gambit, arguing that Russification in 
the Baltic Republics, but Latvia in particular, had reached damaging proportions. The 12th June 
resolution began by noting ‘that the deficiencies uncovered in the 26th May decree in regards to 
Lithuania apply equally well to Latvia’.77 The resolution made clear that Sovietisation failed 
because Latvia had not embraced its status in the Soviet Union. Rather than accepting the 
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‘privilege’ of this status, nine years later thousands of Latvians were still violently resisting it. 
Continued armed conflict was merely a symptom of the fiasco of the Sovietisation project.78 In 
admitting that the Latvian Party and State apparatus remained dominated by Russians, Beria and 
Khrushchev found that Latvia had Soviet structures and mechanisms, but behind that 
‘Potemkin’ edifice, the Latvian people remained un-sovietised, and therefore, the republic never 
properly integrated into the USSR. The majority of the population considered the Soviet regime 
as ‘alien’ and temporary.79 The purpose of the ‘New Course’ was to correct this situation, and 
the resolution provided instructions and concrete initiatives on how to do so: 
The CPSU CC decides: 
The LCP should quickly put an end to distortions of Soviet nationality policy 
[and] eliminate the hostile nationalist underground. 
1. To consider the main task of the Latvian Party organisation… the 
preparation, cultivation and widespread advancement of Latvian cadres to 
leading Party, Soviet and economic work. To end the practice of selecting non-
Latvian cadres as second secretaries of raikomy [District Committees], Vice-
Chairman of People’s Deputies, Directors of sovkhozy [state farms], MTS and 
industrial enterprises, and as a rule, assign [the position] to Latvian cadres. In 
connection with this, release [from their jobs] nomenklatura who do not know 
the Latvian language, and put them at the CPSU CC’s disposal. 
2. To stop record keeping in all Party, government and public organisations of 
Latvia, not in Latvian. Conduct Council of Ministers meetings and plenums of 
the LCP CC in Latvian. 
3. The LCP CC is to strengthen political and explanatory work among the 
population… carrying it out in their native language.80 
Though the wording was vague, Fairbanks describes the implications of this document as 
revolutionary. If strictly applied, this decree would result in thousands of Russians losing their 
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positions in Latvia. In cases where Russians remained, the rule about knowledge of Latvian 
assured that they were Russians who had long resided in Latvia and perhaps joined the local 
Party organisation, rather than those sent from the centre on a ‘tour of duty’. Thus, a powerful 
tool used by the central government in curbing local autonomy was wrenched away.81 This 
resolution represented the final stage in the development of the ‘New Course’ and combined 
Khrushchev and Beria’s approaches to national policy. Khrushchev and Beria had to be capable 
of cooperation in this period of fluid alliances. In the context of the memoranda on nationality 
policy, this was a process of review and adjustment to achieve a compromise for the final 
Presidium resolution.82  
The 12th June Presidium resolution, as a final product, contained some significant 
differences from Beria’s original memorandum. In content and style, it was more reminiscent of 
an official document, with a summary of the situation and the appropriate measures needed to 
rectify complications in Latvia. According to Zubkova, Khrushchev revised Beria’s content to 
‘fit into the broader political context and receive the necessary ideological shell’.83 In other 
words, Khrushchev provided a theoretical, Marxist-Leninist structure for the information Beria 
collected, presenting the ‘New Course’ as a project that was ideologically sound. Therefore, 
Beria only appeared to have directly created the conditions for what transpired in Latvia in 
summer 1953. In preparing a report, Khrushchev was responding to Beria by constructing his 
own nationality policy. Alternatively, it is possible that Khrushchev was ‘piggybacking’ on 
Beria’s initiative, providing a way to convince the Presidium of the need for fundamental 
changes in nationality policy. Khrushchev’s biographer William Taubman asserts that 
‘Khrushchev not only supported Beria’s nationality reforms at the time but borrowed wholesale 
from them’.84 Nevertheless, we must avoid misconstruing Khrushchev’s policy formulation as 
an outright attempt to undermine Beria. The resolution approved by the Presidium was far more 
a joint venture between Beria and Khrushchev than anything else.85 
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 In a single stroke, Beria and Khrushchev condemned Stalin’s nationality policy, whilst 
advocating a return to the 1920s policy of indigenisation. This undertaking marked the first 
concerted anti-Stalinist policy since Stalin’s death. It widened the powers of local authorities 
and the borders of acceptable cultural autonomy. The unveiling of the ‘New Course’ caused a 
furore in Latvia. This was nothing short of a volte-face by a government that had deliberately 
dispatched large numbers of Russians to run the Party and state administration (due to a 
shortage of suitable Latvian cadres) and was now recalling them specifically so indigenous 
cadres could take their place. This became a catalyst for social complications between Latvians 
and migrant Slavs. In his memoirs, Berklavs recalled the initial reaction within the LCP: ‘it was 
so unusual and unexpected. It caused a shock in both Moscow and the national republics. 
However, the decision was made, and nobody argued with the Party’.86 
1.1.2 Beria’s aims 
For his part, Beria intended the ‘New Course’ to encourage a moderate renationalisation of the 
Party, reducing the most glaring indications of external control. The ‘New Course’ permitted 
the republics’ parties to take account of local characteristics in carrying out their policies, in 
order to further Sovietisation. As Tannberg puts it, the policy encouraged the Baltic Republics 
to accelerate adaption to, and reconciliation with, the regime ‘with their own hands’.87 For 
Beria, this principle offered a way of recruiting a following within the Party elite. This was a 
general, impersonal principle that would generate appointees who knew they were indebted to 
him for their posts without his having personally chosen them.88 Yet, there was no intention to 
reinforce indigenous traditions and attitudes in their own right.89 It was, however, the objective 
of zealous (future national communist) Latvian officials, keen to improve the position of 
Latvians, to do just that. 
 After 12th June, the ‘New Course’ offered Beria, as the public face of the policy, the 
potential to make enormous political capital. Privately, Khrushchev had good reason to resent 
Beria’s public imposition of the ‘New Course’, particularly as he must have realised it 
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threatened his control of Ukraine, where it struck directly at his powerbase. Amy Knight 
maintains that despite this, ‘he was compelled to go along with it for the time being’.90 Though 
careful to ‘forget’ his role in the formulation of the ‘New Course’ in his memoirs, Khrushchev 
accepted it had Presidium support: ‘it so happened that Beria’s position on this question was 
correct. Russian dominance in the leadership of non-Russian republics had to end and it 
coincided with the position of the CC… Everyone knew this was true’ - including Khrushchev 
himself.91 Khrushchev even admitted limited participation: ‘We made the decision that a local 
person should be First Secretary in each Union Republic instead of some Russian sent from 
Moscow’.92 Beria correctly assumed the Presidium would not contradict him. Convinced about 
the dire situation with security and titular representation in the Baltic Republics, the Soviet 
leadership displayed a readiness to take steps to redress the ethnic imbalance in the republics’ 
leaderships. This is evident from the lack of resistance from Beria’s Presidium colleagues and, 
likewise, that the Presidium swiftly formalised his initiatives as CC resolutions, bypassing the 
usual central debate.93 
 
1.2 The ‘New Course’ and the Latvian Interior Ministry 
In May 1953, the ‘New Course’ was very much in the developmental stage. Without a 
resolution from the Presidium, Beria could not enact substantial reform within the republics. He 
could, however, reorganise his personal preserve, the MVD, to implement the principles of the 
‘New Course’ without Presidium approval. In late May, Beria personally implemented rapid 
and far-reaching changes to the Latvian Security Services in advance of the Presidium 
resolution. 
 As an area of widespread opposition to Sovietisation, Latvia contained heavy 
concentrations of Soviet security forces and personnel. Under Stalin, this caused the number of 
non-indigenous People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD) officers to swell to the 
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extent that the personnel department hired an interpreter because it only employed two 
Latvians.94 Beria saw the importance of rebalancing the composition of the security services as 
part of his campaign for support in the periphery and to end the struggle between the 
predominantly Russian Soviet security forces and nationalist partisans. Therefore, on 11th June 
1953, Beria issued order No.00355, noting that ‘crude mistakes occurred in cadres preparation 
for the Latvian MVD with respect to Leninist-Stalinist policy’.95 Beria blamed these mistakes 
on the shortage of Latvian cadres in his ranks: ‘[We failed] to create operatives of Latvian 
nationality. The existing police school in Riga is made up, mostly, of citizens from the USSR’s 
central regions, instruction takes place in Russian, and there are no learning materials in 
Latvian. Consequently, there are very few Latvians working in the Latvian MVD’.96 Beria was 
ordering the ‘Latvianisation’ of the security services. In summer 1953, only 5% of leading 
cadres were Latvians; just 4 of 56 regional unit chiefs were Latvians; 31% of militia (police) 
were Latvians but they only occupied 17% of leading positions.97 Overall, indigenous Latvian 
representation comprised just 15% in 1953.98 Incredibly, this percentage represented a slight 
decline from 16.5% in 1945.99 On 19th June, Latvian Interior Minister Ivan Zujāns reported to 
Latvian First Secretary Jānis Kalnbērziņš about the inclusion of Latvians in the MVD: ‘In order 
to guarantee that the Latvian MVD have operational and supervisory functionaries from the 
titular nation, two schools have been created in Riga… Training in the schools will take place in 
the Latvian language... with an annual intake of 550 and all places reserved for Latvians’. 
Zujāns noted ‘considerable difficulties with organising teaching in Latvian’, and requested help 
in supplying Latvian lecturers for the new school.100 
 Beria’s personal intervention had a profound and immediate effect on the security 
services. He personally ordered 11 Russians back to Moscow, and according to MVD Cadres 
Department Deputy Head Burbo, Beria directly ordered a thorough replacement of personnel 
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and issued a stern warning: ‘If even one Russian surname remains on the lists, you will be 
arrested and prosecuted for distortion of Party policy’. 101  The ethnic Russian, Ivan 
Mitrofanovich Ivanov, himself later removed as Deputy Minister for Internal Affairs by Beria 
and sent to Moscow oblast (Regional) Police Department, specified his orders as to ‘replace all 
governing bodies of the Interior Ministry, including the police, with employees of Latvian 
nationality, and transfer all Russian leaders to lower positions’.102 
 The Latvian MVD swiftly implemented the fledgling ‘New Course’. One letter reported 
that at ‘the direction of Comrade Beria, the Latvian MVD is now solidly replacing... not only 
leading, but rank and file employees who are not Latvians’.103 The results were remarkable; 
within days of the June LCP plenum Latvians replaced nearly all senior officials. Of the 17 
department heads, 16 were replaced, and 51 of 56 city and district chiefs were deposed. In all 
232 officers lost their positions.104 Attitudes inside the MVD changed as suddenly as its officers. 
In one example, Department Head Korshunov gave instructions to one of his employees, in 
Latvian. When the employee replied that he could not understand, Korshunov rebuked him: 
‘You have been living in Latvia for 12 years, eat Latvian bread, and you do not know how to 
speak in Latvian!’105  Inflammatory statements were recorded by former Interior Minister 
Nikolai Kovalchuk, who perhaps recalling his native Poland, stated at a meeting of MVD 
operatives that ‘the imperial government pursued a national policy on the periphery of Russia, 
that was ostensibly more flexible than our Party’, and along with Police Chief Krastiņš, referred 
to Russians as ‘occupiers of Latvia’.106  
Later, at the July LCP plenum, future national communist Indriķis Pinksis revealed an 
extraordinary practice established during the ‘New Course’ under Beria. When appointing 
personnel within the apparatus, the decision was not the Party organs but the MVD’s. Pinksis 
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said that ‘to Party committee requests for employees, the MVD would decide: “unusable” or 
“undesirable”’.107 Having the final say in any recruitment or removal of Party and government 
personnel reflected the extraordinary role of the security organs’ in society. By usurping Party 
control over the final decision for apparatchiks, the MVD could shape the Party, and this gave 
Beria ‘Stalinesque’ powers to promote his supporters within the republics. It appears Beria left 
nothing to chance in Latvia; according to Krūmiņš, Beria personally secretly visited the MVD 
headquarters in Riga in June 1953 without the knowledge of the Latvian leadership.108 
Presumably, Beria wanted to directly oversee the implementation of his resolution and the 
MVD’s restructuring. 
 
1.3 The ‘New Course’ reaches Latvia 
At the beginning of the summer, it seemed that the Party would initiate a full-scale return to 
korenizatsiia. Kommunist, the CC’s theoretical organ, celebrated the ‘flourishing’ and continued 
development of ‘the national character of all the USSR’s socialist nations’. There was no 
mention of a ‘merger’ or even of ‘drawing together’ of nations. Instead, the media dutifully 
adopted the new line and encouraged the ‘diligent advancement and promotion of local cadres, 
who know their peoples’ languages, lifestyles, and traditions’.109 June 1953 represented the first 
hints of de-Stalinisation as a pillar of Stalinist doctrine was dismantled. 
Several Latvian leaders (First Secretary Kalnbērziņš, Council of Ministers Chairman 
Vilis Lācis and Presidium of the Supreme Soviet Chairman Kārlis Ozoliņš) were present at the 
12th June Presidium meeting for the decision on Latvia.110 The 12th June resolution ended with 
an encouragement for the Latvian Party to develop the ‘New Course’ and to supervise its 
implementation themselves: ‘The Latvian CC [should] discuss the resolution at a CC plenum; 
within a month develop and submit for approval by the CPSU CC concrete measures to remedy 
the situation’.111 If the Latvians were unsure how to implement the ‘New Course’, they did not 
have to wait long for specific instructions. When the Latvian leaders returned from Moscow, an 
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aircraft carrying a note from Beria was waiting.112 In this note, Beria went further than the 
resolution, expressly criticising the ‘chauvinistic’ character of nationality policy in Latvia. He 
went so far as to refer to the deportations from Latvia in 1941 and 1949 as ‘terrible ills’ and 
even referred to the number of deportees (which he would have known because he personally 
organised the June 1941 deportations as Minister of Internal Affairs), evidently attempting to 
demonstrate his sympathy towards the Latvians. Beria ordered that all First and Second 
Secretaries (including at the city and district levels) and directors of all industrial enterprises 
and associations be persons of Latvian nationality. Furthermore, Beria required that officials 
immediately translate all paperwork into Latvian. 113  Beria similarly stated that it was 
unacceptable that instructors at Latvia State University (LSU) taught 85 courses only in 
Russian.114 Finally, he instructed that all senior officials who did not speak Latvian, be sent to 
Moscow within two to four weeks. The note instructed the LCP to immediately hold a plenum 
to discuss these issues.115 To ensure his orders permeated the bureaucracy, Beria sent his note to 
all branches of the Latvian MVD, gorkom (City Committee) and raikom first secretaries.116 In 
his memoirs, Krūmiņš aptly highlighted the extraordinary nature of Beria’s note and its rebuttal 
of Stalinism: ‘In my opinion, no one, even the most extreme radical today [Krūmiņš was writing 
in 1990 during Latvia’s ‘Third National Awakening’], conceived of the extremes Beria’s note 
contained’.117 
1.3.1 Changing the rules: The second secretary 
Before his note arrived in Riga, Beria was already engineering its application. The Kremlin 
summoned Valentin Yershov, the ethnic Russian LCP Second Secretary, to Moscow a few days 
before Beria’s note arrived in mid-June. Moscow appointed Vilis Krūmiņš as his 
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replacement. 118  This political manoeuvre deliberately flouted the practice of maintaining 
Russian second secretaries in the republics to act as a ‘watchdog’ or as Ilga Apine puts it, 
‘Moscow’s ever-vigilant eye’.119 The Second Secretary monitored the activities of the First 
Secretary and was in charge of cadre affairs. These changes were not only applicable to Latvia. 
As the ‘New Course’ gained momentum, in many republics, indigenous officials supplanted 
Russians in the Party and state apparatuses. That summer all three Baltic republics replaced 
their Russian second secretaries with native Balts.120 
 There is some confusion among historians regarding Krūmiņš’s promotion to Second 
Secretary. At the June plenum, Yershov was not present because Krūmiņš attests he left for 
Moscow before the plenum began. On the first day of the plenum, Krūmiņš was introduced as a 
CC Secretary, but, at the end of the second day, 23rd June, Kalnbērziņš announced that Yershov 
needed to be replaced. He proposed a vote for the position of Second Secretary, suggesting 
Krūmiņš’s candidacy to the plenum, who obediently and unanimously elected him. 121 
Kalnbērziņš’s words support Krūmiņš’s assertion that Beria summoned Yershov so that 
Krūmiņš could replace him from early June. As usual, the plenum merely formalised Krūmiņš’s 
appointment. Prigge offers a dissenting voice, arguing that Krūmiņš did not become Second 
Secretary in 1953. Prigge cites his 2003 interviews with Berklavs in which Berklavs insisted 
that Krūmiņš was only Second Secretary once, in 1958. Prigge accepts that Krūmiņš held the 
role in 1954 (which contradicts Berklavs’s assertion), citing a plenum in which Krūmiņš was 
elected to the post. However, this was part of the routine of annually rubber-stamping the re-
election of the leadership. Kalnbērziņš was re-elected in the same manner just before Krūmiņš 
and Pelše followed him. 122  Regardless, Prigge downplays the importance of Krūmiņš’s 
elevation to Second Secretary. He believes that Krūmiņš held the role in a caretaker capacity: 
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‘Krūmiņš was Second Secretary in name only and all understood he would not have the power 
of a Second Secretary and that as soon as a suitable Russian replacement was found, Krūmiņš 
would step down from the post… his nomination was nothing more than a formality’.123 Though 
providing useful insight into the period from a central figure, the interviews between Prigge and 
Berklavs were conducted when the latter was 89 years old, just 13 months before his death. I 
consider that the role carried more weight than Prigge, and in any case, it had enormous 
symbolic significance - all three of the previous second secretaries between 1944 and 1953 - 
Ivan Lebedev, Fedor Titov and Yershov were Russians and after Krūmiņš’s promotion all three 
CC secretaries were Latvians (the others being Kalnbērizņš and Pelše). In the literature, 
Krūmiņš’s promotion is cited as the primary achievement of the ‘New Course’ and the first 
inroad made by national communism.124 Krūmiņš often had to travel to Moscow to visit the 
Party Organs Department’s Baltic Sector.125 Krūmiņš’s attendance at these meetings indicates 
he was in full control of his office, or it could mean that he was being kept on a tight leash. 
Either way his appointment was no formality. Moreover, it is unlikely that Krūmiņš would have 
been allowed to remain in an ‘acting’ capacity in such a prominent position for long, and yet he 
remained Second Secretary until January 1956. 
 
1.4 The June 1953 Latvian Party Plenum 
Scarcely ten days after korenizatsiia was revived at the 12th June Presidium meeting, the LCP 
held its 6th plenum on 22nd-23rd June. There are a few points worth noting about the 
circumstances of this plenum. Firstly, it commenced just five days after the first anti-Soviet 
uprising in Eastern Europe. We can surmise both the wrath of the German populace and 
Moscow’s heavy-handed response was in the minds of some Latvian leaders after Soviet tanks 
rescued the GDR government. Secondly, the plenum closed on the evening of the most 
important event in the Latvian cultural calendar, the pagan festival of ‘Jāņi’ or ‘Līgo’, which 
celebrates the summer solstice; on this occasion the Latvian leadership celebrated by utilising 
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their newly granted powers to promote Latvian national interests for the first time since 
incorporation into the USSR. Finally, during this meeting, one by one, the Latvian leadership 
vociferously denounced Russification in Latvia, which was unthinkable only three months 
earlier. 
 One of the most incredible aspects of this plenum and representative of the atmosphere 
created by the ‘New Course’ was that 26 of the 36 speeches at the plenum were given in 
Latvian.126 Kalnbērziņš admitted it was a deliberate decision to hold the plenum in Latvian to 
demonstrate that almost everyone in the leadership spoke Latvian at a high level.127 Speakers 
usually made speeches only in Russian and therefore this simple yet bold act did not go 
unnoticed. Ivanov complained later that he could not remember ‘all the details of the plenum 
because it was in Latvian and only those with headphones could listen to the translation’ 
because ‘they were not provided to all’.128 This perhaps accounts for the silence of the Russian-
dominated CC during the plenum. Not only were its members resentful and dumbfounded by 
the Latvians’ hostility (Ivanov describes the presentations as making ‘a painful impression on 
the audience’), they were unable to understand many speeches.129 
 First Secretary Kalnbērziņš opened the plenum of 108 members of Latvia’s leadership.130 
According to Krūmiņš, Kalnbērziņš constructed his report to the plenum ‘in accordance with the 
basic provisions received in the documents from Moscow’.131 His speech made two points very 
clear: failure to promote local cadres to leading positions in the Party would result in dismissal, 
and that Russian officials’ lack of local cultural knowledge alienated Latvians. He said: ‘The 
Latvian CC... coarsely overstepped Soviet nationality policy principles in the training of cadres 
and in their selection for leading work. The result of this harmful practice is that among the 
republic’s leading cadres the majority of officials have not mastered Latvian and poorly 
understand local conditions’.132 Kalnbērziņš provided examples of ‘serious shortcomings’ in 
ideological work, attacking the fact that ‘in many enterprises and kolkhozy all agitation, work 
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with the masses and meetings happen in Russian... In Riga only 1/3 of lectures and speeches are 
read in Latvian’. Latvians were not enthusiastically participating in Party work, primarily 
because it was in Russian. He concluded his point by explaining the Presidium’s opinion that all 
these factors undermined support for the Party and aided the nationalist partisans: ‘The use of 
Russian in Party and soviet offices and social organisations, weakens the links between state 
power and the masses... it elicits justifiable national grievances’.133 Kalnbērziņš’s counterpart in 
the government, Council of Ministers Chairman Lācis, agreed with Kalnbērziņš, declaring that 
the Latvian population was unimpressed with the current state of affairs. ‘This situation’, Lācis 
said, ‘is without a doubt the reason for the complaints and dissatisfaction we have earned from 
the people’.134 The Party saw the opportunity to increase its dismal popularity through the ‘New 
Course’ and attempt to improve its connection to the people.135 
Kalnbērziņš did not outright state that many of the republic’s problems were caused by 
a lack of indigenous cadres but he alluded to that fact. He noted that Latvians were a definite 
minority in the Party hierarchy, listing an array of statistics to illustrate his point. Latvians 
accounted for only 47.2% of raikom and gorkom secretaries, 42% of the CC (less than half of 
those addressed in this closed plenum accessible only to CC members), 38.9% of the Komsomol 
and 43.9% of the Council of Ministers, and therefore ‘the Council of Ministers cares little about 
the nomination of local cadres’.136 Kalnbērziņš went on to explain the nature of nomenklatura 
promotions within the Party, ‘Numerous Party, Soviet and economic executives’, he said, 
‘basing their actions on false vigilance expressed their distrust of local cadres and for leading 
positions picked mostly non-Latvians’.137 Kalnbērziņš was primarily referring to the Stalinist 
atmosphere, which maligned Latvians within the Party because of their suspect biographies as 
members of organisations in bourgeois Latvia. This was the reason the Ministry of Education 
delayed the certification of more than 600 teachers and the agricultural academy drew up a list 
of 60 teachers for dismissal on political grounds.138 It was also why the Latvian share of the 
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nomenklatura dropped from around 70% in 1945 to approximately 30% by 1953.139 Kalnbērziņš 
chose his words carefully and did not use the phrase ‘Russification’ but he certainly implied it. 
For example when talking about Latgale (Eastern Latvia), he remarked that there was an 
‘established erroneous and harmful view that if everyone is fluent in Russian then only 
newcomers [from Russia] can work there’.140 Agricultural Secretary Aleksandr Nikonov, a 
native of Latgale, confirmed this, agreeing that ‘the main mistake is that Latgale is considered a 
Russian region. The raikom secretaries and Propaganda Departments heads who know Latgalian 
or Latvian can be counted on the fingers of one hand’.141 In response, Kalnbērziņš said ‘the LCP 
is outlining measures to return cadres who previously worked in Latgale, who are familiar with 
local conditions and customs, to leading positions’.142 
In an extraordinary move, which resembled elements of Khrushchev’s Secret Speech 
three years later, Kalnbērziņš revealed to the plenum the atrocities committed by the NKVD. He 
reported that in the post-war years the NKVD repressed at least 118,873 people in Latvia. At 
least 72,850 people were arrested and deported, 43,702 imprisoned, and 2,321 were killed.143 
Incredibly, Kalnbērziņš implied mistakes were made on the part of Soviet security services, 
saying that the repressions were not only of ‘enemies, bandits and other state criminals, but of 
innocent Latvians’.144 The usually obsequious Kalnbērziņš acquired this brazenness by example. 
In his 8th June note, Khrushchev quoted the same total (almost 119,000 people) and mentioned 
that unfortunately the security services had suppressed some innocent people.145 Beria had 
likewise lamented the repressions in his special note to Latvia. Both are significant because 
Kalnbērziņš, or anyone else for that matter, could not have discussed this subject even within 
the Party during Stalin’s rule. 146  Open discussions about the innocent casualties of an 
overzealous security force drew a stark dividing line between the Stalin and post-Stalin eras.  
 Other Latvian Party leaders followed Kalnbērziņš’s example in their criticism and self-
criticism: they remained strictly within the sphere of promoting the Latvian language and 
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measures to combat insufficient indigenisation. There was only one specific mention of 
Russification, although many hinted at it, and there was no discussion about reversing 
migration. Instead, Latvia’s leaders castigated Russians for their lack of proficiency in Latvian, 
their chauvinistic attitude towards the Latvian language and the weak representation of Latvian 
cadres in the Party hierarchy. In his speech, Lācis unleashed a withering attack on Russian 
chauvinism. Lācis condemned the use of Russian: ‘[Through] political short-sightedness in the 
Justice Ministry... the condition was created that not one of the five people’s judges understands 
Latvian or can hold court sessions or review materials in Latvian’. Lācis referred to this as ‘a 
king-of-the-mountain attitude’. He gave the example of Riga People’s Education Section Chief 
Yevgenii Ronis. Lācis said, ‘Ronis began by prohibiting office work in Latvian... later, Ronis 
openly declared that it was time for Riga to go over completely to Russian’. Lācis implicitly 
blamed the persistent use of Russian on the pervasive fear of Stalinism. He said that 
‘responsible and leading figures of the Party who show excessive fear of the so-called “shadows 
of the past” demonstrate too much timidity and insecurity in the placement of Latvian 
cadres’.147  
1.4.1 Unacceptable biographies 
Lācis went on to make a controversial argument against the current system, which penalised a 
person because of their family’s record in pre-Soviet Latvia: 
We have cadres who continue to be governed by curricula vitae, which are 
fifteen or twenty years old and completely ignore what citizens did in the Soviet 
years. Aizsargi [‘defenders’ interwar paramilitary organisation], Boy Scouts, 
served in the Legion, such words act like a scarecrow, hanging over their whole 
life… What were the employment conditions in bourgeois Latvia? One could 
not stay in a job if he did not join an organisation.148 
Through the ‘New Course’ Beria repudiated this policy, turning the Stalinist system on its head. 
Ivanov summarised Latvian sentiment on this matter in a letter to Mikhail Suslov, 
‘organisations and institutions blindly guided by the personal data of 15 years ago, found fault 
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with each misdemeanour in the past, looked at who the grandfather and grandmother was and 
were not interested in the worker at the present time’.149 
Latvian cadres who were war veterans and best placed to run the republic because of 
their knowledge of local conditions were excluded. Before 1953, Latvians dominated only 
lower nomenklatura positions, the ispolkom (Executive Committee) and raiispolkom (District 
Executive Committee) of villages and districts especially in rural areas. Latvians generally filled 
roles in science and (niche) culture, art, education (school directors), agriculture (kolkhoz 
chairmen). In contrast, directors of major factories, chief engineers, managers and cadre 
secretaries of Party organisations in enterprises constituted an absolute majority of Russians. 
According to Apine, ‘whole industries, particularly the management of industry, security 
organs, diplomatic service, railways, Party instructors, military cadres, construction, commerce 
and the navy were purified of Latvians’.150  The displacement of Latvian cadres to rural 
committees led to the creation of a more independent nomenklatura. These peripheral districts 
became the eventual support base for national communism. 
  A dramatic case in neighbouring Lithuania demonstrates Beria’s personal intervention 
in the biographical matter. After the MGB and MVD were merged in March 1953, the Russian 
MGB Chief Dmitrii Yefrimov was made deputy to Lithuanian former MVD Chief Jonas 
Vildžiūnas. Under normal circumstances, the Russian could have expected to head the new unit. 
Vildžiūnas had been sidelined from police work in the 1940s because his brother resided in the 
United States, being considered unsuitable for such service according to the canons of Stalinist 
eligibility. In his interview with Beria upon his new appointment, Beria supposedly answered 
Vildžiūnas’s mention of his American brother with: ‘We will discuss that when we decide to 
appoint him minister’.151 At the July 1953 CPSU CC plenum Lithuanian First Secretary Antanas 
Sniečkus explained, ‘Last year [1952] we made it clear that we could not put Lithuanian 
communists in the MGB because of all those uncles and aunts living abroad who could not be 
overlooked... Along came Beria, who put on a generous air and announced a new approach’.152 
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Beria was in no uncertain terms throwing Stalin’s rulebook out the window. Unfortunately for 
Vildžiūnas, he was returned to lower levels of officialdom after Beria’s removal. 
1.4.2 The blame game 
In his memoirs, Khrushchev declared that ‘Beria was promoting the idea that Russian 
domination held sway in local areas... [Local cadres] began thundering not only against 
Russians but also against national cadres who would not fight against Russian “domination”. 
This happened in many Party organisations in the republics’.153 Khrushchev was describing 
precisely what had occurred during the Latvian Party plenum. There was bitter recrimination 
among Latvian leaders about who was to blame for the situation. Lācis blamed the Ministry of 
Agriculture for ignoring the bureau’s directives on appointing indigenous MTS and sovkhozy 
chairmen.154 Lācis singled out former minister Vācietis for allowing the situation to develop 
where only 5 of 31 sovkhoz directors and 23 of 107 MTS directors were Latvians.155 This was 
not unusual: many leaders complained in their speeches that resolutions were obstructed or 
improperly carried out. Interior Minister Albert Sieks gave the example of the May 1952 
Council of Ministers decision to publish 15,000 copies of the Highway Code in Russian and 
Latvian within a month. However, over a year later the Transport Ministry had only published 
the rules in Russian.156 Robert Ķisis, Public Utilities Minister, accused Lācis and Kalnbērziņš 
‘of trying to destroy the Latvian nation’ by allowing this situation to develop.157  
Propaganda Chief Jānis Avotiņš voiced similar concerns in his speech. Avotiņš implied 
that Kalnbērziņš was ‘allergic’ to nationalist insinuations and sided with Stalinists in the past. 
According to Avotiņš, Kalnbērziņš showed his colours during the purges under Stalin: 
‘Kalnbērziņš said it was necessary to stop discussing carrying out political work among Latvian 
workers in Latvian... Comrade Kalnbērziņš undoubtedly feared that a politically immature 
communist would call him a nationalist if he supported such ideas’.158 Latvia’s Party School 
Director, Kārlis Pugo, joined Avotiņš in criticising Kalnbērziņš. He said: ‘I think [he] was very 
afraid to boldly promote Party workers from among the best local people. He feared higher 
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authorities would think... he was actively pushing local talent and would have drawn the 
conclusion that Latvia has local chauvinist tendencies’.159 Avotiņš showed how this led to the 
absurd situation where Latvians spoke Russian at Party meetings. ‘Ignorance of Latvian was so 
great’, he stated, ‘that during the recent session of the Riga City Soviet even Latvians, who 
knew their mother tongue well, delivered speeches in Russian… Even the decision of the 
session was not read by Comrade Straujums in Latvian, although he knows it well’.160 Avotiņš 
used the hitherto inadmissible word ‘Russification’. In discussing the mistakes of the Party, 
Avotiņš lambasted the CC for ‘ignoring the native language... [which] undoubtedly estranges us 
from Latvian workers and nationalists use it as a weapon. We gave them a reason to talk about 
the Russification of Latvia’.161 There were frequent assertions at the plenum that mistakes in 
nationality policy were effectively a gift to the nationalist underground. 
1.4.3 The speeches 
Eduards Berklavs, Riga gorkom First Secretary, delivered the penultimate speech on 22nd June. 
Berklavs spoke of the need to learn both languages, fully aware that many Latvians had a good 
command of Russian. He couched his criticism in Kalnbērziņš’s terms, noting that cadres’ 
insufficient knowledge of Latvian (Berklavs pointed out that only 800 of Riga’s 20,000 
agitators worked in Latvian) meant that Party agitation was ineffective in penetrating the local 
population. Berklavs offered the Riga railway carriage factory as an example of how this left the 
Party organisation almost without Latvian members (a paltry 28 of 214).162 Moreover, he 
criticised migrants for their inability to learn Latvian: 
We have not devoted the attention it deserves to the question of the acquisition 
of Russian and Latvian. Almost nine years have passed since liberation. That is 
enough time in which each person, if they were willing, could have acquired 
another language... That is why today there should no longer be a language 
problem.163 
                                                      
159 LVA-PA f.101, apr.16, l.10, lp.108. 
160 LVA-PA f.101, apr.16, l.9, lp.168. 
161 LVA-PA f.101, apr.16, l.9, lp.168. 
162 LVA-PA f.101, apr.16, l.9, lp.297-98. 
163 LVA-PA f.101, apr.16, l.9, lp.299. 
  54 
Berklavs, known for his controversial comments, did not shy away from explaining why the 
language problem persisted. He brazenly told the Russian-majority CC that the bureau made 
two resolutions on the question, ‘but beyond that, nothing further has been done. The CC is not 
interested in the implementation of [the bureau’s] decisions’.164 
Not every speaker at the plenum followed Kalnbērziņš’s lead. Some, such as Presidium 
Chairman Ozoliņš simply ignored the national question. Among others, we can detect a formula 
in their speeches. Wavering Latvians would criticise the language or cadres situation within 
their domain but often conclude with an effusive point demonstrating that they were not hostile 
towards Russians. A useful example is Liepāja gorkom First Secretary Ivan Desmitnieks who 
complained about the situation in Liepāja with only 10 of 85 primary Party organisations run by 
Latvians and the locomotive plant only accepting two Latvians into the Party organisation in the 
previous five-year period, before praising the ‘fraternal help of the Great Russian people with 
cadres’.165 
There was a minority of dissenting voices among committed Stalinists. These men had 
spent the interwar period in the USSR and continued to praise Russian primacy. In his speech 
Culture Minister Jānis Ostrovs carefully phrased his criticism of the lack of work in Latvian in 
factories to ultimately support Russian cadres, ‘I do not want to say that we should stop the 
political work of Russians who do not speak Latvian. On the contrary, it is necessary to conduct 
political work in Russian more widely than it is today’.166 Of the two leading orthodox 
Stalinists, Arvīds Pelše, was the more conciliatory in his speech, agreeing that Beria’s resolution 
gave ‘clear and unmistakable directives to end Soviet nationality policy perversions… in the 
immediate future to prepare, educate, and broadly promote Latvian cadres to leading work’.167 
Even Pelše, whose adversaries described him as ‘a lackey of great power politics’ and 
‘unquestioningly obedient to Moscow’, admitted to personal mistakes in ideological work but 
attributed this to the Party’s inattention to the national question.168 Pelše was a cautious 
operator. He conveniently took ill during preparations for the June plenum, leaving Krūmiņš to 
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make arrangements, possibly in a tactical decision limit his involvement.169 Pelše balanced his 
speech carefully, firstly agreeing that replacing cadres with Latvians and transferring 
institutional work into the Latvian language would be ‘on the right track’, but then asking 
‘would it fundamentally improve the political situation in our republic?’ Pelše argued it would 
only silence ‘hostile elements [who] will have no reason to conduct anti-Russian propaganda’. 
Pelše’s suggestion to rectify the situation was couched in traditional Stalinist rhetoric, warning 
against bourgeois nationalism and stressing the need for vigilance.170 On one point, Pelše made 
a definite stand. He refuted the popular idea, proposed in the speeches of Jānis Peive, Ozoliņš, 
Lācis, Desmitnieks and Ostrovs, that it was unnecessary for new cadres to have their 
biographical histories scrutinised, announcing to the plenum that ‘it would be completely 
wrong. Not one iota do we have the right to abandon the Party principle for selection. We need 
to know everything’.171 Berklavs described the performance of his future nemesis Pelše as that 
of ‘a chameleon suddenly changing his colours’ to adapt to the new Party line, though in a 
manner that would allow him to still criticise other speakers’ speeches.172  
More reactionary than Pelše’s speech was that of Jānis Bumbiers, Economics Institute 
Chairman and Berklavs’s’ foe. Bumbiers focused his speech on attacking Ķisis and Avotiņš for 
praising the work of the ‘Young Latvians’ (a group of Latvian nationalist intellectuals who 
attempted to preserve Latvia’s cultural and linguistic heritage in opposition to Germanisation 
between the 1850s and 1880s. The unspoken comparison was with contemporary Russification 
and a need to take similar action). In stark contrast to the other speakers at the plenum, 
Bumbiers went on to say that it was completely correct that the name of one of Riga’s most 
famous streets, Krišjāņa Valdemāra (the Young Latvians’ leader), was changed to Gorky Street 
in 1953.173 
Krūmiņš’s speech was unlike that of other future national communists. In his memoirs, 
he offers insight as to why he moderated his speech, explaining that he ‘intuitively felt that 
something was wrong’. Therefore he reiterated Kalnbērziņš’s line ‘that, of course, people 
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coming to Latvia should learn Latvian’ as all speakers did, but mitigated this by remarking ‘at 
the same time we cannot lament the fact that Latvia’s youth has learned Russian over the 
years’.174 Krūmiņš suspected that the new nationality policy might be temporary: wanting to 
protect himself, he took a risk and went against the grain. In a 1988 interview, he revealed he 
was sceptical about the ‘New Course’ because of the deportations, believing that to be ‘Beria’s 
real “concern” for nationalities’.175 In doing so, he potentially exposed himself to Beria’s wrath. 
Moscow’s emissary, Department for Party Organs Baltic Sector Head Mikhail Polekhin, who 
was at the plenum as Beria’s representative, warned him pointedly after his speech that ‘these 
words will cost you dearly’.176 
In his closing speech, Kalnbērziņš addressed some questions raised during the plenum. 
Kalnbērziņš defined the LCP’s answer to the language question and its impact on cadres 
composition in uncompromising terms, ‘how do we have meetings and plenary sessions if all 
the leading personnel do not have a command of Latvian? There is one solution - replace all 
personnel who do not speak Latvian. All meetings, all office work must be in Latvian’. Yet, he 
alluded to the possibility of non-Latvian speakers remaining in office, ‘comrades who continue 
to work and do not speak Latvian, have to learn Latvian. No matter how difficult that may be, it 
needs to be overcome and Latvian must be learned’.177 
Discussions of hitherto unacceptable topics such as ethnic Latvians being a minority in 
their own Party and how to redress the balance, would inevitably lead to a resolution that 
discriminated against Russians. If Latvians received promotions regardless of their competency 
then it implied that Russians would be correspondingly downgraded through dismissals and 
demotions of the occupants of these posts. This became evident from the plenum’s resolution, 
which declared an end to the practice of non-Latvians being first or second secretaries of Party 
organisations and government institutions. The resolution pledged to install, by law, Latvian 
employees as directors in soviets, MTS, and factory enterprises. Furthermore, the resolution 
ordered all official paperwork in Latvia’s Party (including CC, plenum and bureau meetings), 
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state, and social organisations, transferred into Latvian.178  The resolution was remarkably 
similar to that published by the Lithuanian CC’s 4th plenum, complaining of ‘inadequate 
advancement and promotion of cadres to top positions in the Party, soviets, and economy’.179 
Though dramatic, the Latvian Party resolution was unsurprising given the extent of Russian 
encroachment in the nine years since Latvia re-joined the USSR. The plenum’s vociferous anti-
Russian tone and overtly nationalistic resolution represented the Latvian reaction to this 
encroachment as soon as it became permissible. Beria may have prodded the Latvians but they 
were enthusiastic and required little encouragement.  
 The June 1953 plenum unleashed a six-year process of nativisation that ended with the 
July 1959 plenum. In his memoirs, Krūmiņš singled out Ķisis’s speech and the fact that most 
national communists deserted Berklavs in 1959. ‘Amazingly,’ Krūmiņš pointed out, ‘it was 
Ķisis who at the plenum in 1959 no less vehemently accused [everyone] of nationalism. And 
there were many turncoats’. Krūmiņš reflected on Berklav’s performance saying that his 
‘speech at the plenum was much more restrained than those of his prosecutors six years later’.180 
Krūmiņš’s words are those of a man cynically attempting to deflect accusations that he likewise 
abandoned Berklavs. 
 
1.5 The ‘New Course’ in Action 
In the wake of 12th June Presidium resolution, the results of the ‘New Course’ became 
immediately apparent because the process of removing officials began swiftly in Latvia. 
Polekhin arrived to monitor the situation at Beria’s behest. He visited Krūmiņš and demanded 
‘lists of those who [you] are going to send [to Moscow]!’ Krūmiņš calmly replied that there 
would be no lists and that only two people (perhaps one was Yershov) would leave Latvia.181 In 
his memoirs, Krūmiņš recounts how he and Agriculture Minister Nikonov (also a future 
national communist) called the 107 Russian MTS political department chiefs to the CC one 
night. Krūmiņš explains that ‘people were concerned and were already hearing rumours about 
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Beria’s note’. Instead of an exam, he tested the officials by simply asking them to say ‘bread’ 
and ‘good evening’ in Latvian. Concluding ‘that the overwhelming majority of members are 
trying to learn Latvian’, in the morning he let them go home.182 An outraged Polekhin then 
came to see him. ‘How is it you have no one to send? [the officials] have you for [one] night 
and learned the language?’ he asked sardonically. Krūmiņš replied sarcastically ‘yes - imagine 
that you’ve learned [Latvian]’. Furious, Polekhin stormed off to call Gromov, his boss. Gromov 
then called Krūmiņš demanding a response: ‘The Lithuanians already sent their [officials]… 
what are you waiting for? This will be regarded as sabotage. You know who signed the 
document, you will be responsible not only to the Party’, referring to Beria on both counts. 
Regardless of warnings from Gromov and Polekhin, Krūmiņš reiterated in his memoirs, ‘all the 
same we did not send people to Moscow’.183 This seems like strange behaviour from a man who 
would become a leading national communist. Why did Krūmiņš not compile a list? This episode 
took place between 12th June and 21st June so before the plenum. In his speech, Krūmiņš hedged 
his bets because he anticipated that the situation would change. His reluctance to pursue to the 
‘New Course’ was due his anticipation of a backlash from Moscow triggered by incensed 
Russians. 
Regardless of Krūmiņš misgivings, the ‘New Course’ was unleashed, and lists were 
drawn up. Director Vushkan of ‘Skultes’ farm, Saulkrasti District, compiled a list of 49 
Russians for dismissal, which according to Instructor Petrov ‘caused ethnic strife’.184 Within 
days of the June plenum, there were sweeping personnel shifts within the CC with many non-
Latvians dismissed. No less than five new department heads were replaced.185 Future national 
communists moved into positions of responsibility in the Party and state hierarchies. Nikolai 
Bissenieks returned to head the Party Organs Department, which he previously directed between 
1949 and 1951.186 Very much in the spirit of the ‘New Course’ Voldemārs Kalpiņš became First 
Deputy Minister of Culture, providing a check on the Russianised Minister Jānis Ostrovs.187 
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One of Krūmiņš’s first acts as Second Secretary was to reorient Komsomol policy (he was 
Komsomol First Secretary between 1948 and 1951) towards ‘support for the “core” 
nationality’.188 Almost immediately, the Agricultural Ministry transferred all its work into 
Latvian.189 On 25th June, the Academy of Sciences Presidium decided that all clerical work, 
meetings and Academy institutions must use Latvian.190 On the orders of Deputy Minister 
Grāvītis, the Ministry for Food and Light Industry would not accept a single document in 
Russian.191 
The ‘New Course’ was implemented in an atmosphere of optimism. Native cadres filled 
thousands of top and mid-level executive positions in a process that continued more subtly after 
Beria’s arrest until the purges of 1959.192 Yet, many opposed the ‘New Course’. Ivanov 
interpreted the immediate enthusiasm among Latvians for the ‘New Course’ as akin to a coup: 
‘the day after [the plenum], the whole population had learned their instructions and on the 
streets told Russians that they occupied Latvia’. 193  Paradoxically, a part of the Latvian 
population also treated the ‘New Course’ with suspicion. Elksnitis, a solicitor, concluded its 
purpose was to ‘lift the spirits of Latvian communists, [who were] placed on the step below the 
Russians’, and therefore, ‘you can not attach much importance to the New Course, as this is a 
game and there will not be a radical shift’.194 By this, Elksnitis meant that the effects of the 
‘New Course’ would only be felt by Party apparatchiks and that it was an internal Party matter. 
Accountant Pēteris Ozoliņš’s opinion was stronger, predicting that indigenisation would be 
counterproductive to Soviet designs: 
Russification is weakening and Latvians are nominated for leading positions... 
The people have endured and that creates an opinion among the masses about 
the weakness of Russians and reduces fear [among] Latvians. This will only 
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strengthen nationalist spirits and increase confidence that the USSR will be 
defeated.195 
Finally, Interior Minister Zujāns noted the enthusiasm among a nationalist segment of the 
population that the ‘New Course’ would result in the ‘strangulation’ of the Russians.196 Judging 
by the strained relations between Soviet authorities and the Latvian populace, under these 
circumstances, it is unsurprising that many Latvians were sceptical about the promise of greater 
representation among a leadership that was divorced from the population. 
 
1.6 Beria’s Downfall  
An unforeseen consequence of Beria’s initiatives was the struggle between central apparatchiks 
and newly promoted indigenous cadres. This was the case between Pavel Meshik, Beria’s 
Interior Minister in Ukraine, and local Party officials. In an attempt to discredit his opponents, 
Meshik ordered regional MVD leaders to find compromising information about the Ukrainian 
leadership. It is unclear if Meshik instructions came from Beria but it was enough for 
Khrushchev’s associate, Lviv MVD Chief Timofei Strokach, to warn Khrushchev of an 
imminent coup attempt by Beria in Moscow on 21st June.197 Strokach informed Khrushchev that 
Beria intended to send special MVD divisions to Moscow.198 While it is unlikely that Beria was 
actually preparing a coup, there were few options left to Beria by June 1953. Among his rivals, 
Beria had the greatest capability to seize power with his militarised and independent NKVD. 
This was enough to arouse the suspicions of his colleagues, who unified against him. It seems 
Beria sensed that his Presidium rivals would never allow him to accumulate enough support to 
legitimately claim the leadership; thus, his only option was to seize power. If this is accurate, 
Beria’s strategy was probably designed to rely on the support garnered in the periphery after his 
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seizure of power in Moscow. Apine concurs, noting that ‘Beria was ready to do anything to gain 
the support of the national republics for his coup’.199  
To win that support he fostered anti-Russian reactions in the republics with the ‘New 
Course’ hoping to emerge as a non-Russian champion after the power struggle. To sweeten the 
deal he cooperated to decentralise the system with his contender Khrushchev, who also relied on 
peripheral support from his Ukrainian Party base. Together they dismantled some of the 
centralised bureaucracy that smothered the republics by reducing All-Union nomenklatura 
oversight, known as ‘counselling’. This reduced the number of upper level nomenklatura posts 
from 45,000 to 25,300. The republics’ leaderships benefited from the reduction, which curbed 
Moscow’s supervisory capabilities.200 According to Riekstiņš, ‘Beria understood very well that 
the retention of a Stalinist national policy in the USSR’s western republics could provoke wide 
scale destabilisation processes’, something to be avoided if he was to hold the country together 
after a coup.201 Yet, there was no guarantee that this sudden and unchecked korenizatsiia would 
not have spiralled out of control given the leeway permitted to republics in interpreting and 
enacting the Presidium’s resolutions. When he reflected on summer 1953 six years later, 
Khrushchev claimed that ‘Beria was preparing a meat-grinder’.202 Certainly, by July expressions 
of nationalism among the population and middle management within the bureaucracy threatened 
a major crisis in centre-republic relations.  
Khrushchev sensed the danger long before and worked to isolate Beria. As Taubman 
puts it, what finally turned Khrushchev against Beria was the fear that ‘Beria would get him if 
he did not get Beria first’.203 He gathered support for his arrest by persuading individuals of 
Beria’s ambitions for power and playing on their fears of the ‘Marshal of Lubyanka’. In 
disrupting the Beria-Malenkov alliance, Khrushchev warned Premier Georgii Malenkov about 
Beria’s plans, persuading him that Beria was ‘getting his knives ready for us’.204 Consequently, 
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Malenkov reconsidered his position. Beria’s policy was ultimately unsuccessful with the 
Presidium. Between March and mid-June the ‘New Course’ was the raison d’ětre of Beria’s 
collaboration with Khrushchev, but in late June it was a crucial factor in creating the coalition 
against him.205 Furthermore, Beria’s manoeuvres began to cause alarm among his Presidium 
colleagues, which Khrushchev deftly exploited.206 He talked of plans to normalise American 
relations and permit Germany’s reunification. In one alleged scenario, Beria wanted to grant 
autonomy to the Baltic Republics as People’s Democracies modelled on the East European 
satellites.207 Horrified by these plans, in a dramatic meeting on 26th June, three days after the 
conclusion of the Latvian plenum, the Presidium confronted Beria, denounced his actions, and 
arrested him. 
A special CPSU CC plenum was convened between 2nd and 7th July to denounce Beria. 
One of Khrushchev’s accusations against him was his interference ‘with Party organisations in 
the Baltic Republics’.208 Khrushchev used Beria as a convenient scapegoat, heaping blame upon 
the imprisoned MVD Chief for permitting an overzealous and uncontrollable nationality policy. 
This was despite the Presidium giving its support to Beria’s proposal on 12th June. Since 
Khrushchev benefited from this policy and repeatedly espoused a relatively pro-minority view, 
one might have expected him to have this aspect of the attack on Beria muted unless he was 
convinced of the danger it posed.209 At the plenum, Khrushchev omitted his role in the 
construction and promulgation of the ‘New Course’.210 This demonstrates Khrushchev’s skill as 
a politician. The Party accepted that Beria was the sole initiator of the fiasco in the republics.211 
Latvia’s leaders were not present at the plenum but Zubkova believes they dutifully attempted 
to ‘hush up’ (zamiat’) Khrushchev’s initiatives.212 Therefore, Khrushchev was successful in 
masking his contributions to the ‘New Course’ once it became convenient to denounce it as 
Beria’s ‘erroneous’ policy. 
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At the plenum, speakers laid bare the nationality policy wholly attributed to Beria. 
Beria’s aim was to sow discord and split the Soviet nationalities for his own nefarious 
machinations, as Khrushchev put it, ‘Beria speaks under the guise of implementing Stalin’s 
policy on nationalities, but in reality he drives a wedge between ethnic groups’. Leningrad 
oblast First Secretary Andrianov implied it was a conspiracy directed at Russians: ‘Beria 
attempted to make other nationalities bitter, to set them against the Russian people... This is a 
great wrecking act’.213 The Presidium annulled the resolution from 12th June but crucially did 
not order the republics’ parties to do the same. Instead, the republics’ branches were obliged to 
hold their own plenums and meetings in all Party organisations to join the chorus in criticising 
Beria.214 This implied Khrushchev wanted the nationality policy he and Beria constructed to 
survive his opponent. He used it against Beria at the July CPSU CC plenum but avoided 
properly abrogating the ‘New Course’, thereby allowing it to remain in the background until he 
elaborated his own nationality policy in 1956, which included many aspects of the ‘New 
Course’. In December 1953, Beria was sentenced to death for ‘spreading animosity and dissent 
among the USSR’s peoples, and particularly for undermining the friendship of the USSR’s 
peoples with the Great Russian people’.215 After the July plenum, Khrushchev’s accusations 
stuck. On the rare occasion when Party members referred to Beria, he was portrayed, as Lācis 
put it, as having ‘started to collide the Party with the people’.216 Beria was sentenced to death at 
a secret trial on 23rd December 1953 and executed the same day. 
Between 12th and 13th July, a united plenum of the LCP CC and Riga gorkom convened 
to discuss the results of the July CPSU CC plenum on the ‘Beria conspiracy’. The July plenum 
in Latvia demonstrated the Latvian leadership’s confusion over the official reversal of the ‘New 
Course’ by Moscow. Questions were raised about whether to uphold the June plenum decisions 
since Beria authorised them. Another question was what to do with the Russians that were 
                                                      
213 D.M. Sickle (ed.), The Beria Affair: The Secret Transcripts of the Meetings Signalling the End of 
Stalinism, (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 1992), 22. 
214 Tannberg, Politika Moskvy, 371-72. 
215 Simon, Nationalism and Policy, 230. 
216 Fursenko, Arkhivy Kremlia, 374. 
  64 
dismissed.217 Neither question could be answered at the plenum with any surety. The plenum 
savaged Beria’s attempts ‘to undermine the multi-century friendship of the Great Russian 
people and the Latvian people’.218 Concurrently, however, the Latvian leadership did not 
downplay the rhetoric of the ‘New Course’. Speeches appeared contradictory, simultaneously 
repudiating Beria and his machinations, as in the case of Kalnbērziņš, yet calling for 
improvements in ‘the training and rearing of national cadres who are familiar with local 
conditions, language, customs, culture and life of the Latvian people’ and for their promotion 
‘to leading posts. The ties between the Party and working masses will be strengthened by 
conducting propaganda and political-educational work [with] the masses in their own 
language’.219 Kalnbērziņš emphasised a central tenet of the ‘New Course’ associated with Beria. 
This was despite the plenum resolution pledging to halt the ‘inappropriate replacement of [Party 
and state functionaries] who do not know Latvian, and to decide to keep records in Russian and 
Latvian’.220 
 
1.7 Ethnic Discrimination? 
By all appearances, the plenum was successful in its annulment of the ‘New Course’ but 
throughout July, complaints flooded Moscow and the LCP made little attempt to correct the 
situation. There was further confusion during a bureau discussion on 21st July. The bureau 
criticised the reluctance of raikomy and gorkomy to promote Latvian cadres. In Ludzas District, 
‘the leaders were ingrained with the misconception that working with the population, you can 
ignore national peculiarities, this has led to the fact that there is very little political work with 
Latvians in Latvian’. Only Russian newspapers were available in the kolkhozy despite half the 
workers being Latvians. Teaching at the local agricultural school was exclusively in Russian.221 
Bizarrely, at the same meeting there was also criticism of mistakes made in nationality policy 
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such as the removal of Russian banners in Rēzekne and Jelgava and the hasty compilation of 
lists for the replacement of non-Latvian personnel. The bureau admitted there was ethnic 
discord in Latvia because the situation ‘revitalised and energised nationalist elements, and 
fomented ethnic hatred between the republic’s workers’. In its resolution, the bureau played this 
down, emphasising that ‘communists misunderstood the June plenum’s decisions’.222 Quite 
simply, Latvia’s leaders did as they were bidden but were reluctant or even unwilling to 
interrupt the ‘New Course’, or as one letter to Moscow phrased it - ‘everything known in Riga 
but for some reason they are silent’.223 So why did Moscow tolerate this? Widmer argues that 
‘even after Beria’s ouster a green light was granted on this score’. The Soviet leaders realised it 
was in the regime’s interests to attract reliable cadres from among the local populace although 
there were limits on how far this would be tolerated.224 Widmer is correct, between 1953 and 
1959, greater numbers of local Latvian functionaries were appointed to posts in the middle and 
upper levels of the Party, state and economic hierarchies especially within the bureau. 
By late July Kalnbērziņš was becoming reticent about the ‘New Course’. Writing to 
Khrushchev he explained his fears that ‘in some raikomy, gorkomy, ministries and departments, 
rushed lists of replacement workers of non-Latvian nationality were made. Too many Russian 
workers were told that they would be relieved from their positions and should be ready for 
departure’.225 According to Kalnbērziņš, Party ‘principles in cadres’ selection were not taken 
into account; nationality was the main reason [for Latvian promotions]’.226 This was the 
justification of several Latvian leaders who wished to deflect charges of nationalism. Lācis 
recalled the pressure: ‘directives from above, from Moscow, made us put together lists of 
people to release from work who were not Latvian. We were rushed by phone calls, harried, 
checked on - whether it was done quickly enough’.227 Latvian leaders often used the speed of 
implementing the ‘New Course’ to explain the ‘unanticipated’ consequences of the top-down 
change in nationality policy, which Moscow foisted upon them. The rapid implementation of 
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the plenum’s decisions was a cause for complaint on the Russian side. Its swiftness indicated 
enthusiasm on the part of the Latvians. An anonymous letter to the Presidium explained that the 
‘the ink had not yet dried and the excesses had already begun. Despite the Riga gorkom 
comprising 80-85% Russian comrades, 80% of the delegates selected for the Party conference 
were Latvians’.228 
Returning to the subject of the lists, Prigge asserts that after Yershov returned to 
Moscow, ‘it can be surmised that the list [of names of Russians to be removed, referred to by 
Polekhin and Gromov] would have eventually expanded to those with pro-Russian sympathies’. 
‘Pelše’, Prigge wrote, ‘was almost certainly spared removal from power by Beria only because 
of the latter’s arrest’.229 Prigge’s claim seems unlikely. Russified Latvians were still ethnic 
Latvians and their expulsion would have followed the removal of thousands of Russian officials 
from Latvia. This would have not only hollowed out the Party but threatened it with collapse 
because the core indigenous strata represented only a small minority, hence the original 
problem. The question is whether these reputed lists of Russians to be dismissed were used but 
this is difficult to assess. There are numerous examples of Russians being removed. On 23rd 
July, Kalnbērziņš released eight regional leaders ‘for work in other republics and regions’. All 
eight had Russian surnames.230 
What was the fate of all these removed Russian officials? Budding national communist 
Party Control Commission (KPK) Chairman Pēteris Plēsums remarked in his June plenum 
speech ‘do not worry about whether those who do not know Latvian will remain. Communists 
are sent to where they are needed’.231 Krūmiņš stated that Yershov was ‘given a position of no 
small importance in Moscow, CPSU CC Deputy Head. He recalled that Yershov was ‘the most 
intelligent of all second secretaries sent from the centre. He constantly and consistently 
emphasised that he was proud to be working in a republic with such a high level of culture and 
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traditions’.232 This lends credence to the argument that Russians were removed not because of 
deficiencies in their work, but as the plenum resolution implied, simply to create room for 
indigenous cadres. Ousted Russians were not repressed, in Yershov’s case he was even 
promoted. 
There were, however, serious consequences attached to the process of ‘Latvianisation’ 
triggered by the ‘New Course’. After Beria’s arrest, the Presidium became nervous, having 
unleashed forces that they did not anticipate, evidenced by the unexpected level of anti-Russian 
sentiment at the Latvian Party plenum. The removal of the most brutal aspects of Stalinism 
permitted an explosion in expressions of nationalism in the most unlikely of places. In a report 
to Moscow, several senior Interior Ministry officials (where the ‘New Course’ had been in 
effect since May) were criticised ‘for nationalistic actions… Deputy Minister Sieks writes 
instructions on official documents in Latvian, knowing that there will be employees 
implementing them who do not know Latvian’.233 After Beria’s arrest, MVD leaders met to 
discuss the situation. The MVD chiefs complained that Beria’s restructuring brought the fight 
with the nationalist partisans to a standstill. Ratov stated that ‘for the last two months the MVD 
was inactive. Operational work was not conducted. Arrests were not carried out. On the 
contrary, some of those arrested for serious crimes were released from custody’. According to 
Ratov, Kovalchuk said this was part of a change of tactics designed to end repression of the 
nationalist underground.234 Zujāns confirmed this, criticising the fact that ‘we were given 
instructions not to use weapons against the bandits’.235 Ending the worst excesses of MVD 
repressions was an important point in both Khrushchev and Beria’s memorandums. Initially, 
Beria’s initiatives appeared to have a counter-productive effect. Yet, the partisan war dwindled 
rapidly, largely due to amnesties organised by Beria. Between 3rd April and 1st June 1953, 2,481 
individuals in Latvia were amnestied.236 The ‘New Course’ changes wrought upon the MVD 
continued, and by late July, the MVD’s Section for Letters received numerous reports that 
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‘under Beria’s direction, the Latvian MVD hastily conducted the replacement of non-Latvian 
employees’.237  
1.7.1 The ‘New Course’ continues unabated 
Following Beria’s arrest, Khrushchev began to receive appeals and letters from concerned 
individuals. These concerns snowballed into an avalanche of criticism about the ‘New Course’, 
which poured in to Moscow from Latvia and undoubtedly contributed to Khrushchev’s decision 
to apply the brakes. Many letters complained that the July CPSU CC plenum denounced Beria 
and his nationality policy, but all the while, the ‘New Course’ persisted in Latvia. Russians felt 
that they were not consulted about the changes and were ignored by the Latvian leadership and 
abandoned by Moscow. The anonymous author, who used the pseudonym ‘Ozolin’, wanted a 
CC inspection team to come to Latvia to ‘control the implementation of the Presidium decision’ 
and remarked that the team ‘would find the time to talk with Party activists’.238 The Presidium 
received another anonymous letter in mid-July frantically entitled ‘If this letter reaches you!’ 
expressing this confusion: ‘We, communists of the periphery, do not completely understand the 
national policy conducted by you now’. The author of the letter reminded the Presidium that 
many Party workers and specialists arrived in the Baltic Republics at the behest of the Party and 
did not know why the Party had forgotten them. Demonstrating the mood in the workplace, the 
letter reported that a number of managers in different enterprises told Russians to ‘go back 
where you’re from, you were not asked to come’. The letter concluded by hysterically 
demanding ‘why now does everyone want the Latvianisation of the leadership and language??? 
This is overkill’.239 
After Soviet leaders reversed their official opinion on the ‘New Course’, Moscow 
dispatched the ever-loyal Polekhin (who confronted Krūmiņš about lists of Russians to send to 
Moscow but was only too keen to demonstrate his adherence to the post-Beria political line) to 
observe the situation in Latvia. Polekhin investigated complaints about excesses and wrote to 
inform Khrushchev of Latvia’s new restrictions on the use of Russian. A recurring theme was 
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the Latvians’ volatile reaction towards the Russian language. Examples poured in from across 
Latvia. Gulbene raikom secretary Zarinia forbade personnel to talk on the telephone in Russian 
and told his employees who did not speak Latvian to look for another job.240 The director of 
Ventspils fish processing complex banned the airing of Russian gramophone records on the 
radio. There were reports about the distribution of anti-Russian slogans and leaflets.241 Some of 
the most alarming examples, which reached the Presidium, reported the situation on the factory 
floor. Minister for Trade Kukainis ordered board meetings to be held only in Latvian, despite 
80% of participants not knowing Latvian, and instructed directors to immediately replace ethnic 
Russians with Latvians employees.242 Ivanov reported that ‘those who do not know Latvian 
were removed from meetings’.243 According to Riga transport political department instructor 
Tatianchenko, at a meeting of Riga’s Moscow raikom on 29th June, ‘Secretary Pakaln proposed 
Latvians for leading positions, and said that from now on all decisions [and] all documents 
should only be in Latvian. When someone objected because no one could write in Latvian, he 
said it was necessary to learn Latvian, and whoever does not may leave Latvia’.244 It seems clear 
from numerous reports that the majority ethnically Russian apparatuses of Riga’s raikomy 
dutifully transferred their work into Latvian. One such raikom Party employee, Kroshev, 
reported that ‘now there is a great hindrance for us Russians, since everything is rearranged in 
Latvian, all the paperwork, without a Russian translation’.245 There were instances of sacking 
qualified Russians because of their nationality. Ivanov reported that the situation on the street 
was just as tense:  
In some shops, if you do not know Latvian, the sellers do not pay attention [to 
you] and sell you the fewest goods... National animosity began to flare up 
increasingly every day. Work in offices and factories almost ground to a halt as 
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each worker sat and waited to be fired, to see how his fate is decided, for he 
saw no prospects.246 
In this remarkable comment, we see the economic impact of the ‘New Course’ by causing work 
stoppages. 
The rampant ‘New Course’ both targeted ethnic Russians and was a defensive Latvian 
reaction towards perceived Russification designed to protect the Latvian language and culture. 
Some alluded to a programme of ethnic cleansing. ‘Even the Russian who speaks Latvian’ one 
anonymous letter said, ‘and lived all his life in Latvia is replaced. As they say here: “There is a 
campaign for the Latvians and forcing [out of] Russians”’.247 Another anonymous letter to the 
Presidium reinforced the notion that there was a distinctly ethnic flavour to the situation; it 
concluded, ‘now the man of Russian nationality in the Baltic Republics even conceals his 
nationality and gives up Russian’.248 Ample archival evidence illustrates the ethnically charged 
circumstances. Abrene District MTS Political Department Chief Cheremnikh, reported that in 
kolkhoz Kalinin, during a report in Russian, a group of farmers rose from their seats shouting: 
‘Down with the Russian agitator. We do not need this report’.249 Reports such as these 
demonstrate the situation in the countryside where Latvians represented a majority. There is 
evidence that Latvians deliberately misinterpreted the June LCP plenum resolution in order to 
replace more Russians. During a discussion on the implementation of the state plan at the 
factory ‘Azintars’, plant workers said ‘they will not work under [the] leadership [of engineer 
Korotaeva] because she is Russian, and by the Latvian CC decision Latvians should replace all 
Russian employees’.250 
These rumours made those in the RSFSR hesitant to migrate to Latvia. In 1953, 
immigration largely stopped as people adopted a ‘wait-and-see’ attitude, despite the fact that 
there were no recorded incidents of violence between Russians and Latvians. Party membership 
stagnated as a result. Between 1948 and 1952, membership grew by an average of 2,350 
annually. Between September 1952 and 1954, the Latvian Party only grew by 700 members 
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(approximately 18% of the pre-September 1952 rate).251 This was no anomaly. Rather it was a 
combination of concern on the part of migrants about moving to Latvia combined with 
dismissals from the ‘New Course’. It appears that rumours were already widespread by the time 
of the June plenum because in his speech Berklavs referred to the need to ‘struggle against the 
incorrect judgments about the alleged anticipated forcible expulsion of other nationalities from 
Latvia’.252 At the July plenum, Pinksis noted that ‘some bourgeois-nationalist elements threw 
aside all restraint and openly said that all Russians should leave and conversations must only be 
in Latvian. There is evidence that Latvians who know Russian, did not converse with Russians 
in that language, spreading rumours that hurt the friendship of the Latvian and Russian 
peoples’.253 We can at trace at least one example to the beginning of the ‘New Course’ inside 
the MVD. Within the militia, being an ethnic Russian appeared grounds for dismissal. Talsi 
District Police Chief Yenishonok was born and raised in Latvia, spoke fluent Latvian, and had 
‘good knowledge of local conditions’ but was dismissed. He was offered a position in the 
RSFSR instead. In Elejas, there were reports of Russian kolkhoz directors and their deputies 
being replaced.254 Similarly, in Madona District, kolkhoz Director Ivanov was released ‘because 
he is Russian’, and a Latvian, Travis, was appointed, who served as a captain in the 
Wehrmacht.255  Certainly, there was a degree of anti-Russian sentiment connected to the 
dismissal of Russians from managerial positions. Latvians viewed Russian party secretaries as 
haughty and arrogant because they had not learned Latvian, comparing them to Latvia’s 19th 
Century German barons.256 
The dismal level of indigenous participation in the Party could hardly have been 
surprising in 1953. In 1905 and 1917, Latvia proved fertile ground for revolutionary socialism. 
Several high-ranking Bolsheviks were Latvians: Deputy Chief of the Cheka Yakov Peters, Party 
Control Commission Chairman Janis Rudzutaks and Commissar for Agriculture Roberts Eiches. 
After the Civil War, the Latvian population’s enthusiasm for socialism waned and was 
practically wiped out following Latvia’s incorporation into the USSR and the 1941 and 1949 
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deportations. In their speeches, Latvian and Muscovite Party functionaries constantly attempted 
to reignite Latvia’s passion for socialism by referring to Latvia’s strong revolutionary traditions, 
praising the Latvian Riflemen’s role in the Russian Civil War including their position as Lenin’s 
bodyguard. Yet, the Party was unsuccessful in this endeavour and remained very much an 
import in terms of manpower and structure from the RSFSR, without which it could not have 
functioned, especially given the raging nationalist insurgency. If the ‘New Course’ had 
continued with the full endorsement of Moscow, successfully returning tens of thousands of 
monolingual Russians to the RSFSR, the implication was that the Party would have required an 
urgent recruitment drive. The state of Latvian recruitment was dire: in Riga, between 1944 and 
1953 only 2,000 Latvians were admitted to the Party as candidates, compared with 6,000 from 
other nationalities.257 Furthermore, on 1st January 1953 the Party comprised just 29.2% Latvians 
including the ‘Latovichi’ from the RSFSR, which made the number of homegrown Latvian 
communists even smaller.258 This figure indicates the enormous task the LCP faced to create a 
genuinely Latvian communist party. 
So ultimately, what was the specific transgression of Slavs in Latvia? What was truly 
unforgivable appears to have been those Russians who could not speak Latvian. A report from 
29th June (compiled by future national communist Deputy Justice Minister Emīlia Veinberga) 
presented a thorough examination of Justice Ministry staff and their language competency. 
Where there were cases of a lack of proficiency in Latvian, personnel were dismissed in favour 
of ethnic Latvian employees. The official line on whether a person could keep their job can be 
inferred from this document. Being an ethnic Latvian such as Administration Department 
Instructor Valtgail, despite not having ‘mastered the Latvian language’, was sufficient to allow 
him to retain his position as the report stated ‘this drawback could be eliminated in the next 5-6 
months because Valtgail is energetic and capable’. Latvian-speaking Russians retained their 
positions. Of the four state arbiters, one, Ivanov, was Russian. It was decided he could remain 
because he was studying Latvian and could work ‘on the large number of cases associated with 
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organisations and institutions outside of our republic’.259 Similarly, Savelev was Russian but 
was allowed to retain his position because it involved transport coordination across the USSR 
and he was proficient in Latvian.260 Furthermore, when there were no Latvian cadres available it 
was permissible to retain Russians as in the case of engineers and other specialists within the 
Gulag bureaucracy.261 Therefore, it appears that when it was useful for Russians to remain in 
their positions, it was language, not nationality, that was the determining factor. Yet, without 
specific instructions as to how to carry out the ‘New Course’ the results were not uniform, with 
differing consequences across government departments and Party organisations. Considerable 
hostility had generated among Latvians towards Russians since Latvia’s annexation, which was 
manifested in the wave of Russophobic incidents that swept across Latvia in the haphazard 
implementation of the ‘New Course’. 
 
1.8 The Uncontrollable ‘New Course’  
Not only Russian officials and citizens felt it necessary to draw Moscow’s attention to events in 
Latvia. In late July, Kalnbērziņš wrote to Khrushchev perhaps perceiving that the ‘New Course’ 
had exceeded its anticipated bounds and was slipping out of control into febrile Russophobic 
activity. Thus, Kalnbērziņš could become Moscow’s local scapegoat, charged as a ‘Beriaite’ if 
the Party found him to have permitted the persecution of Russians, especially after continuing to 
promote the cause of national cadres at the 12th July LCP plenum designed to malign Beria. 
Kalnbērziņš described the severity of anti-Russian action. He recounted that Culture Ministry 
Vocational Training Chief Trinkler, announced in one meeting, ‘all Russian directors and head 
teachers would soon be replaced by Latvians, and that Russians who didn’t know Latvian, will 
be thrown out of Latvia’. Trinkler personally dismissed 10 Russian employees.262 In early 
August, an embattled Kalnbērziņš tried to persuade Khrushchev that the situation was in hand. 
He wrote, ‘no employee of the Riga raikomy apparatus has been released [since mid-July]. 
There were instances where a different job was offered to certain employees of the raikomy 
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apparatus who do not know Latvian, but soon these conversations ceased and these comrades 
remained in place’. He refuted the claim that the CC or Riga gorkom advised the Riga raikomy 
on transferring paperwork into Latvian, though four raikomy did hold their June plenums in 
Latvian and translated speeches into Russian despite three having Russian majorities.263 
Forty days into the ‘New Course’ and MVD Section Head Kabashkhin evidently 
concurred with Kalnbērziņš on the worsening situation in late July. His report informed 
Khrushchev that many letters and statements still complained of ‘gross perversion in nationality 
policy’.264 Kabashkhin confirmed that ‘Russians are expelled from everywhere, removed from 
leadership positions in ministries, enterprises, MTS, etc’.265 Kabashkhin even revealed rumours 
about the ‘imminent overthrow of Soviet power and the intervention of England and the USA’, 
as had been the case after Latvia’s reincorporation into the USSR.266 There was talk of a 
revolution in the countryside.267 There were also pervasive rumours about the dissolution of 
kolkhozy. Peasants acted upon these assumptions: In Viļāni and Jaunjelgava districts, farmers 
stopped work on kolkhozy and began to remove cows and horses from farms.268 In Zilupe 
district, the agronomist Hermia (a former Aizsarg) said at a public meeting that ‘Beria was the 
defender of the peasants’. We can see here that Beria’s plan to emerge as a champion of non-
Russian nationalities against the Russian-dominated centre gained some traction.269 
1.8.1 The shadow of the deportations 
From July, rumours abounded about the forced expulsion of Russians.270 Deportation was 
Russian inhabitants’ greatest fear and was exacerbated by comments made by some Latvians, 
which indicated contempt towards Russians. One letter to Moscow demonstrated that the 
replacement of Russians by Latvians was happening in all spheres of life not just within the 
Party and state hierarchies, ‘they released executives, foremen, tractor drivers, janitors and 
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guards from work and offered to transport them to Siberia’.271 From comments such as this one, 
there is a sense that Latvians considered themselves protected by the new legislation. There was 
a perceptible undercurrent that Latvians were exacting revenge for the 1940s deportations of 
Latvians. On the farm Kommunar (Communard), communist Proll said that ‘Russians have one 
week left to live in Latvia, they have nothing to do here’. In Saldus District, Ezeres MTS 
workers reputedly stated ‘there will not be Russians in Latvia, we vote for the expulsion of 
Russians from Latvia’.272 Leaflets addressed to the secretaries of Ventspils gorkom and the 
ispolkom chairman demanded ‘the return of Latvians deported to Siberia; to sack all Russians 
and throw them out of Latvia’.273 Aneta Schultz, who lived in Ventspils, declared ‘if you had 
seen the Russians with all their families leave. It’s all happening in a big hurry. I heard quite 
pleasant conversations that absolutely all the “Ivans” will leave, and [deported] Latvians will all 
return to their homeland’.274 The return of deported Latvians was a common theme linked to the 
removal of Russians, for example in Liepāja, ‘nationalists declared that all Russians should 
leave Latvia, that in 1949 Russians evicted Latvians, and now “we will evict Russians”. There 
are cases of sudden attacks against workers who do not speak Latvian’.275 From testimony such 
as this, we can see that many Russians did indeed leave Latvia. Judging by Party membership 
data, I estimate around 1,000-2,000 left. In Gulbene District, Financial Department Acting Head 
Mielaes casually remarked at a buffet ‘soon all Russians shall be expelled from Latvia and 
Latvians will remain the masters here’. When barmaid Pokrovskaia spoke to Mielaes, he 
reputedly said to her ‘oh you Russian dog, tomorrow you will not be here’.276 One letter wrote 
that ‘if more things change, 500,000 Russians will be forced to leave Latvia’.277 Hysterical 
anonymous appeals to the Presidium such as this must have made uncomfortable reading for 
Soviet leaders. 
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1.8.2 The Russian backlash 
It is important to note that Russians and Moscow loyalists in Latvia were not passive during this 
period and railed against the plenum decisions. The Presidium placed considerable emphasis on 
ensuring that the Party collectively renounced Beria and his works. In July there were over a 
thousand anti-Beria speeches in meetings of Party cells across the republic.278 There was 
vociferous criticism of the decision to completely transfer office work in Party, soviet and 
public organisations into Latvian.279 There was ‘sharp criticism’ of the most enthusiastic 
advocates of the ‘New Course’ such as the aforementioned Food and Light Industry Minister 
Grāvītis and Vocational Training Chief Trinkler.280 Having lost their privileged management of 
the Party, Russian attendees criticised the abolition of the practice of nominating non-Latvian 
cadres as raikomy second secretaries, ispolkomy deputy chairmen, kolkhoz and enterprise 
directors. 281  Any particular outbursts of anti-Russian sentiment were judged not as an 
assessment of the popular mood within the Latvian Party but as ‘the manifestation of bourgeois 
nationalism among individual managers’. Jelgava Railways Political Department Deputy Chief 
Žilina was one such individual whose transgressions were so numerous that he appears to have 
been singled out for punishment. Polekhin wrote to Khrushchev about Žilina’s activities at 
railway political apparatus meetings: 
He said that Russians occupied the Baltic and that all the Russian workers in 
leadership positions should be replaced. Žilina gave an instruction to accept 
only Latvians into the Party, replace all slogans and banners in Russian... 
conduct office work and meetings only in Latvian. He refused to sign a 
commendation for a young Russian railway worker who distinguished 
himself.282 
Polekhin reported that the Latvian bureau expelled Žilina from the Party.283  The bureau 
concluded that Žilina was ‘unaware’ of the decision of the June plenum and was acting without 
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guidance although many of his actions corresponded with the Party’s resolution.284 Žilina’s 
enthusiasm was merely a consequence of the Latvian Party’s decisions, which were bound to 
inflame local nationalist sentiment. Žilina’s expulsion as a zealot was designed to distance the 
Party from a beast of its own making. 
 
1.9 The ‘New Course’ Reversed? 
There is a significant divergence of opinion among historians and contemporaries as to whether 
the Party halted the ‘New Course’ after the July plenum. Outside Latvia, it appears the Kremlin 
applied greater pressure to curb the policy. Berklavs’s 1972 ‘protest letter’ described the fate of 
the ‘New Course’ following Beria’s arrest: 
In 1953, it was officially admitted that the nationality policy of Marxism-
Leninism was grossly vitiated in our country. But was the perversion ended 
after this plenum? No. The new course lasted only one week. Subsequently, 
although this Presidium decree was not withdrawn, all the intended measures 
were halted and everything remained the same as before. Even more - in the 
national republics there began an increasingly insistent and consistent 
implementation of a carefully thought out programme for the forced 
assimilation of small nations.285 
In his memoirs, Berklavs asserts that the plenum decisions lasted slightly longer, but still only 
‘for a few weeks’. Presumably, he was referring to the period from 23rd June when the Latvian 
plenum closed until the CPSU CC plenum on 2nd-7th July, which denounced Beria. Berklavs 
remarked upon the ‘New Course that ‘if it was realised, then today [1998] there would not be so 
many Russians in Latvia, many other things would be better... I do not know how the decision 
about the withdrawal of Russians from the republics was cancelled but it was not realised’.286 
This is representative of the historiography on the ‘New Course’ and not exclusively in Latvia. 
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David Brandenberger makes the orthodox case, attributing the changes solely to Beria and 
claiming they vanished with him:  
The spring of 1953 hinted at imminent changes in nationality policy and a 
retreat from official russocentrism, [but] they receded almost as unexpectedly, 
linked, as they were, to the brief ascendancy of Beria. Beria’s prompt removal 
in June 1953 denied any of his innovations a chance to mature, let alone affect 
any sort of lasting change.287  
It is my contention, however, that the ‘New Course’ made significant inroads in Latvia 
that were not easily curbed nor completely reversed, though I concede that Berklavs is correct 
that only a small fraction of the Russians in Latvia actually returned to the RSFSR. The plenum 
that resulted from the ‘New Course’ fostered an atmosphere in which discussions about 
nationality were no longer taboo, which had been the case since the mid-1930s under Stalin. In 
Latvia, the real significance of the ‘New Course’ was that it permitted the national communists 
to coalesce, attract interested individuals, and evolve to become a cogent faction within the 
leadership. Some its members rose to prominence even before the Secret Speech in 1956, when 
Khrushchev launched a ‘New Course’ explicitly of his own making. Misiunas and Taagepera’s 
appraisal is accurate: ‘on the whole... Beria’s death did not result in a change in the nativisation 
policy, although it came to be pursued at a gentler pace’.288 Most Latvian historians, however, 
disagree. Bleiere maintains ‘the measures envisaged by resolutions of the plenary meeting were 
not implemented’, but concedes ‘this brief attempt was not forgotten’.289 Riekstiņš, supports the 
conventional Latvian line that ‘after the arrest of Beria... these [decisions] were quickly 
“forgotten”, Latvia’s leaders failed to enforce them’.290 Aldis Bergmanis similarly argues that 
‘in July 1953 the USSR’s political leaders changed their attitude... For that reason, no consistent 
changes happened in nationality policy. The inhabitants of the Baltic republics were still 
regarded as potential traitors and all positions of trust were assigned to immigrants’.291 
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Bergmanis’s statement disregards the key positions secured by future national communists 
because of the ‘New Course’ and that the balance of power continued to shift in their favour for 
the remainder of the decade. The Liepāja gorkom replaced Desmitnieks with future national 
communist Indriķis Pinksis as First Secretary at its plenum on 30th June, after Beria’s arrest.292 
The Liepāja plenum decided to ‘pay particular attention to the issue of local ethnic people and 
their advancement to leading positions in Party, Soviet and economic work’.293 Instead of being 
removed after Beria’s fall, Pinksis held the role until his promotion to Trade Union Council 
Chairman in May 1958. 
A number of historians support my contention. Zubkova, Tannberg, Taagepera, 
Misiunas, Smith and Widmer all agree that the ‘New Course’ was not so easily dismantled after 
the July CPSU CC plenum. Nor do I think that was Khrushchev’s intention. Artis Pabriks 
agrees Khrushchev intended to continue the ‘New Course’, as does Smith when he stated that 
‘Beria’s colleagues never really abandoned these mild, pro-nationality cadre policies’. 294 
Likewise, Zubkova maintains that ‘even after Beria’s arrest and the accusation of carrying out 
the wrong national policy, the “New Course” in practice continued through the development of 
the national language, the expansion of the zone of economic freedom for the Union Republics 
and the liberalisation of cultural policy’.295 Widmer’s line is more moderate. He asserts that 
many of the concessions granted to titular nationalities were not withdrawn after Beria’s ouster. 
The new Soviet leaders were in a ‘sufficiently precarious position to discourage a re-imposition 
of the very rigid controls of Stalin’s last years… regular emphasis was placed on the necessity 
to develop Latvian national cadres and to conduct public activities in Latvian. But from all 
indications the actual state of affairs did not change markedly’.296 At the Union level, Beria’s 
fall ended ‘linguistic prescriptivism’, and the media dropped references to ‘great power 
chauvinism’ or the republics’ ‘independence’. Along with this went a vast expansion in the use 
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of formulas celebrating the dominance of Russia, beginning with ‘great Russian people’.297 The 
USSR Academy of Science’s Institute of History was called upon to renew its ‘study of the 
progressive role of… the Russian people in the USSR’s brotherly family of nations’.298 In 
Latvia, however, as we have seen, the Kremlin did not revoke the policy. Instead, Moscow 
applied pressure to reduce the significance of the Latvian plenum’s resolutions. This formally 
froze the measures, although the Party did not repeal the resolutions themselves until July 
1959.299 
Archival evidence supports the argument that the ‘New Course’ survived Beria’s 
downfall. In Polekhin’s July letter to Khrushchev, he evaluated the progress of the rollback of 
the ‘New Course’ as dismal. From his description, we can infer that Latvia’s leaders and mid-
level officials did the minimum required to appease the Presidium but exerted no rigorous or 
immediate effort to undo the results of the ‘New Course’. 
In the execution of the July CPSU CC plenum resolution, the Latvian CC has 
begun to correct its mistakes. However there is great sluggishness in this 
process; insufficient resoluteness in the struggle against bourgeois-nationalists. 
In Riga, Liepāja, Daugavpils and Jelgava some nationalists were exposed 
among leading workers, but gorkomy did not... take any steps to prevent these 
things. For a long time, the Latvian CC has not considered incoming materials 
about ministers’ nationalist activities.300 
This last comment implies that the Latvian leadership was ignoring Russians’ grievances. 
Kabashkhin likewise protested Latvians’ lack of activity in the struggle against ‘bourgeois-
nationalist elements spreading among the population’.301 
Krūmiņš described another useful episode about the persistent effects of the ‘New 
Course’ in his recollections to the Presidium in 1959. In 1954, he made inflammatory remarks 
of the kind prohibited the previous year. 
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I said that local staff were under-promoted. I must say I have never made any 
speeches about that matter anywhere but in the CC… Why did I say this? 
Because, according to my understanding of things during this time, I thought it 
was wrong that in meetings [composed] of 90% Latvian-speaking people we 
usually used the Russian language.302 
This indicates that despite Beria’s denunciation and with him the ‘New Course’, it was still 
possible to talk relatively openly about the hitherto Stalinist taboo of nationality. Latvian 
communists began to test the demarcations of Khrushchev’s developing Thaw. This kind of talk 
appeared permissible so long as it remained inside the Party. 
The situation began to stabilise from August. There were no more dismissals of Russian 
officials but many of the gains for indigenous Latvians were preserved. Furthermore, Party 
institutions continued to advance the status of the Latvian language without opposition. On 21st 
September, the Ministry of Education recognised the poor standard Latvian language learning in 
Russian schools and that students lacked Latvian grammar textbooks. The ministry decided that 
schools should not be exempt from teaching in Latvian.303 
 
1.10 The Growth of National Communism 
The ‘New Course’ was undoubtedly popular with the Latvian public. This was the first time that 
Latvian politicians gained a measure of popular approval from the indigenous population and it 
affected future policy, as the national communists displayed an unusual responsiveness towards 
public opinion.304 The anti-Russian character of events in Latvia resonated with disaffected 
Latvians who were enthusiastic about being able to ‘punish’ Russians for their chauvinism. 
Enthusiasm for the ‘New Course’ within the Party emanated from its emerging national 
communist segment, which was more focused on enhancing the position of Latvians than on 
pandering to the populace’s anti-Russian hostility, resisting perceived Russification by 
coalescing around Berklavs. There were exceptions, however, as even respected former 
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politicians were caught up in the nationalist furore. The Latvian Presidium received a note about 
its former Chairman, Augusts Kirhenšteins, then Academy of Sciences Vice-President, which 
reported that at a meeting at Riga University Professor Kirhenšteins said that ‘Latvia does not 
need Russians’. Furthermore, Pelše confirmed that at a graduation ceremony, in a conversation 
with students Kirhenšteins ‘made nationalist statements and praised his line of national policy 
during his tenure as chairman’.305 In 1959 as Krūmiņš desperately tried to distance himself from 
Berklavs, he reflected on the anti-Russian fervour within the Party and what he called the 
‘difficult days of 1953’. ‘During that time’ he said, he had to ‘respond not just to very wrong 
actions of young people, but to actions of some old Party members who threw out typewriters 
with Russian letters, threw out portraits’.306 He was referring to Deputy MVD Minister Albert 
Sieks, who spoke Latvian quite haphazardly but who personally broke a typewriter with Russian 
letters.307 
If the ‘New Course’ gave birth to Latvian national communism, the Komsomol was its 
embryo. Six prominent national communists served in the Komsomol leadership in the 1940s. 
Geoffrey Swain considers that the ‘New Course’ formed deep roots in the Latvian Komsomol 
and that ‘the Russification of the Latvian Komsomol was promptly ended in June 1953’.308 
After the official end of the ‘New Course’, the Komsomol ignored Moscow’s dictate. On 5th 
August, a Komsomol bureau meeting called for improving ‘the preparation, encouragement and 
advancement of local cadres with a knowledge of the customs, culture and life of the Latvian 
people and a knowledge of Latvian’. Although the resolution conceded that it was equally 
essential to ‘stop to all carelessness in confronting bourgeois nationalism’ implying not enough 
was being done to root out nationalists.309 Instead, the resolution stressed mass political work 
should be carried out ‘in the native language’ and thereafter, conscious efforts were made to 
stress the Komsomol’s ‘Latvianness’ such as the return to presenting the work plan of its 
newspaper Padomju Jaunatne in Latvian.  
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 In 1959, during the denunciation of the national communists, when Lācis’s addressed the 
Party, he referenced the events of June 1953 and how it led to the creation of national 
communism. 
Beria was soon discovered, his attempt to break apart the people of Soviet 
Union was a disaster, but some uncertainty and nervousness remained amongst 
comrades. Everything settled down but seemingly among part of the comrades 
there was a residual uncertainty, and bourgeois nationalists [the national 
communists], also having quietened down, were apparently waiting it out for 
another suitable opportunity to openly express themselves.310 
Here Lācis corroborates the argument that Latvia’s national communists played a more 
clandestine game after Beria’s arrest. We can infer from Lācis’s words that the national 
communists were waiting for a politically opportune moment to openly promote their plans. 
This moment came in 1956 with the 20th Party Congress. 
 
Conclusion 
In 1953, Khrushchev’s political manoeuvring was exceptional. He eliminated Beria, his most 
serious rival. At the July 1953 CPSU CC plenum he found it politically expedient to denounce 
the very same nationality policy he helped to create. Khrushchev then appropriated the policy he 
blamed Beria for designing, modifying it as he saw fit. 311  Unlike Beria, Khrushchev’s 
nationality policy was subject to purely pragmatic considerations. He went from a strongly pro-
minority position in December 1949 to cooperate with Stalin’s campaign against bourgeois 
nationalism and the Jews in autumn 1952, before collaborating with Beria in 1953. 312 
Khrushchev incorporated many of the elements of the ‘New Course’ into his own nationality 
policy from 1956. Tannberg confirms this assertion: ‘In 1956 Kremlin leaders had not yet 
abandoned the principles of the “new national policy” [of] 1953... As before attention was paid 
to using local languages in office work and in the organisation of Party life and the 
                                                      
310 LVA-PA f.101, apr.22, l.15, lp.27. 
311 Simon, Nationalism and Policy, 230. 
312 Fairbanks, ‘National Cadres’, 155. 
  84 
advancement of national cadres to management positions’. 313  After Beria’s denunciation, 
Khrushchev walked a tightrope as he developed his nationality policy, oscillating between 
korenizatsiia and sblizhenie (the drawing together or rapprochement of peoples) between 1953 
and 1956. From the end of 1953, Khrushchev tried to use nationalities policy as a sectarian 
weapon, as Beria did. Like Beria, he took a pro-minority stance, but with a new twist: Slavic 
solidarity. The Ukrainian people were elevated to the Russian level, being called a ‘great 
people’ for the first time.314 This benefited Khrushchev whose client base was Ukrainian. 
Interestingly, a stance favourable to non-Russian nationalities was not delegitimised by its 
connection with a disgraced former leader. 
The June 1953 Latvian Party plenum marked a remarkable break with Stalinist 
nationality policy. It was not merely reminiscent of the atmosphere of the korenizatsiia period 
of twenty years previously. This was about promoting national cadres, but also about combating 
concentrated Russification efforts. The speeches were unprecedented. With thinly veiled 
ferocity and contempt towards the perceived Russification of Latvia, Party leaders spoke 
passionately in defence of Latvian language and culture and, as Apine phrases it, registered their 
‘smouldering dissatisfaction’.315 What is more, this took place nearly three years before de-
Stalinisation officially began with Khrushchev’s Secret Speech at the 20th Party Congress. 
Therefore, it was an early foray into de-Stalinisation, a ‘knee-jerk’ reaction to Russification, 
which had been an integral component of Stalinism since the mid-1930s. 
The significance of the June plenum for Latvia cannot be overstated though Krūmiņš 
tried to do so in 1959 to the Presidium. He did not want to ‘exaggerate the significance of the 
year 1953’, but even in those personally trying circumstances he conceded that the impact of the 
‘New Course’ ‘created a really difficult situation’. 316  That the plenum’s resolution was 
obstructed but not repealed demonstrates the contentiousness of the policy. Furthermore, 
Krūmiņš recounts an extraordinary conversation (probably in 1957) with Kalnbērziņš who told 
him that he once asked Khrushchev ‘what about the decisions of the June 1953 Latvian 
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plenum?’ Khrushchev supposedly replied, ‘you have made them, and you follow them, and 
Beria has nothing to do with it’. Krūmiņš adds cryptically, ‘later, this conversation affected the 
infamous events of 1959’. 317  Here Krūmiņš concurs that the ‘New Course’ created the 
conditions for Latvian national communism, and ultimately led to the purge of the national 
communists. This also demonstrates Khrushchev’s tacit acceptance and even support for further 
Latvian indigenisation, so long as references to Beria’s initiatives were omitted. This is in 
keeping with the idea of Khrushchev appropriating the co-authored ‘New Course’ strategy and 
using it for his own ends. 
In 1959, Lācis mused about how he thought the situation was brought under control in 
1953, ‘thank god another plenum took place two weeks afterwards [the 2nd-7th July CPSU CC 
plenum] and it put an end to all that. It worried Latvians as well, but they calmed down 
afterwards’. Faced with the same issue of how to bring the national communist leadership under 
control in 1959, Khrushchev replied to Lācis’s statement sarcastically remarking that ‘they just 
appeared to be calm’.318 Khrushchev recognised the common national communist element in the 
events of 1953 and 1959. Krūmiņš certainly thought so. In May 1958, with the national 
communists ascendant, he raised the issue of holding a plenum to discuss the June 1953 plenum 
decisions. The day after his return as Second Secretary, Krūmiņš visited Aleksei Kirichenko 
(effectively CPSU Second Secretary with responsibility for cadres, and Khrushchev’s heir 
apparent). Krūmiņš told Kirichenko that ‘despite some of the costs [of the plenum], its 
provisions remain relevant national policy in the republic’. Krūmiņš considered the June 
plenum’s resolutions sufficiently important and, crucially, still pertinent enough for them to be 
resurrected. Kirichenko supported Krūmiņš’s proposal to hold a special plenum for work with 
cadres in autumn 1958.319 Krūmiņš’s speech at the October 1958 plenum favoured increasing 
national cadres’ representation.320 
Zubkova provides a theory, which might explain the ‘New Course’. She argues that in 
the period 1953-56 the model of incorporation, of Sovietisation, changed. After Stalin’s death, 
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Khrushchev and Beria recognised the attempt to make the Baltic Republics a complete part of 
the USSR as a failure. Instead, Zubkova contends that there was an idea within the leadership, 
in the spirit of ‘the Thaw’ to make the Baltic into ‘another USSR - a showcase of Soviet life,’ 
although with defined limits that ‘could not be crossed’. 321  Considering that the Baltic 
Republics’ achieved the highest wages and living standards in the USSR there is some merit to 
this theory. Such a contention supports the idea that Latvia constituted a special case where 
attempts to dismantle the ‘New Course’ were not as concerted as elsewhere. 
 In Latvia, it proved impossible to quash the national question after the June 1953 plenum. 
Beria’s courting of the republics permitted them greater flexibility over local affairs and this 
proved difficult to rescind. The July reversal and Beria’s execution in December 1953, however, 
ensured there could be no public discussion about the plenum’s decisions. It was not until after 
the 20th Party Congress in 1956 that Latvian national communism could openly take shape. The 
origins of national communism were discussed at length in 1959 when the Stalinist faction of 
the leadership seized the opportunity to attack Berklavs and his followers. The 7th plenum in 
July 1959 described the results of the June 1953 plenum ‘as politically incorrect’ and ‘imposed 
by the enemy of the Party and state, Beria’, and ordered their abolition.322 
 In the summer of 1959, at the 20th June Latvian bureau session, Khrushchev’s 
representative Nuritdin Mukhitdinov blamed Berklavs for the trouble caused by the national 
communists. Mukhitdinov supposedly reprimanded him, drawing another comparison with 
1953: ‘Comrade Berklavs, Beria was shot for similar views. What do you suggest we do with 
you? You have something to think about’.323 Six years later, the issue of Latvian nationalism 
was even more controversial. This time it was Berklavs ‘on trial’. The spectre of Beria’s fate 
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Chapter Two: Children of the Twentieth 
Party Congress: Policies and Structure of 
the Latvian National Communists, 1953-
1957 
 
Chapter One analyses how the power struggle following Stalin’s death and ensuing appeals for 
support in the periphery by his would-be successors created fertile conditions for Latvian 
national communism to develop. Yet, the political rise of the national communists was slow 
between 1953 and 1956, partially due to the vacillation of central authorities because 
Khrushchev’s authority remained tenuous. Similarly, the national communists only gradually 
coalesced during this period, while members steadily climbed the Party and state hierarchies. 
This chapter addresses who the national communists were and examines their origins. I also re-
evaluate the prevalent notion in Latvian historiography that the national communists were a 
collection of individual politicians loosely cooperating because of their interest in preserving the 
Latvian language and culture. While the national communists formed between 1953 and 1956, 
following the sudden opportunities created by the June 1953 Latvian Party plenum, they were 
limited in their ability to enact significant reform until the extraordinary 20th Party Congress in 
February 1956 in which Khrushchev denounced Stalin’s cult of personality to a closed session 
of the CPSU. The profound effects of the Congress gave the national communists the flexibility 
necessary to launch a series of campaigns and policies in an effort to realise their vision for 
Latvia. The national communists used the 20th Party Congress as justification for undoing the 
Stalinist crimes they felt were inflicted upon their generation and the Party. Their cohort 
benefitted from the Congress’s decision, and the national communists were the children of the 
20th Party Congress. Taking their cue from Khrushchev, the national communists unleashed a 
Latvian variant of de-Stalinisation in Latvia. This chapter asks if the national communists were 
pursuing a ‘Latvianisation’ policy with the reform programme. 
The consensus among historians is that the national communists enjoyed limited, 
generally symbolic, success before provoking Moscow. This was purportedly due to their brief 
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period of hegemony and resistance to the implementation of their policies from the Russian-
dominated LCP bureaucracy. Furthermore, Latvian historians criticise the national communists 
for their concern with reforming the Soviet system, not liberation from it.324 For example, 
Riekstiņš sees their achievements as quite limited: ‘Documentary evidence shows that, on many 
points of ideology and politics, they completely supported views of the CPSU CC and 
Khrushchev. Their success in resolving several problems was due to the topicality of these 
problems, as well as widespread popular support’. 325  This understanding, however, was 
predicated upon analysis of official newspapers and dissident reports by émigrés and Western 
academics (though many Latvian historians continue to subscribe to this viewpoint). The access 
afforded to researchers in Latvian archives since the late 1990s now reveals a more active and 
aggressive reform campaign initiated by the national communists, and an equally determined 
counteroffensive waged against them from within the LCP.326 There were tangible political 
effects from national communist rule and though some policies were short-lived, in key areas 
such as migration and cadres, the national communists were successful in furthering their 
ultimate aim of halting the Russification of Latvia. Chapters Two and Three chart the rise of the 
national communists and evaluates the success of the full range of initiatives they undertook. 
The historiography on the Latvian national communists often portrays them as an 
assorted group of Latvians dominated by Berklavs, who gained control of the levers of power in 
the late 1950s and enacted radical nationalistic reforms. This put Latvia on a collision course 
with Moscow and its vested interest in protecting the position of Russians in the periphery. 
There has been little analysis of the nature, composition or operation of this dynamic and unique 
group. Generally, the national communists are assumed to be a group formed on the basis of 
their common military service during the Second World War or during their political training in 
the Komsomol. Artis Pabriks and Aldis Purs write that they were ‘baptised during World War 
Two and indoctrinated with Soviet methods of upward mobility and dealing with dissent. They 
benefitted from a sort of affirmative action for the lowest classes both in educational 
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opportunities and, with loyal service to the Communist Party, in governmental employment’.327 
While many senior national communists did meet in the Red Army and Latvian Komsomol, in 
this chapter I aim to expand our understanding of the national communists and challenge some 
of the preconceptions about their nature. 
  
2.1 Who were the Latvian National Communists? 
The national communists’ odyssey began with the friendships forged during the Second World 
War between Eduards Berklavs, Vilis Krūmiņš and Pauls Dzērve. They served in the Red 
Army’s 201st Latvian Rifle Division. After the war, Berklavs was appointed Komsomol First 
Secretary aged 31. He was permitted to appoint other Komsomol leaders and requested the 
demobilisation of Krūmiņš and Dzērve.328 Krūmiņš then followed Berklavs’s rapid ascent up 
the Party and government ladders as Komsomol First Secretary (1948-1951), then CC Third 
Secretary (1951-1952) and Riga obkom (Regional Party Committee) First Secretary (1952-
1953). Many of those Berklavs and the others established contact with in the Komsomol in the 
late 1940s and early 1950s later became senior national communists. Indriķis Pinksis, 
Komsomol First Secretary (1944-1946) and wartime partisan leader, became Berklavs’s most 
loyal ally. Other prominent future national communists in the Komsomol leadership during this 
time included Pavel Cherkovskii (Deputy Minister of Culture 1958-1959), Vladislavs Ruskulis 
(Komsomol First Secretary, 1958-1959) and Vilis Samsons (Education Minister, 1950-1960). 
According to Pinksis, 10 former Komsomol secretaries were sacked during the purges, 
demonstrating the Komsomol’s role as the crucible in the national communists’ formation.329 
An analysis of the careers and backgrounds of the national communists reveals a complex web 
of correlations and connections. Many were young, committed, ‘true believing’ communists 
who worked in the Communist Party underground during Kārlis Ulmanis’s dictatorship between 
1934 and 1940, which clamped down on opposition. Important figures such as Arnolds Deglavs 
(Riga City Executive Committee Deputy Chairman, 1958-1960), Voldemārs Kalpiņš (Minister 
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of Culture, 1958-1961) and Kārlis Ozoliņš (Presidium of the Supreme Soviet Chairman, 1952-
1959) all met in a Latvian prison in 1935.330 Kalpiņš and Aleksandr Nikonov (Agriculture 
Minister, 1952-1960) were wartime comrades, as were Eduards Liberts (Transport Minister, 
1951-1961) and Visvaldis Vallis (Deputy Agriculture Minister, 1958-1959). 
One myth is that the national communists were a homogenous Latvian group. Instead, 
they were a diverse collection of like-minded individuals from a range of backgrounds, 
ethnicities and ages. Despite the sectarian nature of Latvian politics in the mid-late 1950s, it is 
worth noting that Russian politicians were not automatically members of the ‘loyalist’ faction 
grouped around Arvīds Pelše, nor vice versa for Latvians. Though Latvians comprised an 
overwhelmingly majority of the faction, there were exceptions. Nikonov, born in Pskov region 
on the Latvian border was the senior Russian national communist. Aleksandrs Straujums 
personnel file (Riga gorkom First Secretary, 1958-1960) lists him as a Russian.331 Belorussian 
Pavel Cherkovskii was born on the Latvian side of the Belorussian-Latvian border. Others were 
ethnic Latvians who were born outside Latvia and even Imperial Russia. While this does not 
affect their nationality, it suggests they spent their formative years outside their ethnic 
homeland. Zvaigzne magazine editor Rafael Blūms, was a Jew born in the Baden-Wurtemburg 
region of Imperial Germany. Economics Institute Deputy Chairman Benjamiņš Treijs was born 
in Samara province, Kalpiņš in Smolensk, Riga gorkom Department Head Albert Tseplis in 
Yaroslavl and Council of Ministers Secretary Arnolds Zandmanis in Bashkiria. Moreover, 
Latvians who spent the interwar period in the USSR were not necessarily Russified Latvians 
and precluded from membership. Agricultural Secretary Nikolai Bissenieks, one of the most 
prominent national communists, spent 15 of the interwar years living in Turkmenia between 
1933 and 1947 and before that as Komsomol First Secretary in Komsomolsk-on-Amur.332 
Among the national communists were also representatives of the younger generation who began 
their careers in Soviet Latvia such as Riga Education Department Head Jānis Ģibeitis and 
Riga’s 49th High School Director Milda Vernere.333  
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Historians such as Prigge often claim that the conflict within the Latvian leadership was 
a generational dispute between a gerontocracy unwilling to yield power to a rising young cadre 
of technocrats.334 My analysis of the careers of approximately 100 leading officials in Latvia 
between 1944 and 1962, based on available data for the dates of birth of 81 apparatchiks, allows 
us to compare the median ages of the two factions for 1959, the year of open confrontation 
between the two sides. Interestingly, the generational divide referred to by Prigge is actually 
very small. The average age of 38 national communists was 46.7, slightly older than they are 
often perceived to be. Forty-three of Pelše’s acolytes, at 49.3 were less than three years older 
than the national communists and hardly the elderly old guard they appear in the literature.335 
Comparisons such as the twenty-year age gap between Pelše and the 40-year old Krūmiņš are 
not representative because many national communists were in their late forties or older; 
Berklavs himself was 45. Furthermore, several prominent national communists were 
considerably older in 1959 such as Ozoliņš at 54 years old he was closer in age to Stalinist 
Roberts Ķisis at 63 than Krūmiņš or KPK Chairman Pēteris Plēsums (64). This is in contrast to 
the numerous young Russified Latvians who rejected the national communists and followed 
Pelše such as Agriculture Minister Pēteris Strautmanis (40), Komsomol First Secretary Augusts 
Zitmanis (30), Cīņa editor Ilmārs Ivert (35) and Secretary for Industry Voldemārs Leiņš (39).  
If ethnicity, age, place of birth and residency are insufficient explanations, on the 
surface, the common denominator seems to be that all national communists could speak 
Latvian. Yet, there are even exceptions in this case. Bissenieks struggled with learning Latvian 
upon his return to Latvia from Turkmenia.336 Certainly, there was an element of unity through 
their shared experience in the communist underground, military service or the Komsomol 
leadership in the early post-war years. This background gave these former underground activists 
and veterans significant political capital and according to Smith ‘even a certain independent 
legitimacy’; as such, they were considered the next leaders of the republic.337 Smith believes 
that this ‘left them both susceptible to the mood of the local population and confident enough to 
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stand up to Moscow and Russians sent from Moscow’.338 Certainly, members were aware of 
their dual roles as Party leaders and representatives of their nationality. Consequently, their 
intellectual potential and understanding of conditions in Latvia seriously threatened the old 
guard causing a factional dispute between the orthodox and the emerging reformer wings of the 
Party.339  
Another aspect of the glue that held the national communists together was their shared 
embrace of Latvian culture and traditions. Riekstiņš goes so far as to say the national 
communists ‘shared the higher goal of ensuring the survival of the Latvian people’.340 Apine 
describes the national communists as ‘internationalists, but not cosmopolitan. Their focus was 
on Latvia - its culture, language, environment and people’.341 The national communists stood in 
contrast to the Russified Latvians who wanted to supplant Latvia’s culture with an 
internationalist Soviet culture. The pervasive influence of Russian culture upon Soviet cultural 
development made it especially difficult for the Latvian population to accept the replacement of 
their culture with one so distinctly Russian without a concomitant sense of colonisation. The 
national communists exploited this in their competition with the loyalists for popular support.  
2.1.1 National communist organisation 
The literature on the national communists emphasises the loose and informal nature of their 
connection, defining them rather as a group of like-minded individuals who acted in consensus 
by voting together at bureau meetings and Congresses, and playing down their level of 
organisation.342 That definition fails to accurately represent Latvian national communism. I 
argue that the national communists operated as a definite faction within the leadership. In this 
context, I define a faction as a cogent bloc of allied politicians with identifiable members, 
leadership, aims and ideology. This was not a faction in Lenin’s embryonic CPSU. This faction 
emerged during the resurgence of the Party under Khrushchev, when it was again permissible to 
hold divergent views. According to Apine, the use of the term ‘group’ for the national 
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communists was interpreted as an insult and cast aspersions that they were part of an anti-Soviet 
conspiracy.343 Prigge concurs, using the word faction to refer to them throughout his book.344 At 
the July 1959 plenum, Pelše himself described them as an ‘organised group’.345 King grudgingly 
admits that the national communists were organised but stipulates that this was only the case 
after they gained control of the bureau and the Council of Ministers chairmanships from 1958, 
at least two years later than I argue.346  
Admittedly, in arguing that the national communists were a faction it is necessary to 
note that while they had aims they did not have a cohesive plan for implementing their 
policies.347 They groped their way in the dark, jockeying for position within the leadership to 
enact legislation whose principal aim was to safeguard the Latvian population as a majority 
within the republic, promote Latvian traditions and culture, and especially preserve the primacy 
of the Latvian language, as well as prioritise Latvians for scarce resources such as housing. 
One of the key indicators that the national communists were a faction can be seen in 
how they convened, discussed and plotted to expand their influence, something a coalition of 
independent politicians at the apex of Latvian politics would not do. In his speech at the July 
1959 plenum, Kalnbērziņš revealed how the leadership functioned under the national 
communists. Decisions about many important issues took place during breaks between 
meetings, over ‘a cup of tea’ without an exchange of views among the wider bureau.348 The 
national communists would effectively bypass their non-members on the bureau, deciding the 
question at a break in proceedings, one of them would then propose a decision, and the others 
would vote for it. At the 20th June 1959 bureau meeting Sovetskaia Latviia editor Nikolai Saleev 
similarly described how many issues were resolved in coordinated so-called ‘working 
discussions’ (v rabochem poriadke) that excluded all bureau members except the national 
communists. Saleev explained this meant that the national communists would ‘make the 
decision collectively’.349 He gave the examples of Berklavs’s proposal of a surprise ministerial 
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appointment without any information so Saleev could not express his opinion, and a discussion 
on the question of Russian language streams in schools in June 1959. The national communists 
reputedly said that it was unnecessary to discuss these items at the bureau, because it would be 
solved at one of their regular discussions. Saleev indicated that these private discussions helped 
protect national communists. After one ‘tea break’ in April 1959, Krūmiņš suggested that the 
bureau discuss problems in Berklavs’s ideologically questionable ‘Conversation from the Heart’ 
article. Saleev described the ensuing decision as ‘toothless’. Similarly, a report from a CPSU 
CC cadre instructor seriously criticised the shortcomings of the intelligentsia but after a 
‘consultation’, the national communists proposed sacking the inspector.350 
Another example from January 1958 further demonstrates the workings of a 
coordinated and determined faction within the leadership that presented a platform to the Party 
and lobbied for support. The national communists organised a successful and covert campaign 
for CC members’ votes to prevent Russian Second Secretary Fillip Kashnikov’s re-election. An 
investigation sanctioned after the defeat of the national communists in 1960 used the 
testimonies of several former raikom secretaries including Titov, secretary of Dagda District. 
This commission found that national communist leaders met before the opening of the 15th LCP 
Congress at the apartment of Jānis Kacens (a national communist) to galvanise support for the 
vote against Kashnikov. At Kacens’s apartment national communists including Pinksis, Edgars 
Mūkins (Gosplan Deputy Chairman), Favišs Frīdmans and Anton Luriņš (CC Agricultural 
Department Head) gathered to discuss their strategy, and according to Titov, insisted he vote 
against Kashnikov’s reappointment.351  
In their memoirs, former national communists often refer to each other as ‘frontnieki’, 
literally frontline fighters, referring to the camaraderie forged between national communists 
during their service in the Red Army.352 These friendships bound the national communists into a 
tightly knit faction. After Krūmiņš turned on Berklavs to save his own career at the July 1959 
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plenum, the latter only forgave the former when he attended Krūmiņš’s funeral in 2000.353 
Berklavs did not consider the betrayal merely politics but personal. 
2.1.2 Structure 
The national communists are often portrayed as an uncoordinated group because of their 
informal status. Yet, how else could they operate but informally? This was necessary because it 
was impermissible for factions to operate openly within the CPSU with factionalism closely 
monitored; the façade of unity was maintained at all times. Despite its informal appearance, a 
leadership structure within the national communists is discernable. This is another reason to 
view the national communists as a faction. All historians in the field acknowledge Berklavs as 
the national communists’ leader. Despite arriving on the bureau relatively late, in January 1956, 
he offered the leadership, direction and personification needed to galvanise the national 
communists. Widmer refers to the national communists throughout his thesis as the ‘Berklavs 
group’, Uldis Ģērmanis referred to them by the sobriquet ‘Berklavieši’ (‘Berklavists’).354 
Berklavs was the undisputed leader of the national communists but around him, his senior 
acolytes were sometimes in unorthodox positions within the Party and state hierarchies. 
Krūmiņš was the highest ranked as Second Secretary (1953-1956, 1958-1960). Pauls Dzēve is 
listed as a leading national communist, especially by his enemies because of his role as the 
architect of the faction’s economic plans and the national communists’ ideologue. Yet, outside 
the national communists, Dzērve held more humble status, he was never a bureau member and 
only became Economics Institute Chairman in 1958. Pinksis was the fourth senior national 
communist. He had early connections with the others though he did not reach the bureau until 
1958 (as a candidate) in the relatively unimportant position of Trade Union Council Chairman. 
Outside these four men, the literature differs on the remaining senior members. As 
Presidium of the Supreme Soviet Chairman (nominally the Head of State), Ozoliņš is often 
included as a leading member. Another was Bissenieks as Secretary for Agriculture along with 
his counterpart Agriculture Minister Nikonov. Both held bureau seats and were prominent 
national communists not least because the faction identified agriculture as an area requiring 
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major reform. Pavel Pizāns, editor of the main Latvian daily Cīņa, and Edgars Mūkins, Gosplan 
Deputy Chairman from 1958, are sometimes included as leading national communists though 
only Pizāns held bureau candidate membership. 
Interestingly, many middle-ranking members held superior positions within the Party 
and state hierarchies to those commonly cited as leading national communists. In 1958, 
Berklavs was forced to become a Council of Ministers Deputy Chairman, a demotion from Riga 
gorkom First Secretary. His chosen successor, the 40-year old Aleksandrs Straujums effectively 
held the fourth most powerful position in the republic and gained bureau candidate membership, 
but is considered part of the intermediate level of national communists. Culture Minister 
Kalpiņš was a member of this layer, and along with his Deputy, Cherkovskii, they became 
prominent national communists for their leading roles in directing the resurgence of Latvian 
culture between 1957 and 1959. Many others have been linked with the national communists 
but held lower positions in the hierarchy, often as a CC department head or deputy, belying their 
clandestine seniority among the national communists. Yet, these were key positions because 
they provided representation for the national communists and allowed senior members placed 
within the bureau to effect significant change, which was implemented with less bureaucratic 
resistance in the various departments, ministries and regional offices they controlled. 
2.1.3 Political developments 1953-1956 
The small clique grouped around Berklavs at the end of the war benefitted from the upward 
mobility that existed under both Stalin and Khrushchev. The shortage of indigenous cadres, who 
were necessary for a degree of regime legitimacy, ensured that the Latvian minority within the 
Party experienced rapid promotion. The concerns over loyalties and suspect biographies, which 
dogged Latvians attempting Party careers since 1945, subsided after Beria’s downfall. Those 
Latvians that joined the Party enjoyed considerable upward mobility. The 1972 ‘Protest Letter’ 
claimed that Latvians were not promoted: ‘Many Party, government, and economic officials, 
expressing an unwarranted mistrust of local cadres and lying about a need for security, 
promoted mostly non-Latvians to leading work’.355 Latvian historiography similarly downplays 
Latvians’ ability to ascend the Party ladder. Riekstiņš states that ‘local inhabitants were not 
                                                      
355 http://www.letton.ch/lvx_17com.htm. 
  97 
promoted, but leading positions were taken mostly by immigrants from the USSR’.356 Prigge 
rightly points out the contradiction with Berklavs’s own rapid rise.357 Examples of Latvian 
cadres’ rapid promotion within the Party apparatus in the early post-war years are plentiful, such 
as Krūmiņš or Bissenieks. Prigge is perplexed as to the reasons for this but several are apparent. 
Promoting Latvian cadres made them beholden to the Soviets and there was an acute need to 
bridge the chasm between the brutalised population (who were reluctant to involve themselves 
with the regime) and the Party. Native Latvian cadres were designed to facilitate this and 
present a reassuring face to Sovietisation. 
There was much cooperation between the national communists in their various shifting 
leadership positions. Krūmiņš became Riga obkom First Secretary (and Pinksis and Bissenieks, 
the first secretaries of the Liepāja and Daugavpils obkomy respectively) after Stalin reorganised 
Latvia into oblasti in April 1952. Between then and the dissolution of the oblasti in April 1953, 
Berklavs was a Riga gorkom secretary having returned from the Higher Party School in 1950. 
Since the obkom devoted most of its attention to Riga’s city organisation, functionaries of the 
two committees kept in close contact. Furthermore, during the first year of Berklavs’s tenure as 
a secretary on the Riga gorkom (1951-1952), Bissenieks was Riga gorkom First Secretary. From 
June 1953, Bissenieks as Department of Party Organs Chairman and Krūmiņš as Second 
Secretary presumably became closely acquainted in their joint responsibility for cadres. 
Nikonov and Bissenieks worked together in agriculture after Bissenieks became Secretary for 
Agriculture in May 1954. Upon Bissenieks’s appointment, all four CC secretaries were Latvians 
(the others being Kalnbērziņš, Krūmiņš and Pelše). In February 1955, Lācis engineered 
Berklavs’s promotion to Council of Ministers Deputy Chairman to replace the ‘indolent’ Jānis 
Ostrovs who was relegated to Culture Minister.358 The novelist cum Party leader Lācis enjoyed 
good relations with Soviet Premier Malenkov, who permitted him a special deal: half his days 
spent on Party work and the rest writing. Therefore, Lācis relied on the energetic Berklavs to 
make many of the day-to-day decisions, which permitted Berklavs remarkable freedom.359 
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Ahead of the 20th Party Congress in February 1956, in which de-Stalinisation began in earnest, 
not all the changes since Stalin’s death were preserved. Beria imposed Krūmiņš’s appointment 
as Second Secretary in June 1953 but in January 1956 Krūmiņš was removed. This was 
connected with a piecemeal attempt by Moscow to strengthen control over the republics.360 
Even as the national communists were rising, Krūmiņš’s removal and Nikonov’s ejection from 
the bureau at the Congress suggests a crackdown. Supposedly, Krūmiņš and Nikonov were 
punished because of Latvia’s agricultural disappointments in 1955, which were criticised at the 
Congress.361 Yet, the agricultural link was merely a pretext. An October 1955 CPSU CC 
commission report on the fractious situation in the Azerbaijani leadership resulted in the 
dismissal of Second Secretary Vitali Samedov and his replacement by an official from 
Moscow’s CPSU CC Department of Party Organs for Union Republics (hereafter the 
Department for Union Republics) in November 1955.362 In August 1956, Pavel Kovanov 
replaced the indigenous Georgian Second Secretary Mikhail Georgadze, who had held the post 
since February 1954. It was in this context that Kashnikov was dispatched from the central 
apparatus to replace Krūmiņš. As a concession, Krūmiņš retained his seat on the bureau in his 
new position as Council of Ministers Deputy Chairman.  
Within the leadership, the national communists only gradually assumed control over the 
bureau. At the level below the bureau, the national communists made considerable progress in 
‘Latvianising’ the all-important republic CC. There was a great deal of turnover. At the June 
1953 plenum, Kalnbērziņš stated that 42% of the CC were Latvians.363 Two and a half years 
later at the 14th LCP Congress in January 1956, half of the LCP CC elected at the 12th LCP 
Congress in September 1952, the last before Stalin’s death, were removed.364 . Latvians 
comprised 69.5% of the new CC.365 By January 1958, that figure had risen to 75%.366 
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From the visibly increasing strength of the national communists from 1956, we can 
detect a methodical strategy to supplant those hostile to reform with carefully selected 
personnel. It seems there was a coordinated plan to gain full control of the leadership, to which 
Pelše and his Agitprop Department represented one of the last bastions of opposition in mid-
1958. This organised effort saw dozens of personnel enter the leadership, particularly in middle 
management. The national communists identified vital sectors and strategically positioned their 
supporters in key roles in CC departments, government ministries, in the media and centres of 
economic decision-making. It is erroneous to portray the national communists as merely voting 
in unison on the bureau without any discipline. It was not by happenstance that by 1959 the 
national communists boasted extensive influence and control with identifiable representatives in 
25 sectors: the Komsomol; the KPK; in the CC departments: for the Riga gorkom, 
Administration, Trade and Finance, and Agriculture. In the government: the Council of 
Ministers; the Presidium; the Ministries of Agriculture, Education, Culture, Transport, Foreign 
Affairs, Health, Justice, and the Trade Union Council; municipal control of Riga through its 
gorkom and gorispolkom (City Executive Committee). In the economy: Gosplan, the 
sovnarkhoz and the Economics Institute. Within the media: the newspapers and journals Rigas 
Balss, Cīņa, Padomju Jaunatne, Zvaigzne and Literatūra un Māksla. The reforms enacted by 
the national communists were within its spheres of hegemony: economics, culture, education, 
and chiefly concerned Riga. 
2.1.4 Newspapers and public opinion 
To achieve their myriad goals the national communists attempted to mobilise the Latvian 
population itself in support of their programme. They understood the importance of public 
opinion and hoped to exploit it for tangible political advantage. Berklavs intended to play the 
populist and tap into public opinion in a way atypical for the USSR. Despite the fact that by 
1957 the national communists controlled most of the republic’s print media, Berklavs set up a 
new newspaper - Rigas Balss (Voice of Riga). National communist Rigas Balss editor Oswalds 
Darbiņš, invited Western correspondent Frank Gordon to join his staff. This was to be a very 
different publication, as Darbiņš told Gordon there were to be ‘no eulogies on Partyism and 
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ideology’.367 Gordon recalled that ‘Rigas Balss was from the beginning quite an unusual media 
product that blew the monotonous, mouse-grey conformity of the contemporary press to pieces’. 
He compared it to 1920s Krasnaia gazeta (Red Newspaper), which caused a furore in Petrograd 
during the NEP era. ‘Since those days... no one in the Kremlin empire held anything like Riga 
Balss so hot from the press in his hands’, wrote Gordon.368 Crucially, the newspaper was printed 
in both Russian and Latvian, unlike the other major dailies Sovetskaia Latviia and Cīņa. An 
exceptional graphic feature of Rigas Balss was that the newspaper’s Latvian name was 
transliterated into Cyrillic on the Russian edition and underneath in very small lettering stood 
‘Voice of Riga’ in Russian. Gordon described the layout as ‘extremely “decadent-bourgeois” in 
those pleasant years’.369 As such, Rigas Balss came under fire in 1959 from the Department for 
Union Republics for its ‘intrusive, flashy headlines, which relish some of the shortcomings in 
our Soviet life’.370 This was in contrast to the bureau’s meeting on 17th February 1959, which 
discussed the editorial work of Rigas Balss. The bureau praised the newspaper’s ‘gradual 
strengthening of ties with readers’ and its focus on ‘actual problems’.371 
Berklavs designed Rigas Balss to be the national communist mouthpiece and its direct 
link to the populace. Berklavs used Rigas Balss as a vehicle for his various campaigns as Riga 
gorkom First Secretary, appealing for popular support to overcome the truculent bureaucratic 
machine. In the first issue, printed on 1st October 1957, Berklavs promised to maintain close 
contact with the citizenry and to ‘attentively heed your opinion’.372 Prigge notes that the 
national communists recognised the potential for widespread popular support by providing a 
greater voice for the public on such explosive issues as anti-Russian sentiment.373 Berklavs’s 
most notable crusade was against corruption. According to Prigge, while criticising Party 
policies was strictly forbidden in the media, criticism of individuals, even high-ranking 
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officials, was permissible. 374  One example is Pharmacy Management Chief Aleksandr 
Tumanov. Tumanov had no prior connection to Latvia. He was attacked in Rigas Balss and then 
sacked on Berklavs’s orders for ‘inflating prices, pilfering and poor management’.375 Pelše 
understood Berklavs’s strategy, describing Tumenov’s ouster as ‘a very agile organisational 
technique: take the administrative decision and then shape public opinion in the press’.376 
During Berklavs’s own dismissal in 1959 his actions caught up with him. Kalnbērziņš accused 
Berklavs of having Tumanov removed unnecessarily. Ultimately, the bureau reinstated 
Tumanov.377 
Berklavs used the national communist press to promote, and gain public support for, his 
initiatives such as the residency restrictions. Padomju Jaunatne published an article entitled ‘So 
Riga is full’, which expressed outrage that citizen Troshnikov brought his wife from Velikie 
Luki to live in Riga. The article awaited ‘such a wonderful day when the people without 
residence permits, will leave the city and go back to where they used to live’.378 Another 
campaign began in November 1958, against drunkenness. A debate on the opinion page of the 
newspaper encouraged a large public response including suggestions to remove alcoholics from 
their jobs.379 Unsurprisingly this campaign contained an anti-Russian component. In 2003, 
Berklavs personally boasted to Prigge that he could ensure ‘no Russian drunkard would head a 
kolkhoz’. He was referring to the retired Red Army officers who often ‘poorly managed’ 
kolkhozy.380 Berklavs’s formula was to expose the inadequate work of officials in Rigas Balss 
before officially demanding their dismissal in response to public outrage. One 1957 campaign, 
against rudeness among sales staff, had anti-Russian overtones with poor competency in 
Latvian listed as a transgression. As with drunkenness, the charge of rudeness applied almost 
exclusively to non-Latvians. According to Berklavs, numerous officials, particularly in the 
economic ministries and Gosplan, were exposed and removed by the newspaper. ‘Not for being 
Russian’, he told Prigge, ‘but for not understanding local conditions’. Nevertheless, it is clear 
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that Russian officials were the targets of these campaigns.381 Prigge notes that this was more 
than just a public relations measure. The Riga gorkom dismissed Party members judged not to 
have met ‘high moral standards’. In 1957, 44 Party members were removed on these charges 
and only one was Latvian. The specific charges in this morality campaign centred on problems 
that affected work performance: lateness, intoxication at work and pilfering, or a Party member 
was concluded to have conducted himself in an ‘un-Party-like manner’.382 Yet, this worked both 
ways as ‘immoral behaviour’ assisted Pelše during the purge in dismissing national 
communists. Komsomol chief Vladislavs Ruskulis was sacked ostensibly for public inebriation 
and brawling.383 In August 1959, Riga gorkom First Secretary Straujums received a reprimand 
following an accusation by a Party member that he failed to provide child support to their 15-
year-old son, ‘borne of their short-term intimate relationship’. 384 
Reflecting in the 1990s on the newspaper’s success, Berklavs wrote that Rigas Balss 
‘had a great positive impact on our future work, because we were able to discuss household 
problems and convincingly demonstrate the existence of manifestations of Great Russian 
chauvinism. The newspaper helped awaken Latvians’ self-confidence and courage to fight for 
their legitimate rights’.385 Gordon believed Rigas Balss heralded ‘a new age of press creation’ in 
the USSR, terming it ‘“the Thaw” in black and white’.386 The newspaper style was undoubtedly 
popular; in 1959, Rigas Balss’s circulated 60,000 copies in Latvian and 40,000 in Russian.387 
Berklavs explained that they could have sold three times as many copies were there not 
restrictions on scarce paper.388 Berklavs’s frequent contributions to the paper made him a 
household name and the face of the national communists. Yet, this also fed accusations that he 
was arrogant and haughty. At the July 1959 plenum, Nikolai Saleev attacked him for creating 
his own cult of personality. He noted Berklavs’s ‘aura of fame’ and that he became a sort of 
‘idol’. Saleev said Rigas Balss followed Berklavs’s every step and carefully described his 
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activities. ‘In newsreels, on television, on all tribunes’ he explained, ‘people saw Berklavs’. He 
also quoted an article by national communist Vēra Kacena published in Rigas Balss on 1st 
March 1958. She wrote that Berklavs had ‘such great talent, that he could accomplish any task 
without exception’.389 While it is unlikely that Berklavs actively cultivated a personality cult, 
Berklavs’s behaviour created much enmity and contributed to his overthrow in 1959. 
The people of Latvia were disenchanted with ‘the sacrifices the republic was being 
asked to make for the cause of the larger Soviet state’, as Widmer puts it. Through mediums 
such as Rigas Balss the national communists convinced the populace that they were defenders 
of Latvia’s culture and traditions and therefore they increasingly lent the national communists 
their support. Indigenous Latvian enlistment in the Party grew significantly after the 20th Party 
Congress and contributed to the national communists’ rise. Widmer thought that the 
improvement in Party recruitment and steady rise in LCP membership levels towards the CPSU 
average emboldened the national communists.390 Prigge considers that the national communists 
‘translated public support into real power in the Party... but the faction ultimately failed to make 
communism popular’.391 The national communists were partially successful in using public 
support to manipulate the Party apparatus. Though Soviet socialism would never become 
popular among Latvians, the Latvian face that the national communists gave the Party 
encouraged rapprochement and boosted Latvian membership. The public identified them with 
pro-Latvian policies but they were incapable of making Soviet rule sufficiently palatable to the 
population to make Latvians a majority in the LCP during their brief dominance of Latvian 
politics. 
 
2.2 The Twentieth Party Congress and De-Stalinisation 
Nikita Khrushchev’s Secret Speech at the 20th Party Congress in February 1956 intensified de-
Stalinisation and ushered in the Thaw era in the USSR. The significance of Khrushchev’s 
speech is difficult to overestimate as it had diverse implications for the political development of 
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the USSR, Eastern Europe and the national communists. It facilitated Latvia’s responses to, and 
exploitation of, events in the centre. The Congress altered nationality policy, permitting the 
national communists extraordinary flexibility to pursue their most controversial policies. As 
with the ‘New Course’ in 1953, six months later, Khrushchev struggled to regain control of the 
forces he unleashed at the Congress. The repercussions of the reaction to de-Stalinisation and 
the Thaw in the Soviet periphery and satellites led to riots in Poland and the Hungarian 
Uprising, countries chafing in their attempt to loosen their Soviet bonds. Furthermore, the 
subsequent release and return of thousands of Gulag prisoners distinctly affected Latvian 
society. 
The 20th Party Congress took place between 14th and 25th February 1956. At the closed 
morning session on 23rd February, Khrushchev delivered his extraordinary Secret Speech 
‘Concerning the Cult of Personality and its Consequences’ in which he castigated Stalin’s 
regime. In repudiating Stalin’s methods, Khrushchev affirmed his commitment to observe 
socialist legality and put an end to Stalinist-style ‘barracks socialism’. This put tangible 
emphasis on the republics’ constitutional ‘sovereignty’.392 Khrushchev could not secure full 
control over the Kremlin leadership while his rivals and their client bases obstructed his 
initiatives. The eternal pragmatist, Khrushchev used de-Stalinisation for his own designs to 
undermine his Stalinist opponents. Therefore it was symbolic that the core members of the 
national communists Pinksis, Krūmiņš and Berklavs received special invitations to the Congress 
and thus witnessed the Secret Speech, while Pelše was excluded.393 The denunciation of Stalin 
despite his ‘demigod’ status caught Khrushchev’s political opponents off guard. 394  The 
decisions of the 20th Party Congress initiated the partial liberalisation of the Soviet system, 
including in nationality policy. This was designed to galvanise support for Khrushchev in the 
periphery. 
At the 20th Congress, Khrushchev signalled the return of the powers Stalin stripped 
from the Party. To do this he repeatedly invoked Lenin to portray Stalinism as an aberration that 
should be corrected. Khrushchev echoed Lenin: ‘Far from erasing national differences and 
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peculiarities, socialism assures the all-round development and flourishing of the economy and 
culture of all peoples. It is our duty not to ignore these peculiarities and differences, but to take 
careful account of them in our work in directing economic and cultural construction’.395 
Krūmiņš recalled a comment by Khrushchev’s ally Anastas Mikoian, which had an oddly 
religious undertone: ‘I think that Lenin is present at this Congress’. Delegates to the Congress 
received copies of Lenin’s last will and testament.396 This collection of letters written shortly 
before his death (and subsequently suppressed by Stalin) exposed, among other things, his 
revulsion towards Stalin’s treatment of ethnic minorities. Krūmiņš reflected on the Congress: 
‘We first learned the true opinion of Lenin's union of free republics, on what principles it should 
be, the complete independence of sovereign republics… except defence and foreign policy. We 
learned what Lenin… wrote [about] great-power chauvinism’.397 The revelations about Lenin 
profoundly affected the national communists. Whether as reform-minded communists or 
pragmatists they based the foundations of their policies on Lenin’s teachings. Berklavs 
explained that in every situation he strategically employed Lenin, particularly in his statements 
about Russian chauvinism. ‘It was not that I was a believer in Lenin, but it was the only legal 
way’, he told Prigge.398 As Prigge puts it, ‘Lenin’s words, tightly censored before, now provided 
Latvians with the justification they needed for a full-scale rollback of pro-Russian policies’.399 
Before the 20th Party Congress, the political development of the national communists 
was limited. The Secret Speech offered the national communists their most substantial boost 
since Beria in 1953. 400  Khrushchev’s call for de-Stalinisation dovetailed with national 
communist aims. De-Stalinisation implied a rejection of Stalinist ‘old guard’ apparatchiks 
throughout the apparatus and their supplanting with a new generation of Party cadres. In the 
same way as Beria intended to gain from the ‘New Course’ in 1953, this new, rising generation 
would be beholden to Khrushchev for their advancement and thus would expand and secure his 
powerbase allowing him to become the undisputed Soviet leader. Furthermore, Khrushchev’s 
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implementation of economic, social and administrative reforms offered the republics greater 
autonomy, making the national communists natural allies. The denunciation of Stalin released a 
shockwave, which launched decentralisation initiatives that increased the stature of the Soviet 
Republics within the system by restoring their authority. Thus, from 1956 Khrushchev initiated 
a series of administrative reorganisations favourable to the development of the republics’ power 
at the expense of the excessively centralised management system.401 This was a conciliatory 
move towards the republics, in which Khrushchev continued with Beria’s original plan to 
reduce the nomenklatura and thus the power of the centre. By June 1956, the nomenklatura was 
further scaled back by 9,402 positions, to 62.8% of its 1953 level.402 
The Secret Speech did not remain secret for long. The Latvian bureau ordered its 
translation and 300 copies were produced just two weeks afterwards. 403  The national 
communists wanted to spread the word. Khrushchev’s de-Stalinisation campaign in Latvia was 
unleashed swiftly and with enthusiasm. Shortly after the Congress, Pinksis, decided to order a 
‘cleansing of the cult of personality’. Portraits of Stalin were removed in the Liepāja gorkom 
and soviet. The Krasnyi Metalurgs (Red Metallurgy) factory followed Pinksis’s example by 
swiftly removing the large bust of Stalin that had stood at the factory entrance.404 The national 
communists could only become properly active and openly articulate their programme after the 
20th Party Congress when de-Stalinisation was sanctioned by Moscow.405 The combination of 
their aggressive reforms and the implication that they were marked to succeed the obsolete 
Stalinist generation set them on an inevitable collision course with Stalinists in Latvia and 
Moscow.406 Tensions further escalated after Khrushchev defeated the attempt by his rivals, the 
other surviving members of Stalin’s inner circle: Viacheslav Molotov, Georgii Malenkov and 
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Lazar Kaganovich, the so-called Anti-Party group, to oust him in June 1957. This ended the 
equilibrium still in place after the 20th congress. 
2.2.1 The impact of events in Poland and Hungary and Gulag returnees 
After the 20th Party Congress, Kremlin politicians remained undecided about how to proceed 
with de-Stalinisation: there was no plan for remaking Soviet society. The Secret Speech created 
circumstances that the Kremlin leadership did not anticipate.407 Khrushchev did not provide a 
true assessment of the Stalin era regime, which would have highlighted his culpability. Instead, 
he attempted to shore up his position and outmanoeuvre the Stalinists. Yet, the speech appeared 
to suggest to leaders in Eastern Europe that there were multiple roads to socialism. According to 
Kemp, by allowing for more openness and sensitivity to national concerns, Khrushchev 
overlooked the degree to which Eastern European regimes sought domestic stability through 
popular acceptance, making them more susceptible to nationalist infection, which was bound to 
damage Soviet interests.408 Moscow considered Hungary’s Imre Nagy and Poland’s Władysław 
Gomułka’s attempts to reform their respective regimes a serious threat. The Soviet leadership 
found it necessary to restrain society with repression, as with East Germany in 1953. This 
culminated in intervention with Soviet tanks to suppress the subsequent uprising in Hungary 
and riots in Poznań, Poland during October and November 1956.409 
In the Baltic Republics, events in Poland and Hungary were watched closely. The open 
expression of nationalism became more commonplace in the wake of the Secret Speech and 
more so after the suppression of the Hungarian Uprising. Reports of nationalist activity both at 
the grassroots and official levels mushroomed in the wake of the Secret Speech.410 Amir Weiner 
quotes Baltic dissidents in their expectation that Eastern European rebellions would trigger a 
chain reaction that would sweep the region: ‘[It will be] the beginning of the end. Soon all the 
democratic countries will overthrow the hated system and breakaway from the Soviet Union. 
The unrest will then spread to the Baltics, which will be liberated from the Russians’.411 Weiner 
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emphasises that these instances of Baltic instability were ethnically charged. The authorities 
were aware that ‘in the hierarchy of animosities, ideology and politics took a backseat to 
ethnicity. Anti-Soviet leaflets or individuals shouting in the streets “down with the Russian 
government” and “death to the Russian occupiers” did not even bother mentioning the 
Communist Party’.412 Citizen Justin Liepa drew parallels between the situation in Latvia and 
what he considered a Russian occupation in Hungary. He wrote several letters to Cīņa 
complaining about Russification in Latvia.413  This was deeply concerning to the Latvian 
leadership. Reflecting on this period in 1959, Lācis noted that events in Eastern Europe spurred 
the national communist cause. 
The Hungarian events raised a lot of dust among the intelligentsia and young 
people… [they] thought it was a revolution. Even our nationalists felt 
threatened, [recognising]: “If those events develop here, we will be the ones 
hung or shot”… Some comrades, concerned with avoiding such large-scale 
problems considered the Hungarian events as a negative example. That was the 
beginning of everything.414  
Pelše was similarly troubled. At the October 1957 plenum, he described the period after the 20th 
Congress and Polish and Hungarian incidents as a time when press and culture were lacking in 
Party values, a period of ‘confusion and sailing without a rudder’.415 
The Secret Speech, the Hungarian revolution and Polish ‘October’ all unleashed the 
desire for greater freedom of expression in Latvia, which translated into increased pressure from 
the populace to give voice to its national feelings.416 No doubt, the national communists closely 
observed Gomułka’s Polish ‘road to socialism’. Gomułka made peace with the Catholic Church, 
secured the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Warsaw, and disbanded of over 80% of kolkhozy. 
All of this was admissible, as it did not challenge the Soviet bloc’s security.417 One observer 
summarised the Polish situation: ‘Gomułka has been the model of how Communism can be 
                                                      
412 Ibid, 357-58. 
413 LVA f.270, apr.1-s, l.1205, lp.41. Soobshcheniia iz KGB LSSR dlia 1958. Ob’iasnenie, Justin Liepa, 8 
maia 1958. 
414 Fursenko, Arkhivy Kremlia, 374. 
415 LVA-PA f.101, apr.20, l.5, lp.13-14. 
416 Widmer, ‘National and Communism’, 529. 
417 Kemp, Nationalism and Communism, 146. 
  109 
united with national interests. Lively contacts are maintained with Poland, and Polish 
newspapers have many interested readers in Latvia today’.418 It is possible that Berklavs 
considered himself a ‘Latvian Gomułka’, representing the cause of Latvian national identity. 
Gomułka removed the Russian-Polish Defence Minister General Konstantin Rokossovskii. 
There are parallels in the denial of Russian General Pavel Batov a seat on the Latvian bureau in 
April 1958. Misiunas and Taagepera consider the Baltic leaderships’ reassertion of their 
prerogatives within the system a consequence, as elsewhere in Eastern Europe, of de-
Stalinisation’s psychological impact.419 
The Kremlin viewed developments in the Baltic as dangerous and turned its attention 
there in late 1956. Tannburg suggests that events in the Baltics were one of the factors that 
contributed to the application of repressive measures in Poland and Hungary. 420  In late 
November, the Department for Union Republics prepared a memorandum entitled ‘Nationalistic 
and anti-Soviet manifestations in the Baltic Soviet Republics’. Department Chairman Gromov 
found that ‘in recent years nationalism in the Baltic Republics poses a certain danger because it 
does not received a proper rebuff and communication between local authorities and the people 
is weak. According to some leaders, the situation could be remedied by replacing cadres with 
local-born leaders’. Gromov proposed that the CPSU CC interview each Baltic First 
Secretary.421  
In November 1956, Department for Union Republics Baltic Sector Chairman Mikhail 
Gavrilov met with Baltic leaders. Gavrilov’s report examined the causes of the spread of 
nationalist and anti-Soviet sentiment in the Baltic Republics and found similarities to problems 
occurring in the recalcitrant Eastern European satellites: ‘The intensity of the internal political 
situation was linked to the fact that the role of local cadres in these republics was too small. 
Political work is weak among the masses with [ignorance] of the Baltic Republics’ peculiarities. 
The national cadres question has been linked directly with the Poles’.422 Reports like this 
indicate that Moscow remained acutely nervous about a rebellious contagion spreading from 
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Eastern Europe. The final section of the report addressed the populace’s everyday problems 
using interviews with the public and local officials. Workers complained about their slowly 
rising living standards, the high price of consumer goods, the shortage of urban housing and 
insufficient salaries that did not provide a living wage, in other words, that the system was not 
delivering.423 
The Soviet leadership paid close attention to this report. In 1953, Khrushchev accepted 
that the Sovietisation of the Baltic Republics had failed. Therefore, from 1956, Khrushchev 
tried a different approach, he attempted to improve life in the Baltic Republics and make them 
as Zubkova terms it, ‘the shop window on Soviet life’.424 Riga was opened to foreign tourists. 
Citizens were allowed to exchange letters with their relatives abroad. This ‘Soviet West’ 
received greater investment, resources and privileges than other republics for the remainder of 
the Soviet era. Another consequence of the Congress and condemnation of Stalin’s cult of 
personality was the reassessment of history with special ‘overtures’ made toward the Baltic 
Republics. In his speech, Khrushchev rehabilitated two important Latvian revolutionaries, 
Roberts Eiche and Jānis Rudzutaks, who were executed during the Terror.425 Latvia benefitted 
considerably from this change of tack, though ultimately this ‘soft Sovietisation’ proved little 
more effective than the brutal methods Stalin employed. 
There was no equivalent of a violent uprising in Latvia. The repressions in Eastern 
Europe confirmed to Latvians that the Soviet regime would endure. Instead, unrest led to 
increasing support for the national communists, viewed as the only option for Latvians to 
improve their position vis-à-vis the centre by working within the system. The Latvian people 
grew more demanding, advocating limited freedom of expression, which manifested itself in 
increased concern for Latvia’s national heritage.426 The 20th Party Congress raised hopes in 
Latvia that it would be possible to improve the status of the Latvian language and to limit 
migration, particularly in Riga, because housing construction and infrastructure no longer kept 
pace with population growth.427 
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According to Thomas Simons, in both Poland and Hungary, there were pertinent 
questions as to why the leaderships ran ‘roughshod over local circumstances. The answer to 
these questions pointed to Moscow and raised the issue of national paths to communism’.428 In 
response to events in Hungary and Poland, Khrushchev backtracked on the idea of alternative 
‘paths’ to socialism in his speech to the USSR Supreme Soviet on the October Revolution’s 40th 
anniversary in 1957. If republics could differ in their approaches to socialism, ‘singly, 
scattered… floundering about separately. There would be so many “paths” that people would 
lose their way as in a forest and would not know how to reach their great goal’. Khrushchev 
pronounced judgement on these Eastern European versions of national communism. There 
could be only one ‘highroad to socialism’, the tried and tested Soviet road.429 This was in 
contrast to his previous speech at the 20th Party Congress, promising to respect ‘national 
differences and peculiarities’.430 Kemp correctly recognises Khrushchev was ‘stuck in a cyclical 
pattern of compromise and crackdown. Every time he felt that he was rectifying the situation, he 
unwittingly unleashed new centrifugal forces’.431 This applied to Latvia and Khrushchev’s 
ambivalent support for the national communists. Khrushchev’s quandary permitted the Soviet 
Republics considerable room for manoeuvre. 
In 1956, to Latvia’s west, Eastern Europe was in rebellion, and from the east, another 
external factor confronted Latvian society, the return of deportees. In September 1955, a general 
amnesty was proclaimed for some 200,000 Latvian prisoners, and about 30,000 persons 
returned from various exile camps. 432  Amnesties released 80-85% of Latvians from the 
Gulag.433 More than 21,000 people repressed for ‘counter-revolutionary crimes’ returned to 
Latvia between 1956 and 1957, with an additional 7,022 families, some 18,318 persons, 
removed from the Council of Ministers’ special camp lists.434 After Khrushchev allowed 
deportees to return home, the housing shortage became acute. Krūminš received an instruction 
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from Presidium member Kliment Voroshilov to supply Gulag returnees with apartments.435 The 
Gulag amnesties of 1956 exacerbated tensions and displays of anti-Soviet behaviour, because 
nationalists and sectarian activists were allowed to return to their western republics, close to 
where rebellion flared. Latvian returnee Harlis Heislers caused a sensation in 1956 with the 
publication of his autobiographical poem The Unfinished Song, in which he told of ‘innocents 
languishing behind swamps and gullies of bluish hills’.436 
There are numerous reports about the actions and statements of gulag returnees who 
were quite open about their hostility towards the Soviet establishment. Latvian KGB chairman 
Jānis Vēvers, reported on anti-Soviet expressions from Gulag returnees to Latvia. Vēvers 
claimed 1,000 former members of armed groups and nationalist organisations returned to 
Latvia, comprising 70% of the 1,630 persons who returned to Riga. Despite restrictions in their 
passports, many of those registered outside Riga lived in the city. Vēvers described a seemingly 
unopposed revival of anti-Soviet activities from former Gulag inmates: ‘Among the returnees 
there are many who have retained hostile opinions of Soviet power, [and] they anticipate or are 
already engaged in anti-Soviet activities... Some of them engage in anti-Soviet agitation, and 
threaten communists.437 In the Limbaži district, the KGB reported several cases in which brazen 
Gulag returnees confronted Soviet officials. The Supreme Court reviewed the case of returnee 
Arvīds Lanks:  
Working in the kolkhoz ‘Stanicele’, Lanks systematically disseminated anti-
Soviet propaganda. To the communist Krūmiņš, Lanks, pointing out others who 
share his ideas and returned from imprisonment, stated clearly: ‘See our ranks 
are growing. You Russian black beetle, the time will come when our sparks will 
set a fire, and then we will settle the score with you and take your heads off’.438  
This was a commonplace threat as many statements from vengeful Gulag returnees predicted 
the collapse of the Soviet order. Returnee Hermanis Francis openly expressed utterances such as 
‘Russians out of Latvia’ and ‘they have no business being here’. In an election meeting, Francis 
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openly said to communist Dārziņš: ‘We can probably break you’, and said to Orlov, a Russian: 
‘If you were drowning then I would not help save you’.439 The returnees’ anti-Soviet fervour 
had not lessened. These reports gave authorities cause for concern. With terror curtailed, anti-
Soviet moods became more overt in Latvian public opinion. The rise in anti-Soviet activity was 
linked to, and boosted by, the palpably anti-Russian atmosphere generated by national 
communist initiatives. In 1958, the KGB liquidated 11 anti-Soviet groups comprised of 
students, and in early 1959, seven similar groups were eliminated.440 
 
2.3 Cultural Struggles 1955-1957 
Perhaps the national communists’ most significant achievement was cultural preservation, 
which remained in place after their ouster. Retrospectively, the national communists viewed 
their contribution to Latvia’s cultural survival during the Soviet period as their most successful 
accomplishment.441 In his memoirs, Kalpiņš refers to the period as ‘a time in which the active 
participation of popular forces was permissible’. He described the years 1955-1959 as the 
‘Latvian nation’s era of revival’.442 In the initial post-war Stalinist period, Latvia witnessed the 
direct suppression of intellectuals and the straightjacketing of Latvian culture. This was in 
contrast to the culturally liberalising effect of Khrushchev’s Thaw. The Thaw in Latvia gave the 
national communists considerable latitude and prompted something of a cultural renaissance in 
which the national communists sought to rehabilitate as much of Latvia’s pre-Soviet culture as 
possible. Pabriks and Purs agree that the national communists ‘spurred a revival of national and 
cultural identity’.443 Antagonism towards the subjugation of Latvian traditions and cultural 
heritage, and their replacement by an imposed Soviet culture, increased. Passive resistance 
towards cultural Russification became more apparent following Khrushchev’s Thaw, following 
the national communists’ arrival on the cultural scene. The defence of Latvian culture and 
resistance to Russification was their raison d’ětre. Jānis Stradiņš considers poetry, the fine arts, 
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theatre, song festivals, and other spheres of culture the ‘arenas where most of the battles for 
national identity were fought’.444 
During the cultural Thaw, the national communists made significant strides to reverse 
the suppression of Latvia’s literary heritage. The prevailing notion about Soviet Latvian 
literature was that bourgeois Latvia produced acceptable pieces but post-war publishing should 
concentrate on Soviet Latvian authors. Ozoliņš was the first to criticise this in an article 
published in spring 1954. He attacked the feebleness and formulaic nature of Soviet Latvian 
prose, describing it as unpalatable ‘assembly-line literature’. Ozoliņš’s implication was that the 
Party doctrine formulated by Stalin’s cultural mandarin Andrei Zhdanov (zhdanovshchina) in 
1946, which forced the cultural intelligentsia to conform to the Party line, led Latvian literature 
into a ‘blind alley’.445 
Yet, these early complaints did not produce immediate results. The national communists 
encountered opposition from Stalinist cultural ideologues Pelše and Bumbiers. Pelše’s role as 
Secretary for Ideology included work in agitation-propaganda, culture and publishing. Pelše and 
his allies objected to the national communist’s exploitation of the Thaw to ‘Latvianise’ culture. 
They did not want to focus on pre-1940 Latvian culture and only reluctantly recognised the 
works of the Latvia’s literary greats Rainis, Andrejs Upītis, Leons Paegle and Eduards 
Veidenbaums.446 Kalpiņš, Ozoliņš, Pizāns and Berklavs led national communists efforts to 
preserve Latvian literary, cultural and historical heritage.  
Consequently, a personal conflict developed between Pelše, the ideological dogmatist, 
and Deputy Culture Minister Kalpiņš. Prigge describes the clash between Pelše and Kalpiņš 
with the somewhat exaggerated phrase ‘The Latvian Culture Wars’. Nevertheless, it was a 
serious confrontation over ideological interpretations, émigré writings, and the censorship 
debate all initiated by Khrushchev’s Thaw. Prigge considers that ‘for the national communists, 
culture meant legitimacy or illegitimacy of the Soviet government in the eyes of the Latvian 
population. Whereas the national communists believed that local culture was something worthy 
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of preservation, Pelše viewed it as a dangerous relic of a bygone age’.447 Their first dual was 
over the repertoire for the Dekad, a decennial 10-day cultural event hosted by Latvia on 14th-
26th December 1955 in Moscow. This was an opportunity for Latvia to present its cultural 
achievements in the Union capital. Latvia’s Dekad included opera, ballet, theatre, the national 
choir and symphony orchestra as well as amateur choirs, song, dance and folklore ensembles, 
writers and artists: over 1,000 performers in total.448 The point of contention between the 
national communists and Pelše was over the inclusion of Rūdolfs Blaumanis’s 1902 Latvian 
comedy Skroderdienas Silmačos (The Tailors of Silmačos) in the theatre.449 Pelše opposed the 
play because it exhibited class differences. Kalpiņš believed Pelše’s Agitprop Department were 
too restrained on Latvian classics and the play was important even though it did not follow the 
Party line.450  The local Latvian theatre director, Berklavs, and Kalpiņš refused to relent; 
threatening to send nothing if Blaumanis’s play was not included. Pelše ultimately agreed.451 
The second major clash between Kalpiņš and Pelše came in 1957 following articles by 
Kalpiņš on the value of Latvia’s pre-Soviet era literary heritage published in the journal he 
edited, Literatūra un Māksla. At this time, the press was more lenient and permissive with 
regard to Latvian national traditions. No doubt, this was not only related to the Thaw, but 
because the national communists dominated print media by 1957: Pizāns managed Cīņa; Rafael 
Blūms ran the satirical magazine Zvaigzne; Kristaps Kaugurs headed Padomju Jaunatne; and 
Darbiņš and his Deputy Anna Mūkina edited Rigas Balss. Kalpiņš extolled the works of banned, 
‘bourgeois’ Latvian writers Friča Bārdas, Andrieva Niedras, Pāvils Rozītis and Edvarts Virza, 
and successfully organised the printing of new editions of their work. In a series of articles, 
Kalpiņš even made some positive comments about works of émigré writers. He praised the 
recent relaxation on foreign publications and advocated publishing some of their writing. Like 
Ozoliņs, Kalpiņš, considered Soviet Latvian literature as primitive and wooden.452 
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At the October 1957 plenum, the row between Pelše and Kalpiņš reached its climax. In 
his speech, Pelše attacked Literatūra un Māksla and Zvaigzne for being ‘ideologically 
undisciplined’ referring to the journals’ support for the printing of pre-war Latvian writers’ 
works.453 In response to Literatūra un Māksla’s crusade, the Union of Latvian Soviet Writers’ 
Party secretary Bertse, called for the establishment of a Russian language literary and art 
magazine in Latvia.454 Pelše lambasted the fact that a Latvian émigré article praised Kalpiņš’s 
initiatives, arguing that ‘all our blunders in literary and artistic policies, all [this] ideological 
vacillating is… picked up by our enemies’. He feared that Kalpiņš was weakening the Party’s 
grip on the cultural intelligentsia, noting that ‘some artistic workers are slipping from the Party 
position’. Pelše argued that Kalpiņš was throwing the Party’s position as the guiding force in 
cultural activity into question: ‘Each year in our republic, two million go to the theatre, nearly 
three million see films, millions of people read Soviet literature. Where there are millions, there 
is politics. That is why the Party organisation cannot stand on the sideline of artistic politics’.455 
Krūmiņš, then responsible for cultural affairs, came to Kalpiņš’s aid, stating ‘The 
situation must not be considered normal when the enormous riches of our people’s cultural 
heritage remain in hiding’. As evidence Krūmiņš referenced a number of leading pre-war 
Latvian artists who ‘until recently’ were ignored in Soviet Latvia.456 Eventually, Pelše conceded 
that in the struggle against nationalism there were instances of ‘infringement upon the rights of 
the Latvian language’, but did not deviate from the standard rhetoric that this ‘gave nationalists 
cause to shout about Russification and great-power chauvinism’. Perhaps aware of his eroding 
authority within the Party, when he spoke again at the end of the plenum Pelše attempted to 
placate Kalpiņš, which concluded their dispute.457 At the July 1959 plenum, Department for 
Union Republics Deputy Chairman Petr Pigalev recalled the episode, and declared that Pelše 
rightly criticised Kalpiņš. Piglaev sarcastically remarked that Kalpiņš ‘took over the thankless 
mission of protecting Latvian émigré writers and their readers in matters of Party politics in 
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literature and art’.458 No doubt, these cultural struggles fuelled Pelše’s two-year battle to expel 
Kalpiņš from the leadership between 1959 and 1961. 
Moscow was willing to tolerate a national component in the republics’ culture albeit 
within severely drawn limits. Kalpiņš boasted an extensive list of cultural achievements during 
this period: the preservation of the Dome Cathedral’s interior, the revival of Latvian cultural 
activities in Latgale, the construction of a concentration camp memorial in Salaspils, and the 
Dzintari concert hall’s construction.459 With the national communists approaching their peak, on 
8th April 1958, the bureau adopted a decision ‘On Latvia’s National Heritage’. This provided for 
greater emphasis on the discussion of Latvian cultural heritage including a plan for the wider 
use of the work of pre-Soviet Latvian writers, artists and musicians on stage and in concert 
halls, and the construction of a Latvian literature and art museum in Riga.460 There were many 
other achievements. Latvia published more books per capita than any Soviet Republic except 
Estonia. Folklore groups, folk art and research developed under the auspices of the Emilis 
Melngailis Folk Art Centre. There was a heavy ideological component to the traditional Latvian 
Song Festival but it remained a powerful expression of national unity.461 Finally, the national 
communists successfully secured the lifting of the ban on Midsummer’s Eve celebrations.  
The hitherto stifled Latvian creative intelligentsia championed the national communists’ 
efforts. Egil Levits describes how the cultural Thaw revitalised this drive. The cultural elite 
radically renewed its ranks. Intellectuals who were already prominent during the interwar 
period, along with numerous intellectuals who were ‘victims of the Stalinist repressions found a 
place here’.462 Kalpiņš focused his reform efforts on theatre. In the 1956-1957 theatre season, 
just one out of five plays in Valmiera was related to ‘Soviet life’. This was also the case at the 
Musical Comedy Theatre, the Daugavpils Theatre, and the Opera and Ballet Theatre in Riga.463 
On Berklavs’s part, he worked personally to prevent the demolition of historical buildings in 
Riga. As a Council of Ministers Deputy Chairman, he persuaded Lācis and his colleague Matiss 
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Plūdonis to let him direct the restoration of buildings on Lenin Street (now Brīvības or Freedom 
Boulevard). The work was completed in 1959. Berklavs’s interference in this matter was listed 
among the nationalist charges made against him in July 1959; there was even a proposal that 
Berklavs should pay for the construction work himself, but this was later dropped.464 In 
November 1958, with the national communists politically dominant, to safeguard their cultural 
policy Berklavs secured the retirement of Jānis Ostrovs, a Russian-Latvian ignorant of Latvian 
culture, and his replacement as Minister of Culture by the erudite Kalpiņš.465 Ostrovs was 
demoted to the ceremonial post of Latvian Foreign Minister. Prigge is careful to point out that 
despite the national communists’ notable victories, ‘Pelše always had the final word in culture; 
on this front the national communists experienced as many defeats as victories. For example, 
Berklavs was never able to get streets renamed for prominent nineteenth-century Latvian 
figures’.466 
 
2.4 The Language Law 
Before the Second World War, German, Latvian and Russian were common languages in Riga. 
Yet, by the mid-1950s, a decade of Soviet rule and large waves of migration saw Russian 
became the dominant language in many spheres of life in Latvia. Most political, educational and 
cultural events were held in Russian. The name of some streets, some signs on institutions, 
businesses and shops were written only in Russian. In many ministries, such as finance and 
trade, Russian was the language of communication. The language issue was most serious in 
vital public services such as the police and hospitals. In the Riga Medical Institute, many 
doctors could not speak Latvian, which complicated communication with patients. Russian was 
used in many kolkhozy, sovkhozy and MTS. 467  The problem was most acute among 
management. The industrial sector was the worst offender, in all major cities and especially 
Latgale region. Despite approximately 70% of industrial workers being Latvian, technical 
literature in the light, fuel, construction, textile, meat and dairy industries was only published in 
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Russian. Latvia’s House of Scientific and Technical Propaganda did not produce a single sheet 
of information in Latvian. The Fuel Industry Ministry printed operating instructions for 
machines only in Russian. 468  Most enterprise directors were Russian and therefore gave 
instructions and other administrative notices exclusively in Russian.469 According to a 1955 
Agitprop report, despite Latvians comprising more than half the workers and engineers at VEF 
(the State Electro-technical Factory), political work was conducted mainly in Russian. The 
Agitkollektiv combine employed 292 people, of whom 87 were Latvians, yet visual aids 
(posters, various indicators of ‘socialist competition’) were in Russian. In this enterprise, even a 
letter from the USSR Council of Ministers was read in Russian. The report explains that it was 
no accident that in 1954 the Liepāja Party organisation recruited only 115 candidate members, 
just 35 of whom were Latvians. The report blamed the neglect of propaganda work in Latvian 
on the LCP CC for overlooking it.470 Interestingly, fluency in Latvia’s service sector was higher. 
A majority of staff at Riga’s general post office spoke both languages. At Riga’s bread trading 
organisation, khlebotorge, of 350 salesmen, just 60 (17.2%) did not know Latvian. Of 69 shop 
managers there were only 20 (28.9%) monolingual Russian-speakers.471 
From his first speech as Komsomol First Secretary in 1946, Berklavs complained about 
the lack of effort among Russians to learn Latvian. According to Prigge, it was his priority as 
Riga’s First Secretary to establish that in sectors where employees interacted with the populace, 
command of only one language was no longer permissible.472 The national communists felt it 
imperative to act because the Soviets were altering Latvian orthography to make it more similar 
to Russian. On 5th June 1946, the Council of Ministers passed a law removing the palatalised ‘r’ 
(ŗ) from the Latvian alphabet, and in 1957, the indicator ‘c’ for the palatalised ‘h’ sound was 
eliminated.473 As Donald Horowitz puts it, ‘the status of the language denotes the status of the 
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group that speaks it’.474 Latvian was not dying out but the national communists feared that if 
Latvian were relegated to the status of a rural and cultural language, not only would it adversely 
affect Latvian identity but it would make Latvians second-class citizens in their own republic. 
Letters to Moscow showed its usage declining in the cities.475 With ignorance of Latvian high 
among Slavic migrants, in shops and on the street, Russian increasingly became the lingua 
franca. 
With Berklavs heading the Riga Party organisation from January 1956 and 
circumstances radically altered in their favour by the 20th Party Congress, in winter 1956 the 
national communists were able to enact their first, and arguably their most controversial, major 
piece of legislation. As early as January 1956, at the 14th LCP Congress, there were specific 
calls for all government employees and those in the service industry to know both languages.476 
The national communists realised that persuasion alone would not induce migrants to change 
their attitude towards Latvian. Only an official decree, one that could not be ignored by 
members of the Party, could enforce Latvian-language learning. The national communists had 
another motivation. Competence in both languages would have helped to bring the Party closer 
to the people and lent the regime more legitimacy. 
In summer 1956, articles in support of Latvian-language learning appeared in the press. 
An article in Sovetskaia Latviia by a philologist offered practical advice on learning Latvian 
from textbooks to radio and on self-taught and classroom strategies. He noted that at Riga 
department store the few cashiers who did not know Latvian would soon acquire the necessary 
minimum of knowledge, because the personnel department would soon send them on language 
courses. 477  The Russian secretary for Aizpute District, Nikolai Shalaev (who nominated 
Berklavs for Second Secretary in 1958), wrote an article about his experience of learning 
Latvian and emphasised the importance of doing so. 
For each of us who live and work in Latvia, Latvian language skills should be 
urgently acquired. Particularly Party officials, heads of enterprises, institutions 
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and organisations, everyone who has to communicate with people on a daily 
basis. Knowledge of the language of the people among whom you live and 
work is necessary to listen to people, to better understand their needs and 
requests… But if you don’t want to learn, it is disrespectful… it is absolutely 
unacceptable! We must persistently study not only the language but also 
Latvian culture and history.478 
This suggests a subtle national communist campaign to prepare the population for more 
stringent measures to encourage Latvian language acquisition. 
A resolution on Latvian-language learning in schools preceded the language law. In 
October, the Riga gorkom bureau declared that Latvian language study at Russian schools was 
unsatisfactory. According to the report, students at secondary school level could not converse in 
Latvian. The gorkom decided to appoint a commission to monitor teaching in Latvian and to 
approve funds for schools to replenish school libraries with Latvian writers’ works. School 
directors and Party secretaries in schools were required to pay more attention to educating 
teachers, students and parents in Latvian culture and history, and to hold extra-curricular 
activities in Latvian. Furthermore, the national-communist controlled Riga Education 
Department was to discuss measures to improve the study of Latvian with teachers, Party 
secretaries and school directors.479 This drive to improve Latvian in schools demonstrated 
Berklavs’s commitment to overhauling every sector required to reaffirm the primacy of Latvian.  
It seems action on the language issue was prompted following Krūmiņš’s attendance at 
an Estonian Communist Party plenum in October 1956. Krūmiņš reported to the Latvian bureau 
about the changes in Estonia and drew parallels between shortcomings in nationality policy in 
Estonia and Latvia, among them language and cadres policy. On 12th November, there was a 
heated debate at a bureau meeting, indicating that a resolution on the language question was 
forthcoming. In his speech, Berklavs presented a large amount of statistical data on the 
composition of the Riga gorkom, which indicated that Latvians comprised only a small stratum 
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of the gorkom and its leadership. Berklavs complained about the ‘ever-increasing flow of 
Russians to [Latvian] cities, especially Riga’. He stated bluntly: ‘Riga is losing its national 
identity and is being converted into a Russian city with Russian as the dominant language’. 
Other leaders agreed. Ozoliņš attributed the dominance of Russian to insufficient Party work in 
Latvian and thus the Party became ‘sectarian’. The meeting ended with an agreement to make a 
decision on the study of Latvian and Russian by all employees in the Party, government and 
economic apparatuses at the next bureau meeting.480 
On 19th November, there was another dramatic discussion characterised by 
extraordinary comments from national communists. LSU Rector Jānis Jurgens drew an 
unflattering parallel between feudal 19th Century Latvia where German barons spoke with 
Latvian peasants in German, and Russian raikom secretaries who had worked in Latvia for 10 
years but still did not know Latvian. Krūmiņš claimed that ‘Party activists want to eliminate 
Latvian because Latvians study Russian well, and therefore all Latvians will communicate in 
Russian’. Berklavs openly doubted that a decision on Latvian-language learning would be 
effective. Instead, for the first time, he proposed a two-year period to learn the language for 
‘Russians and not real Latvians [the “Latovichi”]’ and if they did not comply, then they will be 
‘removed from their jobs and invited to leave the republic’. Kalnbērziņš, who wanted to 
distance himself from this sort of dangerous talk, reported the content of these discussions to the 
Department for Union Republics. He maintained that, in contrast to the assertions of the 
national communists, the CC considered the mood among workers quite healthy and individual 
nationalistic manifestations did not characterise the overall situation on the national question.481 
Second Secretary Fillip Kashnikov reported that after the 19th November meeting State Control 
Minister Anton Ozoling, CC Agricultural Department Head Zhukov and other non-Latvian 
speakers approached him and Kalnbērziņš with a request to the CPSU CC for a transfer.482 No 
doubt, these officials feared rising Latvian nationalism, as in summer 1953, therefore it was 
preferable to leave. It is worth noting that Ozoling remained in his position until 1962 and 
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therefore either this incident was exaggerated, the CC denied their requests, or these individuals 
felt subsequent developments were not as serious as they presumed.  
Unsurprisingly, in his report, Gavrilov condemned the ‘non-Party views expressed by 
Berklavs, Ozoliņš and others’. He described their statements as ‘politically harmful nationalist 
attacks’.483 Interestingly, there was no reaction from Moscow to this report; in the spirit of the 
Thaw, the Latvians were allowed to decide how to solve the language question themselves. 
Furthermore, according to Kalpiņš, in December 1956, after the creation of the language law, 
Khrushchev received Lācis, Ozoliņš and Kalnbērziņš in Moscow. Lācis reputedly discussed the 
language law with Khrushchev among other proposals. Khrushchev acknowledged that the 
Latvian government’s concerns were legitimate and agreed in principle that cadres needed to 
know the local language.484 Although there is no archival evidence to corroborate this, it would 
be consistent with Khrushchev’s conciliatory position towards the national communists on 
many issues between 1956 and mid-1959. He approved the removal of Russian Second 
Secretary Kashnikov in 1958 and the Latvian Council of Ministers received permission from 
Moscow to institute a passport regime in 1956. 
2.4.1 The resolutions 
On 30th November 1956, the Riga gorkom bureau adopted a resolution ‘On learning Latvian and 
Russian by cadres serving the general public’. The resolution decreed that all those working in 
professions which served the general public must possess conversational language skills in both 
Latvian and Russian. It affected a broad stratum of employees particularly in the service 
industry, including trade union chairmen, managers of public businesses and establishments, 
bus and tram drivers, tradesmen, utilities workers, housing managers, medical facilities, 
pharmacies, hairdressers, shops, and the militia. The Party was not exempt from the law. It 
mandated that cadres be bilingual. Party secretaries and agitators connected to enterprises and 
institutions were particular targets. The resolution noted: ‘The placement of cadres is still 
unsatisfactory. In many commercial organisations, in enterprises dealing with communal 
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services, in medical facilities... a significant number of employees who on a daily basis are in 
contact with the working masses know only one language’.485 Furthermore, ‘one of the most 
important and practical characteristics’ to be considered in employing cadres was knowledge of 
both languages. Cadres were to take into account national peculiarities in their work with the 
populace and propaganda (slogans, leaflets, posters) were to be published in both languages.486 
The legality and prospects for the realisation of Berklavs’s resolution at the Riga 
gorkom was enhanced by the national communists’ ability to convince the bureau to adopt a 
resolution on 6th December 1956 ‘On the need for Party and Soviet officials and economic 
managers to learn Latvian and Russian’. The resolution complained of numerous examples 
throughout Latvia where business was conducted ‘only in Russian, disregarding the national 
composition of the workers’. This was said to have caused discontent among Latvian workers 
and allowed bourgeois nationalists to incite ethnic strife between Latvians and Russians. 
Directives from the 20th Party Congress on the need to abide by the principles of Leninist 
national policy were used to justify the resolution.487 The resolution accused the republic’s 
gorkomy, raikomy and raiispolkomy of being satisfied that cadres who had worked in Latvia for 
many years did not know Latvian and were not learning it. The statute ordered all local parties, 
ministries, organs of Latvia, and all other aspects of Latvian society, including schools and 
cultural organisations, to begin addressing the language problem no later than 1st January 
1957.488 Crucially, the 6th December resolution replicated the provisions of the gorkom decision 
on 30th November, applying them to the whole republic. Berklavs claims that rural areas 
successfully attempted to follow Riga’s example and create their own specific language laws 
and that the bureau adopted those proposals.489 Despite these resolutions referring to two 
languages, they were principally aimed at ensuring proficiency in Latvian, since a majority of 
Latvians in leading positions already spoke Russian.490 The law required proficiency in Russian 
to make it palatable and not appear directed at Russians. Prigge believes the law was not 
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nationalist in character. ‘While the language policy itself cannot be termed bourgeois 
nationalism, it did signal that Latvia would no longer tolerate linguistic Russification’.491 Yet, it 
is clear Russians were targeted and that the law constituted linguistic ‘Latvianisation’, which 
makes Prigge’s assertion difficult to accept. 
The most extraordinary feature of both directives was that they stipulated a timeframe, 
as Berklavs outlined at the 19th November meeting. They required that those employees in the 
aforementioned professions be proficient in Latvian as well as Russian within two years. The 
law assigned ‘to the Party organisation secretaries... the task of initiating the learning of the 
Latvian and Russian languages among cadres so that they can acquire these languages in two 
years’ time starting from 1st January 1957’.492 An important clause was included concerning 
sanctions applicable to those who avoided learning these languages or failed to achieve 
proficiency within the allotted time. The issue would then be raised as to their suitability to 
occupy a position bringing them into direct contact with the public.493 Enterprise directors, state 
offices and organisations were to assess all new employees’ language skills. The time limit was 
one of the most fiercely criticised aspects of the law. The resolution contained the ironic 
phrasing ‘the bureau has forgotten previously adopted decisions regarding the [language] 
question’, which was no doubt a reference to the previous resolutions about language learning 
that went unenforced.494 Berklavs defended his resolution by explaining that if the law had no 
deadline then it would be toothless and could be ignored or circumvented. He was of the same 
opinion about the need for sanctions for those who failed to obey the law.495 Unlike previous 
resolutions, these were not merely hollow edicts devoid of instructions for their implementation. 
Ministries and large enterprises were responsible for organising Latvian and Russian language 
courses in institutions, organisations, enterprises, MTS and kolkhozy from 1st January 1957. The 
Education Ministry was to prepare and distribute coursework and to develop a curriculum to 
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facilitate language acquisition. This was to be in the form of textbooks for adults and 
conversational dictionaries and vocabularies prepared by the education and culture ministries.496 
The resolution asked the Ministry of Culture to play a role. The ministry was asked to 
allocate funding for publishing newspapers in Latvian and Russian in Maltas, Dagda, Zilupe 
and Krāslava districts. It was to improve musical culture by including Latvian and Russian 
musical numbers in travelling concerts and theatrical productions. A request was sent to the 
USSR Ministry of Culture to change over one Riga radio station to broadcast in Latvian. The 
resolution even took aim at the Russian dominated region of Daugavpils. It declared that a 
‘large percentage of the inhabitants within the city are Latvian’ (though this was not actually the 
case) and asked the CPSU CC to permit the publishing of a Latvian newspaper in Daugavpils 
district.497 
 The language law had enormous scope. It affected at least 30,000 Soviet specialists in 
Latvia, requiring them to acquire a command of Latvian.498 Berklavs admitted that despite 
simultaneous efforts alongside the language law to halt the flow of migrants, the major problem 
remained the overpopulation of Riga, but migrants could not be expelled.499 One detects in 
Berklavs’s language the hope that if migrants to Riga disliked the language law, they would 
simply leave. The language law was not merely aimed at ensuring Latvians could use their 
language in day-to-day activities or to improve propaganda to boost Latvian Party membership. 
It was an overhaul of society and a redressing of the balance between indigenous and Union 
influences on the functioning of the republic. The national communists aimed to radically 
strengthen the Latvian language’s role in public life. Similar to the June 1953 plenum 
declarations, the resolutions stipulated that Party, soviet, Komsomol and kolkhozy meetings be 
held in both languages. Furthermore, these meetings’ resolutions, reports, speeches and draft 
decisions were to be published in both languages.500 
Ultimately, the 1956 Riga language law was a failure. The law existed for two and half 
years and in that time made very little impact. Though data on the subject is scarce, it appears 
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there was no discernable uptick in Latvian language competency. Although the 1959 census did 
not include a question about second language proficiency, the 1970 census did. The census 
revealed that 26 years after the re-establishment of Soviet power, just 18% of all Russians in 
Latvia spoke Latvian, as opposed to the 47.2% of Latvians who spoke Russian.501 
Some historians believe the language law was not a complete failure. It seems the law 
was used to remove some obstinate officials. King describes the language requirement as 
‘probably the most potent lever used in removing or neutralising Russian influence… There are 
indications that it was used primarily to remove inefficient, dogmatic party hacks’.502 Similarly, 
Prigge claims that ‘prior to 1959, a large number of Russians did indeed lose their positions’ 
because of failure to comply with the language law.503 
Yet, by the end of national communism in summer 1959, six months after the end of the 
two-year period stipulated for service sector and Party employees to have gained a 
conversational level of Latvian and Russian, little had changed. A report from May 1959 about 
the situation in the Communication Ministry noted that a significant portion of the Ministry’s 
leaders and technical engineers still not speak Latvian. Of Riga Telegraph’s 226 employees, 144 
(63.7%) did not understand Latvian, including the chairman and chief engineer. The report 
admitted there were ‘formal Latvian language courses, language groups have been established 
but lessons do not take place on a regular basis and attendance is low. In addition, a significant 
number of workers do not even participate in the language programme’.504 The issue appeared 
to be a failure to enforce the law. In October 1958, Krūmiņš enshrined the national communists’ 
cadres policy in a plenum resolution. The resolution required similar measures as the language 
law, that senior officials must possess both Latvian and Russian languages and especially those 
cadres involved in propaganda work. The resolution acknowledged a most unfavourable 
situation in language competency and cadres work, demonstrating that almost two years after 
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the language law came into effect new resolutions were still attempting to solve the problem 
because of a lack of progress.505  
Pinksis lambasted the language situation in Riga’s Proletarian District in April 1959, 
claiming that the trade unions in Riga reported that Latvian workers were not spoken to in 
Latvian. Pinksis accused the Proletarian raikom of not implementing the language law. He cited 
visits by foreign delegations to the district. On visiting the textiles factory Rigas audums an 
Albanian delegation asked ‘why do only Russians work here?’ Their hosts replied that Latvians 
comprised 70-80% of the factory’s workforce, to which the Albanians responded ‘but why do 
they all write in Russian?’ A Finnish delegation to VEF similarly asked ‘is the state language in 
your republic Russian? Why Russian?’ The Latvians officials told the Finns that they used their 
own language to which the Finns replied ‘[then] why is all the writing in Russian?’ Reputedly, 
the Proletarian raikom Secretary Matveev did not speak or attempt to learn Latvian, and at a 
Party conference asked ‘why is there so much talk about Latvian. It is necessary to speak the 
Party’s language, Russian’.506 On 23rd August 1958, the Ministry of Agriculture prepared a list 
of kolkhoz directors and key specialists who did not have a command of Latvian, revealing 63 
such officials could not speak Latvian.507 It is possible that this list was compiled in accordance 
with the language law’s provisions for monitoring language competency. 
This situation was repeated across Latvia with leading cadres unable to speak Latvian. 
Riga’s progress was little better than in Liepāja, Latvia’s second largest city, where there was no 
special language law. National communist Agitprop Deputy Chief Herberts Valters, reported on 
the situation in Liepāja raikom in April 1959. Of 69 primary Party organisation secretaries, only 
10 spoke Latvian. Propaganda work among the population was reputedly hindered because 
more than half of raikom employees did not speak both languages despite Latvians comprising 
50.7% of Liepāja District’s population. 508  Another report on Liepāja from March 1959 
highlighted poor competency in the construction and transport sectors. Of Liepāja’s 318 
nomenklatura personnel, 154 (48.4%) could not speak Latvian. Only half of the 36 Cadres 
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Department heads and enterprise cadres’ inspectors knew Latvian. Again, the report concluded 
that though many voluntary circles for studying Latvian and Russian formally existed, 
attendance was poor.509 
The language law was unsuccessful because it failed to penetrate the administrative 
bureaucracy’s lower levels allowing officials to obstruct the law’s implementation. This 
encouraged concerted opposition from the Slavic population. Substantial migrant turnover 
contributed to the lack of progress because they considered their time in Latvia temporary. In a 
letter to Khrushchev, former Marxism-Leninism lecturer Jānis Dīmanis complained that the 
language law failed because it was exploited through a loophole on the ill-defined level of 
competency required. He wrote: ‘Raikom instructors openly “revolted” at their seminar and a 
gnashing of teeth took place at the Riga gorkom conference. Discontent was inevitable, as the 
decision, through its strict terms, created the tactic of learning a convenient “basic” [Latvian] 
which satisfied everybody, while achieving nothing in practice’.510 Dīmanis continued: 
Public opinion is being strongly manipulated, intimating the CC’s decision is 
due to nationalist pressure… The republic’s Russian press and personnel are 
quiet, the cat has their tongue. They are obviously very interested in nothing 
coming of the decision… The decision on language is being thrown out... What 
sort of CC cannot implement its decisions? The foundation upon which it is 
based and dependent [Russian Party members], isn’t satisfied with what the CC 
is doing… The justification was that if Latvians didn’t want to look like 
nationalists, then they must know Russian; that they shouldn’t harass Russians 
to learn Latvian.511 
Dīmanis astutely critiqued the law’s problems and insinuated that hostility from within elements 
of the Party leadership encouraged Slavs not to learn the language. 
Frustration in the language law’s implementation by no means weakened the national 
communists’ resolve. They continued to incrementally introduce more Latvian into daily life 
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despite their failure to induce Russians to learn Latvian en masse. Levits believes that due to 
national communist efforts, ‘the Latvian language was able to slightly recover its position in the 
public sphere’ but that the ‘decision was not practically realised’.512 Recognising the language 
law’s failure to improve knowledge of Latvian, Berklavs insisted that ‘at least it stopped 
[people] ignoring Latvian’.513 One anecdote that illustrates the impact of Berklavs’s language 
policy was about the nickname given to vodka during the national communist period. It was 
called ‘crystal clear’ and ‘Berklavs’ because the branding no long had no Cyrillic letters in 
Latvia. People asked each other in line, ‘how many bottles of “Berklavs”, 2 or 3?’ While this is 
only anecdotal, at the July 1959 plenum, Gosplan Chairman Augusts Čhulitis revealed that print 
on drinks labels (his example was fruit water) had been solely in Latvian for some time.514 
 
2.5 Restricting Russians: The Passport Regime 
The slump in Slavic migration between 1954 and 1955 is often attributed to the uncertainty that 
followed the ‘New Course’. Migration data indicates a reversal in the torrent of newcomers for 
the first time since 1945. Net migration slumped by 71% in 1954 to 2,200; in 1955, the outflow 
surpassed the inflow by 1,700.515 Yet, there is an additional cause for the abrupt fall in 
migration. The CPSU sought to control where people lived with an internal passport system 
designed to manage migration through administrative means.516 Therefore, to move to, and live, 
in Riga, it was necessary to obtain a propiska, a residency permit. The ostensible rationale for 
the system was to regulate the countryside’s massive depopulation by those attempting to 
escape rural poverty. On 21st October 1953, Soviet Premier Georgii Malenkov announced order 
No.2666-1124s relaxing the Stalinist passport regime across the country by reducing the 
number of cities and regions with passport restrictions.517 A limited passport regime directed at 
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those coming to Riga from rural areas had been in effect since July 1949.518 The Latvian 
response to this decree is one of the most significant indicators that the ‘New Course’ was not 
fully halted in Latvia. On 18th November 1953, the Council of Ministers issued resolution 1187-
s, which preserved the passport regime, exempting Riga from the USSR Council of Ministers’ 
decision.519 This decision was co-authored by future national communist Jānis Kacēns, Council 
of Ministers Head of Administrative Affairs. This allowed Latvian authorities limited control 
over registration in Riga and no doubt contributed to the subsequent fall in migrant numbers in 
1954-1955. This is evident from the passport regime’s success in those years. In 1954, Riga’s 
police arrested 15,000 unregistered ‘aliens’ and removed 2,500 from the city. In 1955, the 
number of removals doubled to approximately 5,000.520 Latvia’s circumvention of Malenkov’s 
central decision in November 1953 supports my contention (argued in Chapter One) that after 
Beria’s arrest Latvia retained a measure of decision-making power it did not previously enjoy. 
The resolution, however, proved incapable of restricting migration in the long term. In 1956, the 
influx surpassed the six preceding years combined.521 Instead, the principle significance of 
decision 1187-s was that it formed the basis of far-reaching and comprehensive decisions 
enacted by the Riga gorkom and Latvian bureau under Berklavs’s direction between 1956 and 
1959, which significantly restricted registration in Riga. 
Riga, along with most major post-war Soviet cities, experienced chronic housing 
shortages. The waiting times for apartments were years; many people lived in poor conditions in 
places not intended as living spaces. In the immediate post-war years, there was little housing 
construction. Latvians blamed Russians for the housing shortage. At a Party meeting at VEF, 
engineer Andrianova said ‘workers complained that many Russians came to Latvia and now 
there are not enough apartments’.522 Riekstiņš claims that apartments were preferentially given 
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to newcomers because municipal housing departments were largely staffed by new Russian 
arrivals, who prioritised other Russians for housing. 523  Even if Riekstiņš’s claims are 
exaggerated, the rapid increase in Latvia’s urban population undoubtedly strained the housing 
stock. Between 1950 and 1955, the urban population increased by 68,100. Over the wider post-
war period, Widmer estimates 500,000 migrants arrived in Latvia between 1945 and 1956 with 
360,000 settling in urban areas. In total, between 1940 and 1965 the urban population 
skyrocketed by almost one million people. In 1959, 73% of Russians in Latvia lived in urban 
areas and comprised 48% of the urban population. By contrast, 75% of the rural populace were 
Latvians.524 By the late 1950s, Latvia was splitting into two, a Russian-dominated urban Latvia 
and a Latvian-dominated rural Latvia. Under these circumstances, the national communists 
tackled both the housing crisis and migration. They knew restricting residency and thus slowing 
population growth would allow for better resource distribution in Riga. Furthermore, such 
initiatives would have a dual purpose, helping to maintain Riga’s Latvian character and 
improving the citizenry’s lives through better living conditions including improved housing and 
municipal services. 
Aware of the aforementioned statistics, Berklavs feared that if something was not done 
to reduce the flow of Slavic migrants, Latvians would become a minority in their own republic 
and this would deprive Latvians of the benefits of being a titular nationality of a Soviet republic. 
Prigge goes further and states that ‘demographic Russification troubled the Latvian people most 
because it threatened the survival of the nationality itself’.525 In his memoirs, Berklavs describes 
the overcrowding he saw in Riga: ‘Shops, hairdressing salons, clinics and bathhouses - lines 
everywhere became increasingly longer. Trams, buses, trolleybuses, people were crushed like 
herring in barrels’.526 According to the ‘Protest Letter’, about 20,000-25,000 migrants registered 
in Riga annually.527  Berklavs decided to use the Soviet system’s controls on population 
movement, in conjunction with his language policy efforts, to his advantage. Between January 
1956 and May 1958, as Riga gorkom First Secretary (effectively the city’s mayor), Riga was 
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Berklavs’s fiefdom. The capital was nine times larger than Daugavpils and eight times greater 
than Liepāja. Riga accounted for half Latvia’s urban population, almost a third of the workforce 
and two-thirds of industrial output.528 Therefore, Berklavs held one of the LCP’s most powerful 
posts and was in a position to take radical action to block further immigration by refusing to 
consider applications for residency permits. 
Prigge judges the economic policies of the national communists as ‘localist’ and their 
motives for implementing the passport regime as ‘nationalistic’ but avoids characterising them 
as ‘nationalist’.529 Prigge concedes that while the policy applied to all migrants, including 
Latvians from the countryside, its intended targets were non-Latvians.530 The deliberate attempt 
to prevent migration based on nationality must surely be a ‘nationalist’ policy. Berklavs argued 
residency restrictions were ‘perfectly in keeping with Lenin’s nationality policies and the idea 
of friendship of nations because Riga could not secure the necessary conditions for incoming 
immigrants’. 531  One seriously doubts such measures would have had Lenin’s approval. 
Furthermore, Berklavs manipulated the passport regime into a form of protectionism. In 
Berklavs’s passport regime and his economic policy, he tried to shield Latvia from All-Union 
concerns. In his memoirs, Berklavs recounted a factory visit. He was making a speech about 
prioritising housing for native Rigans to loud applause. A Russian woman interrupted and told 
Berklavs in tears that she was an honest worker with two children but had nowhere to live. 
‘What am I to do?’ she asked Berklavs. 
Berklavs: ‘Were you offered work in this factory?’ 
Woman: ‘I came myself’. 
Berklavs: ‘When? How long have you worked in this factory?’ 
Woman: ‘About two months ago. I’ve worked [here] for over a month’. 
Berklavs asked the audience to raise their hands if they had worked in the factory for over five 
years and lived in Riga for over 10 years but still did not have an apartment or had very poor 
living conditions. There was a forest of hands in reply. ‘I think you have the answer to your 
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question. If your life in Riga is worse than where you came from, go back! We didn’t promise 
you anything. And we can’t promise you anything now’, Berklavs said to cheers.532 Berklavs, 
the controversial populist, was ready to play the nationality card. 
2.5.1 The passport regime in action 
From June 1956, Berklavs resorted to drastic measures to restrict migration to Riga by using 
Party statutes. He recognised that most hostility would come from Russian department heads 
and second secretaries of Riga’s gorkom and raikomy, placed there deliberately to prevent 
parochial actions by first secretaries. Berklavs worked in conjunction with the Justice Ministry, 
Riga gorispolkom Chairman Vilhelm Lecis, his deputies Victor Kreituss and Aleksandr Timerev 
and Riga’s Police Chief Mecheslav Matsulevich (all national communists) to find an 
interpretation of the law, which would restrict migration. He investigated the legality of making 
propiska more difficult to obtain by complicating stipulations for registration and expanding the 
list of categories of persons not to be registered. Citizens would be denied permission to settle 
in Riga upon their attempt to register as required by Soviet law when arriving to reside in a new 
city.533 Berklavs used the housing shortage as a pretext to claim that Riga could not house more 
migrants until more living space became available. Resolutions stipulated 9m2 as the ‘sanitary 
norm’ (the fixed dwelling space minimum) for apartments and 4.5m2 for hostels to prevent 
overcrowding by non-residents.534 Therefore, by increasing the number of those ineligible to 
live in Riga, enforcing their removal by the police, and preventing new migrants from arriving, 
there would be less demand on housing. Berklavs further argued that Riga had an ample 
workforce and that there was even slight unemployment.535 
To overcome resistance to proposals from Russian officials, Berklavs sought to protect 
new regulations with permission from Moscow. Berklavs prepared a letter, which Lācis signed, 
asking Moscow to clarify whether Berklavs’s powers as Riga gorkom First Secretary extended 
to population regulation. A positive response was received confirming the matter fell within the 
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local government’s jurisdiction.536 This was characteristic of the Thaw period, in which the 
Kremlin was more accommodating towards local initiatives. Moscow was not alarmed by 
Berklavs’s proposals in 1956 and 1957 because of Khrushchev’s attempts to decentralise the 
system. At the meeting between Latvia’s leaders and Khrushchev in December 1956, he agreed 
to reduce the flow of migrants. 537  Moreover, in Krūmiņš’s memoirs he attests that in 
conversation with the Soviet Premier, ‘Khrushchev expressed the need for such a passport 
regime in Latvia’ in summer 1958.538 The unprecedented conditions created by the 20th Party 
Congress offered considerable decision-making latitude to the republics. Berklavs saw his 
opportunity and seized it. When the time came to inform Riga’s district secretaries, the Justice 
and Interior Ministers of his plans, Berklavs cited Moscow’s approval and his legal ability to do 
so in the city statutes. The disgruntled Russian secretaries were powerless to oppose. 
The adoption and implementation of decisions on the passport regime required close 
coordination between Riga’s gorkom, gorispolkom and police. Cooperation among the leaders 
of these organisations was on an informal and personnel level, the way the national communists 
preferred to operate. A folder of the gorkom’s secret correspondence for 1957 contains 
messages between Matsulevich and Berklavs about the execution of city authorities’ decisions 
on the passport regime.539 Berklavs placed Matsulevich’s police department in charge of the 
registration process rather than the district police, whom Berklavs did not necessarily control. 
Together with Matsulevich, they concocted ways to avoid registering migrants. Berklavs and 
Matsulevich composed the text of the gorispolkom’s original decision about registration on 27th 
June 1956. He wrote, ‘we agreed to register only those who not registering would violate 
existing All-Union directives. Refuse everyone else’. Matsulevich or one of his deputies were 
the only officials allowed to register citizens. Every Monday Berklavs met Matsulevich to 
inspect the registration application. Each Monday there was nothing to report. Berklavs noted 
that ‘part of the time more migrants departed than arrived’.540 With Riga restricted, this meant 
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27.7% of the republic’s population and 49.4% of the urban population were covered by the 
restrictions.541 
There were numerous amendments and attempts to gain further concessions from 
Moscow in order to extend the passport regime. In December 1956, emboldened by their 
success in passing the language law, the national communists requested the Council of 
Ministers allow the expansion of restrictions to include those attempting return to Riga who had 
left to reside elsewhere.542 In January 1957, on Berklavs’s behalf, Kalnbērziņš and Lācis asked 
Moscow to extend the passport regime to Liepāja, Daugavpils, Jelgava, Ventspils, and Riga’s 
satellite districts of Ogre and Sigulda. This was because those denied residency in Riga were 
trying to settle in those areas. Those exempt from the restrictions were elderly and sick parents 
migrating to live with their children, the parents of children, students, and a spouse if the partner 
was a permanent resident. Berklavs also pushed for stiffer punishments for passport regime 
violators. None of these requests were approved, though Riga’s existing passport regime was 
unaffected. Taking advantage of Moscow’s lenience, the national communists implemented 
many of their requests unilaterally.543 
In late 1956 and early 1957, the passport regime faced resistance from within the Party 
on the legal basis of restricting migration, as Berklavs expected. Council of Ministers’ legal 
group Chairman S.G. Skobkina, alleged that the 27th June 1956 gorispolkom decision contained 
illegal provisions giving secret instructions prohibiting registration on Riga’s coast and that 
neither the Council of Ministers nor city soviets had the powers to freely interpret passport 
regulations.544 Gorispolkom Chairman Lecis justified the gorispolkom’s actions by explaining 
that the decision was modelled after witnessing a similar decision by the Leningrad soviet 
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during an exchange visit.545 According to Eric Le Bourhis, by invoking the Leningrad example, 
Riga’s authorities considered Riga comparable to Leningrad, with the same rights.546 
The passport regime’s operation involved considerable challenges. In 1957, the 
gorispolkom complained that many citizens without residence permits remained in Riga. Work 
by the police and the prosecutor’s office to remove them was described as ‘insufficient’. Many 
factory managers were circumventing the restrictions by employing workers without permits. 
Housing administrations and superintendents were accused of allocating living space without 
verifying with neighbourhood residential management (raizhilupravleny) that citizens possessed 
residence permits and falsely certifying the size and number of tenants in dwellings. Riga’s 
ispolkomy ignored these ‘gross violations’ and ‘lost control’ over permit issuance. The 
gorispolkom responded with stricter measures. Police officers faced severe punishments for 
mistakes in matters of registration and persons whose residency was voided who failed to leave 
Riga were to be charged with a criminal offence.547 Further decisions followed in March and 
May 1957 and in August 1958, all of which tightened the rules. A May 1957 order denied 
registration to those arriving in Riga for medical treatment or to study on short-term courses.548 
In August 1958, the gorispolkom decreed that Riga’s satellite towns could only allot living 
space with the local raiispolkom’s permission. Employment in a range of fields both 
professional and vocational, and the attendant allotment of living space was subject to the 
gorispolkom’s prior approval. This included government work, including in the sovnarkhoz, 
schools, hospitals, nurseries, sanatoriums and nursing homes. The allocation of land for 
individual construction was prohibited. Educational institutions were required to inform the 
police if those with study permits ceased their education in Riga.549 
2.5.2 The Soviet military and Jūrmala 
To achieve their aim of prioritising Latvians in housing distribution, the national communists 
worked to reduce retired Soviet officers and demobilised soldiers settling in Riga. This followed 
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a wave of demobilisations within the Soviet Army in autumn 1955. In connection with 
demobilisation, local gorispolkom and raiispolkom were obliged to provide officers with jobs 
and housing with their families. In 1955, 2,700 officers arrived in Riga seeking employment, 
while there were 700 housing applications.550 To ensure their needs were met, the LSSR 
military commissar requested that 10% of all newly constructed housing be reserved for 
demobilised officers. 551  About one-third of the 308 officers demobilised and requiring 
accommodation in autumn 1955 had not previously lived in Riga.552 
By spring 1956, of 16,000 families in the housing queue, 2,007 were demobilised 
officers’ families. At Berklavs’s urging, Latvian authorities sent a letter to USSR Council of 
Ministers Chairman Nikolai Bulganin and Khrushchev, explaining that Riga’s population had 
doubled since 1945 but available housing only increased by 5% in that period. They requested 
limits on the numbers of demobilised or retired officers, because the USSR Ministry of Defence 
called for the provision of 50,000m2 of dwelling space but only 5,500m2 was available in 1956. 
Knowing many officers had not resided in Riga before but that those who did might have some 
familiarity with Latvia, Berklavs asked that the right to choose Riga as their permanent place of 
residence be granted only to those officers who had lived in Riga before their military service or 
were demobilised from Riga garrison units.553 A second similar request was sent in January 
1957 but both received negative responses.554 
To Riga’s authorities, the influx of discharged officers with priority entitlements to 
housing was depriving local families of access to residential accommodation.555 With Moscow 
unsympathetic, Berklavs decided to act himself. In early 1957, the gorispolkom and the bureau 
tried to prevent the registration and employment of demobilised soldiers and officers in Riga.556 
Berklavs’s ally, gorispolkom Deputy Chairman Victor Kreituss did not support the LCP CC and 
Council of Ministers’ plan to preferentially allocate dwelling space to officers and enlisted 
servicemen in the Soviet armed forces. In 1957 alone, they requested 20,000m2 of living 
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space.557 Berklavs’s passport regime clashed with the effects of Khrushchev’s 1957 decision to 
reduce the Soviet military’s size, which encouraged a flood of demobilised officers to attempt to 
settle in Riga where they confronted Berklavs’s restrictions, causing considerable discontent.558 
It appears Berklavs enjoyed some limited success in reducing the flow of retired 
military personnel, further earning the enmity of the Baltic Military District (BMD) 
headquartered in Riga. There were numerous cases where military personnel were refused 
registration in Riga. At the July 1959 plenum, Pigalev reported that the BMD repeatedly asked 
the Riga gorkom and gorispolkom to register 200 demobilised military builders who were living 
in barracks and dormitories. Despite Kalnbērziņš and Lācis’s agreement in principle, residency 
was denied because it was prohibited to register demobilised servicemen in Riga, even if they 
had arranged accommodation.559 Of 1,210 retired officers who required housing on 1st February 
1958, near the apogee of national communist power, 369 were still waiting by the year’s end.560 
In contrast, after the national communists’ removal, provisions for officers considerably 
improved. In the first eight months of 1960, 1,312 officers were registered in Riga, 723 received 
jobs and 780 received apartments. A further 350-400 flats were reserved for distribution in 1960 
but this was deemed insufficient. Acting BMD commander General Baukov requested the 
sanitary norm’s reduction to assist in the allocation of accommodation.561 Yet, these figures 
mask the reality that most military personnel attempted to retire to Jūrmala, Latvia’s seaside 
resort town, which gained city status in November 1959 and was not counted in these figures. In 
1960, a wave of officers retired to Latvia. In total, 2,874 officers arrived in 1960 with all but 
242 housed by 1961.562 
During the national communists’ tenure, Berklavs successfully stymied the Soviet 
military’s aims in Jūrmala. Berklavs resisted pressure from All-Union tourist organisations that 
wanted to establish a large tourist centre in Jūrmala. He denied permission for the construction 
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of All-Union holiday establishments, rest homes and sanatoriums on the beach.563 In his 
memoirs, Berklavs derided these supposed ‘honours’, believing their real intentions were to 
facilitate Russification by encouraging more tourists, sports camps and competitions to be held 
in Latvia, which he believed would result in people permanently residing in Latvia.564 The 1972 
‘Protest Letter’ explains that after the national communists’ defeat, a large number of All-Union 
recreational facilities were built in Jūrmala and therefore ‘the local population was flooded with 
masses of Russians, Belorussians and Ukrainians. Riga’s seashore has been converted into an 
All-Union resort, almost no local inhabitants remain there’. 565  The relative wealth and 
prosperity of Riga and nearby Jūrmala made these communities popular retirement destinations 
for military officers. Berklavs claims that the national communists successfully reduced the 
disproportionately large share of dachas held by non-Latvians and military officers.566 From 
1957, newly arrived citizens were barred from purchasing dachas at Jūrmala.567 The conflict 
with the military over settlement to Jūrmala and Riga embittered the military towards the 
national communists. From 1957, they joined forces with Pelše to engineer their downfall.  
2.5.3 Evaluation and conclusion 
Interestingly, the literature deems the propiska system in the USSR a failure in its aim to 
‘attempt to regulate patterns of population movement and urban growth… So long as 
motivations for migration persisted, even the strictest passport regime did not help’. According 
to Cynthia Buckley, macro analyses of population trends indicate that passport restrictions 
exerted only a slight influence on aggregate urbanisation patterns and migration flows.568 Basil 
Kerblay’s contention that the propiska system constituted a system ‘which was highly 
unpopular without proving a real obstacle to migration’ is generally accepted by Western 
scholars.569 It appears, however, that these studies overlooked the national communists’ passport 
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regime in Latvia, which enjoyed considerable success. 
Ascertaining the degree of success is difficult because of the unknown number of 
potential Russians arrivals if it had not been in force. Berklavs claimed at the July 1959 plenum 
that according to the Communal and Public Services Department, 200,000 people attempted to 
register with the police in Riga between 1958 and mid-1959, though this seems a suspiciously 
high figure.570 According to Buckley, passport regimes’ circumvention was facilitated by labour 
shortages throughout the USSR, which made employment easy to find. In Latvia, the national 
communists were aware of this. They reduced labour shortages by curtailing production and 
thus cut demand for labour. Buckley also cites bribes to officials in passport offices as another 
popular path for bypassing controls.571 This is why in Latvia Berklavs controlled the process 
through his allies Kreituss and Matsulevich, who shared his convictions. This maybe the key to 
the passport regime’s success in Latvia: the carefully selected national communist officials 
responsible for managing it were highly motivated. 
We can measure the regime’s remarkable results in the restrictions’ enforcement. 
Within the first month, January 1957, Riga registered only 1,500 new residents and shortly 
thereafter, a ten-fold reduction was achieved.572 The residency balance (the number of registered 
persons in the city in relation to the number of permits issued) reveals a striking decline. The 
balance rose by 12,700 in 1955 before the implementation of the passport regime. In contrast, in 
1956, the balance decreased by 700 people, and in 1957, it plummeted by 10,500 persons.573 
Berklavs triumphantly claims that in one particular month only four people were registered.574 
Prior to restriction operations, Riga saw a net gain of 1,000-2,000 new arrivals per month. 
Within just a few months, there were periods when there was a net loss in population as 
departures exceeded arrivals.575 Prigge concurs, writing ‘migration to Riga virtually ceased 
during Berklavs’s tenure, and continued to be almost non-existent under his successor, 
Straujums’.576 From the many individual cases quoted by officials opposed to the restrictions, 
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the system appeared to be functioning effectively. Pigalev complained at the July 1959 plenum 
that specialists were refused residency. He cited the 1957 case of Romashin, who, after 
graduating from Moscow State University (MGU) was sent to work in Latvia’s 
hydrometeorology office. His registration however, was progressively reduced, first for one 
year, then extended for six months, then for three months, and in January 1959, his residence 
permit was denied. Romashin was fined twice for remaining in Riga.577 Khrushchev himself 
attacked the migration restrictions at the June 1959 CPSU CC plenum. Khrushchev described an 
encounter with a tearful Russian woman during his visit to Latvia in early June 1959. She and 
her husband were not permitted to register in Riga. Khrushchev replied that he was unaware of 
the law (which contradicts Kalpiņš’s assertion that Khrushchev agreed to limits on migration in 
December 1956) and would enquire. Latvian officials reputedly told him they were not 
registered because there were no apartments available, though the woman told Khrushchev her 
family had purchased a home, which led Khrushchev to conclude that they were not registered 
‘because they were Russian’.578  
The establishment of Berklavs’s passport regime caused considerable conflict with 
various regional authorities and agencies, the military and factory managers, and led to criticism 
of the Latvian leadership from the State Committee for Control, the Council of Ministers 
Administration Department and the prosecutor’s office. This friction was a product of the 
extraordinary decision-making freedom, representative of the Thaw, with which Berklavs’s 
alliance of city authorities operated. They decided the criteria of the passport regime and 
determined independently how it would function.579 
The passport regime was not an unmitigated success. King believes that it was only 
partially effective, citing evidence that migrants continued to arrive without proper 
documentation and live in Riga illegally.580 In April 1959, 20,000 people in Riga were living 
without a residence permit. Reputedly, police officers subjected them to fines and repeatedly 
warned them to leave Latvia.581 That figure was higher than the 15,000 unregistered people 
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known to be in Riga in 1954.582 Latvia’s Gosplan set maximum labour limits for all of Riga’s 
industries. Cina reported, however, that factory managers attempted to circumvent this, nothing 
that ‘some people publicly agree with the notion of productivity increase but almost 
immediately run to Gosplan for permission to increase the numbers of workers’.583 
Ultimately, however, the passport regime in Latvia appeared to buck the trend and 
operate successfully. Gross migration (see Appendix A, Table 1) fell sharply once the national 
communists became politically dominant. In a repeat of the uncertainty following Stalin’s death, 
the insecurities of the mid to late 1950s temporarily stymied Russian settlement in Latvia. The 
combination of a nationalist revival spurred by the national communists’ rise, the return of 
thousands of deportees, the Hungarian Uprising’s effects and the impact of Berklavs’s passport 
regime, ensured tens of thousands of Slavs returned to their homelands between 1956 and 
1959.584 For a brief period, the outflow of exceeded the inflow once the passport regime was 
enforced.585 This period was too short-lived, however, to make a dent in the 400,000 Russians 
and 100,000 other Slavs who migrated to Latvia by 1959, amounting to 25% of the pre-war 
population.586 After the national communists’ defeat, net migration to Latvia surged and was, on 
average, over 5,000 a year higher than under the national communists.587 Furthermore, the 
centre fought back and rescinded the republics’ rights to interfere with population migration.588 
In this chapter, we have seen how the national communist movement evolved from 
1953, developing dramatically following the 20th Party Congress, which acted as a catalyst for 
national communist ambitions. The improved political position and cohesiveness of the national 
communists by late 1956 allowed them to enact their most controversial and radical policies, 
ultimately with mixed results. They were also able to launch a cultural revival and harness the 
power of public opinion. Yet, other national communist initiatives on the economy, cadres, 
education and the environment could not be launched until they became the dominant political 
force in Latvia. In Chapter Three, we shall explore how the national communists achieved 
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dominion and exploited it. Finally, the struggle between Kalpiņš and Pelše had greater 
significance. It was an attempt by the national communists to ‘Latvinise’ the republic’s culture. 
Victories in culture struck directly at Pelše and the Stalinists. After the cultural struggles, 
conflict between Berklavs’s national communists and Pelše’s Stalinists could no longer be 
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Chapter Three: The Zenith of the 
National Communists, January 1958 - 
March 1959 
 
3.1 The Rise of the National Communists 
The defining moment in the Latvian national communists’ political history came in January 
1958. From 1953, the national communists began to climb the LCP’s ranks, and by 1956, they 
had made sufficient progress to enact legislation in pursuit of their goals. So, how did the 
national communists come to dominate Latvian politics? They lacked, however, control over the 
LCP, a firmly Russian-majority party. To continue their course and enforce the laws they 
created, such as the language requirement, the national communists needed control of the Party 
leadership. They required possession the LCP CC bureau. The bureau was the executive organ 
of each republic’s Communist Party CC. Jerry Hough summarises its role as follows:  
In the period between plenary sessions of the committee, [the bureau] leads all 
the activity of the Party organisations; it secures the execution of the directives 
of the higher-standing Party organs; it gives instructions on the most important 
economic, cultural, and Party questions; it selects and confirms a defined circle 
of officials; and it examines and decides cases concerning the personal 
behaviour of communists.589 
Prigge describes the Latvian bureau in the 1950s as ‘an example of true collective leadership 
and Soviet democracy’ and states that ‘all bureau decisions were reached democratically with 
actual votes’. 590  Therefore, a majority in the Latvian bureau was vital for the national 
communists to be able to push through their radical agenda. The bureau consisted of between 
10-14 full members and 1-5 candidate members (who could not vote but were able to join and 
shape the debate). In 1957, the national communists held four full seats and one candidate seat 
on the bureau. Their opponents, grouped around Pelše, held three seats and a candidate. The 
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other five members were neutral. Those who would become national communists numbered 
approximately one-third of the bureau from the early 1950s.591  
In 1958, the national communists strove to take control of the bureau by removing their 
opposition and replacing them with other national communists. This would have allowed the 
national communists to install increasing numbers of national communists in key positions 
throughout the Latvian Party and state. Thus, they sought to impose their pro-Latvian 
programme on a Party in which non-Latvians represented 63.4% of membership in 1958.592 The 
principal bureau positions included the Council of Ministers Chairman (effectively the Prime 
Minister), the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet Chairman (the nominal head of state) and the 
Riga gorkom First Secretary. Nominally, the most important position on the bureau was the 
First Secretary, the republic’s most significant Party representative and invariably of the titular 
nationality. In many ways, however, the Second Secretary surpassed the First. Selected by 
Moscow and nominally approved by the republic’s CC, the Second Secretary played an 
important role on the centre’s behalf, keeping a check on the Union Republic’s First Secretary, 
as an advisor, mediator, and interpreter of Moscow’s guidelines. Until 1958, with the exception 
of Krūmiņš between June 1953 and January 1956, the Second Secretary in post-war Latvia was 
a Russian, and in the case of Ivan Lebedev and Fedor Titov, a Stalinist hardliner. From January 
1956, Moscow returned to the practice of appointing a Russian as Second Secretary in Latvia.593 
Krūmiņš’s successor, Fillip Kashnikov, was a typical apparatchik: previously he served as Third 
Secretary in post-war Moldavia, Second Secretary of the Buriat-Mongol obkom and as a CPSU 
CC inspector.  
With the national communists’ rise, the bureau became increasingly polarised, and 
especially after Berklavs’s entry in 1956, there was no consensus. The Party divided along 
factional lines. Kalnbērziņš maintained neutrality but leaned towards opposing the national 
communists. Lācis also performed a balancing act but favoured the national communists with 
whom he was connected by marriage (his wife Velta was Kalpiņš’s sister). Pelše could rely on 
the support of Aleksandr Gorbatov, the Russian general representing the BMD, one or two 
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candidate members, and Kashnikov. In January 1958, the national communists controlled only 
two of the senior positions through Berklavs and Presidium Chairman Ozoliņš. 
3.1.1 The fall of Fillip Kashnikov  
In January 1958, conditions were favourable for the national communists, who received positive 
signals from Khrushchev after the Anti-Party purges. The national communists made an 
ambitious attempt to replace Kashnikov with one of their own and challenge the existing order. 
Usually a Congress rubberstamped the election of a new CC, but this was not the case at the 15th 
LCP Congress. In a stunning display of Party democracy in action, on 25th January, Pelše and 
Kashnikov received an unprecedentedly high number of ‘no’ votes for their election to the 91-
person CC. Of 653 delegates, Pelše received 67 ‘no’ votes with his allies tallying similar 
numbers, for example, Augusts Voss’s ‘no’ votes totalled 62. The real shock was Kashnikov’s 
‘rejection’: 223 ‘no’ votes, some 34.1% of delegates.594 This was highly irregular; normally ‘no’ 
votes for a candidate did not exceed 10-12. By comparison, Berklavs himself received 31 ‘no’ 
votes as did Krūmiņš, and other national communists only a handful. Despite the sizeable 
opposition, Pelše and Kashnikov still received a majority of the Congress’s votes and were duly 
elected. It is worth noting that there was no real alternative in the Soviet system as there were 91 
candidates for 91 seats. Yet, this was an extraordinary vote of no confidence in Pelše’s 
conservative hardliners. According to Berklavs, Pelše received numerous ‘no’ votes at the 
January Congress because of his negative attitude towards Latvia’s cultural heritage and 
traditions and his well-known servility to Moscow; it was well-documented that he was a ‘man 
of the bureau’ who rarely made visits to factories, let alone rural areas.595 Some of the LCP’s 
wider leadership became receptive to the national communists’ ideas, emboldened by the 
atmosphere of Khrushchev’s Thaw. 
With Kashnikov’s authority undermined, the national communists seized the 
opportunity to exploit his weakness at the January CC plenum immediately following the 15th 
Congress, thus testing the Party’s rules on democratic centralism for the second time that week. 
Once the Congress elected the CC, the first order of business was the election of CC secretaries. 
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Then Moscow confirmed the appointments to senior positions such as first and second 
secretaries. As usual, Kalnbērziņš was re-elected First Secretary unopposed and unanimously. 
The election continued:  
Kalnbērziņš: ‘We need to elect the remaining CC secretaries. In spite of the 
circumstances, I believe that it is necessary to elect Comrade Kashnikov as 
Second Secretary. What is the committee’s opinion?’ 
Nikolai Shalaev (Aizpute District Secretary): ‘I believe Kashnikov might not be 
completely comfortable with his own nomination, instead of Kashnikov I would 
recommend Comrade Berklavs for Second Secretary’. 
Surprised by the suggestion, Kalnbērziņš answered frankly: ‘What are the opinions on this 
question? We have a large stratum [prosloika] of Russian communists, if a Russian comrade is 
not elected, is it acceptable?’ Attempting to divert his own question, Kalnbērziņš suggested 
further consideration as to whether this was correct. 
Pēteris Plēsums (KPK Chairman): ‘I suggest Comrade Shalaev. He is a Russian 
comrade; he has long worked for the Party and fully deserves to be elected 
Secretary of the Communist Party. He deserves this’. 
Kalnbērziņš then attempted to postpone the vote but the Central Committee demanded an 
answer.  
Kalnbērziņš: ‘Maybe because we have difficulties in this regard, we should 
delay resolution of this issue’. 
From the audience: ‘We need to vote’. 
Again, Kalnbērziņš proposed Kashnikov’s candidacy.  
Kalnbērziņš: ‘Who is for Kashnikov’s election as Second Secretary? Please 
vote. Who is against? Very few. Abstaining? A few’. 
With under a third of the CC members’ hands up in favour, members shouted that the votes 
needed counting. Kalnbērziņš was forced to ask for a proper count and conceded that there was 
no majority.  
  149 
Kalnbērziņš: ‘Very well. Comrade El’vikh counts the right side, and Comrade 
Strautmanis the left side. Who is in favour of electing Kashnikov Second 
Secretary, please raise your hand’. 
Twenty-seven votes were recorded in favour of Kashnikov and 31 against. In the circumstances 
of this highly unorthodox vote, 33 members chose to remain neutral and abstain. Kalnbērziņš 
was then forced to offer Berklavs as a candidate. Berklavs received 32 votes for, 12 votes 
against, and 47 abstentions from wary members. Despite Berklavs receiving more votes than 
Kashnikov, Kalnbērziņš yet again tried to delay the Second Secretary’s selection, presumably 
because he feared Moscow’s reaction to the preordained candidate’s rejection. ‘Comrades’, he 
said, ‘Let’s elect the [other] secretaries, and then the Second Secretary’. Finally, Lācis 
intervened and proposed that the plenum leave the question of electing a Second Secretary open 
and the CC agreed.596 The CC did not endorse Kashnikov. Flustered, Kalnbērziņš declared 
‘meeting adjourned’ and was the first out of the hall. This was the most extraordinary plenum 
since June 1953. In an unparalleled move, the CC used the Party’s rules to prevent the 
reinstallation of Moscow’s nominee. The significance of this was enormous: as Berklavs put it, 
‘nothing like that had ever happened in Latvia or elsewhere’.597 
 Stunned by their victory, Berklavs and some of his colleagues, including Pinksis, 
Krūmiņš, Kacens and Pizāns, left the meeting last and walked the streets. In his memoirs, 
Berklavs claimed that he had a reputation in Moscow as a troublemaker and believed that 
Moscow and the Latvian Stalinists would never tolerate his elevation to Second Secretary.598 
Prigge believes archival evidence supports Berklavs’s self-portrayal as ‘an uncompromising 
maverick’. He points to Berklavs’s speech to the 14th LCP Congress in January 1956 in which 
he openly lambasted the Party for skewing statistics in reports and demanded to know why.599 
This portrait of Berklavs suited his interpretation of his own dismissal in 1959 and in the post-
Soviet period helped him distance himself from allegations of collaboration. Despite his 
controversial policies, Berklavs was exaggerating his rebelliousness. There is evidence to 
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suggest that in 1958 Berklavs did not actually have a reputation as a renegade. At 20th June 
1959 bureau meeting, Kalnbērziņš revealed that Berklavs was marked to join the CC apparatus 
in the Soviet capital in the future.600 Furthermore, the ailing Lācis designated his Deputy 
Berklavs as heir apparent for the post of Council of Ministers Chairman.601 This suggests that, 
contrary to Berklavs’s assumptions, his foray into national communism had not damaged his 
reputation and the Soviet upper echelons regarded him highly until early 1959.  
Rather than endorsing himself, Berklavs suggested Krūmiņš as a compromise 
candidate. The question was if Moscow would accept the offer. Krūmiņš was a more tactful and 
able negotiator than Berklavs. Kalnbērziņš and Moscow’s representative agreed.602 According 
to Krūmiņš, when the Department for Union Republics’ Baltic Sector learned of Kashnikov’s 
removal, it turned to Khrushchev for guidance. Responding to Kashnikov’s being ‘rolled over’ 
(prokatili) Khrushchev said that it was not necessary to send anyone to Riga, but to let the 
Latvians decide for themselves whom to nominate.603 This reaction should be interpreted as a 
display of trust, as evidence that Khrushchev considered the Latvians responsible. At the April 
1958 plenum, Krūmīņš was elected Second Secretary (the post was vacant for almost four 
months), reclaiming the position he lost in January 1956. 604  Kashnikov’s dismissal and 
Krūmiņš’s return to the post demonstrated that the Latvians had won leverage in their 
relationship with Moscow. 
Kashnikov’s unpopularity partially explains why the CC ousted him. According to 
Krūmiņš, Kashnikov could not cope with his responsibilities. Raikomy secretaries nicknamed 
him ‘porridge’.605 Many of the votes against Kashnikov can be attributed to these raikom and 
gorkom level secretaries from outside the bureau and secretariat. Even Kashnikov’s original 
election at the 14th LCP Congress in January 1956 was not unanimous. From 575 delegates, 
there were 44 dissenting votes.606 With his political career in tatters, Kashnikov left Latvia to 
become Director of the All-Union Agricultural Institute of Correspondence Education. The 
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significance of Kashnikov’s rejection went far beyond the removal of an incompetent 
apparatchik. This was a rebuff to Moscow and the imposition of a Second Secretary with no 
connection to Latvia. Berklavs believed Kashnikov was ousted because he ‘did not know the 
Latvian land, its people, its language, culture or tradition’.607 Yet, it is inconceivable that such a 
rebellious vote was a spontaneous rejection. Instead, as we saw in Chapter Two, leading 
national communists covertly campaigned among CC members for this outcome. 
3.1.2 The aftermath 
Kashnikov’s ouster was not, however, an absolute victory for the national communists. Pelše, 
Kashnikov and Kalnbērziņš wanted some ‘compensation’, as Berklavs put it, for conceding that 
the Second Secretary would be a non-Russian.608 Pelše and Kalnbērziņš had already attempted 
to depose Berklavs as Riga gorkom First Secretary in 1957 in the hopes that his language and 
residency efforts would be curtailed without him.609 Berklavs was summoned to Moscow and 
pressured into accepting a deal where he would leave the gorkom and take up Krūmiņš’s vacant 
Council of Ministers Deputy Chairmanship (the precise position Berklavs left in February 1955 
for the gorkom leadership and effectively a demotion). In his new role, Berklavs oversaw 22 
different ministries, including the Education and Culture Ministries and the Academy of 
Sciences, all institutions that subsequently fell under national communist control.610 Crucially, 
Berklavs managed to negotiate that he remain on the bureau. This was unusual because 
normally only the Chairman (Lācis) and First Deputy (Plūdonis) sat on the bureau. Berklavs 
retained supervision over the Riga gorispolkom (an oversight on Pelše’s part as this allowed 
Berklavs to keep his residency restrictions in place), and he selected his successor. He chose the 
young national communist Aleksandrs Straujums to replace him as Riga gorkom First Secretary. 
Furthermore, Berklavs was aware of Lācis’s poor health and admits in his memoirs that he 
aspired to eventually succeed him as Council of Ministers Chairman.611 
Widmer believed that the rejection of Moscow’s candidate crossed a firm line, that if 
‘one event can be singled out, that was the one that opened the floodgates for the events to 
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follow’.612 At the April plenum, which elected Krūmiņš, he was the only candidate and as such, 
Pelše left the plenum with a ‘very unpleasant impression’.613  Pelše survived the January 
Congress but his sizeable number of ‘no’ votes and the loss of Kashnikov weakened him. 
Furthermore, despite being twenty years Krūmiņš’s senior, a CC secretary, and bureau member 
since 1941, Pelše was leapfrogged by Krūmiņš for the second time. It is clear Khrushchev did 
not favour Pelše because he was passed over for a younger and less experienced bureau 
member. The younger generation, embodied by the national communists, surpassed Pelše in 
both official positions and real influence, writes Prigge.614 In May 1958, Aleksei Kirichenko, 
Presidium member responsible for cadres, reassured Krūmiņš upon his election as Second 
Secretary that his return to the Latvian CC was a long-term appointment. ‘Kalnbērziņš is 
supposedly often sick,’ he explained ‘and the chief ideologue [Pelše] was not at the Twentieth 
Congress, so you will have a lot to take on’.615 Khrushchev had ignored Pelše for at least two 
years by 1958, from his snub to Pelše by not inviting him to the Congress to the fall of 
Kashnikov. This embittered Pelše and intensified the now open struggle between the two 
factions within the leadership. 
After the confrontations of early 1958, the national communists consolidated their 
triumph by making key personnel changes during spring and summer 1958. They brought about 
radical change in the composition of the LCP’s upper echelons, reflecting the leadership’s 
‘Latvianisation’. Krūmiņš’s position as Second Secretary offered considerable power, this time 
with strong national communist bureau support. As Second Secretary, he led congresses, 
plenums and bureau sessions along with the First Secretary and wielded a considerable amount 
of decision-making power especially in the crucial area of cadres’ placement. Krūmiņš also had 
greater direct access to Khrushchev and the Kremlin.616 In 1958, the national communists 
gained a majority on the LCP CC by replacing members with their own. This amounted to a 
one-third turnover from the 14th Congress in January 1956.617 
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Within the bureau, there were major changes that gave the national communists a 
majority. At the April plenum, along with Krūmiņš’s ascension, Elmārs Bēmanis was promoted 
to the All-Union Komsomol administration and replaced as Komsomol secretary by national 
communist Vladislavs Ruskulis. In July, Straujums was co-opted into the bureau as a candidate 
and Berklavs engineered Agriculture Minister Nikonov’s return to the bureau.618. In August 
1958, Indriķis Pinksis replaced the Russian Kārlis Voltmanis as Trade Union Council Chairman 
and received a candidate seat. Additionally, in 1958, national communists were installed as 
heads of CC departments. In April, Pelše’s acolyte Vitālijs Rubenis was displaced as CC 
Agricultural Department Head and replaced by Anton Luriņš, in August Jānis Kacens became 
Administration, Trade and Finance Department Head, and in December Herberts Valters 
became Deputy Head in Pelše’s own preserve, Agitprop. In July 1958, the most significant 
change that summer, symbolic of the political shift in favour of the national communists, took 
place. General Gorbatov, BMD Commander, was made Inspector General at the USSR Ministry 
of Defence and transferred from Latvia. His replacement, General Pavel Batov, did not receive a 
bureau seat, which until then was ex officio.619 This left the national communists with a 
majority on the bureau with a total of five full members and three candidates. Pelše was isolated 
as the sole full member (along with his Russian ally, candidate member Nikolai Saleev) openly 
hostile towards the national communists.620 Indigenous Latvians overwhelmingly dominated the 
bureau. Only Pelše and Plūdonis had resided in the Soviet Union during the entire interwar 
period. In August, Pelše’s acolytes Pavel Litvinov and A.J. Vīndedze lost their Council of 
Ministers Deputy Chairmanships. In summer 1958, the Pelše faction reached its lowest ebb in 
the struggle with the national communists. 
 
3.2 The Pļaviņas Hydroelectric Dam Affair 
Perhaps the greatest expression of the fledgling civil society under development in Soviet 
Latvia during the national communist period was the unusual wave of protest aroused by the 
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proposed construction of a 40-metre high hydroelectric power plant on the River Daugava at 
Pļaviņas in 1958. Endangering a particularly scenic valley, the project aroused opposition 
principally among intellectuals including eminent scientists, writers, educators, and members of 
the cultural and artistic community. It caused an unprecedented outpouring of popular support 
from the general public. In the circumstances of the Latvian Thaw, the Pļaviņas affair was 
particularly significant as the first instance of a genuinely broad public debate in post-war 
Latvia. 
National communist Vēra Kacena, Kalpiņš’s wife, initiated the debate and championed 
Latvian opposition to the project. In an article published in Literatūra un Māksla in March 1958 
entitled ‘We must not be hasty!’ Kacena described the plan as ‘a hasty, ill-considered 
project’. 621  In her article, Kacena openly promoted Latvian interests above Soviet ones. 
Kacena’s aim was to encourage a public debate because ‘only local considerations and 
collective opinion are a good judge and the safest guarantee against possible errors’. She said 
‘to hear out the ideas of the nation was more than necessary’. Kacena did not fail to note the 
successful Lithuanian precedent (whose ability to exercise a considerable amount of 
independent political will was emulated by the Latvians in the 1950s). Activists persuaded the 
Nemunas River power plant designers of the threat to the Birštonas spas and some architectural 
monuments. Plans were amended accordingly so that the site was not flooded. 
The most striking aspect of Kacena’s article is the juxtaposition of nationalist imagery 
against the plans of an uncaring All-Union organisation (the Design Institute’s 
Hidroenergoprojekts) interested only in profitability. She wrote: ‘The beauty and natural wealth 
[of] historic sites are values that are not calculated in the millions’. Kacena implicitly criticised 
the Soviet government by mentioning the ‘inheritance’ of the ‘wrongly placed’ superphosphate 
plant, another environmentally damaging project that affected the popular Mežaparks forest.622 
Her argument was twofold, appealing first to evoke national sentiment among the public for 
support, and then providing an economic rationale against the dam’s construction. Kacena 
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described the area surrounding the proposed dam as ‘the most beautiful place in our republic’ 
and explained that because of attendant flooding, a scenic gorge with rare plants and natural 
features known the Staburags (the apex of which was two metres below sea level) would be 
destroyed along with the Pērses ravine and its waterfall. Furthermore, the higher water level in 
the Daugava would damage the 13th century ruins of Koknese castle, which featured in Latvian 
folklore. The dam would also significantly increase the danger of flooding in Jēkabpils District. 
From a historical and archaeological perspective, Kacena explained that the Daugava valley 
contained many protected natural monuments such as ‘the oldest mounds which tells the story 
of times long before our era’ and emphasised the ‘deep significance of the area for our 
people’. 623  According to Dreifelds, the core of Kacena’s argument was the rhetoric of 
archaeology and history, rather than environmentalism, because of the environmental 
movement’s embryonic state in other industrialised societies.624 Nevertheless, this was the first 
grassroots movement in Soviet Latvia and was implicitly based on environmental concerns. 
Kacena admitted that at first glance the Pļaviņas location seemed advantageous. 
Recognising the need for a practical and economic argument to dissuade designers and planners 
from constructing the dam at Pļaviņas, Kacena systematically explained that the dam would be 
a waste of money because of the long-term consequences associated with the dam’s 
construction. Kacena listed the economic problems the dam would create such as bogs that 
would threaten the surrounding urban areas; difficulties for shipping requiring extensive 
engineering to surmount a 40m high dam; the fishing industry would suffer, and finally the dam 
would render the Pļaviņas dolomite quarry inaccessible. Recent investment expanded and 
mechanised the quarry. Dolomite was widely used in road and construction projects as well as 
for molten metal in the Krasnyi Metalurgs factory. Geologists confirmed there were no other 
high-quality dolomite concentrations in Latvia. Kacena also argued against the creation of an 
inland sea, which might necessitate future costly land reclamation projects. 
Kacena acknowledged Latvia’s shortage of electricity and the necessity of a project to 
improve the electrical supply. She implored those officials and designers working on the project 
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to re-examine the case for an alternative variation that would see the dam located downriver, 
arguably causing less damage to the scenery and environment and preserving the primeval 
Daugava river valley rather than creating a large reservoir. This alternative plan was the result 
of a comprehensive study by local specialists. Representatives from across Latvian society 
publicly associated themselves with the study’s conclusions. Kacena admitted that this variation 
was estimated to cost 10% more to build but countered that higher prices for electricity were 
worth the cost of preserving the valley.625 According to Riga gorkom Second Secretary Ivan 
Biniatian, the alternative proposal was estimated to cost an additional several hundred million 
rubles. Furthermore, the alternative proposal involving a reduction in the dam’s height by 10m 
would produce 25% less power.626 
Kacena concluded her article by directly warning dam designers that the Council of 
Ministers’ decision designating the Daugava River valley as an important natural monument 
requiring protection ‘must be respected’.627 Adolfs Šilde describes Kacena’s article as ‘her own 
protest against the devastation of Latvian natural splendour. It was romantic, her idea of protest 
was a form of passive resistance’.628 Šilde raises an interesting point about the campaign and the 
first exercise of peaceful resistance in Soviet Latvia that set the tone for the subsequent three 
decades of minimum outward compliance to Soviet rule among a large part of the population 
following the purge. 
The article ignited debate. Further articles by Literatūra un Māksla’s editorial staff 
followed. Zvaigzne highlighted issues linked to Latvian national consciousness in an article 
about the Staburags’s beauty, which ended with the words: ‘The German fascist invaders tried 
to destroy the Staburags, but it did not work’, implying the Soviet attempt would likewise 
fail. 629  These articles moved many inhabitants of Latvia to write letters supporting the 
safeguarding of Latvia’s cultural monuments. Many visible personalities from the intelligentsia 
signed a petition. Kacena published in Literatūra un Māksla because she was a contributor to 
the journal and the Party press did not oppose the dam’s construction. Cīņa bemoaned ‘non-
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specialists’ discussing the project, claiming that ‘biased and emotional articles by non-
specialists have created an unnecessary uproar’. 630  Shortly, after this rebuke all public 
discussion of the plan ended.631 The newspapers, however, did not control the republic, it was 
the national communists in the bureau who did. They were approaching the pinnacle and keenly 
listened to public opinion.  
The project proved divisive for the leadership. Latvia’s energy sector specialists were 
largely in favour and their opinion carried weight. From 1956, Dzērve repeatedly espoused the 
need to expand Latvia’s power output through the construction a hydroelectric dam, though by 
1959 he was in favour of a thermal power station.632 Retrospectively, Berklavs alleged that 
Latvia had an ample electricity supply but that the dam was built to bring construction workers 
from the RSFSR. Consequently, the new town of Stučka (now Aizkraukle) was created 
nearby.633 The Council of Ministers debated the project’s viability and according to Mārtiņš 
Mintaurs, the very fact that a discussion took place, which offered recommendations, infuriated 
Moscow’s Institute of Design representatives who were unused to local interference in All-
Union infrastructure projects.634 Within the leadership, only Kacena’s husband Kalpiņš was 
vociferously against the project (possibly the capricious Krūmiņš was also opposed). Swayed by 
public opinion, the bureau shelved plans for the Pļaviņas hydroelectric dam. During 
Khrushchev’s visit to Latvia, at a meeting on 12th June, he upheld the national communists’ 
decision not to construct the dam, a position in accordance with national communist economic 
policy.635 
The national communists’, or rather Latvian public’s victory, over the Pļaviņas dam 
was a triumph for peripheral interests over the centre. It had a lasting effect; the Latvian Society 
for the Protection of Nature and Historical Monuments was founded in 1959. The campaign 
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demonstrated Latvians’ capacity to mobilise in an effort to preserve national cultural values.636 
As such, the affair should be viewed as a precursor (emboldening the national communists with 
public support) to Latvia’s struggles against Khrushchev’s 1958 education reform and 
curtailment of the production of large All-Union industrial enterprises, which the national 
communists blamed for the inflow of workers, the housing shortage, pollution, the worsening 
food supply.637 
The Pļaviņas affair played a role in the purge. After the campaign, KGB Chairman 
Vēvers announced that he kept in his safe a list of all the protesters and those who signed 
petitions.638 Immediately after defeating the national communists, Pelše wasted no time in 
endorsing the Pļaviņas dam. Construction began in 1961 with the first turbine activated in 
December 1965; a concrete reminder of the priority his new government afforded All-Union 
concerns over national sensibilities. The Pļaviņas affair during the Latvian Thaw in the 1950s 
paralleled the 1980s Latvian ‘Awakening’. Twenty-eight years after defiance among the 
intelligentsia halted the Pļaviņas dam’s construction, Latvia’s path to independence began with 
grassroots environmental activism against the Daugavpils hydroelectric dam’s proposed 
construction in 1986. In the context of the Glasnost era, this activism and opposition developed 
rapidly into the Popular Front, which championed Latvia’s independence movement. 
 
3.3 Cadres Policy 
A major aim of national communist policy was transferring Party control to ethnic Latvians. 
The national communists considered it a form of Russification to have primarily non-Latvian 
cadres in leadership positions in the Party and state apparatus. National communist cadres 
policy was most fully elaborated at the 1st-2nd October 1958 plenums, considerably later than 
initiatives on language and residency. This was Krūmiņš’s jurisdiction as Second Secretary, 
with responsibility for cadres. His speech to the plenum was carefully worded in order to avoid 
provocation. The wary Krūmiņš first obtained permission from Presidium member Aleksei 
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Kirichenko to unveil a new cadres policy. He told Kirichenko it was based on the decisions of 
the June 1953 plenum, to which Kirichenko agreed it was necessary to ‘finish the work and 
leave no ambiguities’.639 According to Krūmiņš, CPSU CC apparatchiks participated in the 
plenum’s preparation including Baltic Sector Chief Gavrilov, who awarded the work ‘high 
praise’.640 
In his keynote speech, Krūmiņš revealed that Latvians comprised only 44% of 
nomenklatura personnel in October 1958. Only 70 directors of 314 of the largest enterprises 
were Latvians. Krūmiņš noted that ‘it cannot be considered a normal situation, when those 
working in leadership positions in enterprises and organisations are of only one nationality’. 
Krūmiņš qualified his position, ‘It would be a serious mistake to assume that in Latvia only 
Latvians should be in leadership positions. Cadres selection and placement cannot be 
implemented, subject only to national identity… it should be primarily by Leninist 
principles’.641 The plenum’s resolution, entitled ‘On the situation of working with cadres and 
measures for improvement’, asked gorkomy and raikomy ‘to take steps to strengthen and 
partially update senior management’, code for promoting Latvians. Senior enterprise managers 
were to take into account the ‘collective ethnic composition’, again Soviet government speak 
for promoting more Latvians.642 Lācis too called for ‘local cadres to be boldly promoted to 
leadership positions in government, economic and other organisations’.643 Krūmiņš later wrote 
that Latvian cadres promotion was one aspect in the process of turning the LCP into a party of 
the Latvian people.644 In his speech, Cīņa editor Pavel Pizāns urged that the Party take greater 
notice of Latvia’s eastern province of Latgale. He complained that in the early post-war years, 
many Party, soviet and economic personnel raised in Latgale were sent to other Latvian regions. 
In turn, those directed to Latgale were unfamiliar with local conditions there, including the 
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Latgalian language.645 In essence, Pizāns called for cadres’ selection to be based to a degree on 
regional peculiarities. 
Crucially, Krūmiņš avoided making the plenum overtly controversial. Therefore, the 
1956 language law’s two-year requirement for competency in both languages was omitted. 
Krūmiņš did pass judgement on the law though. He explained that it performed extremely 
poorly because it was badly organised by the bureau and there ‘must be a business-like 
organisation and implementation of this important resolution’.646  Krūmiņš formulated the 
resolution’s wording to reflect a more implicit interpretation: ‘Knowledge of Latvian and 
Russian is considered an important quality when nominating personnel’.647 Perhaps it was 
because Krūmiņš toned down the rhetoric that the plenum’s resolution was acceptable to 
Moscow. A diplomatic character, Krūmiņš was adept at bridging the gap between the national 
communists and Moscow. This was also the reason the national communists selected Krūmiņš, 
rather than Berklavs, as their candidate for Second Secretary. In practice, the resolution still 
required all cadres working with the public to know the local customs and both languages. 
Krūmiņš reported that the number of officials who spoke Latvian had increased but more 
progress was required. Krūmiņš cited the Jelgava flax mill as an example of the work to be 
done, where a majority of workers were Latvians (60%), but where the director, chief engineer, 
Party organisation secretary and factory committee chairman did not know Latvian. ‘Because of 
a poor knowledge of local conditions and the Latvian language, significant portions of our 
cadres are unable to work efficiently to establish close connections with the masses’. He 
concluded by declaring that ‘the most important task of leading cadres is to stubbornly and 
persistently study Russian and Latvian’.648 
On the surface, the share of Latvian cadres in almost all sectors of the economy and 
culture increased every year under the national communists.649 Yet, Latvian historians disagree 
over whether there was significant cadre replacement during the national communist period. 
According to Riekstiņš, the policy enjoyed limited success. The resolution on Latvian-speaking 
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cadres was implemented in many instances, and the number of Latvians in positions of 
responsibility increased slightly.650 The national communists’ cadres policy was directed against 
the placement of a small number of personnel (usually very experienced Russians) from the 
centre in key positions in the local administration. An 8th June 1959 CPSU CC commission 
report revealed that between 1956 and 1959, half of gorkomy, raikomy and raiispolkomy first 
secretaries were replaced along with almost all gorkomy and raikomy second secretaries (roles 
customarily occupied by Russians).651 This was significant because it undermined the centre’s 
efforts to counter regionalism through staffing policies.652  
The turnover in cadres however, did not necessarily translate into increased Latvian 
representation. Despite the removal of 35% of enterprise directors and 31% of chief engineers 
between May 1957 and mid-1959, at the 20th June 1959 bureau meeting, Berklavs explained 
that only 36.6% of enterprise directors were Latvians.653 At the local level, cadre replacement 
figures for the mid to late 1950s are significant, suggesting an overhaul of local government 
favouring the national communists. More than 50% of regional Party secretaries and 60% of 
kolkhoz chairmen (over 200 managers) were replaced in this period.654 Some of these statistics, 
however, are misleading. There were mergers of kolkhozy during this period, which 
significantly reduced the number of farm managers, partially accounting for the decrease. In 
April 1949, there were 2,999 kolkhozy but only 1,105 in 1960.655 Bleiere writes: ‘The forcing 
out of non-Latvians from the nomenklatura did not occur in theory nor in practice. The low 
proportion of Latvians in the LCP was the Achilles heel for attempts to promote the language 
because only Party members could be appointed to leading positions, and too few knew 
Latvian’.656 Krūmiņš’s revelations in June 1959 lend weight to Bleiere’s argument. He noted 
that in 1950, over 80% of cadres in enterprises were non-Latvians. Yet, in 1958, in VEF, little 
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seemed to have changed, the director was not Latvian, and its engineering and technical 
personnel were 80% non-Latvian.657 
3.3.1 Cadres retention 
In Moscow and Latvia’s struggle over cadres placement, the national communists sought to 
amend the policy chiefly responsible for the drain on Latvian cadres. At the October 1958 
plenum, Krūmiņš explained the detrimental effect of existing cadres policy, causing distrust 
because nothing changed in the 15 post-war years. Thousands of Latvian cadres were trained 
but the practice of hiring newcomer non-Latvians, often demobilised officers without a 
specialist education, continued.658 In 1957, there was a shortage of some 3,000 specialists across 
the Latvian economy with 55-70% of all engineering and technical posts filled by persons with 
practical experience but no special education. Considerable difficulties arose because most 
textbooks used in specialised higher education courses were in Russian.659 Such conditions in 
education contributed to the situation where in 1957, Riga’s railway carriage factory employed 
only 11 Latvian engineers out of 101 and only 15 of 123 engineers at Riga’s electro-machine 
building factory were Latvians. In the Riga gorkom nomenklatura (including managers of 
industrial enterprises), Latvians filled 73 of 291 positions and of 212 chief engineers only 39 
were Latvians. In construction, Latvian representation among leading cadres was even lower. 
From 43 construction organisation heads, just five were Latvians, and from 43 chief engineers 
only six were Latvians.660 Many trained Latvian specialists were sent to work in other republics, 
explicitly by the USSR Education Ministry. This was due to the Soviet practice of rabota po 
raspredeleniiu (literally ‘job by distribution’). New graduates were sent to work in another 
region of the USSR for three years. Similar to the practice of avoiding stationing soldiers in 
their native republic during military service, it aimed to promote an internationalist outlook and 
weaken ties between the youth and their homeland. Between 1952 and 1956, over 38% of all 
graduates from the technical faculties of LSU were sent to work elsewhere.661 
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Surreptitious national communist policies were connected to correcting this situation. In 
education, the national communists aimed not only to roll back immigration and improve 
fluency in Latvian, but also to restrict Russian-language streams and cap their numbers at 
education institutions. The national communists wanted to build their own Latvian cadre of 
functionaries to run the republic without the need for Russian staffers. Berklavs changed the 
practice of sending Latvian graduates to other republics and then importing graduates of other 
nationalities at, for example, the LSU Technical Management Faculty. In a speech at a Party 
meeting at LSU, Berklavs reputedly said: ‘Non-Latvian comrades should not take offence [to 
the new cadres policy]. We thank you for helping to nurture [our] cadres, but now they will take 
charge’.662 In order to improve the training of Latvian cadres across a wider range of fields, a 
joint CC and Council of Ministers resolution took radical action against central administration. 
The resolution forced the All-Union Gosplan and Education Ministry to consult the Latvian 
Council of Ministers on ‘all matters of admission’ including the ability to set quotas on 
specialties in higher educational institutions and technical schools. Crucially, the resolution 
included a requirement ensuring the Council of Ministers was consulted about graduate 
distribution. LSU was ordered to devise textbooks for secondary schools and colleges in 
Latvian. Finally, the Health Ministry, the USSR Trade Ministry and the USSR MVD were 
instructed ‘in their work on the advancement of specialists to achieve a significant increase in 
local cadre numbers in their respective Latvian institutions and enterprises’.663  
There was a gradual improvement in the ratio of Latvians to Russians. The number of 
Latvian students admitted to various educational establishments, such as the Liepāja Naval 
School, overtook the number of Russian students. More Latvian specialists began to teach in 
trade schools.664 The situation in agriculture was persistently problematic. Pinksis wrote in Cīņa 
in June 1957, ‘Although LSU produces a reasonable number of engineering cadres, we do not 
have enough of them because nearly half of graduates are sent to work in other republics and 
districts’.665 Krūmiņš discussed the problem of finding employment for Latvian agricultural 
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specialists with Khrushchev during his June 1959 visit.666 According to King, the national 
communists resorted to encouraging non-Latvians to volunteer for Khrushchev’s Virgin Lands 
agricultural project in Kazakhstan.667 
 
3.4 The Education Reform 
I have demonstrated on several occasions that national communist relations with Khrushchev 
remained convivial after 1956. Khrushchev accepted, or at least did not obstruct, the national 
communists’ initiatives, considering them to be in the spirit of the 20th Party Congress’s 
decisions. These cordial relations were severely strained by national communist opposition to 
Khrushchev’s flagship education reform. Khrushchev unveiled the so-called Thesis 19 to the 
CPSU CC on 12th November 1958 as a component of the general restructuring of secondary and 
higher education. The reform was debated at the USSR Supreme Soviet in December 1958. 
Khrushchev’s reform was designed to modernise and standardise the USSR’s education system, 
with an increased emphasis on practical work experience. One component of the reform related 
to language instruction. The bone of contention in Thesis 19 was the proposal to allow parents 
to decide whether a student in the Soviet Republics (excluding the Russian Republic) studied 
the local nationality’s language or not. Under Stalin, it was mandatory for all students in the 
Soviet Republics to study three languages: Russian, the titular nationality’s language and one 
foreign language. Introducing parental choice, the theses stated, would ‘be more democratic and 
would eliminate excessive overburdening of pupils studying languages’.668 This was essentially, 
however, an attack on the primary status of the titular language in each republic. 
 The rationale behind instituting optional secondary language training was to reduce the 
course load on students in the republics already overburdened by the additional course 
requirements imposed by the reform. Across their education, students studied Latvian for 2-3 
hours a week totalling 700 hours of study (the equivalent of almost a school year).669 Supporters 
                                                      
666 Krūmiņš and Vallis, ‘Arvīds Janovičs’, 10; Krūmiņš, ‘Tas drūmais’, 135. 
667 King, ‘Management of the Economy’. 
668 ‘Par skolas sakaru nostiprināšanu ar dzīvi un par tautas izglītības sistēmas attīstību mūsu zemē. PSKP 
CK un PSRS Ministru Padomes tēzes’, Cīņa, 16th November 1958. 
669 LVA f.290 (Prezidium Verkhovnogo Soveta), apr.1, l.3673, lp.9. 3-i sessii Verkhovnogo soveta Latvii, 
stenogramma pervogo zasedaniia, 6 iiulia 1956. 
  165 
of the policy welcomed it as a democratic reform; parents could choose the language in which 
their children would be taught.670 While greater choice in the education system would ordinarily 
have received public support, Thesis 19 instead provoked vehement opposition among the non-
Russian republics’ titular nationalities. These non-Russian nationalities feared that Russian 
students’ parents would prevent their children learning the local language. In theory, studying 
the Russian language also became voluntary. Yet, as the USSR’s lingua franca, knowledge of 
Russian was necessary for career advancement. Fluency in Russian was a requirement for 
attendance at universities and practically a prerequisite for professional development. Widmer 
notes that even if some non-Russian schools took advantage of their option not to offer Russian, 
many parents decided to send their children to Russian schools.671 Therefore, students of all 
Soviet nationalities had no realistic option but to study Russian. 
 The provisions of Thesis 19 triggered widespread opposition across the USSR but the 
most virulent resistance came from Latvia and Azerbaijan. The struggle between Moscow and 
Latvia over Thesis 19’s implementation represented the most concerted attempt by any republic 
to test and redraw the limits of the republics’ authority vis-à-vis the centre in the new era 
ushered in by the 20th Party Congress. This conflict had been brewing for several years as 
pressure built for a universal education system that reflected the Russian language’s dominance. 
The issue was brought up as early as October 1956 at the Inter-republic Academic Conference 
on ‘Questions of Improving Russian Language Instruction in National Schools’.  
In 1958, knowledge of Latvian among the younger Russian generation was dismal. That 
year Russian language schools, attended mainly by Russian children, introduced a Latvian 
language exam. On 3rd July, Skolotāju Avīze (Teacher’s Newspaper) evaluated the results of this 
examination and determined low comprehension levels in grammar and reading. A significant 
number of Russian students were unable to name historical Latvian figures.672 The national 
communists enacted the 1956 language law to combat ignorance of Latvian, but the education 
reform threatened to undermine their work just as the two-year deadline set by the law for 
gaining competency in both Russian and Latvian was approaching. In defiance of Thesis 19, the 
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national communists requested the Latvian school curriculum be revised to allow more hours to 
study Latvia’s geography, history, language and literature.673 After the influx of so many Slavs, 
the national communists were sensitive to Latvians’ perception of Soviet rule, because they 
wanted to improve the Party’s image in order to increase the proportion of Latvian membership. 
Thesis 19 threatened this aim because it was tantamount to extending further privileges to 
Russians at the expense of the Latvian language’s status. As Prigge puts it, ‘if the local language 
was not mandatory, then it almost certainly would be marginalised’.674 Fearful of greater local 
resentment, the national communists were hesitant to enact the reform. The national 
communists considered Thesis 19 a display of cavalier Russian chauvinism, evidence of 
Russians’ unwillingness to learn indigenous languages, an attempt by Moscow to undermine 
local languages, and ultimately linguistic Russification because, in practice, Latvians still had to 
learn Russian.675 
There was another reason the national communists preferred the status quo. After the 
incorporation of the Baltic Republics into the USSR, titular schools in the Baltics preserved the 
tradition of an extra year of schooling, unlike Russian schools. This meant that Latvians and 
Estonians were generally better educated than local Russians, and consequently, often had 
access to superior employment.676 The national communists had defended 11-year schooling 
long before Thesis 19. In July 1956, Education Minister Vilis Samsons reinforced the national 
communists’ commitment to Latvia’s school system in a speech to the Latvian Supreme Soviet. 
He declared that if Latvia were to transition to 10-year schooling it would ‘be a step 
backwards’.677 Yet, Thesis 19 envisioned a universal 10-year education system throughout the 
USSR. 
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3.4.1 The debate in Latvia 
At a meeting of the Riga Party aktiv (activists’ organisation) on 22nd November 1958, the 
normally neutral Lācis took the lead in challenging the implementation of Thesis 19 and ignited 
the debate on the subject. He questioned the logic of making second language study optional 
because ‘knowledge of both Russian and the republics’ languages was necessary for working in 
Latvia and other Soviet Republics’, and for the continuation of one’s education outside the 
RSFSR. Therefore, the law was ‘somewhat difficult to realise practically’. Lācis found that the 
termination of compulsory language study would ‘hardly promote the strengthening of peoples’ 
friendship’ and that it was ‘advisable to hear the opinion of teachers and the general public on 
this issue’, encouraging them to join the debate and to ‘speak out’.678 Over the next month, the 
Party press were inundated with letters criticising Thesis 19 and supporting Latvian proposals 
for extended schooling and continued obligatory Russian and Latvian courses. 
Prigge believes the national communists encouraged a wide public debate on the 
education reform, again harnessing the power of public opinion, in order to galvanise support 
for their resistance to Thesis 19. ‘The Latvian public’, he wrote, ‘which for over a year had 
become accustomed to being consulted, was mobilised by Lācis’s call’.679 In his article on the 
education reform Yaroslav Bilinsky supports this notion. According to Bilinsky, the education 
reform did not follow the usual pattern of universal endorsements from a spectrum of parents, 
teachers, school administrators and Party officials, officially sanctioned rallying of public 
opinion, a controlled discussion, and the ‘Supreme Soviets affixing their rubber stamps after a 
brief and perfunctory debate’. Instead, there was a ‘comparatively free expression of real 
differences of opinion among party officials, educators and parents. […] The most striking 
challenge to the central government, however, was provided by Latvia’.680 According to Smith, 
the reason for the extraordinarily unrestrained debate on Thesis 19 stemmed from Khrushchev’s 
activist regime, which ‘sought reform in a number of areas, and called publicly for regional 
input into policy-making as well as implementation of policy’.681  
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While spokesmen from the Baltic Republics and the Caucasus advocated continuance of 
the status quo, they understood that this might put the republics’ school graduates at a 
disadvantage against Russian school graduates in the RSFSR. In those schools, only two 
languages were required (Russian and one foreign language) compared to three in the Union 
Republics.682 Therefore, as a solution, Lācis and the national communists proposed a further 
year of schooling (12 years in total) to ensure that students were not overburdened. In addition 
to Russian and Latvian language study, Samsons wrote in December 1958 that ‘it is necessary 
to provide at least basic information on the history, literature and geography of Latvia, and 
traditional subjects of our republic (e.g. singing)’. Samsons estimated that the assimilation of all 
this knowledge required over 900 hours, totalling almost another school year. Consequently, 
Samsons suggested some primary education could be transferred to secondary education to 
reduce the load on younger students.683 Ivan Kairov, President of the USSR Pedagogical 
Sciences Academy, opposed extending obligatory education by two years because it would 
strain resources, which were already fully exhausted by the suggested one-year extension, and 
would delay entrance into the workforce and higher education.684 
The impassioned responses of the Latvian public to the law were matched only by the 
extraordinary frankness of the debate. Discussions ranged from workers’ meetings at factories 
and kolkhozy to Party cells, open Party meetings, meetings of teachers, parents’ conferences in 
schools, and especially the press. This was because in the context of the Thaw, Moscow initially 
encouraged a genuine discussion in the republics and the presentation of realistic proposals.685 
The national communists recognised this. Samsons wrote in Kommunist Sovietskoi Latvii ‘the 
CPSU CC is not afraid to disregard the usual views on education, looking for creative new ways 
for its further development in consultation with the broad masses of the people’.686 The national 
communists used such leniency to their advantage by appealing for public support to provide 
them with greater leverage to amend the law. 
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At the 22nd November meeting, others echoed Lācis’s sentiments. Erna Purvinska, the 
Deputy Education Minister, insisted that ‘the unburdening of pupils should not be at the 
expense of language’. Purvinska viewed competency in Russian and Latvian as equal.  
Can I refuse to allow the study of Russian in Latvian schools, the language, 
which is a powerful means of international communication and familiarises 
people with the riches of Russian culture? - I think no! Can Russian schools 
abandon the study of Latvian to children who in the future will live and work in 
Latvia, who will continue to study at universities in Latvia? - Just the same, I do 
not think so!687 
National communist Milda Vernere, Director of Riga’s 49th School, followed Purvinska’s 
speech, pouring scorn on the reform’s voluntary principle in language study.  
I join the teachers and great majority of parents who think that democracy in 
relation to language learning in school is irrelevant… If we do not establish a 
strict order in language learning, then there will be irresponsible parents who 
want their children to learn only one language... I believe that every citizen 
should know both languages, because otherwise we will have a situation where 
no one can talk in institutions without an interpreter. 
Vernere went on to blame the situation of overburdened students ‘borrowing the programme of 
Russian Republic schools instead of aligning [our curriculum] with [Latvia’s] peculiarities’. She 
went so far so to urge Latvia’s leaders to suggest to Moscow that Thesis 19 should be 
abandoned.688 Her zeal in opposing Thesis 19 must have played a part in her dismissal in 1962 
during the purge. At a teachers’ meeting at the Academy of Sciences on 1st December, there was 
a lively debate between members of the school parents’ committee. Riga’s 22nd school Director 
Mokrinska announced that there was a consensus among teachers after consultation on the 
reform that 11-year schooling should continue because Russians needed to learn Latvian and 
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after school many graduates remained in Latvia or attended the republics’ higher education 
institutions.689 
In the press, there was a flood of articles supporting Lācis and Samsons in their 
proposals to extend schooling to 12 years in order to retain instruction in three languages. Some 
articles were from concerned officials in the republics’ education departments. M. Kalnin, Head 
of Liepāja’s Education Board wrote in Sovetskaia Latviia that ‘the question of the length of 
secondary education in our republic should be solved on the basis of local conditions. Eight-
year training is insufficient. I believe that our republic requires nine-year compulsory 
[secondary] school’. 690  On 19th December, national communist Jānis Gibietis, Riga City 
Education Department Head wrote to Trud (Labour) in support of an extra secondary school 
year. A survey of readers’ letters published in Sovetskaia Latviia indicated that most 
respondents favoured a continuation of the existing arrangement for compulsory second 
language study.691 A significant portion of the discussion was devoted to the necessity for 
children to acquire knowledge of Latvian history and geography. In 1958, the Education 
Ministry developed its own curriculum, focusing on Latvian history and other subjects related to 
Latvia.692 
The other side of the education debate, however, was ignored. Bleiere noted that the 
republic’s press gave a one-sided presentation of the discussion. Yet, there was support for the 
All-Union law in Latvia. At a meeting of teachers and education staff on 1st December, 
spokeswoman for parents of Russian school students Stogova argued that there was 
considerable turnover in migration to Latvia, arguing that it was unnecessary for children to 
learn Latvian if they would be leaving Latvia for the RSFSR or another republic in a few 
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years.693 Doctoral candidate P. Kuņin from LSU’s theoretical physics department complained in 
Sovetskaia molodezh’ that 12-year schooling would be ‘contrary to national interests’.694 
3.4.2 The Supreme Soviet 
Between 22nd and 25th December 1958, the USSR Supreme Soviet in Moscow debated the 
education reform. Representatives from all three Baltic Republics insisted that non-Russian 
languages remain a required subject in all schools.695 On 24th December, it was the Latvian 
representatives’ turn to speak and they took the lead in opposing the reform. Berklavs made an 
impassioned speech in defence of 11-year schooling and the need to preserve mandatory 
Russian and Latvian language learning. He was characteristically outspoken and 
uncompromising, declaring that ‘our republic’s eight-grade [primary] school absolutely requires 
the continuation of traditional classes in three languages - Latvian, Russian, and one foreign 
language’. He argued that ‘to solve the problem of overburdening students, without lowering 
the level of knowledge, seems hardly possible to us’. Berklavs then demanded that it was 
‘necessary to study the peculiarities of each republic and to grant the republics’ Supreme 
Soviets the right to prolong the education period by one year’.696 This was a call for greater 
decision-making for the republics in the sensitive educational sphere, which was crucial for the 
Soviet government in inculcating the country’s youth with Soviet values. 
One of the most striking aspects of the struggle between the national communists and 
Moscow over the education reform was that Pelše (outwardly at least) supported the national 
communists. He presented a united front with his archenemy Berklavs in opposition to Thesis 
19 when he spoke at the Supreme Soviet. It is unclear why Pelše supported the national 
communists on this occasion, especially because defying Moscow was anathema to him. 
Certainly, Pelše did not actually oppose Thesis 19. He used Berklavs’s opposition to the reform 
as a charge against him during the purge in July 1959 but deftly sidestepped accusations of his 
own opposition. Furthermore, after Berklavs’s removal it took only one month to bring Latvia 
into line with All-Union legislation thereby demonstrating Pelše’s willingness to implement the 
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reform. The explanation for Pelše’s unlikely support at the Supreme Soviet was probably due to 
his political weakness at the time. The Pelše faction was at its nadir in late 1958. Once again 
facing political oblivion, Pelše may have considered it prudent to temporarily support the 
national communists on this issue to avoid a confrontation on a Latvian bureau that was 
dominated by the national communists while he was unable to draw Moscow’s attention to the 
national communists’ agenda. Prigge believes strong public support for the Latvian 
government’s position may also have affected Pelše’s decision.697 
In his speech, Pelše focused on the popularity of the current system amongst the public 
and specifically referenced the debate on the reform in Latvia. ‘Latvia’s working people’, he 
declared, ‘at parents’ meetings, have unanimously spoken in favour of the need to preserve the 
study of Latvian and Russian in our schools… It would be inadvisable to abolish this fine 
tradition’. Pelše aped national communist rhetoric in his speech, stating: ‘Each national republic 
has its own historically formed peculiarities which are taken into account by the Party and 
Union government… It is necessary to consider these peculiarities in the school reform’s 
execution’. Furthermore, he echoed Berklavs in his comment that the republics should retain the 
authority to amend the draft law before its ratification. He protected himself by adding that ‘the 
knowledge of both languages helps to strengthen the historical friendship between the Latvian 
and Russian peoples. In our day, Russian is a powerful instrument of communication among all 
Soviet peoples; it offers access to the wealth of Russian and world culture’. On the subject of 
students’ workload, Pelše noted that the study of three languages, Latvian and Russian 
literature, Latvian history and geography, would place them under more pressure than students 
in the RSFSR, who studied only two languages. Under the circumstances Pelše believed it was 
‘extremely advisable’ to have schools with an extra year in Latvia but ‘for pedagogical and 
political considerations’ both Latvian and Russian schools should have an extra year, which 
would eliminate the existing bias in favour of Latvians.698 
In the draft memorandum on the education reform circulated on 21st September 1958, 
Khrushchev preferred standardised schooling, though proposed that the extra year be left to the 
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discretion of each republic. In the law proposed at the Supreme Soviet in December, however, 
ten-year standardised schooling was taken for granted.699 According to Krūmiņš, during the 
Supreme Soviet session, Presidium member Otto Kuusinen informed him that contrary to the 
CPSU CC leadership’s views, including Khrushchev, Ukrainian deputies announced they would 
vote against the draft law because of the provision shortening schooling from 11 to 10 years of 
study. Other republics, including Latvia, supported Ukraine. 700  Due largely to Latvian 
obstinacy, the Supreme Soviet was unable to make Thesis 19 All-Union law. The central 
authorities compromised and permitted each republic to decide whether to pass or reject the 
proposal, as Berklavs had suggested.701 
3.4.3 The rebel republic 
Ultimately, due to widespread resistance, the skeleton education law passed by the USSR 
Supreme Soviet on 24th December 1958 contained no regulations pertaining to the language 
issue. This law provided only a general framework and offered the republics the possibility of 
different approaches to its implementation through republic level legislation and administration. 
Moscow, however, was unsatisfied and individually pressured each republic’s leadership into 
accepting the law’s original provisions outlined in November 1958. In March and April 1959, 
12 Soviet Republics’ Supreme Soviets ratified statutes that contained the regulations of Thesis 
19 essentially unrevised. Azerbaijan and Latvia were the only recalcitrant republics to pass their 
education laws with no regulations pertaining to the language issue.702 
The Latvian Supreme Soviet convened on 16th-17th March 1959 to debate the education 
law and draft appropriate legislation. Berklavs gave the keynote speech, announcing that 
Latvia’s draft law took into account Latvia’s conditions, including the special requirements and 
traditions of Latvian schools. He stated in unequivocal terms that ‘it was absolutely necessary to 
continue the tradition of schooling in three languages’. Numerous speakers reinforced this, 
among them Council of Ministers Deputy Chairman Brodelis who made it clear that Latvia’s 
peculiarities included knowledge of Latvian, which was necessary for working in Latvia. In his 
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defence of an extra year of schooling, Berklavs said that it would ‘prepare students mentally and 
physically to be more mature young people who will be better prepared to immediately join the 
workforce’. He went further by pledging to provide free textbooks for grades 1-8 from 1962. 
Berklavs conceded that learning three languages this would inevitably lead to an overburdening 
of students in comparison to those in other republics learning only two languages. To reduce the 
burden, Berklavs announced that Russian and foreign language teaching was to be streamlined 
to focus on the practical use of the language, developing students’ speaking ability over 
grammar. This was inline with the National Congress of Teachers’ March 1957 
recommendations, which suggested a major overhaul of the curriculum. Furthermore, 
Samsons’s speech reaffirmed that the curriculum for some subjects would be reduced and 
transferred to the secondary school stage to lighten the load. As Pelše suggested, both Latvian 
and Russian schools would include the extra year of study, ‘because the curriculum will be one 
and the same’.703 Here the national communists had an ulterior motive. They wanted to expand 
the time in Russian schools devoted to studying Latvian subjects. As late as 12th March, the 
national communists maintained the need for 12-year schooling allowing for the continued 
study of three languages. This was the most significant aspect of the law, yet, in and Berklavs’s 
speech there was a conspicuous absence of any mention of Thesis 19. Widmer believes that the 
national communists avoided dealing with Thesis 19 by ignoring it altogether.704 According to 
Bilinsky, as far as Berklavs was concerned, the republics received the right to decide on the 
reform’s implementation and Latvia alone chose not to include Thesis 19 in its legislation. 
‘Latvian government leaders declared in no uncertain terms that Thesis 19 had been weighed 
and found wanting’, wrote Bilinsky.705 In the law passed on 17th March, however, the national 
communists agreed to the limitations of a further year of study; Latvia preserved its 11-year 
programme but would not transition to the 10-year system in the RSFSR. The national 
communists hoped that Moscow would be satisfied with this partial concession. 
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The national communists felt that they had done enough by meeting the letter of 
Khrushchev’s proposals and nominally introducing parental choice.706 Yet, Smith notes that the 
Latvians brazenly insisted that this meant nothing in practice because they intended to obfuscate 
the law and perpetuate the existing system.707 The national communists realised that outright 
subversion would incur Moscow’s wrath and so they preferred to tacitly accept the reform and 
then, as other republics did (in the style of centre-republic relations during the Brezhnev era), 
quietly fail to implement it. 
3.4.4 Consequences 
The March 1959 education law passed in Latvia was unacceptable to Moscow. After vacillating, 
Moscow finally rejected Latvia’s proposals for an extra year of schooling on 17th March, the 
day the Latvian law was ratified but the Latvian Supreme Soviet session continued. Bleiere 
believes that the national communists still hoped it would be possible to extend the study period 
in secondary school by one year, so the clause remained in the law to test Moscow’s reaction 
and the limits of republics’ authority.708 According to Bleiere, Moscow only made a final 
decision in late March or April, as Estonia’s Education Act was adopted on 23rd April and the 
Estonians abandoned all previous proposals including mandatory three-language teaching and 
12-year education.709 Once Moscow made its decision, the national communists encountered 
sustained pressure to bring their law inline with All-Union legislation. On 12th May, the Latvian 
leadership was forced to make changes to the law in determining the period of study.710 
Smith describes the national communists’ resistance to the education law as merely a 
‘relatively mild show of defiance’, though he suggests their brazenness provoked further 
reaction from the centre.711 In May 1959, a commission from Moscow investigated charges of 
nationalism against leading Latvian national communists. Demands for 12-year education and 
free Latvian textbooks were among the accusations in the commission’s report, and Pelše 
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reiterated them when he orchestrated Berklavs’s dismissal between June and July 1959.712 In his 
defence, Berklavs explained that there was ubiquitous support for 12-year schooling amongst 
the Latvian leadership including Pelše, and widespread backing from the populace.713 On 20th 
June, Pelše capitalised on the disarray among the national communists after Khrushchev’s visit 
and reported to Moscow that he had prepared amendments to the law, which eliminated all 
remaining discrepancies with the All-Union law.714 Pelše waited to enact the new law until after 
the purge began and he was the clear victor. Keen to distance himself from his defeated national 
communist colleagues, Ozoliņš signed the law ‘Concerning some issues in the Latvian SSR’s 
Educational System’ on 11th August 1959. The new law gave parents the right to decide the 
language of instruction for their child at school, and crucially, repealed the March 1959 law’s 
clauses about compulsory education in both languages. Finally, the new law abolished the extra 
school year, bringing Latvia into line with the 10-year system observed elsewhere.715 
At a CPSU CC plenum on 24th-29th June 1959, Khrushchev demonstrated his frustration 
over Azerbaijani and Latvian defiance. He spoke out against Latvia’s eight-year primary 
education law with its provision of free textbooks because there were ‘insufficient material 
conditions to do it across the whole country’ and opined that it could not be a case of one rule 
for one republic and another for the rest.716 Both Smith and Widmer postulate that one major 
cause of the purge was Latvia’s rejection of Khrushchev’s education law. Widmer remarks, ‘the 
Latvian leadership’s position on this issue must have been an important factor which prompted 
Moscow to purge the Berklavs group’.717 Bilinsky agrees, noting that ‘Moscow promptly took 
up the challenge from Baku and Riga’ and that ‘both Latvia and Azerbaijan were finally brought 
into line after far-reaching changes in their leadership’.718 Understandably, these historians 
assumed Khrushchev already determined to cleanse Latvia’s leadership of the national 
communists and used the education reform as a pretext. According to Simon, the education law 
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‘signalled a change in the overall thrust of nationalities policy’ and resulted in the rapid spread 
of purges to nearly all Union Republics.719 
In the mid 1950s, as in Latvia, Azerbaijan’s indigenous leaders attempted to improve 
the status of the local language, Azerbaijani. After the 20th Party Congress, First Secretary Imam 
Mustafayev and Presidium Chairman Mirza Ibrahimov amended Azerbaijan’s constitution to 
make Azerbaijani an official language in addition to Russian. Azerbaijan was the only other 
republic to challenge Thesis 19. As in Latvia, Baku received a CPSU CC investigation team, led 
by Department for Union Republics First Deputy Chairman Yosif Shikin. Ibrahimov was 
dismissed shortly afterwards in March 1959. Both at the CPSU CC June 1959 plenum and at 1st 
July Presidium meeting, Khrushchev criticised Azerbaijan’s leaders. A joint Azerbaijani CC 
and Council of Ministers resolution brought Azerbaijan back in line in June: parents would 
decide if their children learned Azerbaijani. A purge of the Azerbaijani government’s upper 
echelon was the price of Baku’s disobedience.720 In July 1959, at a simultaneous plenum to the 
Latvian one in Riga denouncing Berklavs, Azerbaijani bureau members were reprimanded for 
tolerating ‘confusion in the perfectly clear language question’ and Mustafayev was sacked.721 
The Council of Ministers Chairman was charged with ‘artificially differentiating between native 
and non-local officials’.722 In August 1959, presumably to restore order, Department for Union 
Republics Chairman Vladimir Semichastnyi was dispatched to Azerbaijan to become the 
Azerbaijani Communist Party’s Second Secretary. 
Despite the education reform’s role in the Azerbaijani and possibly other purges, 
Widmer, Bilinsky and Smith exaggerate its contribution as a root cause of the Latvian purge. 
The national communists’ amendments to their education law in May 1959 were a tactical 
retreat in the face of intense scrutiny designed to placate Moscow. Nevertheless, the education 
reform featured heavily among the charges levelled at the national communists. The 4th July 
bureau meeting recorded that ‘individual senior leaders are inclined towards national isolation 
on the issues of school reorganisation. Latvia decided on [an extra year of] schooling and free 
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textbooks, which privileges Latvia’s students compared to other republics. Contrary to the All-
Union law, some leaders demanded a 12-year education period’.723 Under pressure, many 
national communists abandoned their convictions. Agricultural Academy Rector Jānis Vanags 
said he had spoken to Samsons during the July plenum, but he was now ‘[hiding] in the 
“bushes”, disavowing [his former position on 12-year education]’.724 Resistance towards the 
implementation of Thesis 19 played an important role in Pelše’s portrayal of the national 
communists as nationalists. In September 1959, Pelše wrote in Kommunist Sovetskoi Latvii, 
‘Some people who began to howl that by studying the Russian language and culture, young 
Latvians would forget the national particularities of their own culture, traditions and customs. 
Such reasoning can only harm Latvian young people. Such a view is nothing but a manifestation 
of bourgeois nationalism’.725  Though it undoubtedly contributed to the Latvian purge by 
unsettling Moscow and facilitating the national communists’ depiction as nationalists, the 
education reform was overshadowed by numerous other developments in Latvia, which gave 
Moscow greater cause for concern. The experience of the education reform demonstrated that 
Khrushchev’s call for input from the republics in the formulation of the education law was an 
impractical half-measure because the inflexible Soviet system could not consider local 
conditions without decentralising real political power to the republics, which the Soviet 
leadership was unwilling to do. 
The long-term effects of the education reform proved counterproductive. In November 
1959, Ilūkste District Secretary Daksh complained that students voluntarily learning Latvian or 
Russian were failing, but still passed onto the next grade.726 In 1962, nearly 5,000 students in 
Riga were forced to repeat the school year because of poor Russian.727 After the reform was 
implemented, the number of hours allotted for teaching Latvian in Russian schools gradually 
decreased while the teaching hours for Russian in Latvian schools increased. In 1964-1965 in 
Latvian schools, the total hours per week across all grades in language and literature were 72.5 
hours of Latvian language and literature classes and 38.5 hours of Russian classes. This 
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compares to 79 hours of Russian and just 26 hours of Latvian in Russian schools.728 A 
‘language gap’ favouring Russian is evident from the 1970 census results. Some 75.8% of 20-
29-year-old Latvians, the generation that grew up with the education reform changes, had 
knowledge of Russian.729 The introduction of bilingual schools, where parallel classes were 
taught in Russian and Latvian, was designed to expand the use of Russian and undo the work of 
the national communists. The number of these schools increased dramatically, even in regions 
with marginal Russian populations. By July 1963, there were 240 such schools in Latvia.730 
According to Bruno Kalnis, this increased Latvian perceptions of Russification.731 Bleiere 
considers the education reform one of Khrushchev’s least popular policies, ‘significantly 
undermining his prestige at all levels of society’.732 
 
3.5 Economic Policy under the National Communists 
3.5.1 The sovnarkhoz reforms 
National communist economic policy developed later than their language and residency 
initiatives. Before 1957, the national communists had little direct control over economic policy. 
This changed dramatically due to Khrushchev’s economic reforms. In February 1957, 
Khrushchev abolished many state ministries in Moscow and replaced them with 105 
sovnarkhozy (Regional Economic Councils). Khrushchev aimed to combat the economic 
ministries’ centralisation and departmentalism through locally based sovnarkhozy, which 
provided operational and planning management and could much better consider the republics’ 
geographical, economic and national characteristics. In May 1957, the republics received 
powers to administer most industries on their territory. The powers of the republics’ Council of 
Ministers were enhanced in a decree on 29th August 1957. Unlike political power, Khrushchev 
felt secure enough to distribute economic power to the republics, in an extraordinary 
decentralisation project that was integral Thaw. The sovnarkhoz reforms decentralised 
considerable decision-making power to the USSR’s regions and republics. This created the 
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conditions and opportunity for the national communists to decide much of Latvia’s economic 
development. An examination of the sovnarkhoz reforms will help us determine to what extent 
the Soviet Union was centralised. 
The sovnarkhoz reforms complemented national communist political ambitions, 
creating an environment conducive for increased economic decision-making in Latvia at a time 
when the national communists were gaining control of the levers of power. Widmer considers 
that the national communists desired that Latvia become more autonomous, with greater 
authority vested in themselves as the republic’s leaders, and that this underpinned their 
economic objectives.733 This was precisely why some members of the Anti-Party group opposed 
the sovnarkhoz reform (before their downfall), because they claimed it increased the likelihood 
of nationalist deviation.734 Their concerns were valid. Kemp noted that national communist 
tendencies were at the very heart of the sovnarkhoz reforms: as he put it, ‘when taken to its 
logical end, this domesticism or localism becomes national communism’.735  This became 
another case of tug-of-war between centre and periphery. The periphery, in this case personified 
by Latvia, converted the authority granted by Khrushchev’s decentralisation into greater 
sovereignty. As Alexander Motyl notes, however, ‘in fulfilling the centre’s mandate [and] 
acting in this manner, the periphery begins to undermine the centre’s position of political and 
economic dominance vis-à-vis itself’.736 In this section, we will examine the question of how 
much autonomy Latvia had. 
One of Latvia’s chains of subservience to the USSR lay in economics. Any serious 
attempt to redress this dependence needed to take account of these economic ties. According to 
King, the major handicap to using resources effectively was excessive ties to other Soviet 
economic regions.737 Previously, most of Latvia’s industrial enterprises took their orders from 
the central ministries in Moscow. Central control limited Latvian ministers’ ability to influence 
output decisions. In 1956, before the sovnarkhoz reforms, only 24.7% of Latvian industrial 
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output was produced by the republics’ enterprises, joint republic-union enterprises were 
responsible for 58.2%, and All-Union ministries accounted for 17.1% of industrial production. 
After the reforms, the sovnarkhoz and other republic organisations controlled almost 98% of 
Latvian industrial output, a radical shift.738 Through the sovnarkhoz reforms, Latvian leaders 
had more latitude to make the republic’s economic decisions. The detailed planning of 
production and distribution in the republics’ industries was left to their respective governments, 
which also received permission to use a certain portion of raw materials produced over the 
amount planned for the republic as a whole for increased consumer goods production, a central 
pledge by the national communists.739 
As the national communists rose to prominence, they were able to gain effective control 
of the sovnarkhoz. The Latvian sovnarkhoz operated under the general command of the Council 
of Ministers. The Council’s Deputy Chairman for industry was a role shared between Berklavs 
and the elderly (and neutral) Latvian sovnarkhoz Chairman Matiss Plūdonis. The economy’s 
reorganisation gave the national communists patronage. Most sovnarkhoz positions went to 
Latvian regional economic specialists. They were in great demand because a host of enterprises 
were transferred to the sovnarkhoz’s jurisdiction. Preference was given to those who could 
speak Latvian.740 There were only two Russian sovnarkhoz department heads. Along with the 
chairman, the three deputy chairmen and eight department heads were Latvians. 741  The 
sovnarkhoz was progressively ‘Latvianised’ during national communist economic hegemony. 
By July 1959, Latvians comprised 74.3% of sovnarkhoz ministers and deputy ministers, and 
62% of sovnarkhoz department heads and their deputies, with Russians holding only 30% of 
these posts.742 
In Kalnbērziņš’s speech to the USSR Supreme Soviet during the debate formally 
approving the reform in May 1957, he highlighted the new system’s advantages. Kalnbērziņš 
pointed out that previously 82 of the largest enterprises in Latvia were subordinated to 26 
different ministries in Moscow. Local organs played an insignificant role in the management of 
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these factories, yet their operation was inseparable from the republic’s economy. Decisions 
about matters such as electricity supply, local construction materials, housing and services for 
the workers could only be solved on the ground.743 The existence of numerous ministries had 
created departmental barriers, which smothered questions about many economic tasks, the 
specialisation and cooperation of enterprises, the introduction of new initiatives and technology, 
and the efficient utilisation of natural resources and local manpower. The purpose of the 
sovnarkhozy was to end this state of affairs by facilitating better coordination between various 
regions’ economic activities. Soviet leaders were aware that this could encourage republics to 
prioritise local needs over the Union. Therefore, Kalnbērziņš tactfully concluded his speech by 
warning that localism would not be tolerated.744 
3.5.2 Pauls Dzērve 
Dzērve was the ideologue, theoretician and publicly the most popular member of the national 
communists. He graduated from LSU in record time and when he defended his doctoral thesis in 
Leningrad, he greatly impressed the examiners - to the extent that they recommended he be 
given a higher doctoral degree instead of the usual PhD equivalent (kandidat nauk).745 Yet, 
Dzērve was a controversial character, outspoken and bold, attracting more hostility and 
criticism than any other national communist (except Berklavs). In one of Khrushchev’s visits to 
Latvia, Krūmiņš introduced him to Dzērve. They discussed economic policy, and afterwards an 
excitable Khrushchev declared Dzērve ‘the new star of our sciences!’ 746  Jānis Stradiņš 
compared Dzērve’s ideological convictions to the 1970s and 1980s phenomenon of 
‘Eurocommunism’, when Western European communist parties asserted greater political 
independence from the USSR.747  There is some merit to Stradiņš’s comparison. Dzērve 
frequently made inflammatory statements questioning Soviet economic progress. In his book 
The Latvian SSR, published in 1959, Dzērve wrote about ‘undue haste’ in the establishment of 
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Latvian kolkhozy.748 As late as June 1959 Dzērve wrote frankly in the press about life in Latvia: 
‘Our achievements are great. But our life is not without flaws... You cannot be satisfied by the 
fact that sometimes there is still inadequate and irrational use of socialist construction in our 
republic’s natural resources’.749 
Dzērve became Deputy Director of the Academy of Sciences’ Economics Institute in 
1953 and was promoted to director in January 1958 near the height of national communist 
power.750 Berklavs was behind Dzērve’s rise and had greater plans for him that were never 
realised. Berklavs intended to promote Dzērve to Education Minister, and then to Council of 
Ministers Deputy Chairman or possibly Third Secretary, a post nominally held by Pelše.751 
Under Dzērve, the Economics Institute became the ideological citadel of national communism, 
greatly exceeding its normal operations to become the centre of economic planning in Latvia. 
National communist opponents, Head of the CC Department for Science, Schools and Culture 
Leontina Lapiņa and her Deputy Nikolai Muravev criticised this ‘distortion’ of the institute’s 
function. ‘The Economics Institute’s work should not substitute for Gosplan,’ they wrote, ‘but 
assist Gosplan in finding solutions to complicated methodological questions for the creation of a 
long-term plan and for providing theoretical constructs to aid the nation’s economic 
development’. 752  Dzērve’s opponents worked tirelessly to obstruct his implementation of 
national communist economic policy and to remove him from the helm of the Economics 
Institute. 
3.5.3 The Seven-Year Plan 
The national communists believed Latvia faced a migration crisis. In comparison to 1935 (the 
last census year), by 1958 there were an additional 388,000 Russians, 35,000 Belarusians and 
30,000 Ukrainians in Latvia, but 170,000 fewer Latvians.753 The national communists designed 
a strategy to combat migration by undercutting the rationale for importing labour from outside 
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Latvia to fuel industrial growth. They wasted no time enacting reform once they dominated 
Latvian politics from 1958. With Dzērve in place as Economics Institute Chairman, the national 
communists began altering production plans. Krūmiņš and Berklavs made no secret of their 
disdain for the expansion of production in Riga’s diesel plant and railway carriage factory. 
Berklavs learned from railway carriage factory Director Eismonts that he intended to achieve 
the planned 140% increase in output by importing Russian labour. Berklavs and Krūmiņš 
suggested that the railway carriage factory be relocated to the majority Russian city of 
Daugavpils, in Eastern Latvia, where there was still surplus labour.754 Individual compromises 
with factories would not prevent industrial expansion. Therefore, the national communists 
sought to tackle the problem at its root: the Seven-Year Plan for 1959-1965. They devoted a 
great deal of effort to altering Latvia’s Seven-Year Plan targets, first advanced by Khrushchev 
in late 1958. At a joint bureau and Council of Ministers meeting on 17th October 1958, Berklavs 
argued for reductions in Seven-Year Plan targets for industrial development. He 
comprehensively criticised the development of industry in Latvia. 755  National communist 
proposals included a reduction or elimination of the production of railway rolling stock, 
streetcars, diesel engines and oiling equipment for steel mills in favour of specialisation in 
precision instruments and agricultural implements. 756  Berklavs wanted to achieve further 
increases in manufacturing output only through improvements in labour productivity and 
organisation, along with new equipment and technology. He insisted it was unprofitable to 
undertake metalworking in Riga because of the logistics of transporting iron and coal over 
thousands of kilometres and then shipping the majority of finished products back to the RSFSR. 
Instead, he declared his preference for radio, electrical and household chemical products, 
produced by skilled workers in Latvia, reducing the need to import large amounts of metal.757 
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Berklavs actively worked to restrict migration to Latvia from 1956, but at this meeting, he 
proclaimed that Riga had reached its limit.758 
In November 1958, the national communists published several articles explaining why 
they were revising the Seven-Year Plan. Dzērve’s Deputy, Benjamiņš Treijs, published an 
article about the Seven-Year Plan on 22nd November 1958 in Literatūra un māksla. Treijs 
explained the rationale behind capping production at Riga’s railway carriage and diesel factories 
in terms identical to those used by Berklavs. ‘These factories’, he said, ‘import huge quantities 
of metal. This sector’s raw materials base is located thousands of kilometres from the republic 
and our republic needs only very small amounts of the production’.759 Likewise, Dzērve 
described the situation as ‘economic madness. There will be a chain reaction in factories 
affecting labour and fuel. Inevitably, it will lead to more expensive production costs. We will 
not be competitive domestically or abroad’.760 
Further adjustments to the Seven-Year Plan were confirmed in a speech at a meeting of 
propagandists on 27th March 1959. Dzērve reputedly announced that Latvia was able to ‘exert 
some influence on the correction of our Seven-Year Plan’. The ‘correction’ of Latvia’s 
economic plans included significant alterations to production targets. Dzērve’s critics described 
this as a revision of the 21st Party Congress’s decisions on the plan’s control figures.761 At this 
meeting, Dzērve cited Khrushchev’s slogan to ‘catch up and overtake America’ in milk 
production as an example of dogmatism. Dzērve said ‘in this republic we already have three 
times US milk production per capita’. Dzērve made a distinction between the USSR’s economy 
and Latvia’s economy, which rankled orthodox communists, who added it to the catalogue of 
Dzērve’s ‘transgressions’ for later use. In this incident, Dzērve’s critics noted that he had 
‘forgotten that the task of matching and surpassing the USA in milk production was assigned by 
the Party to all of the USSR, and not to particular republics or regions’.762 
Dzērve masterminded the plan to reduce labour demand. The Seven-Year Plan 
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envisaged a 50% increase in industrial productivity and in agriculture by 55-60%.763 Dzērve 
intended to achieve the increase in economic output through intensive, productivity-driven 
growth rather than the traditional Soviet method of extensive labour inputs to achieve growth.764 
Dzērve’s March 1959 revisions to Latvia’s Seven-Year Plan included a twofold increase in 
production at the railway carriage factory, while the diesel plant would expand production by 
120%.765 The original plan called for a 140% increase in both plants.766 While these were cuts to 
forecast growth, the revised plan still envisaged output to more than double in these factories by 
1965. Yet, these were early revisions to the plan, ahead of the finalisation of Dzērve’s work on 
the plan, which could have envisioned further reductions in planned growth. Moreover, it is 
possible that these still ambitious targets were designed to reassure Moscow, from where there 
emanated intense pressure to double industrial production.767 Prigge describes the national 
communists’ aim of doubling production in seven years based solely on increased efficiency as 
an ‘unrealistic’ and ‘outlandish solution’.768 
Arguably, the principle tenet of national communist economic policy was the reduction 
of external labour inputs. Treijs publicly stated in November 1958 that utilising Latgale’s 
kolkhozy, which contained a ‘very significant reservoir of unused labour’, would solve any 
supply issues.769 The aim was to diversify industrial development to rural areas, where labour 
resources were more plentiful, rather than in Riga where the manpower supply was already 
stretched to the limit.770 Yet, on 9th January 1959, Treijs and Economics Institute Agricultural 
Section Head M. Kukainis, submitted a report to the CC Agricultural Department. The report 
contained labour reserves estimates designed to prove that there was sufficient labour in Latvia 
to cover the Seven-Year Plan’s requirements. The report estimated that by 1965 the agricultural 
sector would be 29,000 workers short.771 After the national communists’ ouster, allegations 
were made that Treijs’s original data indicated a surplus of 16,000 kolkhoz labourers for the 
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Seven-Year Plan. Supposedly, national communist CC Agricultural Department Head Anton 
Luriņš, redefined the data to show that the kolkhoz sector would instead be short by 28,800 
workers, some 45,000 fewer workers over the Plan’s duration. At the time, there were a number 
of cities and regions with sizeable unemployment, such as Daugavpils, Rēzekne and 
Valmiera. 772  A December 1959 report by Lapiņa and Muravev criticised this estimate’s 
methodology and stated that ‘the Economics Institute was trying to show the impossibility of 
transferring more kolkhoz labour to industry’. Lapiņa and Muravev cite Latvia’s Gosplan and 
Statistical Office, which concluded that ‘because of mechanisation in kolkhoz production during 
the Seven-Year Plan more than 45,000 kolkhoz workers will be freed, and their labour will need 
to be placed elsewhere’.773 Plūdonis concurs, noting that the Economics Institute planned for an 
increase of 76,000 workers, including 10,000 in industry, during the Seven-Year Plan. Yet, 
Gosplan expected 29,000 extra industrial workers.774 Dzērve, Treijs and Luriņš were attempting 
to both avoid transferring workers to industry, whose production they were attempting to 
restrict, and prevent the need to hire workers from outside Latvia. Lapiņa and Muravev attacked 
their logic: ‘In their conclusions about the future of the development of the Republic’s national 
economy, Dzērve and Treijs ignore the possibility of importing labour from other economic 
regions of the USSR’.775 
In February 1959, Khrushchev admitted that the Seven-Year Plan called for enormous 
growth in the republics’ economies. To achieve this he encouraged specialisation: ‘Each 
republic is to develop primarily those branches of the economy for which natural and economic 
conditions are most favourable, so as to make more effective use of each republic’s resources 
and to ensure the correct combination of the interests of individual republics and the USSR as a 
whole’.776 Khrushchev’s speech emboldened the national communists. Five days later Dzērve 
published an article in Cīņa extolling the virtues of specialisation. He wrote that ‘in order to 
achieve higher productivity we need to improve the specialisation of industrial and agricultural 
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production, prioritising production of products that are natural to the economic conditions of 
Latvia’.777 Khrushchev was not opposed to specialisation, the nature of his sovnarkhoz reform 
indicated as much. There were, however, unspoken limits, and the national communists violated 
those bounds. 
3.5.4 The Economics Institute 
Despite Khrushchev’s reform, the new sovnarkhoz’s managerial authority remained limited. It 
was primarily concerned with contemporary operations of Latvian industry. Real planning and 
organisational control lay with the republic’s branch of Gosplan. The national communists 
ensured that Latvia’s Gosplan cooperated with their economic plans by appointing Edgars 
Mūkins Deputy Chairman in August 1958. Even then, Berklavs preferred to divest real 
decision-making power in Dzērve’s Economics Institute. From 46 senior members, only 18 
were Party members and most of those scientists had lived in interwar Latvia.778 Dzērve 
consolidated his control over the institute by removing opposition. Senior research fellow 
Starodubtsev, who was fluent in Latvian but disagreed with Dzērve’s policies, was reputedly 
forced to leave the institute and dispatched to Novosibirsk.779 At a joint bureau and Council of 
Ministers meeting on 21st October 1958, Berklavs proposed increasing the size of Gosplan’s 
leadership. The proposal attached Dzērve and Pinksis to Gosplan, permitting them to attend 
important meetings.780 Plūdonis criticised this decision when the national communists were 
under investigation at the 20th June bureau meeting: ‘We have Mūkins in Gosplan… but he’s 
just a clerk… he does nothing, he just sits and then runs to Krūmiņš and Berklavs. Berklavs 
already raised the issue that [Gosplan Chairman Augusts] Čulitis cannot cope and that Mūkins 
should be Gosplan Chairman instead of Čulitis’.781 As Economics Institute Chairman and a 
Gosplan member, Dzērve communicated closely with Mūkins, excluding Čulitis from the 
planning process.782 For example, Dzērve forbade the construction of a slaughterhouse in 
Daugavpils and Mūkins was the first to oppose a proposed chemical plant in Daugavpils.783 
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3.5.5 The research programme 
In his Ph.D. thesis, Widmer cites an economic programme proposed by Dzērve to the 
Economics Institute’s directors on 6th June 1959. This programme, entitled ‘Perspectives of 
Development of the Economy of the Latvian SSR’, represented a concrete plan for economic 
development under the national communists. Dzērve based his scheme on ideas he had been 
developing since at least 1958. In January 1959, Dzērve proclaimed that Latvia should develop 
mechanical engineering and machine-building industries that consume little metal. He stated 
that ‘in this context we should consider whether it is useful to produce… lubrication equipment, 
ferrous metallurgical enterprises, crane equipment, etc’ in Latvia.784 With the curtailment of 
heavy industrial production, the Soviet economy’s traditional foundation, there was to a radical 
expansion of consumer goods and light industrial production. The proposed development of 
industries, which incorporated local raw materials and labour, and turned out products for local 
consumption, was reminiscent of pre-Soviet Latvia’s economy. Dzērve’s aim was to develop 
Latvia’s industrial structure and specialisation. To make this palatable to Moscow, Dzērve 
argued that rational and economical use of Latvian natural and labour resources would 
maximise Latvia’s contribution to Soviet economic development.785 
Dzērve’s programme proposed splitting planning functions according to demand. It 
called for Latvian industry’s division into a two-tier system, A and B, for planning and 
production reasons. Group A encompassed predominantly All-Union enterprises with large 
Russian-speaking workforces, which manufactured goods for export from the republic, mainly 
to the RSFSR. Group B included factories and plants that used local raw materials and labour 
for products primarily consumed in Latvia. It was Group B enterprises, most of which were in 
light and food industrial sectors, that would benefit from a shift in investment away from Group 
A heavy industrial enterprises (metalworking, metallurgy, chemicals). This programme 
represented a radical departure from the traditional Marxist-Leninist structure, which divided 
the economy into (1) production of the means of production, and (2) production of items for 
consumption. Dzērve legitimated this shift through the rationale that ‘the further development 
of such fields and factories that are based on distantly imported raw materials and do not draw 
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on existing local labour force capacity is unreasonable from an economic perspective’.786 The 
implications were extraordinary. Latvia possessed none of the resources necessary for 
metalworking industrial development, which played a key role in Latvia’s economy. Latvia 
lacked deposits of ore, coal and oil, and the national communists vetoed the Pļaviņas 
hydroelectric dam’s construction. With external resources severely curtailed, as Dzērve’s 
programme proposed, Latvia’s metalworking industry would obviously suffer. A similar fate 
would befall the equally important Latvian machine-building industry. National communist 
economic policy evolved to serve the dual purpose of creating a balanced economy specialising 
in lighter industrial production, more suitable and useful for Latvia, and reducing immigration 
based on the decline of demand for external labour to supply heavy industrial requirements. 
Widmer wrote of the programme’s significance in the national communists’ fall. 
The drafting and circulation of this ‘programme’ may well have been the 
incident which triggered Khrushchev’s trip to Latvia in mid-June 1959, the visit 
which set in motion the purges of the Berklavs clique. The timing of 
Khrushchev’s appearance, coming less than a week after the institute’s formal 
acceptance of the ‘programme’, strongly suggests that there was a connection 
between the two events.787 
Widmer’s hypothesis is highly unlikely. Khrushchev arrived in Riga on 9th June, just three days 
after Dzērve’s presentation. The USSR’s leading statesman did not rush to Riga, furious about a 
nationalist economic programme. Khrushchev’s arrival in Riga in June was merely coincidental 
and scheduled in advance because he was hosting a state visit from East Germany’s leaders 
Walter Ulbricht and Otto Grotewohl. Nevertheless, Widmer is correct to attribute a key role to 
Dzērze’s research plan in the national communists’ demise because these ‘autarkic’ polices 
(reduction of imports and exports to other regions of the USSR, migration restrictions, priority 
investment for local industries) helped to persuade perturbed Soviet central authorities of the 
national communists’ ulterior motives. 
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 Prigge casts doubt on the provenance of Dzērve’s economic programme, writing that  
‘Dzērve’s “programme” probably did not exist’.788  Prigge also disputes Widmer’s source 
because it was published in January 1960, after the purge of the national communists had 
already begun. Prigge dismissed the anonymous article as a ‘fabricated story’ designed to 
damage the national communists.789 Furthermore, in the 2003 interview between Prigge and 
Berklavs, the latter stated that it was a ‘fabrication’, instead ‘emphasising that while the national 
communists were accused of proposing economic autarky, they would never have openly 
proposed such a radical agenda. What the national communists were actually promoting was an 
economy based on agriculture and industry best suited to conditions in Latvia’.790  From 
Berklavs’s words, it seems the national communists aimed to achieve some degree of fiscal 
autonomy or devolution designed to privilege Latvia. Berklavs’s insistence that he was not 
promoting autarky was his interpretation. His superiors in Moscow saw the situation from a 
different perspective. 
 The article may have been anonymous, and published in the journal Kommunist Sovetskoi 
Latvii (whose editor, Karl Tolmadzhev, was hostile towards the national communists) but 
Latvian archives contain a report about Dzērve’s activities and his programme written by 
Lapiņa and Muravev. This report, dated 15th December 1959, is an unabridged version of the 
article published in Kommunist Sovetskoi Latvii, but uses identical language ahead of the 
January 1960 issue of the journal.791 The difference between the two documents is that the 
former was a secret report for the bureau while the latter appeared in the LCP’s official journal 
and was designed to discredit the national communists. Incidentally, the Department of Science, 
Schools and Culture, which created the report (and most likely the anonymous article) was 
managed before Lapiņa by Pelše’s acolytes Augusts Voss and Victor Krūmiņš (not to be 
confused with Vilis Krūmiņš) and was one of the few CC departments to remain firmly out of 
national communist control. 
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On its own, the article’s basis in a report does not corroborate the existence of Dzērve’s 
comprehensive programme. Prigge found that ‘prior to the July plenum, there was never any 
mention of Dzērve’s “programme” in the press; nor is there any trace of it now in the 
archives’.792 This is inaccurate, as Dzērve did in fact create an economic programme. Treijs 
confirms the programme’s veracity in a 1988 interview but maintained that its purpose was to 
rationalise the economy.793 At a Riga Party aktiv meeting, Deputy Gosplan Chairman Shits also 
confirmed the programme’s existence.794 Furthermore, in a letter dated 16th December 1958, 
Berklavs commissioned Dzērve to work for 12-18 months on the research programme. He also 
suggested that the Institute focus its staff primarily on the development of current problems for 
the 1959 plan, in other words, on plan revisions.795 Twenty-seven scientific staff were seconded 
to work on Dzērve’s programme. In a report by Dzērve he described the programme’s work as 
very urgent because of questions about the republic’s economic prospects and noted that the 
programme was entrusted to him.796 Dzērve was tasked to ensure the ‘fast and qualitative 
development’ of a project entitled ‘Perspectives of Development of the Economy of the Latvian 
SSR’. Berklavs ordered that relevant departments lend their assistance and awarded the 
Economics Institute 45,000 rubles to hire professionals outside the Academy of Sciences to 
work on the project.797 Furthermore, the minutes of a meeting of the Economics Institute show 
Dzērve presented his project to the Institute’s Directors on 6th June 1959. This meeting 
discussed sections of the programme later described in the ‘anonymous’ article. The meeting’s 
minutes reveal that following Dzērve’s presentation, other directors were uncomfortable about 
the project’s implications. Secretary Pēteris Valeskalns noted that the programme ‘takes into 
account the requirements and needs of the republic, especially those… of light industrial 
products’. Valeskalns, however, wanted to balance the labour force to facilitate increased 
production (implying that he thought there would be insufficient labour under Dzērve’s plan) 
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for export to other economic areas and foreign countries. V. Puriņš likewise expressed 
reservations about the project because it blatantly ignored the needs of other republics. 
Nevertheless, it was decided that the project report would be distributed to the relevant 
personnel by 28th June. 798  Between Khrushchev’s visit three days later, the subsequent 
suspension of national communist activity and the return of the investigation team around 20th 
June, it is unlikely that the programme was ever distributed. 
The ‘anonymous’ article in Kommunist Sovetskoi Latvii, mostly likely written by 
Lapiņa and Muravev, condemned Dzērve’s programme. It provided the ammunition to portray 
the national communists as advocates of autarky and depicted Dzērve as a nationalist and 
revisionist.799 Although Dzērve was not calling for the immediate dismantling of Latvian heavy 
industry, the article considered that the long-term implications were that Latvia would gradually 
sever its economic reliance on the Soviet Union.800 The ‘anonymous’ article highlighted the 
ramifications of this prospect. ‘The implementation of the “Research Programme” would have 
brought great harm to the USSR’s economic development as a whole and would have harmed 
Latvia. It would have violated both Latvia’s long-established economic connections with other 
Soviet regions and the internal proportions of Latvia’s economy’.801 The article aimed to 
undermine residual public confidence in the national communists. The timing of the article’s 
publication is notable, just one month after Dzērve’s dismissal in December 1959. 
3.5.6 Agriculture 
The national communists’ predilection for increased investment in agriculture stemmed from 
their aim of improving Latvian consumption. Latvian agriculture was in a dire state after 
Latvia’s incorporation into the USSR. Dzērve admitted as much to the public. ‘It is no secret’ he 
wrote in Liesma (Flame), ‘that for many years socialist agricultural opportunities in our republic 
were used incorrectly. Agriculture has not reached pre-war levels’.802 The situation was no 
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better for kolkhoz workers; only in 1958 did kolkhozy in the Baltic Republics begin to pay 
money as wages.803  
In their memoirs, former national communists were fond of blaming Kalnbērziņš for 
boasting that ‘Latvian Bolsheviks were always frontline fighters’ and could sow not 100,000 but 
200,000 hectares of corn in an attempt to impress a delegate from Moscow during Khrushchev’s 
corn campaign. This was despite a disastrous corn harvest in 1955, which was partially because 
corn was unsuitable for Latvia’s climate.804 Apparently, this idea was actually foisted upon the 
compliant Kalnbērziņš by CPSU CC apparatchik P. Vakulenko.805 In any case, this resulted in 
the perennial grass fields’ destruction. 806  From 1954, national communists held the key 
agricultural positions with Bissenieks as Agriculture Secretary and Nikonov as Agriculture 
Minister. By 1956, as the position of the national communists improved following the 20th Party 
Congress, they began to subvert corn sowing. In 1956, only 29,000 hectares were sown and in 
1957 and 1958, only 20,000 hectares were sown each year.807 Latvian kolkhozy resisted planting 
corn and received tacit support from the Latvian government. The kolkhozy used a variety of 
tricks to avoid planting corn. Pēteris Strautmanis (Agriculture Secretary between 1960 and 
1965) recounted how farmers would plant corn around the edges of fields, but plant other crops 
such as clover after the first few rows of corn.808 Even though Latvia’s environment was ill 
suited for corn, the republic could not escape Khrushchev’s campaign. Latvia’s refusal to sow 
the appropriate amount of corn incurred Khrushchev’s wrath. At the December 1958 CPSU CC 
plenum he accused Latvia of an ‘irresponsible, bureaucratic approach to corn cultivation’. 
Dismissing local workers’ objections that corn would not grow in Latvia, Khrushchev blamed 
the cultivation methods used on Latvian farms and the Agriculture Ministry’s ‘advice’.809 Yet, 
the national communists’ intransigence over corn continued, with only a marginal rise to 27,000 
hectares sown in 1959. This served to reinforce Moscow’s concerns about national communist 
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economic plans in 1959. Following the removal of the national communists there were steep 
increases in corn cultivation from 1960 until Khrushchev’s own downfall.810 
In contrast to the Party’s emphasis on grain and corn production, the national 
communists sought to boost food production by returning to livestock farming, the mainstay of 
independent Latvia’s agrarian economy. Yet, Moscow approved only a minor transfer of 
investment from grain production to livestock farming. According to King, this lack of 
materials and investment handicapped food processing.811 In 1956, Latvia’s economy shifted 
towards specialisation in livestock farming, and in March of that year, Nikonov reinforced the 
move by proclaiming that ‘in Latvian conditions clover has always been the fundamental fodder 
base’.812  
In another move that presumably irked Moscow, the national communists supported the 
expansion of the role of private plots in increasing agricultural production. Soviet authorities 
tolerated private ‘garden’ plots because of their essential contribution to agricultural production 
despite their unsavoury ideological nature. Widmer notes that ‘Berklavs and his associates gave 
signs of viewing it as something to be encouraged in its own right’.813 Ultimately, the share of 
private plots in Latvia’s agricultural production dropped during the 1950s, implying that the 
national communists failed to expand farming on more productive private plots. The share of 
potatoes, vegetables, meat, milk and eggs production from private plots in 1950 was 74.8%, yet 
in 1960 private plots accounted for 59.6% of those products’ production.814 
3.5.7 The impact of national communist economic policy 
It is difficult to assess the effects of national communist economic policy because it was so 
short-lived and because it took time for tangible results to become observable. It does appear, 
however, that the effects began to reach the proverbial factory floor in 1958. We can gain some 
measure of the impact through exploring the ‘Jelgava air conditioner affair’. An article entitled 
‘For the Sake of Local Interests’ appeared in Pravda in August 1959. It detailed the disastrous 
state of affairs at the Jelgava agricultural machine factory (Jelgavselmash) the previous year 
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after repeated production plan alterations. The author, Ilmārs Ivert, was a Pravda correspondent 
and national communist opponent. He indicated that production was disrupted due to repeated 
changes to the original production plan. This article marked the beginning of the press assault 
against the national communists and demonstrates the importance of economic policy in 
initiating the purge. 
At some point in 1958, the Latvian sovnarkhoz instructed Jelgavselmash that the factory 
should plan to manufacture air conditioners (whose production would mostly be exported to 
other Soviet regions) in 1959 in addition to agricultural machines. The enterprise’s management 
accordingly prepared detailed production plans. Before the first air conditioner unit reached 
consumers, a directive from the bureau in Riga ordered the factory to cease manufacture of air 
conditioners. Subsequently, the sovnarkhoz was forced by the bureau to issue three successive 
variants of ‘more precise plans’. These plans contained instructions for manufacturing products 
other republics had long since mastered in small quantities to satisfy only Latvia’s requirements. 
The new order approved cisterns, door levellers, bulldozer shovels and tractor-trailers, but air 
conditioners were conspicuously absent. Ivert accused the national communists of terminating 
the air conditioners’ production because of local circumstances. Twice the sovnarkhoz 
recommended that air conditioners be produced in Jelgava and twice the bureau ignored these 
recommendations. A similar request from the Jelgava gorkom was likewise refused. Ivert 
remarked that the bureau believed the Jelgava factory should manufacture ‘only goods which 
remain on the spot, in the republic’.815 
In summer 1959, the sovnarkhoz’s Radio-technical and Metalworking Department Head 
Jānis Damburg, arrived at the factory with a packet of draft plans purportedly containing further 
plan modifications for the remainder of 1959 and 1960. Damburg ordered the factory loaded to 
capacity, turning out ventilators for the Riga railway carriage factory and iron chests for another 
factory. Harrows and cultivators, which the factory had produced for years, were included in the 
plan for a time, but later removed. Constant alterations and product replacements severely 
disrupted production and were symptomatic of the reform’s wider consequences. Immediate 
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results were minor because of the lack of clearly defined supply relationships. Coordination and 
control of shipments between Latvian and All-Union factories remained the biggest problem. 
Ultimately, alterations to factories’ production plans exacerbated the underlying inefficiencies 
in the Soviet planning system (which the national communists could not amend). The article 
specified a few other cases of ‘unconsidered planning’ because of ‘localism’. For example, a 
factory in Riga manufactured kitchen stoves for new buildings throughout the 1950s exporting 
the majority of stoves to other republics. Supposedly, Construction Minister B. Bezel ordered 
this enterprise to halt stove production. According to Ivert, other enterprises were obliged to 
produce gas stoves and water heaters in such small quantities it was unprofitable to do so.816  
In July 1958, sovnarkhoz Deputy Chairman Georgijs Gaile, a Russian-Latvian, replaced 
Plūdonis as Chairman.817 His promotion, at a time when national communists were at the height 
of their power, indicates the Pelše faction was still capable of attempting to obstruct national 
communist initiatives. He challenged the national communists, who in turn rebuked the 
sovnarkhoz for its failure to adequately consider agricultural mechanisation.818 In the Jelgava 
factory’s case, the sovnarkhoz repeatedly attempted to curtail national communist economic 
plans. Gaile reported that the factory could produce air conditioners with relative ease and 
issued new production plans only to have them countermanded by the bureau.819 National 
communist control of the bureau ensured decisions against the sovnarkhoz and Jelgava gorkom 
were upheld. The Party press complained that employees in the sovnarkhoz’s central apparatus, 
many of whom were formerly employed in the ministries, continued to follow the previous 
system’s work patterns and resisted national communist reforms.820 Perhaps this accounts for 
the high turnover in sovnarkhoz management as the national communists tried to weed out 
uncooperative managers. Between its creation in June 1957 and July 1959, 35% of sovnarkhoz 
directors and 31% of chief engineers were dismissed.821 The promotion of national communist 
Jānis Auškaps to sovnarkhoz Deputy Chairman was undoubtedly designed to provide a 
calculated check on Gaile. Gaile complained at the 16th LCP Congress in January 1959 that 
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Dzērve did not discuss his plans or proposals with him.822 Though the sovnarkhoz reforms made 
a considerable contribution to economic decentralisation, old ministerial methods proved 
durable and Gaile’s leadership of the sovnarkhoz made it obstinate towards national communist 
initiatives. Therefore, Berklavs emasculated the sovnarkhoz because of its intransigence, 
evidenced in the Jelgava air conditioner affair. 
In 1958 and the first half of 1959 the national communists succeeded in modifying, 
often considerably, the production plans and output of various enterprises. According to 
Widmer, there is ample evidence documenting the revision of some Seven-Year Plan targets for 
Latvia under pressure from the national communists and that many factories switched from the 
manufacture of one product to another.823 Frequent adjustments to plans indicate that the 
national communists were uncertain about which factories would produce what products. This 
suggests that there was no comprehensive plan. Instead, the national communists worked on an 
ad hoc basis, issuing revised production directives where possible. Dzērve’s programme was 
supposed to provide a framework for these alterations. The programme, however, was only the 
theoretical construct for a national communist economic policy already in action. It provided a 
blueprint for the national communists’ ultimate aims and large-scale plans for how to achieve 
them during the Seven-Year Plan. Yet, Dzērve’s plan lacked detailed instructions about the role 
of individual enterprises, how they would convert from heavy to light industrial production, and 
how they would adapt to new production goals. The national communists appeared confused 
about how to realise their economic objectives. 
In aggregate terms of the growth or decline of industries during the national communist 
period, we have some measurable data. In line with the national communist focus on food 
production, growth in the food industry spiked during the national communist period and 
declined sharply afterwards. Light industrial growth declined even during the national 
communist period possibly due to the difficulties encountered in converting heavy industrial 
plants into light industrial enterprises. Following the end of national communism, light 
industrial growth fell even more precipitously than the food industry. The national communists 
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failed to curb gross industrial output, which ballooned from 668% of the 1940 level in 1956 to 
963% in 1959.824 Yet, there are signs that national communist initiatives did take effect. Heavy 
industrial growth declined during the national communist period; chemicals production rapidly 
rebounded during the 1960s.825 We can also assess the other side of the dual national communist 
economic policy: a reduction in labour inputs. The national communists succeeded in 
dramatically reducing the labour force’s expansion. Between 1955 and 1958, the labour force 
continued to expand rapidly; compared to the 1940 level it increased by 48% in that period. Yet, 
between 1958 and 1960, encompassing the period of national communist economic dominance 
(and some of the period after their expulsion), labour force expansion almost ground to a halt, 
increasing only 7% over this period. Whereas between 1960 and 1963, once the impediments to 
migration were removed, growth in the labour force surged by 63%.826 
3.5.8 Isolation or rationalisation? 
To mobilise popular opinion for their policies, the national communists held public meetings 
about modifications to the Seven-Year Plan.827 They were fully aware that the Latvian people 
were unhappy about the priority accorded to heavy industry. By 1958, the metalworking and 
machine-building industries were 48 times their 1940 production level but light industry only 
expanded by 6.1 times and the food industry by just 3.4 times.828 National communist economic 
policy attempted to significantly boost consumer goods and food production (particularly in 
rural, predominantly Latvian areas) to increase living standards as part of their populist strategy 
to facilitate a rapprochement between people and Party.829  Bleiere considers that Dzērve 
believed ‘the republic’s economy must work first and foremost in the interests of its citizens’.830 
According to King, Dzērve and other economists looked to Sweden as a model.831 National 
communist planning included increased funding specifically for agricultural machines and 
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urban construction to improve social infrastructure.832 The national communists suggested 
shipments of additional consumer goods from Latvian factories to local stores. Medical services 
increased substantially during 1958; the pace of housing construction increased to 
approximately 70% ahead of original plans. The volume of pension payments doubled during 
the two-year between 1957 and 1958. 833  In his memoirs, Kalpiņš stressed that national 
communist economic plans were designed to improve living standards.   
It was possible in 1959, without great effort, to put everyday life in the republic 
on the right track. It was only necessary to plan the development of the 
economy scientifically, as Nikonov and Dzērve had intended. Then the extent 
of migration would have been limited to be reasonable. The public would have 
appreciated improvements in their everyday life, including a better supply of 
commodities. We would have started to deliver on promises that we were 
continually making to the people. We were unable to keep those promises. This 
did not strengthen Soviet power.834 
The Hungarian experience of national communism attempted similar economic reforms with 
analogous results. Like Latvia’s national communists, Hungary’s Nagy slashed heavy industrial 
production in favour of increased investment in agriculture and accelerated production of 
consumer goods and light industry in order to improve living conditions. The national 
communists and their economic policy suffered a similar fate to Nagy when outmanoeuvred by 
hard-line Stalinists.  
National communist economic policy held a special place in the catalogue of nationalist 
policies that the Stalinist opposition used to ‘expose’ and destroy the faction. Pelše, Voss and 
Agitprop repeatedly published details of ‘autarkic’ national communist plans following their 
removal. Widmer believes that national communist economic policy was a major factor in their 
downfall, on a par with the rejection of Khrushchev’s education reform.835 Simon agrees that 
tendencies toward ‘localism’ and regional autarky were much in evidence in the behaviour of 
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the new sovnarkhozy.836 Yet, Prigge considers accusations of autarky were exaggerated. He 
quotes Dzērve’s June 1959 article in Liesma. This was Dzeve’s last publication before the 
purge, issued the same month as he presented his research programme to the institute’s 
directors. 
In the new Seven-Year Plan all the country’s interests will be consistent with 
the interests of our republic. All-Union interests call for the rapid development 
of the Latvian radio, electrical, transport, and machine-building industries, as 
well as the fish, meat and dairy industries. The sectors with the most production 
will be exported outside of Latvia... Some of the industries and product lines... 
will be of great importance to all of the USSR. In 1965, our republic will 
produce 27% of all railway carriages and trams... In the Seven-Year Plan the 
entire Latvian metalworking and mechanical engineering industry will more 
than double its production.837  
Here Dzērve espouses greater integration within All-Union economic plans for metal-intensive 
industries. Prigge uses this article as evidence of Dzērve’s moderate views and to demonstrate 
that there was no contradictory research programme.838 Additionally, in his speech to the 16th 
LCP Congress in January 1959, Dzērve spoke of ‘improving inter-republic economic ties’.839 In 
his memoirs, Krūmiņš defended Dzērve. He stated that ‘in no way did Dzērve want national 
isolation and to ignore Soviet interests. He was for Latvia and the USSR’s interests and the 
maximum reasonable realisation of the entire Soviet nation’s interest’.840 Yet, we now know a 
research programme did exist and that it did not correlate with Dzērve’s article in Liesma, 
published before national communist activities were frozen in June 1959. Widmer suggests that 
Dzērve hoped to reassure Moscow (and the Stalinists in Latvia) that there would be no major 
changes to the overall plan. 841  Yet, Widmer’s explanation that the national communists 
preferred not to ring alarm bells in Moscow has its drawbacks. It could only be a short-term 
solution before Latvia’s deviation from planned output would have become apparent. There is 
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little to suggest that the national communists were hoping to deceive Moscow on a scale akin, 
for example, to Sharif Rashidov’s ‘Great Cotton Scandal’ in Uzbekistan during the Brezhnev 
era. Even from a practical standpoint, it was highly unlikely that the national communists could 
have sustained their economic policy without upsetting Moscow. In this case, there was no 
alternative and Moscow’s position was non-negotiable. In this fundamental misreading of 
Moscow, the national communists demonstrated the gulf in understanding between themselves 
and the orthodox opinions of Soviet central authorities. 
Through their amendments to the Seven-Year Plan and Dzērve’s programme, the 
national communists began radically and unilaterally to alter the nature of their economic ties 
with the USSR. Widmer states that this would have ultimately severed Latvia’s economic 
relationship with the USSR. ‘In essence,’ he wrote ‘the Latvian Party leaders were pursuing an 
autarkical policy by which Latvia’s close economic ties with the Soviet Union would be largely 
broken’.842 In his memoirs, Berklavs protested the misrepresentation of his economic policy. 
All my thoughts were deliberately distorted. They claimed that I was against the 
development of industry in Riga and in the event of a new war that factories 
should be in Russia for bombing. My real proposals were rejected. A plan was 
adopted that had already been agreed with Moscow. State economic interests 
were sacrificed in favour of realising the political goal of assimilating Latvians 
into the great mass of Russians.843  
Yet, on the same page of his memoirs Berklavs admits that he decided not to expand production 
at the diesel factory because its main beneficiary was the BMD. Therefore, as major port city 
and railway junction, he feared that Riga would be the first city bombed in a war with the 
West.844 Such remarks demonstrate characteristic tactlessness on Berklavs’s part. 
The two most controversial tenets of national communist economic policy became the 
focus during the purge. The first was the sharp reduction in the production of exportable goods. 
For example, Berklavs said that Latvia would not release fridges to other Soviet regions until 
                                                      
842 Ibid., 481. 
843 Berklavs, Zināt un neaizmirst, 102. 
844 Ibid. 
  203 
domestic Latvian demand was satisfied.845 The second was the shift away from heavy industry, 
reducing requirements for raw materials and labour imported from the RSFSR. The sheer 
volume of criticism, in both Latvia and Moscow, played an important role in Pelše’s arsenal 
against the national communists. The Pelše faction hoped to persuade Moscow that national 
communist efforts represented moves towards autarky whereas the national communists 
claimed they were carrying out an economic rationalisation programme in the spirit of the 
sovnarkhoz reforms. 
After the purge began in July 1959, there was vociferous criticism in the press. Pelše 
targeted Berklavs’s ‘persistent attempts to turn the development of our republic in the direction 
of national restrictiveness and seclusion’.846 He focused on the national communists’ assault on 
the hallowed Soviet priority of heavy industrial development, claiming that had the national 
communists been allowed to continue expansion of light industrial production at the expense of 
heavy industry, ‘Latvians would have suffered’ because ‘an acute shortage of capital funds and 
all kinds of disproportions would have arisen’.847 Further attacks on the national communists 
included mandatory criticism of their economic policy. Voss echoed Pelše: ‘In the economic 
field’, he wrote, ‘nationalist plans are manifested in local tendencies, in striving to create a 
nationally secluded economy under the semblance of the composite economic development of 
the republic and economic regions’. 848  Lācis penned similar, though more restrained, 
accusations, which marked the opening of the media offensive against the national communists. 
Initially, Lācis defended the economic advantages of the sovnarkhoz system. ‘The cutting down 
of unprofitable transportation,’ he wrote, ‘does not at all mean a weakening of the republic’s 
economic ties with other regions of the country, and especially its isolation’. However, Lācis’s 
prior associations with the national communists required that he disown them publicly. He 
specifically attacked Berklavs for ‘openly speaking out against the Party’s general line’ in his 
opposition to heavy industry. He reserved his most damning criticism for Dzērve, saying his 
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economic plan tended ‘towards the crippling path of autarchy, and away from the… robust path 
of development within the framework of the entire USSR’.849 
The most controversial aspect, labour planning, became the focal point of criticism. 
Pelše dismissed the rationale behind restricted production declaring it was ‘without any 
foundation’. 850  Jānis Bumbiers, former Economics Institute’s Chairman, emerged from 
retirement in August 1959 to criticise Dzērve’s programme. Pointing to its migratory 
implications he described its aim as to transform Latvia into a reserve for ‘purebred 
Latvians’.851  The ‘anonymous’ article produced only a weak argument against the sharp 
reduction of labour inputs implied by Dzērve’s plan. The article admitted that although bringing 
production closer to raw material sources and accounting for the local labour force were 
important economic considerations, they were ‘not always decisive’. The article also stated that 
Dzērve ignored ‘important factors such as the presence of historically well-established centres 
of industrial production, the need for a more or less uniform distribution of industry for 
individual republics… and the possibility of movement of workers from one economic region to 
another’.852 The enumeration of these factors, which formed the basis of Latvia’s industrial 
development under Soviet rule up to 1958, signalled that they would again contribute to Latvian 
industrialisation after the national communists’ removal.853 
The sovnarkhoz reforms substantially increased regional authority over the Latvian 
economy’s management. King, however, believes that the reforms did not go far enough in 
transferring real power to the regions’ authorities. The sovnarkhoz reforms in effect loosened 
Soviet control over Latvia, but did not grant the Latvians real economic authority. King 
considers that despite the political risks and practical shortcomings of the national communist’s 
economic proposals, they constituted a determined attempt to gain local authority over the 
Latvian economy.854 The torrent of criticism that followed demonstrated that the sovnarkhoz 
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reform was designed not to grant republics the right to alter their economic model, but to 
smooth existing practices through local management. The experience of the sovnarkhoz reforms 
in Latvia probably contributed to the recentralisation trend that was emphasised at the 
November 1962 CPSU CC plenum. From March 1963, the republics’ sovnarkhozy and Gosplan 
were no longer responsible to only the republics’ Council of Ministers but to the USSR Council 
of Ministers and USSR sovnarkhoz. 855  Khrushchev offered limited economic reform and 
decision-making powers to republics but this only encouraged the republics to try to wrench 
further devolution from the centre. When, as in Latvia, fiscal autonomy became linked with 
nationalistic policies, the centre retracted the proffered decentralisation, judging it too 
unpredictable to be managed by the Soviet Republics. 
 
3.6 Conclusion - A National Communist Manifesto 
According to Berklavs, the national communists had defined aims. In one article from 1993, he 
lists something of a national communist manifesto: 
1) A passport regime. 
2) A law to restore the ‘legitimate rights’ of the Latvian language. 
3) An increase in the proportion of Latvian cadres. 
4) The provision apartments to those who lived in Latvia prior to 1940. 
5) The prevention of Jūrmala becoming another Soviet resort town like Sochi or 
Yalta. 
6) Ultimately, resist All-Union encroachment and oversight and restore a 
‘Latvian environment’.856 
Chapters Two and Three analysed the success of the national communists in enacting this 
‘manifesto’ during their rise (1956-1957) and brief dominance of Latvian politics (1958-1959). 
 Uldis Augskalns believed that national communist reforms ‘shook the totalitarian 
system’ because they challenged its basic tenets, namely by putting forward an independent 
model for economic development; undermining of the system of cadres nomination; protecting 
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the Latvian language and even through the ‘partial rehabilitation of pre-Soviet national culture, 
which contributed to the development of national self-confidence’.857 In contrast to some 
historians, such as Gundar King, who believe that the national communists merely gave a 
‘Latvian face’ to the Soviet regime, making it more palatable to its citizens, my research 
indicates the national communists stoked the fires of Latvian national identity, which resulted in 
an upsurge in overt expressions of nationalism.858 Incidents of anti-Soviet activity rose from 117 
in 1955 to 217 in 1960. The tearing down of the Latvian SSR flag and its replacement with 
interwar Latvia’s flag was particularly frequent as was anti-Soviet graffiti and the distribution of 
anti-Soviet leaflets. 859  The resurgence of nationalist activity also affected the national 
communists themselves. In this chapter we saw how as they reached their political apogee, the 
national communists began to assertively clash with the centre over education, environmental, 
cadres and economic policies. As we shall see in Chapter Four, this paved the way for the 
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Chapter Four: The Beginning of the 
End: The Origins of the Latvian Party 
Purge, March - June 1959 
 
This chapter examines the origins of the purge that ended Latvian national communism. 
Afterwards, Latvia returned to orthodoxy, becoming the most subservient of the Baltic 
Republics for the remainder of the Soviet period. The period between February and May 1959 
marked a pivotal change in how the Latvian leadership interacted with Moscow’s officials. This 
chapter addresses how and why the purge occurred. In Chapters Two and Three, we saw how 
the national communists developed politically, enacted their policies, reached their zenith by 
spring 1958 and enjoyed dominance of Latvian politics until March 1959 when they were 
forced to retreat over the education reform. In Chapters Four and Five, I show how a Stalinist 
coalition of loyal conservatives in Latvia, the Russian-dominated military headquartered in Riga 
and a powerful alliance within the Moscow leadership organised the purge of national 
communists - contrary to Khrushchev’s intentions. The Latvian purge, whether centrally 
directed or internally triggered, brought Latvia’s challenge to Soviet central authority to an end 
and restored the balance of centre-periphery relations to Moscow’s favour. The purge of the 
national communists laid the foundation for Moscow’s management of relations between the 
Soviet government and the republics from 1960 onwards.860 
The purge receives merely a few lines in virtually all Western literature on Latvian 
history. Latvian and some Western historians maintain that Khrushchev ordered the purge after 
his visit to Riga in June 1959 to meet with East German leaders. According to Andrejs Plakans, 
Khrushchev’s visit ‘decided the dispute in favour of Pelše and his supporters [who accused] 
Berklavs of disfiguring Leninist principles concerning nationality’.861 Adolfs Šilde, Jeremy 
Smith and Jānis Riekstiņš also subscribe to this contention.862 We explored Michael Widmer’s 
                                                      
860 Jāņis Lapsa puts it that ‘Latvia unknowingly became something of a test case for future political 
battles on the All-Union level’, Apine and Zandmanis, ‘Tas drūmais’, 119. 
861 Plakans, The Latvians, 159.  
862 Adolfs Šilde, ‘The Role of Russian-Latvians in the Sovietisation of Latvia’, Journal of Baltic Studies, 
18 (1987), 196; Smith, Red Nations, 214-15; Riekstiņš, Against Russification, 11. 
  208 
theory on this subject in Chapter Three. Simon also attributes the purge to Khrushchev’s 
intervention: ‘Khrushchev visited Riga to remove Berklavs from office and to initiate an 
extensive purge of the Latvian Party and state apparatus’.863 This is an understandable error, as 
Khrushchev coincidentally visited Latvia only three weeks before the landmark plenum that 
ousted Berklavs. Romuald Misiunas and Rein Taagepera also succumb to this misinterpretation 
in their seminal English language work The Baltic States: The Years of Dependence. The 
consensus reached by these historians explains the purge as the consequence of the Latvian 
leadership overstepping established, acceptable boundaries with their nationalist programme. In 
support of the ‘Khrushchev conclusion’, Smith argues ‘Khrushchev’s treatment of the 
Latvians... confirmed his determination to press ahead with policies which amounted to 
intended Russification and… established an unarticulated doctrine concerning the limits of 
republican authority, which paralleled the later Brezhnev doctrine concerning the powers of the 
Soviet satellite states’.864 Similarly, Robert Service described the purge as serving as ‘a warning 
to other republics that crypto-nationalist tendencies would not be tolerated’. 865  This 
interpretation assumes that Khrushchev was angered by Latvia’s departure from the central 
model for Soviet Republics and felt that defiance might set a dangerous precedent. 
Consequently, Khrushchev was determined to make an example of Berklavs by using the purge 
to demarcate previously vague limits on the tolerable degree of the republics’ authority. This 
theory is a fallacy in that it ignores the purge’s local origins. 
Prigge challenges the traditional explanation for the purge’s causes. In his 2004 article 
‘The Latvian purges of 1959: A revision study’, 2010 article ‘The Strange Death of Latvian 
National Communism’ and 2015 book Bearslayers: The rise and fall of the Latvian national 
communists, Prigge rejects the notion that Khrushchev organised the purge. He concludes that 
the purge was the result of a power struggle between the national communists and the pro-
Moscow, old guard faction within the leadership grouped around Stalinist ideologue Arvīds 
Pelše. In conjunction with his allies in the Soviet military in Riga and powerful friends in 
Moscow, Pelše spearheaded the purge. Prigge claims that Pelše engineered the purge contrary to 
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Khrushchev’s wishes, using the support of the anti-Khrushchev opposition led by the Party’s 
chief ideologue, Presidium member Mikhail Suslov.866 Prigge insists Khrushchev’s role was 
that of ‘mediator between the two factions’ and ‘ultimately unsuccessful defender of the 
younger generation’.867 
 Prigge bases his theory almost entirely on interviews with the 89-year old Berklavs in 
2003 and the memoirs of Vilis Krūmiņš. Yet, some historians remain unconvinced by Prigge’s 
assessment. Geoffrey Swain depicts the purge as the result of Khrushchev’s vacillating 
tolerance rather than being on the warpath. Swain writes: ‘Encouraging the national communists 
in 1956, purging them in 1959, Khrushchev was uncertain how to respond to the challenge of a 
Latvian road to communism’.868 Other historians like Aldis Purs meet Prigge half way, judging 
the national communists’ downfall to be equally due to Khrushchev’s heavy-handed threats and 
revanchists within the LCP. Purs’s position is that Pelše’s attack and careful portrayal of 
Berklavs’s policies as counter to Soviet and Leninist principles forced Moscow’s hand in 
purging the national communists.869 Though he exaggerates Khrushchev’s hostility, Purs’s is a 
more accurate interpretation. 
In this chapter, I explore both the ‘Khrushchev theory’ of the purge advanced by 
Widmer and others, and Prigge’s challenge to this theory. Ultimately, archival sources indicate 
that Prigge’s theory is likely to be correct. Yet, the central tenets of Prigge’s argument rely on 
just two pages of Krūmiņš’s memoirs, a source that needs to be treated with greater rigour. For 
example, in all of his publications, Krūmiņš scrupulously avoids mentioning his own 
participation at the July 1959 plenum. This is, of course, because Krūmiņš repented his ‘sins’ at 
the July plenum, ultimately throwing in his lot with Pelše.870 That being said Krūmiņš’s 
memoirs and the recollections of other former national communists, their opponents and Soviet 
politicians cited in this thesis remain extremely useful, helping us to understand the subtext and 
processes behind official documents found in the archives. As long as such sources are treated 
critically, then their revelations of ‘behind closed doors’ discussions provide us with 
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extraordinary insight, something very necessary when dealing with the murky world of Soviet 
high politics. In Chapters Two and Three, I showed how the implementation of national 
communist policies provoked widespread condemnation from their opponents. In this chapter, I 
will explain the origins of the purge, how the national communists’ opponents formed an 
alliance and sought to oust Berklavs and his allies. I will also attempt to answer the question of 
whether the conflict between loyalists and national communists in Latvia was an aspect of the 
wider battle between Stalinists and reformers for control of the USSR following Stalin’s death. 
 
4.1 ‘Conversation from the Heart’ 
On 25th February 1959, Eduards Berklavs published an article entitled ‘Conversation from the 
heart’ (Razgovor po dusham) in Rigas Balss and Padomju Jaunatne. The article’s controversial 
nature drew the Department for Union Republics’ attention and factored heavily in Moscow’s 
decision to send an investigative team to Latvia, the consequences of which culminated in 
Berklavs’s ouster in July 1959. In his memoirs, Berklavs describes his reasons for writing the 
article: 
I tried to increase the proportion of Latvians occupying positions of 
responsibility. Knowing that the Party decided all issues, and that the 
implementation of any of its resolutions depended on the composition of the 
primary Party organisation, I believed that our goals could be facilitated were 
the Party to attract honest, intelligent Latvians. Failing to find any better way, I 
wrote the article… I invited talented and gifted Latvians to join the Party, since 
persons who were not Party members could not fill positions of responsibility… 
I believe it appeared too late. Earlier it might have had a positive effect, but by 
the end of the 1950s, the Party had already been completely taken over by 
Russians. Consequently, the right moment was missed... It was a weakness, 
indeed, a desperate step.871 
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Berklavs obscures his reasoning for composing the article. It was not merely an appeal to 
Latvians to join the Party, but implicit criticism of the Soviet system.  
The Latvian Communist Party was a Latvian party in name only. The national 
communists may have gained bureau control and installed personnel in key positions across CC 
departments and government ministries; the Party, however, remained a Russian-dominated 
organisation even after 15 years of Soviet power. The Party struggled to attract Latvian 
members. At the Riga carriage factory, only two Latvians joined the Party in 1958. The same 
situation existed at VEF, Krasnaia zvezda (Red Star), Kommunar and 8 marta (8th March) 
factories and others.872 Even including Russian membership the Party represented only 3.65% of 
the population in 1959, which was well below the 5% USSR average.873 Bleiere describes the 
small percentage of Latvians within the Party as the ‘Achilles heel’ of the national communists’ 
programme.874  
Irēne Šneidere believes Berklavs was fully aware that his article would draw a negative 
response from Moscow.875 Cīņa did not publish the article because of concerns over its content. 
Cīņa’s cautious editor, Berklavs’s ally Pavel Pizāns, advised him not to publish it in Rigas 
Balss.876 It was then, as Berklavs indicates, a rash and belated move initiated by concerns about 
the insufficient expansion of the Party’s Latvian proportion (those that stood to gain from his 
policies). Despite Berklavs retrospective claims of his misgivings about Party membership, in 
the 1950s Berklavs saw collaboration as the only way to improve Latvia’s position. For this 
Latvians needed to be a majority to control their own Party, which necessitated greater intake of 
local recruits. In his memoirs, Berklavs thought that on the one hand, the fact that Latvians did 
not join the Party was gratifying, but on the other hand, he recognised it limited their 
influence.877 Berklavs wrote ‘Conversation from the heart’ because the Party was at a critical 
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juncture. If he had not intervened, he feared a backlash from the Russian majority who would 
act to reverse national communist policies that he believed were in Latvians’ best interests. 
 In the article, Berklavs recounts his encounters with the public in which he asked, ‘why 
are so many of the best, energetic and educated people not in the vanguard; in the Komsomol or 
Party. Maybe you do not care for our daily life?’ He questioned the motivations of those he met, 
‘Maybe you are afraid of the shortcomings that still exist in our life, or of previous [Stalinist] 
mistakes? … Maybe you think that some of us do not meet the requirements of a true Leninist 
leader?’ Berklavs discovered that these issues kept his respondents from joining the Party and 
Komsomol. Yet, Berklavs implored Latvians to join the Party especially if they wanted to 
change Latvia: 
Who says that we do not have shortcomings? The Party recognises there are 
shortcomings. Is Soviet power or the Party to blame? The Party tries to fight 
against these shortcomings and calls upon every honest person! Do you believe 
that these shortcomings can be eliminated?... But why wait? How long will you 
watch from the sidelines?… Latvia’s development will progress if all the best 
people, including the best sons and daughters of the Latvian people, are in the 
vanguard of the struggle - in the Komsomol, the Party. Give me your hand, we 
are waiting for you.878 
This inflammatory statement could only draw a negative reaction both in Latvia and in 
Moscow. In his carefully worded piece, Berklavs implied the Party could be at fault for 
allowing shortcomings to exist. Furthermore, Berklavs hinted that the Party remained 
unattractive to Latvia’s best and brightest. 
The response was swift after the article came to Moscow’s attention. On 13th March, 
Baltic Sector Head Gavrilov and CPSU CC inspector K. Lebedev wrote to Kirichenko. They 
described Berklavs’s article as ‘worrying’ and noted that ‘the very nature of the issues causes 
varying interpretations, and sows doubt [in Soviet power]’.879 This was because Berklavs asked 
people if they believed in ‘Marxist-Leninist ideology, in its noble objectives, its inevitable 
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victory’ and questioned if they believed in ‘justice and the superiority of Soviet power.’ 
Berklavs remarked that there was some hesitation among those members of the public he 
described meeting, before he received answers which were always ‘yes otherwise [they] could 
not be answered’. In this remark, Berklavs implied that his interlocutors could, but dared not, 
give an answer other than ‘yes’, which caused consternation among Department for Union 
Republics’ officials. Berklavs’s appeal was criticised for contradicting the ‘Party line regarding 
strict individual selection to the Communist Party’ by encouraging an influx of untested 
Latvians (whose loyalties were suspect) to join the Party, and for insinuating that CPSU 
membership did not appeal to the ‘best people’.880 
Gavrilov instructed Kalnbērziņš and Krūmiņš to discuss the article at the bureau and 
Krūmiņš was asked to write a rebuttal article about the growth of Party ranks.881 This meeting of 
the bureau occurred on 14th April 1959. CPSU CC inspectors Lebedev and V. Akshinskii (both 
of whom played a role in the national communists’ downfall as part of the team dispatched in 
May 1959 to investigate charges of nationalism in Latvia) were present at this meeting, 
presumably to ensure Berklavs was sufficiently rebuked.882 The bureau’s resolution condemned 
the article’s publication, stating that it should not have appeared in print. This was because 
‘among some communists it caused different interpretations’ and was ‘not conducive to a 
correct understanding’ of Party recruitment. In future bureau members would be required to 
submit articles to the bureau prior to publication.883 In a subsequent informal discussion, 
Berklavs supposedly challenged Kalnbērziņš, ‘the manuscript was with you for three days, and 
you gave me permission’, Berklavs argued, indicating that it was acceptable for publication. 
Kalnbērziņš made no reply.884  
Berklavs’s article, apparently written without consultation, divided the national 
communists. Prigge describes the effect of the article as a ‘striking admission of the Communist 
Party’s unpopularity among Latvians, which sent a shockwave through the LCP bureau, even 
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among the national communists’.885 This was demonstrated by the vote to adopt the bureau 
decision criticising Berklavs. Nine signatures were recorded in favour of the decision, with only 
three against. Kalnbērziņš, Pelše, Lācis, Batov, Ozoliņš and Saleev were in favour of the 
decision. Nikonov, Pizāns and Bissenieks voted against the resolution, while Krūmiņš appears 
to have abstained.886 In an interview in 1988, Krūmiņš admitted that the article was ‘generally 
correct’, but referring to Berklavs’s character he added, ‘its instructive tone led to objections’.887 
Pigalev considered the matter resolved following this meeting.888 Yet, the article was used as a 
weapon to split the national communists during the purge. At the 4th July 1959 bureau meeting, 
Saleev berated Bissenieks over his original declaration that ‘all opposition to this article is 
foolishness’.889 At the July 1959 plenum, Kalnbērziņš claimed Bissenieks and Nikonov ‘fully 
supported Berklavs’ because they refused to condemn the article.890 In Pelše’s crusade against 
Berklavs, he presented the article as proof of Berklavs’s erroneous views and used it to 
undermine Kalnbērziņš because he failed to oppose the article directly.891 
 
4.2 The Letters of Complaint 
It is worth noting that the Soviet leadership in Moscow (including Khrushchev) were aware of 
all major national communist policies. On all sensitive issues the national communists were 
working on: migration, bilingualism, heavy and light industry, the Latvian Council of Ministers 
appealed to the USSR Council of Ministers with the response that ‘these issues were the 
republic’s responsibility and must be dealt with locally’. The CPSU CC spoke with Kalnbērziņš 
and Lācis on the language issue between 1957 and 1959 but took no action.892 By the spring of 
1959, however, the situation had changed and Moscow began to pay increasing attention to 
events in Latvia. Consequently, the scales tipped in favour of Pelše’s conservative faction. 
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As early as June 1957, Moscow began to receive complaints about Berklavs. Pigalev 
examined the first anonymous complaint and recommended it be sent to the CPSU CC.893 By 
May 1958, Moscow had accumulated 147 such complaints. These letters were addressed to the 
CPSU CC, USSR Council of Ministers, Prosecutor’s Office and Presidium of the Supreme 
Soviet.894 Not all letters focused on Berklavs. Some attacked specific national communists. For 
example, in July 1958, the CPSU CC received an anonymous complaint against Nikonov. He 
was accused of removing Russians as sovkhoz directors and forcing the use of Latvian in office 
work at the Agriculture Ministry. Bissenieks and the Agriculture Ministry investigated the 
complaint and absolved Nikonov of any wrongdoing.895 The investigation reported that there 
was an altercation between Nikonov and senior zoologist Červaņs over the necessity to reply to 
complaints, applications or claims in the language of the document received, which Červans 
was unable to do in Latvian. Nikonov warned that such deficiencies were no longer acceptable. 
Červans remarked to chief inspector Godmaņs that ‘we appear to have a “Beriaist” 
[Agricultural] Ministry’. 896  Uncomfortable parallels were drawn between the national 
communists and Beria on several occasions. 
In May 1958, Berklavs was in Moscow to discuss his transfer to the Council of 
Ministers with CPSU CC Cadres Department Head Kiselev. Kiselev asked Berklavs to read one 
of the letters the CC received. The anonymous letter described Berklavs as the instigator of a 
revival of bourgeois nationalism in Latvia. The letter accused Berklavs of being envious of 
Riga’s Russians, that he prevented Russians from registering and living in Riga, that he 
removed Russians from leadership positions and forced them to learn Latvian, threatening that 
they should reach competency in Latvian within two years or lose their jobs. The letter further 
stated that without knowledge of Latvian, a Russian could not work in the Riga Medical 
Institute and that Berklavs and his associates praised and printed bourgeois writers’ works and 
orientated intellectuals towards the West. The letter was signed with the Latvian surnames 
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Ozoliņš, Kārkliņš, Lejiņš, Kalniņš and Bērziņš, but did not have a sender’s address. Berklavs 
told Kiselev that the letter was ‘malicious’ and asked why Kiselev waited for the 147th letter 
before addressing the issue. ‘If this is true then I should lose my position rather than be 
promoted to a nominally higher position… but if the letter is slanderous, then [we] need to find 
the perpetrators’, Berklavs told Kiselev. Kiselev replied that the CC ‘certainly did not believe 
the entire letter, but there is no smoke without fire’. Berklavs suspected that his enemies in the 
Pelše faction, including both Russians and Russified Latvians, composed the letters. ‘It was 
decided to write [letters] until a commission comes from Moscow to verify the letters’ accuracy, 
when the commission arrives… [they would] pretend to be locals [and] confirm that all the 
letters are accurate’.897 This coordinated letter-writing campaign, which had sent nearly a 150 
letters to Moscow between mid-1957 and mid-1958, was designed to draw Moscow’s attention 
to growing evidence of nationalism in Latvia. 
Due to the increasing effects of national communist policies, Pelše was not short of 
volunteers willing to complain to Moscow. Military officers wrote many of the complaint 
letters. After returning from service in Poland, Lieutenant-Colonel Cherviakov and his family 
were unable to register in Riga despite bringing up the matter with Kalnbērziņš and Lācis, 
which demonstrates their inability or unwillingness to attempt to circumvent the national 
communists’ law. Frustrated, Cherviakov wrote to Moscow. He included the questions he was 
asked when he tried to register: ‘Why did you come to Latvia, why is it necessary to be here? 
We did not invite you here’.898 Very few of these letters are available for examination so it is 
difficult to determine the veracity of the correspondence. Yet, from the letters we know about, it 
is possible to detect a formula. The letters listed dismissals of officials from across the Latvian 
Party and government, detailed special privileges for Latvian citizens, and then discrimination 
against Russians based on their nationality. Riekstiņš discovered one such letter in the Latvian 
archives. I. Stepanov, a retired colonel living in Riga wrote to Mukhitdinov in July 1959. On 
this occasion, Kalnbērziņš wrote a rejoinder explaining on a point-by-point basis why each 
official was dismissed and refuted Stepanov’s claims, though he did admit to deficiencies in 
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nationality policy and pointed to the July 1959 plenum as evidence that these failings would be 
resolved.899 
It appears that until 1959 Moscow did not take the letters very seriously. It seems that in 
1957 Berklavs was still being protected. For example, Kalnbērziņš, hoping to avoid charges of 
nationalism against the Latvian Party, wrote a letter to Pigalev in September 1957 defending 
Berklavs in response to an anonymous letter Pigalev received in June 1957. Kalnbērziņš 
declared all accusations that the ‘nationalist group activities were the result of Berklav’s 
nationalist policy’ were  ‘unsubstantiated and fictitious’. He explained that Berklavs was simply 
implementing Party policy: 
Though Berklavs is guilty of a number of shortcomings and errors in the past, 
this is no reason to raise serious political accusations against him. The CPSU 
CC was informed in due time about the bourgeois Latvian flag flying from a 
radio tower on the night of 15th May. The linking of Berklavs with this incident, 
as the anonymous author does, is a villainous calumny. A nationalist 
underground revival late last year and earlier this year was the result of events 
in Hungary.900 
It is likely that in 1957, Kalnbērziņš did not consider Berklavs’s actions extreme and did not 
want to attract Moscow’s attention.  
4.2.1 The Cherkovskii affair 
Another high profile complaint against the national communists, which garnered Moscow’s 
attention, occurred because of the ‘Cherkovskii affair’ in late 1958. During the national 
communists’ zenith, Berklavs was concerned about Russification and opposition to his national 
communist programme from Latvia’s eastern region of Latgale.901 Prigge describes Daugavpils, 
Latgale’s administrative centre, as ‘the national communist’s nightmare scenario: a heavily 
industrialised city in which the population of ethnic Latvians declined to such a small minority 
                                                      
899 Jānis Riekstiņš, ‘Kā lielkrievu šovinisti “latviešu nacionālistus” apkaroja’, Latvijas Vēstnesis, 3rd 
November 2005. 
900 LVA-PA f.101, apr.20, l.94, lp.4. Letter from Kalnbērziņš to Pigalev, ‘par Berklava apsūdzību 
nacionālismā’, 19th September 1957.  
901 Berklavs, Zināt un neaizmirst, 105. 
  218 
that its language and culture virtually disappeared’.902 The national communists had controlled 
Latvia’s two other major cities, Riga and Liepāja for years, but Daugavpils and its municipal 
Party resisted national communist initiatives. In 1958, with the national communists secure in 
their position, Berklavs intended to confront the Daugavpils Party. 
The Daugavpils gorkom First Secretary, Yuri Rudometov, attempted to appease the 
national communists, announcing his agreement with the bureau at the October 1958 
Daugavpils Party plenum that it was necessary for all public sector workers to learn Latvian.903 
Yet, the national communists were unimpressed by these promises and continued to disparage 
the Daugavpils Party. Using Berklavs’s customary tactics, on 26th October and 6th November, 
two scathing articles were published in Cīņa and Padomju Jaunatne about the Daugavpils Party. 
These articles attacked specific Daugavpils Party officials, describing a long history of 
incompetence, corruption and the failure of the Daugavpils Party to rectify these problems.904 
The Daugavpils Party refuted the charges made in these articles and accused the authors of 
slander. According to Berklavs, the allegations made in these articles prompted a full-scale 
investigation into the Daugavpils Party.905 The national communists were keen to promote 
Latvian cultural life in the region. The opportunity to investigate conditions in Daugavpils 
presented itself in late 1958. Ahead of the Song Festival and Latgale Cultural Week both due to 
be held in Latgale, Berklavs dispatched Deputy Culture Minister Pavel Cherkovskii to 
Daugavpils to report on the situation. Cherkovskii was the ideal emissary as a Belorussian who 
had assimilated into Latvian culture and because he was from Ludzas District in Latgale. Prigge 
describes Cherkovskii as the national communists’ ‘hope for what might eventually become of 
the non-Latvian portion of Daugavpils: fluent in Latvian and regarding it as the first language of 
the republic; respectful of and interested in the local culture; and desiring to assimilate’.906 
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Latgale had a concentrated Slavic population. In Daugavpils, Latvians comprised just 
13% of the population.907 The Daugavpils gorkom was uninterested in participating in this 
cultural campaign. This caused a serious conflict between the Daugavpils gorkom’s leaders and 
the bureau in Riga, and later provided a pretence for accusations of nationalism against the 
national communists.908 Cherkovskii reported that cultural activities in the city were in Russian, 
that Cultural Department cadres did not know Latvian, and were unfamiliar with Latvia’s 
cultural traditions. Cherkovskii noted that in Cultural House No.1 out of 148 cultural events in 
1958 only 43 were conducted in Latvian despite Latvians comprising a third of the 
beneficiaries. Furthermore, Cherkovskii reported that at a meeting of the city’s cultural cadres 
on 30th October 1958 it was suggested that a Latvian musical and theatrical troupe be created at 
the Daugavpils Russian drama theatre but theatre director Ozerovs refused, declaring there 
could only be one Russian musical-drama theatre. Cherkovskii reported that Rudometov did not 
oppose this viewpoint and that he and the Daugavpils Party did not understand how to maintain 
a real ‘friendship between peoples’. Cherkovskii concluded that in Daugavpils, ‘Latvians as the 
indigenous people of this land have been deprived of the opportunity to speak in their mother 
tongue’ in cultural activities and public life. The Daugavpils Party reacted by declaring the 
report ‘incorrect and nationalistic’.909 
The conflict over Daugavpils was a microcosm of the larger issue between Russians and 
Latvians. It was important for the national communists to crush the Daugavpils Party’s 
resistance toward reform. If the Daugavpils Party successfully resisted implementing the orders 
of the LCP bureau, it could have encouraged other regions to exercise more local authority. For 
this reason, the national communists moved swiftly to implement reforms in Daugavpils. 
Cherkovskii recommended replacing a large number of employees from cultural institutions in 
Daugavpils because they did not know Latvian.910 A large number of experts in Latvian culture 
were dispatched to carry out the changes in Daugavpils and Latgale. There was to be an infusion 
of theatre, opera, and choir performances from Riga to Daugavpils. Despite the objections of 
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some Daugavpils Party members, several cultural directors were removed, including the 
Daugavpils Theatre’s director.911 
Outraged by the report and the Daugavpils Party’s subsequent reaction, Berklavs drew 
Kalnbērziņš into the fray. He wanted Kalnbērziņš to hold the entire Daugavpils leadership 
responsible. Instead, Kalnbērziņš held a private meeting only with Rudometov. As Berklavs 
suspected, nothing changed, ‘deficiencies were ordered to be remedied’, and that was all. 
Berklavs was furious that the Daugavpils leadership did not have to face the bureau or receive 
any punishment. Rudometov was forced to accept the accusations made against the Daugavpils 
Party but Kalnbērziņš allowed him to undertake to correct the problems himself.912 According to 
Prigge, what Berklavs actually wanted was ‘a top-to-bottom purge of the Daugavpils leadership, 
not reform’.913 Instead, the national communists added to their list of enemies by alienating the 
Daugavpils Party. Rudometov spoke against Berklavs at the July 1959 plenum. 
The national communists attempted to find another way to bring the Daugavpils Party 
into line. During his visit, Cherkovskii attended meetings of the Daugavpils Party CC, and at 
one meeting, heard Daugavpils raikom MTS Secretary Victor Zhigarkov extol the primacy of 
Russian. In coarse terms, Zhigarkov ridiculed the sacrosanct Latvian Midsummer celebrations 
and the traditional Song and Dance Festival, asserting that they had their roots in bourgeois 
nationalism and were impediments to the establishment of communism. He went so far as to 
make derisory comments about the Latvian language.914 Zhigarkov was quoted as saying ‘this 
could only happen because leading Party organs, including the CC were full of nationalists’ and 
that ‘a Russian cannot breathe easily’ in Latvia. According to Zhigarkov, the only course of 
action was to banish all nationalists, regardless of their position. At the incensed Cherkovskii’s 
insistence, the Daugavpils raikom expelled Zhigarkov on allegations of chauvinism, a decision 
upheld by the bureau in Riga.915 Kalpiņš described this decision as one of the ‘first events that 
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offered hope that times could change’, by which he meant that the national communists would 
respond to Russian chauvinism.916 
Zhigarkov, however, complained to Moscow about his dismissal. The CPSU KPK, the 
CC’s supreme disciplinary body, overturned the Latvian bureau’s decision and reinstated 
Zhigarkov without penalty. Kalpiņš believed this indicated that there were officials in Moscow 
for whom ‘the period of an awakening of the people in Latvia was unacceptable’. In 1959, 
Indriķis Pinksis maintained that the KPK ruling undermined the authority of the bureau. 
If all Russian comrades call us fascists and ‘Beriaites’, we cannot do 
anything… Zhigarkov walks around like a hero saying: ‘What Central 
Committee, what secretaries!’ And others are watching. This undermines the 
authority of the CC. If we cannot expel him, at least give Zhigarkov a 
reprimand, because he was wrong… his speech inflamed nationalist passions. It 
does not help the proper training of cadres… Now these Russian comrades will 
be happy but Latvians are dissatisfied.917 
Conversely, because the bureau’s decision was revoked, the KPK accused Cherkovskii of 
incorrect actions for ‘creating an unhealthy atmosphere among Party activists in Daugavpils’. In 
conversation with employees during his visit to Daugavpils theatre, Cherkovskii was alleged to 
have made non-Party statements, arguing that the Soviet government repeatedly expressed 
distrust in Latvians and that all Russians workers needed to be replaced by Latvians because 
their tenure in leadership positions was reminiscent of the Tsarist autocracy or an occupation. 
Consequently, Miglinieks forced the national communist-controlled bureau was forced to 
reprimand Cherkovskii, but this was only because the bureau was under pressure. Cherkovskii’s 
behaviour was described as ‘wrong only in form’, meaning the bureau still supported 
Cherkovskii’s comments on the situation in Daugavpils.918 Ultimately the national communists 
lost their battle with the Daugavpils Party. Therefore, as Prigge puts it ‘their position was never 
truly secure as long as the Daugavpils Party remained intact as a seat of opposition’.919 This 
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incident did not draw any further attention from Moscow at the time, though it was repeatedly 
used as evidence against the national communists after the arrival of the investigation 
commission in May 1959.  
4.2.2 Ponomarev’s letter 
In his memoirs, Krūmiņš describes how the situation, and Moscow’s focus, changed in 1959:   
The CPSU CC began to receive complaints that this or that official was 
allegedly removed based on nationality. From a conversation with 
Semichastnyi and Gavrilov, I knew that these letters did not receive much 
attention in Moscow. But sometime in March 1959 Semichastnyi asked me to 
address a letter sent to the CPSU CC by former Council of Ministers Deputy 
Chairman Ponomarev. He claimed that in Latvia there was a crackdown on 
Russian personnel, and that in particular, deputy ministers suffer.920 
Vladimir Semichastnyi, Department for Union Republics Chairman, played a significant role in 
the purge of the national communists. Nikolai Ponomarev’s letter drew his attention to Latvia in 
March 1959. Perhaps Semichastnyi had been waiting for such a serious complaint before 
directly addressing the issue of nationalism in Latvia. The first sign that Moscow was preparing 
to retaliate against the national communists was the KPK’s reversal of the bureau’s decision 
against Zhigarkov.921 Moscow tolerated Second Secretary Kashnikov’s removal in January 1958 
possibly because of his apparent ineptitude, but Zhigarkov’s removal on charges of chauvinism 
by Latvians with a nationalistic agenda proved unacceptable.  
Ponomarev was a controversial character. He was removed from his position as a 
Deputy Chairman during the second wave of Latvianisation following the Secret Speech. 
Krūmiņš believed he was dissatisfied with his career when he became Minister of Light 
Industry. He was then charged with speculative activities and misuse of his position, and further 
demoted.922 Disgruntled, Ponomarev complained to Moscow that he had been demoted because 
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he was Russian.923 Krūmiņš dismissed the claim that nationality was the issue, as more than half 
the dismissed Deputy Chairmen were Latvians. 924  Before 1959, Moscow attributed the 
complaint letters to the ‘increasing difficultly of non-Latvians who seek jobs in Riga’.925 
Evidently, the Ponomarev affair proved more inflammatory than Semichastnyi’s discussion 
with Krūmiņš initially indicated. Krūmiņš identifies Ponomarev as someone who attempted to 
draw Khrushchev’s attention to abuses in nationality policy in 1959. Furthermore, one of the 
KPK investigators, I. Fursov, referred to the Ponomarev affair at the crucial 20th June bureau 
meeting.926 
The Ponomarev complaint in early 1959 sparked interest at the Presidium in the 
situation in Latvia and apparently warranted official investigation by the CC. Eleven months 
after Moscow received the letter that Berklavs read at the CC in May 1958, it was his own 
article, ‘Conversation from the heart’, that finally spurred the centre to act. A little over a month 
after its publication, in April 1959, an investigative team was organised to be sent to Latvia. 
Though Berklavs’s article significantly heightened Moscow’s concern, Ponomarev’s letter 
provided a compelling pretext for the investigation. The combination of an avalanche of 
complaint letters, the Cherkovskii affair and conflict with the Daugavpils Party, Ponomarev’s 
dismissal and Berklavs’s article ensured that by April 1959, Moscow, and Khrushchev in 
particular, could no longer turn a blind eye to events in Latvia. 
 
4.3 Moscow Investigates Charges of Nationalism - May 1959 
The sudden and unexpected arrival of an inspection team in Riga in the second half of May 
1959 underscored Moscow’s increased interest in developments in Latvia. Under normal 
circumstances, the Latvian leadership would have been informed if officials from Moscow 
arrived in Riga, but this was not the case. These inspectors were from the KPK and the CC. 
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Mukhitdinov cited the complaint letters as the ostensible reason for the dispatch of the 
inspection team.927 According to Krūmiņš, one inspector told him they were in Latvia because 
of Berklavs’s article.928 In their report, the inspectors stated that they went to Latvia ‘for 
verification of signals received’ - in other words, to check the veracity of the letters.929 Berklavs 
wrote that he had ‘no doubt that Pelše, and his associates Bumbiers and Roberts Ķisis used the 
investigator’s arrival to silence dissent’.930 Krūmiņš recalled his short first encounter with the 
inspectors as an interrogation. 
After a ten-minute conversation about neutral topics, one of the inspectors 
suddenly asked what I had to say about the situation in Latvia. I responded with 
a question: ‘What, we have a particular situation in Latvia?’ The inspectors 
silently looked at one another. I understood that this investigation would be 
serious. They told us not to order reports, work plans or plenum resolutions. 
They pointedly refused my help, stressing that they would keep contact with 
Department for Party Organs Chairman Augusts Voss.931 
Voss kept a low profile during the late 1950s and managed to retain his position despite calls for 
his demotion. 932  Due to his position, Voss was in close contact with his counterparts 
Semichastnyi and Pigalev in the Department for Union Republics in Moscow. Krūmiņš believes 
‘Voss engaged in a dialog with Moscow about sending the investigative team’.933 This lends 
credence to the vital role that I argue the Department for Union Republics played in the purge. 
In the two weeks the inspectors were in Riga, they did not meet anyone from the 
Central, Party or District committees.934 Instead, the inspectors met with Pelše and his ardent 
supporters including Voss, his deputy Aleksandr Aleksandrov, Sovetskaia Latviia editor Saleev, 
KPK Chairman Anton Ozoling, Agitprop Department Head Ivan Veselovs and notably, 
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Ponomarev.935 The only national communist they interviewed was Berklavs. Berklavs recalls, ‘I 
answered all the investigators’ questions: about manifestations of nationalism, on industrial 
matters, the senior leadership, languages, etc. I told them what we thought, and reminded them 
of Lenin’s instructions’.936 According to Mukhitdinov, the team interviewed some of the people 
who sent the complaints and ‘certain facts were confirmed’. The process, however, was far from 
comprehensive. Mukhitdinov noted that while some plaintiffs were interviewed others were not, 
but that the team received some new information.937 The investigation team dispatched to Riga 
was there to gather evidence against the national communists and not to seriously investigate 
the matter. This was due to the Department for Union Republics’ role in organising the 
investigation and because Pelše led all the work with the team, with Kalnbērziņš’s blessing.938 
This had a profound impact on the investigation’s direction.  
After two weeks, the inspectors suddenly departed without meeting with the bureau. 
Realising the likelihood of a purge, Berklavs tried to persuade Krūmiņš and Ozoliņš to go to 
Moscow to meet Khrushchev before he received the inspectors’ report. They did not object, but 
nothing happened. Later, Krūmiņš promised to call CC Secretary Aleksandr Shelepin. Berklavs 
repeatedly asked Krūmiņš if he had followed through on this promise, but his ‘answer was 
cagey’.939 This strained Berklavs’s relationship with Krūmiņš. Berklavs feared that Krūmiņš 
was ‘compromised’. What he meant was that Krūmiņš and other national communists no longer 
had the confidence that Berklavs could survive the investigation so they began to distance 
themselves from the principal target. Pinksis provided insight into the atmosphere surrounding 
the team’s presence: ‘Everyone says there will be a new order. Many comrades came to 
complain to the investigators… Rumours abounded about the replacement of Krūmiņš, Berklavs 
and Lācis by Russians’.940 
The inspectors delivered their report entitled ‘On Shortcomings in Work with Cadres in 
the Latvian SSR’ to the CPSU CC Secretariat on 8th June. The Department for Union Republics 
attempted to present the investigation report as an accurate and unbiased account. Semichastnyi 
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included a cover note to the report, voicing his agreement with the inspectors’ findings.941 The 
report asserted that the team contacted a wide range of personnel, but Krūmiņš’s account 
contradicts this assessment. The report lambasted the LCP CC and called attention to Krūmiņš’s 
support for promoting bilingual cadres into the leadership: ‘Under the pretext of nominating 
workers who know Latvian and Russian, the CC intends to replace non-Latvian cadres with 
ethnic Latvians but does not take into account that the republic is 38% Slavic’. The report 
attacked the language law as privileging Latvians because they already knew Russian, ‘while 
other workers needed to learn a second language from scratch’. In his interview with the 
investigation team, Berklavs defended the language law’s enforcement, saying it was ‘necessary 
to notify comrades about [the regulations], so that in two years they would not be offended 
when asked to leave the workforce. If they had not learned Latvian after two years they’d only 
have themselves to blame’. The report noted that this attitude created ‘nervousness and 
uncertainty’.942 
The report went on to provide further examples reminiscent of the upheavals caused by 
the language requirements of Beria’s ‘New Course’. It cited a conversation between raikom 
secretaries in which Straujums stated that ‘if an employee fails to converse in Latvian then they 
should not be interviewed because the gorkom will not approve their application’. The report 
complained that was one of the reasons why many senior positions in Riga were vacant for long 
periods.943 Indeed, the ‘Bolshevik’ factory lacked a director for six months because no qualified 
personnel could speak both Latvian and Russian.944 The report noted discrimination towards 
Russian-Latvians who returned to Latvia after spending the interwar period in the USSR, citing 
Pelše’s difficulties as an example. As co-author of the report, Pelše could air his many 
grievances. In 1959, Pelše was 60 years old and had been Secretary of Ideology for 19 years. He 
had watched the rapid rise of the national communists while his own career stagnated. Pelše 
made sure to specifically link Berklavs to the ‘unjust dismissal’ of officials based on language 
discrimination. The report included a list of dismissed officials, which included seven out of 
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nine Russian and Ukrainian surnames, and was intended to prove that the language law targeted 
Slavs.945 
The report also linked Berklavs to problematic economic policies. Gaile provided 
information about Berklavs’s economic plans, unsurprisingly finding them ‘untenable’.946 Other 
informants, presumably from Pelše’s clique, opined that the national communists were 
following ‘Bukharin’s path’ and favoured light industry and agriculture over heavy industrial 
development.947 Based on these inflammatory statements, it is unsurprising that Moscow took 
the report seriously. Likening Berklavs’s economic policy to Bukharin’s staunch support for 
NEP (the New Economic Policy) portrayed national communism as an ideological affront to 
Soviet socialism and was a Stalinist tactic to discredit the opposition. 
The report attacked the press, specifically Rigas Balss, Cīņa and Padomju Jaunatne, for 
‘insufficiently fostering a culture of fraternity [among the Soviet peoples]’. The radio 
committee was criticised for allocating only 20 minutes of daily broadcasting in Russian. Anti-
Soviet acts amongst the republic’s youth were attributed to the national communists. The report 
alleged that higher education was closed to those from other republics. The Riga Medical 
Institute, LSU and Riga Polytechnic Institute were singled out for ‘eliminating Russians’. 
According to the report, in 1956, non-Latvians accounted for 30% of students in higher 
education. By 1959, this number had dropped to 14%. Connected with the language restrictions 
the number of practicing doctors in Latvia fell by a quarter. The report likewise attacked 
Latvia’s March 1959 education law because it contained ‘serious discrepancies and 
contradictions with All-Union law’. Particularly egregious was the provision of an extra year 
and free textbooks that would supposedly give Latvian children an unfair academic advantage. 
The report listed Russian artists and writers ‘forced to leave Latvia’ and condemned Lācis for 
not opposing (and therefore ‘silently supporting’) the national communists on questions of art 
and literature. The Cherkovskii affair was an example of disproportionate punishment based on 
nationality. The report complained that Zhigarkov was ‘unfairly removed’ by national 
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communist Pavel Cherkovskii. Yet, Cherkovskii only received a rap on the knuckles from the 
bureau.948 
Throughout the report, the team chastised the CC and bureau (though Pelše himself was 
a member) for its failure to condemn the aforementioned transgressions. To explain this, the 
report mentioned that ‘some comrades taking a principled stand [such as Pelše] do not always 
receive the support of other members of the bureau’. While Berklavs, Bissenieks and Pizāns 
‘advocated unhealthy attitudes and often set the wrong tone’. Lācis, Ozoliņš and Krūmiņš 
received lesser charges of failing to ‘show integrity, sometimes remaining silent’ when 
discussing important matters. Berklavs’s support in the bureau was explained away, because 
‘some members considered Berklavs the likely successor to Kalnbērziņš or Lācis and did not 
want to aggravate him’. The bureau apparently did not condemn Berklavs because of 
‘misplaced fears of offending his pride’. In their report, the investigators stated that Kalnbērziņš 
agreed with their observations and blamed himself for the situation but cited the Russian 
proverb ‘the voice of one man is the voice of no one’, by which he meant he felt isolated and no 
longer commanded the bureau’s confidence. In the first sign that Kalnbērziņš sensed that he 
would be unable to weather this crisis, the report revealed that Kalnbērziņš raised the question 
of his transfer to more ‘relaxed work’ within the CC with the investigators. He further stated 
that perhaps the next Congress should decide whether he should remain First Secretary and that 
his opinion should be conveyed to Khrushchev.949 The most damning criticism was reserved for 
Berklavs himself. He was called ‘the standard bearer of bourgeois nationalism’.950 Ultimately, 
the investigation team’s report was simply a catalogue of Russian frustrations with national 
communist initiatives. On some points, the report gave a fair assessment, but on others, there 
were exaggerations. 
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4.4 Khrushchev in Riga, 9th-13th June 
Khrushchev’s visit to Riga in June 1959, one month before the plenum that ousted Berklavs, 
reinforced the incorrect perception that a Moscow-orchestrated purge was imminent. Historians 
describe Khrushchev seething over charges of ‘nationalism’, dispensing judgement on Berklavs 
and subsequently ordering his removal. Widmer wrote that ‘once Khrushchev realised that the 
Latvian situation was threatening to get out of hand, Khrushchev acted quickly to break up the 
Berklavs faction. He laid the groundwork in a trip to Latvia in the second week of June 
1959’.951 Widmer inferred that Khrushchev arrived with the aim of reorganising the LCP: 
It is not clear when Khrushchev began to appreciate the significance of 
developments in Latvia. Nevertheless, one can pinpoint the moment when he 
took the offensive. On 9th June, he travelled to Riga and ‘took part in meetings 
of leading Party workers of the Latvian SSR’. In view of the soon-to-follow 
developments, there can be little doubt that he was sounding out the views of 
Latvian Party leaders and arranging for changes in the top-level personnel of 
the republic’s organisation.952 
The sources now available show that this interpretation is very likely incorrect. The team 
reported to the Presidium before Khrushchev left for Riga. The report is dated 8th June. I believe 
Khrushchev was aware of the report and decided to personally test the Latvian leaderships’ 
loyalty. In light of the inspection team’s report, according to Mukhitdinov, Khrushchev 
amended his plans. He would still come to Riga as planned to meet the East German delegation. 
The new schedule called for the GDR delegation to leave Riga for Kiev after two days and for 
Khrushchev to remain in Riga for an extra day ‘to discuss the accumulated problems with the 
members of the LCP bureau’.953 Khrushchev wanted to see for himself if there was a nationalist 
problem in Latvia.  
When Widmer wrote his thesis in the 1960s he could not have known that, for the most 
part, the visit went smoothly. When Khrushchev arrived in Riga, he convivially invited all the 
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members of the bureau to dine at his dacha in Jūrmala. Assessing Khrushchev’s mood, Krūmiņš 
recalled that ‘he was cheerful, good-natured’.954 According to Berklavs, the ostensible reason 
for Khrushchev’s visit was to ‘familiarise himself with the bureau’s membership’.955 Unaware 
that the CC team reported to the Presidium the day before Khrushchev’s departure, Krūmiņš 
misread Khrushchev, stating in his memoirs that ‘in nature [Khrushchev] was not a diplomat, 
and I’m sure that if he knew something about the conclusions of the inspection team, it certainly 
would be manifested in his behaviour’.956 
According to Prigge, ‘the extra day the premier spent was not to lay the groundwork for 
a purge, but to conduct a series of meetings that transpired pleasantly’.957 The Lithuanian and 
Estonian first secretaries were invited because Khrushchev wanted to assess the situation in the 
other Baltic Republics as well. The bureau met at Khrushchev’s behest, but discussion focused 
on Nikonov’s negative views about the corn campaign and Latvian kolkhozy mergers in 
opposition to Khrushchev’s views. Instead of becoming angry, Khrushchev listened intently and 
complimented Nikonov’s initiative, noting that he wished all the republics had such ministers.958 
Khrushchev did not comment on the investigation report, underscoring his general lack of 
concern. At the end of the meeting, the discussion turned to cadres. Krūmiņš complained to 
Khrushchev that Latvian cadres could not gain employment because uneducated, demobilised 
army officers received all the cadre postings. He was even so bold as to explain why the bureau 
felt unable to act: ‘We cannot put any [graduates to] work because letters to Moscow would 
immediately follow, evaluating the decision as an expression of nationalism’.959 In the months 
before Khrushchev’s visit, the national communists began to curb their most controversial 
policies in an attempt to avoid further Russian discontent. This demonstrates that Pelše’s letter-
writing campaign concerned the national communists who feared its effect upon Moscow and 
denoted the first signs of hesitation in the national communist camp. Reputedly, Khrushchev 
‘miraculously’ supported Krūmiņš, saying the cadres situation was ‘a very important issue’ and 
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not unique to the Baltics.960 He gave instructions to officially invite Krūmiņš to speak about the 
issue at the next CPSU CC plenum in Moscow, which was to be held later in June. The 
subsequent change in circumstances, however, prevented Krūmiņš from delivering that speech. 
Krūmiņš notes that the usually verbose Pelše remained silent at the meeting with Khrushchev, 
as did Kalnbērziņš.961 With the exception of Pelše and Kalnbērziņš, according to Krūmiņš, the 
bureau was unaware of the contents of the investigation team’s report.962 Pelše had been 
expecting an enraged Khrushchev to arrive in Riga after hearing the report’s conclusions that 
nationalism was rampant within the LCP leadership. Khrushchev’s relaxed behaviour at the 
meeting must have unnerved Pelše and contributed to his decision to send a ‘delegation’ to visit 
Khrushchev that evening. 
Krūmiņš joined Khrushchev and other leaders boating on Lake Baltezers on the 
afternoon of 12th June. He described Khrushchev as amiable, ‘the conversation was normal, 
friendly and there seemed to be no signs of a thunderstorm’.963 Berklavs enquired about an 
invitation to Czechoslovakia, asking if Khrushchev would grant him permission to visit. 
Khrushchev replied that if Berklavs gave him a request the next day, Moscow would issue a 
permit post-haste. 964  Berklavs’s permit was not granted. On the eve of his departure, 
Khrushchev and the LCP leaders dined together. Berklavs witnessed the BMD Political 
Department Chief Major-General Nikita Demin (an old comrade of Khrushchev’s from the 
Battle of Stalingrad) hand Khrushchev’s adjutant a folder.965 After dinner, a group of officials 
hostile to the national communists visited Khrushchev once he was alone.966 The group was 
composed of Ponomarev, who had lodged the most vocal complaints against the national 
communists, accompanied by another unspecified official, possibly Pelše or Saleev.967 The third 
member was General Demin, an ethnic Russian, likely there to vouch for the others with the 
weight of his military influence. Berklavs claims it was Demin and Saleev who wrote the letter 
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that he read, addressed to the CC in May 1958.968 Judging by Khrushchev’s reaction the next 
day, the group must have pressed a stronger case than in their letters or in the investigators’ 
report. It is likely that they gave Khrushchev additional information and probably impressed on 
him the notion that Berklavs was dishonest and that his nationalist policies represented a 
genuine threat to Soviet power. 
Demin was a formidable foe. He ranked third in command within the BMD and sat on 
the Riga gorkom bureau from September 1952. Demin clashed with Berklavs when he was the 
gorkom’s First Secretary over the residency restrictions and Demin’s plan for a military training 
college (which would have allowed for more soldiers to be sent to Riga). Berklavs refused and 
Demin complained to BMD Commander General Gorbatov.969 At a subsequent bureau meeting, 
Gorbatov accused Berklavs of treating the Army and its officers with hostility, because he had 
not ‘allocated apartments to the Army [or] registered [officers and soldiers] in Riga’, and they 
were denied dachas. Berklavs retorted that ‘the military received 10% of all newly built housing 
and that officers still had a greater proportion of dachas than the rest of Riga’s inhabitants’. 
Then Berklavs declared: ‘If Gorbatov can prove this is not true, then we’ll admit we’re wrong’. 
This ended the discussion, but Berklavs admitted that his relationship with the BMD was 
irreparably damaged.970 Berklavs had antagonised a powerful lobby. Consequently, the BMD 
generals supported Pelše’s orthodox communists, hoping to reverse national communist 
restrictions. 
4.4.1 Confrontation at Riga airport 
The following morning, 13th June, the Latvian leadership went to the airport to see Khrushchev 
depart. Kalpiņš described Khrushchev’s mood in the waiting hall as ‘sulky, uncommunicative 
and dissatisfied with something’.971 When he went outside to meet the leadership Khrushchev, 
was ‘unrecognisable... and seething with anger’. A heated exchange then took place between 
Khrushchev and Berklavs, which is the reason the majority of historical literature cites 
Khrushchev’s visit as the catalyst for the purge. Khrushchev was incensed after his visit from 
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the hardliners the previous evening, raging about ‘nationalism’ and ‘nationalists’, and 
demanding an explanation.972 At first, Khrushchev questioned Berklavs’s reliability. 
Khrushchev: ‘Who are you - an enemy or an honest man? Look here! If you are 
an enemy, we’ll wipe you from the face of the earth, but if you’re an honest 
man, then you still need to prove it’. 
[…] 
Berklavs: ‘Are you calling me a renegade?’ 
Khrushchev: ‘I didn’t say that directly about you, but it happens like that… 
You wanted to fool me about Līgo [the Summer Solstice]. It’s fire worship or 
some adoration. Devil knows what’. 973 
Kalpiņš adds that Khrushchev concluded his rant by ordering Berklavs ‘not to push Russian 
citizens into learning Latvian. They do not want to do this and they will not do it’.974 After he 
harangued Berklavs, Khrushchev then turned his frustration onto Kalnbērziņš. Khrushchev 
marched up to Kalnbērziņš, wagging his index finger. ‘And you, Jan Eduardovich, an old 
Bolshevik, you don’t see what is happening right under your nose. So watch it and sort it out! If 
you do not, I’ll send my men - they’ll investigate’.975 Then Khrushchev said that there ‘is only 
one person among you who is completely faultless, and that is Pelše.’976 This incident indicates 
Khrushchev initially intended that the Latvians deal with their own problems, and that he stayed 
in Latvia for an extra day to make sure the leadership put their house in order. After the 
previous evening’s meeting, however, he instead accepted the account of Pelše’s acolytes.  
According to Krūmiņš, the BMD commander General Pavel Batov (a Russian) was the 
only one to maintain his composure after this exchange. Batov spoke to Khrushchev ‘firmly’, 
saying ‘these [Demin’s report] are all lies, shameless lies. I know what I am talking about 
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because I have been on the bureau for over a year’. Krūmiņš recounts that Batov’s words had a 
calming effect on Khrushchev before his departure.977 Unlike his predecessor Gorbatov, at this 
point Batov may not have been wholly hostile towards the national communists. Many in the 
military resented the national communists, but it appears Demin did not take direct orders from 
Batov and therefore even the BMD was not a monolithic entity. Following his exchange with 
Khrushchev, Berklavs noted that all those present were surprised, except perhaps the KGB chief 
Jānis Vēveris.978 
Only Bissenieks shook Berklavs’s hand and comforted him, saying, ‘I understand you, 
Eduards... Be strong. Maybe everything will somehow work out’. This marked the beginning of 
Berklavs’s isolation from his colleagues. After the clash at the airport, no bureau members 
visited Berklavs. In his memoirs, Berklavs points to this as the moment he recognised he had 
‘lost the fight’.979 Khrushchev’s tirade convinced him of his imminent dismissal. Yet, the 
stubborn Berklavs had no intention of changing his position or admitting his mistakes. He 
submitted his resignation two days after Khrushchev’s visit on 15th June. He requested that the 
bureau consider his future tenure as Council of Ministers Deputy Chairman. Pelše quotes 
Berklavs as saying ‘my conscience before the Party and the people is clear. I have been and will 
always remain an honest Leninist, but in this situation I consider it inappropriate and futile to 
remain in a leadership position’.980  Prigge concedes that the confrontation at the airport 
damaged Berklavs’s situation, and that the Pelše faction capitalised on the argument. They used 
it ‘as a pretext to remove the younger generation of national communists, and they moved 
against Berklavs’.981 
The 1972 ‘Protest Letter’ co-authored by Berklavs, supports the historical consensus 
that Khrushchev administered the purges.982 The ‘Protest Letter’ was designed to implicate the 
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Soviet Union in Russifying Latvia and refers to Moscow only in monolithic, imperial terms.983 
Yet, Prigge notes that the nature of Berklavs’s final encounter with Khrushchev at the airport 
sullied his opinion of the Soviet First Secretary. He believed that subsequent events were 
directed by Khrushchev, and was convinced that the investigation team’s report came ‘from 
Khrushchev’s hands’.984 Berklavs was not in Moscow to see Khrushchev’s change of heart that 
July.  
 
4.5 The ‘Moscow Faction’ 
It is necessary to explain Moscow’s role in the purge and how Kremlin politics influenced the 
conflict in Latvia. Prigge reaches the conclusion that Khrushchev was not the power behind the 
purge. Instead, other forces in Moscow promoted and sanctioned it. Prigge correctly identifies 
Mikhail Suslov as Pelše’s counterpart in Moscow. Suslov opposed Khrushchev’s efforts in the 
Presidium to spare Berklavs while Pelše faced Berklavs in Riga, working in tandem to purge the 
national communists. This dimension of the purge merits further explanation. The foundation of 
Prigge’s theory, that Pelše and Suslov had a close relationship, is based on their familial bond: 
their wives were sisters.985 Purs reminds us that this was often the case in the Baltic Republics, 
as ‘initial allegiances based on ideological conviction often masked deeper familial bonds and 
an almost caste-like nature within the ruling elite of the Communist parties’.986 We can 
document such connections within the national communists. Edgars Mūkins’s wife was Deputy 
Editor of Rigas Balss, while Kalpiņš’s sister Velta was married to Lācis. Furthermore, in the 
early years of their careers, we can trace the possible first acquaintance between Suslov and 
Pelše to the period 1929-1931 when both were students at the Institute of Red Professors in 
Moscow.987 
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Suslov played a central role in the purge. Krūmiņš attested that ‘persecution of the so-
called “bourgeois nationalists” was largely due to the fact that “the Latvian case” was placed in 
Suslov’s hands’.988 Mukhitdinov noted that between 1957 and early 1959 ‘Pelše regularly 
[engaged] in detailed discussions with Suslov’.989 From as early as 1957, as the national 
communists became more powerful, Pelše was in contact with Suslov, biding his time, waiting 
for an opportunity to strike. After the purge began, Suslov assisted Pelše whenever possible. He 
lobbied within the Presidium for Pelše to become First Secretary.990 In February 1960, Krūmiņš 
was demoted to Education Minister. Having once held a powerful position, Krūmiņš was 
purged in two steps. This was approved at a meeting of the CPSU CC Secretariat in Moscow. 
CC Secretary Pospelov chaired the meeting, warmly introducing Krūmiņš and adding 
apologetically that his new position was a modest one. Krūmiņš then recalled an unexpectedly 
cruel remark from Suslov, who said that ‘after all that has happened in Latvia, even the position 
of Education Minister is too high for Krūmiņš’.991 Krūmiņš lost his position as a minister the 
following year. Suslov’s early political career reveals his familiarity with combating 
nationalism. He served as Stavropol kraikom (Regional Party Committee) First Secretary and, in 
this capacity, was involved in the struggle against Caucasian nationalism and the deportation of 
the Karachai people for collaboration with the Germans. According to Robert Conquest, his 
performance was so impressive that he was promoted in 1944 to Chairman of Stalin’s Orgburo 
(Organisational Bureau) for Lithuania. In other words, he became ‘the official responsible for 
the most ruthless re-imposition of Soviet rule on a country bitterly resisting through a long-
drawn-out partisan movement. These are not assignments for a merely ideological type… 
Success in these foul operations led to Suslov’s recall to responsible work in the CC apparatus 
in March 1946’.992 
Prigge portrays Suslov as Khrushchev’s nemesis in the Presidium, mirroring Pelše’s 
relationship with Berklavs. This assessment is certainly accurate. As Serge Petroff explains, 
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Khrushchev and Suslov emerged from the 21st Party Congress in January 1959, where Suslov 
refrained from seriously criticising the Anti-Party group, in opposition to one another.  
Obsessed with the idea that Suslov was a political rival, Khrushchev had been 
trying to reduce Suslov’s authority and influence since the Moscow 
International Communist Conference in November 1957. Suslov, on the other 
hand, was becoming progressively more critical of Khrushchev’s theoretical 
pronouncements, his political intransigence, and his campaign to eliminate what 
was left of the old Stalinist guard... In the domestic arena, Suslov was opposed 
to Khrushchev’s policy of rapid and uncontrolled de-Stalinisation, his views on 
economic decentralisation, and [the Thaw].993 
While Prigge insists that Suslov was the purge’s primary instigator in Moscow, I believe that 
there was a cabal within the Soviet leadership intent on purging the national communists. Prigge 
identifies Aleksandr Shelepin’s involvement, but underestimates his role.994 
Shelepin and Berklavs were acquainted during the Second World War.995 Shelepin also 
had prior associations with Pinksis, Berklavs and Krūmiņš from his days in the All-Union 
Komsomol leadership in the 1940s when Pinksis and Berklavs did their respective terms as 
Komsomol First Secretary. Between 1948 and 1951, Krūmiņš was Komsomol First Secretary 
while Shelepin was Second Secretary of the All-Union organisation, thus bringing all four into 
close contact. Animosity between Shelepin and Berklavs began in May 1958 when Berklavs 
was in Moscow to discuss his transfer to the Council of Ministers. Initially, Shelepin greeted 
Berklavs genially, though on the subject of the language law and nationalism in Latvia their 
discussion quickly degenerated. This meeting followed Berklavs’s discussion with Kiselev 
about the complaint letter sent to Moscow. Shelepin wanted to know that Berklavs was willing 
to correct the situation in Latvia. 
Shelepin: ‘I was told that you were with Sector Head Kiselev. So we 
completely understand each other and agree’. 
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Berklavs: ‘Speaking frankly, to be clear - I cannot say that everything will be 
fine. I don’t understand what conclusions I should make about my work and 
what mistakes could have been avoided’.  
Shelepin changed his tone and reverted to addressing Berklavs in the formal ‘vy’ (you). 
‘We have observed nationalist deviations [in Latvia], that you have forced everyone to 
learn Latvian and to hate Russians.’ 
Berklavs: ‘I do not see any political mistakes in my work’. 
Shelepin: ‘If you continue to speak to me in such a tone, then I will arrange a 
conversation with one of the CC secretaries’. 
Berklavs: ‘I’d be glad to arrange the conversation myself, but at my rank I 
cannot reach them’. 
Shelepin stood without speaking and telephoned Kirichenko, who could not be reached. He then 
returned. 
Shelepin: ‘It is a pity. None of the secretaries are free’. 
Berklavs: ‘I am also sorry. I would gladly tell [them] the truth about what’s 
happening in Latvia’. 
Shelepin no longer wanted to argue and tried to smooth things over. ‘Go home’ he said, ‘and 
come into work tomorrow!’ He stood up, suggesting the conversation had ended. At the door, 
he said, as if suddenly remembering, ‘there is a football game this evening, will you come with 
me? Let’s go!’ Not ready to make amends, Berklavs quipped: ‘No, I believe the game has 
already been played’, and walked out.996 
This altercation carried significant consequences. Berklavs had snubbed Shelepin or as 
Krūmiņš described it, Berklavs’s sharp character had ‘bitten’ Shelepin.997 In 1962, Krūmiņš met 
with Shelepin who admitted that he was the one who dispatched the CC investigation team to 
Riga in May 1959, directly guiding its most important activities.998 Krūmiņš speculated that 
Shelepin acted without Khrushchev’s knowledge, but this is unlikely. 999  Shelepin 
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retrospectively relayed his impression of his falling out with Berklavs to Krūmiņš. Berklavs 
apparently called Shelepin ‘a Great Russian chauvinist’. Shelepin retorted that Berklavs was a 
‘nationalist’. Shelepin told Krūmiņš that the dispute was so serious that they ‘almost came to 
blows’. Thereafter, Shelepin could never forgive Berklavs.1000  Apine accurately describes 
Shelepin as a very powerful enemy.1001 Krūmiņš believed ‘Shelepin’s personal feelings about 
Berklavs negatively affected both the process and the results of the [July] plenum’.1002  
Once the purge began, Shelepin supported Pelše in extending it. In autumn 1959 while 
Pelše was preparing its next phase, Shelepin addressed the situation in Latvia at a USSR 
Supreme Soviet session. He spoke about Krūmiņš, Pinksis and especially Berklavs making 
‘assessments that were unrestrained and tactlessly disdainful’.1003 The second victim of the 
purge, Pinksis, attempted to inform Khrushchev in Moscow of the ‘witch hunt’ going on in 
Latvia in early 1962. Shelepin intercepted Pinksis but promised to deliver Pinksis’s letter to 
Khrushchev. Later, he telephoned Pinksis to tell him that Khrushchev was too busy and did not 
have time to deal with Pinksis’s petition. Pinksis believed his letter never reached 
Khrushchev.1004 
In light of evidence supporting Shelepin’s role in the purge, it seems that Shelepin and 
Suslov coordinated their actions within a ‘Moscow faction’ of the Soviet leadership. This was a 
conservative coalition opposed to Khrushchev’s leadership. Shortly after the Anti-Party group’s 
ouster in 1957, another group of surviving Stalinists coalesced in opposition to Khrushchev’s 
increasingly erratic behaviour. Suslov was most likely the leader, and held the most senior 
position within the Presidium. After the Anti-Party group crisis, as Michael Tatu puts it, Suslov 
became ‘a pole of attraction for possible malcontents’ in the Presidium.1005 Shelepin, however, 
as KGB Chairman, was in an ideal position to encourage a purge. The Department for Union 
Republics was the faction’s tool for influencing Soviet Republics. The Department was 
instrumental in building the case against Berklavs following the publication of ‘Conversation 
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from the heart’ in February 1959, and monitored Latvia carefully following the passing of 
residency and language legislation in 1956. From April 1958, the Department for Union 
Republics was no longer under the control of Khrushchev’s client Gromov, but instead Vladimir 
Semichastnyi, who acquired the position from his patron Shelepin.1006 Thus, Shelepin continued 
to control the department he recently vacated. The Department for Union Republics relayed the 
flood of complaints about the national communists to the CC. The Department for Union 
Republics played a direct role in the purge through its Deputy Chairman Petr Pigalev who led 
the crusade against Berklavs’s article. He also accompanied the CC team to Latvia in May at 
Shelepin’s behest.1007 The team’s report also demonstrates that Pigalev coordinated closely with 
Pelše during the investigation. Furthermore, Pigalev was not only present, but delivered the 
keynote speech at the critical July 1959 plenum. Krūmiņš called Suslov ‘the second pillar of 
Stalinist Moscow’, implying that Shelepin played the key role in Berklavs’s removal.1008 
The common denominator between hardliners in Moscow and Riga was that they 
remained convinced Stalinists. Pelše did not conceal being a ‘Molotovite,’ and thought 
Viacheslav Molotov was unfairly punished after the Anti-Party group affair.1009  Krūmiņš 
believed that the plenum against the ‘nationalists’ was organised ‘by those who have a negative 
attitude about the 20th Congress’, and supported the Anti-Party group in 1957.1010 The first 
complaint letters began to arrive in Moscow shortly after the Anti-Party group’s ouster. Pelše 
and like-minded conservatives in Moscow feared the 20th Party Congress’s consequences. These 
officials were unwilling to relinquish control of the Party to the younger generation who 
supported the 20th Party Congress’s decisions.  
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The national communists knew the identities of their opponents in Moscow. Krūmiņš 
acknowledged that Suslov and Shelepin were ‘known for their chauvinistic attitudes’.1011 In the 
early 1960s, the Moscow faction grew to include most of the Presidium in opposition to 
Khrushchev. Semichastnyi, Suslov and Shelepin were the only senior officials in Moscow I 
identify with involvement in the Latvian affair. All three played a pivotal role in Khrushchev’s 
removal in October 1964. This group represented a resurgent Stalinist vanguard in control of 
powerful sectors such as the KGB, which, in its formative stage, removed the Latvian national 
communists. Five years later, Khrushchev’s political fate would mirror that of Berklavs. It is 
possible that since the Moscow faction was only developing in 1959, the Latvian affair ignited 
the coalition’s conflict with Khrushchev. It is worth noting that this alliance was born out of 
animosity towards Khrushchev, quickly disintegrating after his ouster. In his memoirs, Shelepin 
has only scathing words for Suslov because he masterminded Shelepin’s fall from grace in the 
late 1960s.1012 
William Prigge sought to challenge the prevailing historical consensus that Khrushchev 
masterminded the Latvian purge. He has, however, failed to do so. Since Prigge’s article 
refuting the conventional ‘Khrushchev conclusion’ was published in 2004, Western and Latvian 
historians have continued subscribe to this notion. This chapter has attempted to better untangle 
the complex web of political intrigue in Latvia and Moscow in spring 1959 to provide an 
alternative explanation. It was an alliance of the Soviet military, the ‘Moscow faction’ and 
Pelše, rather than Khrushchev, who orchestrated the purge. Chapter Five investigates 
Khrushchev’s vacillation and the course of the purge itself, arguing Pelše’s divide and conquer 
strategy and the subsequent political rout of the national communists was instrumental in 
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Chapter Five: The Death of Socialism 
with a Latvian Face: Summer 1959 and 
the Purge of the Latvian National 
Communists 
 
In this chapter, I argue that a loyalist faction within the LCP, led by Pelše, in conjunction with a 
conservative faction in Moscow, orchestrated and executed the Latvian purge in summer 1959. 
This conclusion is based on correspondence from the Department for Union Republics in 
Moscow, the transcript of the 1st July 1959 Presidium meeting, several published memoirs and 
interviews with senior national communists, and published interview with Khrushchev’s 
Presidium envoy to Riga, Nuritdin Mukhitdinov. 
Despite Khrushchev’s hesitancy, he decided that the national communists should retain 
their positions if they corrected the situation in Latvia. I argue that Khrushchev’s leniency was 
not followed through by concrete instructions. This allowed Pelše to outmanoeuvre the national 
communists. Using the stenographic record of the crucial bureau meetings in June and July 
1959, I argue that the national communists failed to maintain a united front in the face of 
concerted attacks and accusations of nationalism from the Pelše faction. This caused the 
collapse of the national communists as they turned on each other in an attempt to save 
themselves. Finally, this culminated in the dramatic purge of Berklavs at the July 1959 Latvian 
Party plenum and the end of the Latvian Thaw. 
 
5.1 The 20th and 21st June 1959 Latvian Bureau Meetings 
After his visit, Khrushchev knew there were problems in Latvia. The meetings of the Latvian 
bureau on 20th-21st June 1959 were his test to determine if the Latvians were able to correct 
themselves. These meetings ultimately decided the fate of the national communists. From 13th 
June, Berklavs’s career appeared finished. Pelše’s gamble worked. He successfully aroused 
Khrushchev’s suspicions of a nationalist conspiracy. An irate Khrushchev had challenged 
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Berklavs publicly, in front of the other leaders, testing their commitment to national 
communism. After this meeting, there was no alternative to dismissal for the unrepentant 
Berklavs. This need not have been the case for the other national communists. Yet, the national 
communists failed to legitimise their actions: they did not meet after the confrontation at the 
airport. Despite the danger, the faction was unable to mount a credible defence during this 
crucial intervening week.  
 I do not believe it was because the national communists were disorganised or because 
they lacked a clear agenda. Pelše and the Department for Union Republics were able to interpret 
Khrushchev’s resolution as it suited them, which allowed them to decide what was and what 
was not permissible. This facilitated the collapse of the national communists in mid June, which 
throws into question my treatment of the national communists as a cohesive faction. Yet, the 
national communists were pragmatic: their fundamental goal was the reconciliation of 
promoting Latvian interests within the framework of the Party and USSR. Berklavs’s 
personality was a contributing factor. The incident at the airport compromised Berklavs in front 
of his enemies and his friends. Latvian national communism was constructed around its 
undisputed leader and probably could not have survived him. Berklavs’s characteristic 
stubbornness must have affected his colleagues when he rashly resigned on 15th June, and later 
when he spurned Mukhitdinov’s offer of a compromise. Pizāns’s tirade at Berklavs during the 
break in the 20th June bureau meeting demonstrated the national communists’ frustration with 
Berklavs. Consequently, the national communists considered their cause as hopeless once the 
realised that they did not have the tacit support of the Moscow apparatus (which they had 
previously enjoyed from at least 1956) and instead perceived it arrayed against them. Thus, they 
abandoned Berklavs, each man scrambled to save himself by jettisoning his ideology and 
criticising his colleagues for excesses in a wave of self-criticism and accusation because 
penitence became their only recourse. Furthermore, the national communists’ Stalinist 
opponents perceived them a dangerous faction worthy of Suslov’s special attention. Suslov’s 
involvement and intention to come to Latvia himself in mid June 1959 rather than Mukhitdinov 
shows that conservative hardliners viewed the national communists as a serious threat. Under 
the weight of such intense scrutiny, it not so surprising that the national communists scattered. 
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Another reason the national communists failed to maintain a united front at 20th June 
bureau meeting is that there was genuine disgruntlement with Berklavs within the group. 
Berklavs’s colleagues did not unanimously support his abrasive and uncompromising methods. 
This is evident from the acrimonious nature of that meeting. As every national communist 
except Pinksis followed the same course of action, it seems likely they had conferred and 
decided that compliance with Pelše and Mukhitdinov and the scapegoating of Berklavs was the 
most sensible course of action if they were to retain their positions, otherwise they would surely 
have stood by Berklavs.1013 
 Mukhitdinov’s testimony is useful for understanding how the Presidium proceeded. 
Mukhitdinov’s views are those of an important contemporary who was a party to crucial policy 
decisions on how the relationship between Moscow and Latvia evolved in summer 1959. It 
appears that either while Khrushchev was in Riga, or on 8th June when the investigation report 
arrived, the Presidium resolved to send the investigation team back to Latvia. This time they 
would present their findings to the Latvian bureau and determine if the Latvians could, or 
would, restore order as Khrushchev hoped. Mukhitdinov informs us that at the Presidium 
meeting it was decided that Suslov would lead the investigation team. Suslov was reputedly 
chosen because ‘many questions were ideological’. Moreover, he was considered an expert on 
Baltic affairs because of his service in Lithuania.1014 We do not know if Suslov volunteered his 
involvement or if this decision was made without Khrushchev’s consent, but Suslov was 
subordinate only to Khrushchev himself. According to Mukhitdinov, a few days before his 
departure Suslov caught a cold and doctors forbade him from flying. Mukhitdinov offered to go 
instead.1015 This shows Suslov’s close involvement in the deliberations. The Moscow faction 
was likely shaping events by originally suggesting Suslov lead the investigation team back to 
Latvia. Had Suslov been able to question the Latvians personally, and report to the Presidium 
on the situation, Berklavs’s fate would have been sealed immediately. 
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 The Presidium met again on 13th June. The resolution detailed the team’s agenda when 
they returned to Riga: ‘Discuss the issues contained in the inspection report and take action to 
correct deficiencies in the selection, placement and work of cadres. Instruct Mukhitdinov to 
participate in bureau discussions and to express Presidium members’ opinions on this issue’. 
Upon his return to Moscow, Khrushchev admitted to Mukhitdinov that there had been a serious 
discussion in Riga and a ‘skirmish’ with Berklavs and that he was not satisfied. There were 
‘good speeches’ but, according to Khrushchev, ‘our Latvian comrades did not have a strong 
programme or a specific plan of action’.1016 Khrushchev did not trust Berklavs, but he was 
wedded to the idea that the Latvians could moderate their policies and bring themselves into 
line without the need for further action. 
Mukhitdinov arrived in Riga around 16th June and met with Kalnbērziņš, Krūmiņš, 
Lācis and Ozoliņš. A surprisingly nervous Pelše, who feared he might yet lose this 
confrontation (possibly because Mukhitdinov, not Suslov, came to Riga), accompanied the 
group everywhere. Immediately after his arrival, Mukhitdinov asked Kalnbērziņš what 
decisions he was going to make and if he had a plan.  Kalnbērziņš replied he had not thought 
about it.1017 This surprised Mukhitdinov, and understandably so. The bureau had not met since 
Khrushchev’s departure. This prevented the Latvians from making a decision because 
Kalnbērziņš tried to defer to the centre to mediate this dispute. This benefitted the Moscow 
faction, which could argue for decisive action against a growing nationalist threat. Mukhitdinov 
most likely reported Kalnbērziņš’s dithering to Khrushchev, which contributed towards his 
decision to scapegoat the aged First Secretary rather than Berklavs. Mukhitdinov had lengthy 
conversations with Pelše and Kalnbērziņš. He asked them pointed questions, particularly about 
why they had not drafted a resolution to solve the problems mentioned in the report. He 
admonished them for their indecisiveness and that of the LCP as a whole: ‘For two and a half 
years, you have deliberated and many plenums have already passed. You have all the 
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documents with you, and you have talked with Khrushchev and Suslov. So, now you are going 
to meet, discuss, argue and disagree?’1018 
Mukhitdinov attests to meeting with Berklavs on 19th June. He tried to convince 
Berklavs of his incorrect ideological interpretations. Mukhitdinov asked Berklavs to accept that 
his actions were contrary to Lenin’s teachings and directed against the friendship of peoples. If 
Berklavs recognised and publicly recanted, then Moscow would acknowledge that they had 
scolded Berklavs ‘a little, and everything would stay the same’. Berklavs categorically refused 
the offer and Mukhitdinov retorted that Berklavs would regret his unwise decision.1019 On 
Khrushchev’s orders, but to no avail, Mukhitdinov first attempted to defuse the affair quietly 
and with considerable lenience towards Berklavs. 
Ahead of the decisive bureau meeting, Mukhitdinov visited Krūmiņš. Mukhitdinov 
explained that Khrushchev wanted Krūmiņš to criticise Kalnbērziņš at the upcoming plenum. 
This decision was reinforced by Kalnbērziņš’s poor performance when he met the investigation 
team. Krūmiņš reputedly answered that he could only criticise Kalnbērziņš’s character, and that 
he shared responsibility for developments in Latvia. Mukhitdinov telephoned Khrushchev, 
returned to Krūmiņš and said this news upset Khrushchev, who had responded by shouting ‘Do 
what you want!’ before hanging up.1020 From this exchange, it is clear Khrushchev wanted to 
use Kalnbērziņš as a scapegoat for the proliferation of nationalism. It appears at this meeting in 
Krūmiņš’s office, Mukhitdinov told Krūmiņš that Khrushchev was considering him to replace 
the ‘tired and old’ Kalnbērziņš. Krūmiņš claims that he was asked to criticise both Kalnbērziņš 
and Berklavs, but refused to do so.1021 Krūmiņš’s denunciation of Kalnbērziņš and Berklavs 
would have distanced him from the national communists, allowing for his promotion. This 
would explain Khrushchev’s irritation at Krūmiņš’s refusal to blame Kalnbērziņš for permitting 
the explosion of nationalism. 
This is another point where we must approach Krūmiņš’s testimony with caution. It is 
unlikely Krūmiņš would offer to shoulder responsibility for ‘nationalist mistakes’ attributed to 
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Kalnbērzīņš. He readily abandoned his friend Berklavs at the bureau meeting on 20th June and 
again, publicly, at the July plenum. At these meetings, Krūmiņš displayed his readiness to admit 
to mistakes in order to remain Second Secretary. Thus, it seems unlikely that he would decline 
the opportunity to become First Secretary. Berklavs recognised that this was Krūmiņš’s 
ambition.1022 Khrushchev’s consideration of Krūmiņš’s candidacy further suggests his aversion 
to a purge. Krūmiņš was a young and energetic, centrist candidate, in stark contrast to the 
pliable Kalnbērziņš. 
Latvia and its indigenous leadership enjoyed a certain special confidence from 
Khrushchev. I believe this in part explains his reluctance to purge the leadership, alongside his 
wish to preserve this young cohort of cadres that supported de-Stalinisation. Krūmiņš stresses 
that Khrushchev found nothing out of the ordinary during his visits to Latvia in 1957 and 1958. 
In one episode, on a visit to the border between Lithuania and Latvia in 1958, Khrushchev 
castigated Lithuanian First Secretary Sniečkus and extolled Latvian economic management.1023 
At the 1st July Presidium meeting, Khrushchev recounted a scene from his June 1959 visit, 
which demonstrated his implicit trust in the Latvians. Before his speech to factory workers, 
Lācis asked Khrushchev if he should make his speech in Latvian or Russian, as he had prepared 
speeches in both languages (an indication of the absence of a clear language policy). 
Khrushchev told the expanded Presidium: ‘I answered of course it’s better to make it in 
Latvian’. Khrushchev expressed his confidence in the Latvians: ‘I applauded Lācis in advance, 
though I still do not know what he was talking about; I applauded just because of trust in him - 
Lācis won’t say anything against the Party’. Khrushchev ended his reverie by noting that for the 
benefit of those who did not know Latvian, headphones should have been mounted in the hall 
and simultaneous translation should have been organised.1024 We can interpret Khrushchev’s 
sentiments for the Latvians as tacit support for continued national communist leadership.  
 The first of the crucial meetings began on 20th June. K. Lebedev, CPSU CC instructor, 
read out the report of his investigation team from May.1025 This was the first time bureau 
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members, excluding Pelše and Kalnbērziņš, learned the investigation’s conclusions. The report 
summarised national communist transgressions, though it differed from the initial report, 
submitted to the Presidium. This unabridged version was more detailed. It specifically criticised 
the national communists’ ‘liberal’ attitude towards the creative intelligentsia’s political 
education, and questions of literary and cultural heritage. Lebedev concluded by blaming 
Kalnbērziņš for failing to address Latvia’s shortcomings despite being warned repeatedly.1026 
Kalnbērziņš nervously and immediately accepted all the reproaches. He admitted that the 
leadership began to emphasise Latvian distinctiveness after the national communists’ rise. 
‘From 1956, we began to inflate the features of the Latvian people, stressing our differences’, he 
said. Concluding his speech, Kalnbērziņš seemed to be aware that the Latvian Party itself might 
be in danger. Kalnbērziņš stressed that the situation was a ‘very serious test for the Party… we 
need to survive it’.1027 
Lebedev’s report was not universally accepted. Berklavs, Krūmiņš and others took issue 
with its accuracy. Mukhitdinov admitted that the meeting did not go smoothly because the 
Latvians were unprepared to accept complete culpability and ‘raised objections about certain 
aspects’ of the report.1028 Krūmiņš opposed the report, explaining the necessity of national 
cadres, his flagship policy as Second Secretary. He also argued that not all of the complaint 
letters were accurate. He said Ponomarev’s complaint about ethnic discrimination was 
unwarranted because after the downsizing of ministerial posts (including Ponomarev’s 
position), only 30% of ministers were Latvians.1029 
These meetings represented the collapse of the national communists as a faction. In 
successive speeches, most national communists quickly surrendered their positions, abandoning 
Berklavs. This was their opportunity, within the bureau’s confines, to demonstrate their loyalty 
in front of Moscow’s representative. Berklavs became the main scapegoat. By sacrificing him, 
the others hoped that by submitting to Moscow’s pressure, they would be able to preserve the 
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status quo.1030 Krūmiņš demonstrated this in his speech. He lashed out at Pizāns for allowing 
Cīņa to print unacceptable articles. He tried to avoid admitting his own culpability, explaining 
that ‘there was an impression that you could not criticise Berklavs, that he was in a special 
situation… I think Berklavs held inappropriate and completely wrong viewpoints.1031 Krūmiņš’s 
speech impressed Mukhitdinov. He recounted that ‘Krūmiņš’s presentation on personnel issues 
and ideological work contained a deeper analysis of the facts’ than his previous comments.1032 
Unsurprisingly, Krūmiņš avoids mentioning the meetings on 20th and 21st June in his memoirs. 
Lācis displayed some self-criticism in his speech but did not admit wrongdoing on 
several issues, and noted that the Latvians themselves needed to come to terms with the current 
situation. He continued to defend decisions promoting the training and placement of Latvian 
cadres. Lācis claimed there were too few Latvian cadres, especially within the militia. Crucially, 
he said the Latvians had Khrushchev’s support on the matter. He agreed with Krūmiņš and 
thought the report contained ‘some inaccuracies and some incorrect sources’.1033 In his report, 
Lebedev criticised Latvia’s deviation from the All-Union education law and reprimanded the 
Latvians for privileging the Latvian language by pledging to offer free textbooks. He remarked 
that despite ‘the sovereignty in each republic in matters of public education… a republic cannot 
be in a special position compared to the others’.1034 Lācis had broken rank and championed the 
measures in 1958. In a move that may have ended his own career, at the 20th June meeting, 
Lācis did not give his opinion on 12-year education in Latvia and downplayed accusations of 
nationalism.1035 Berklavs believed Lācis would defend him. Lācis had requested Berklavs as his 
deputy and therefore he shared some measure of responsibility.1036 Ultimately, however, Lācis 
behaved as Mukhitdinov expected and conceded Berklavs’s actions had been ‘wrong, dangerous 
and harmful’.1037 
Lebedev used his final words to discredit Berklavs. He explained that he received a note 
about ‘misconduct’ in Berklavs’s admission to the Party, but that at the time the CPSU CC 
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decided not to pursue the issue.1038 When Berklavs began his speech, he had lost much of his 
characteristic confidence. Initially, he admitted to mistakes but repeatedly asserted that 
decisions were made collectively and refuted accusations that he made any serious 
transgressions: ‘It is very bad’, he conceded, ‘if [I] caused some damage in the relationship 
between comrades from Russia and Latvia. Today, however, I cannot see political mistakes or 
anti-party views in my work’.1039 Lebedev repeatedly lambasted Berklavs’s signature policy, the 
language requirement, claiming it ‘introduced uncertainty and nervousness among a large part 
of the cadres’. Lebedev provided examples, such as the decision to reject 500 applications to 
Riga’s universities because the applicants did not know Latvian. Lebedev also mentioned a 
controversial September 1958 Riga gorkom stipulation, which tightened the language law 
specifically to require that all doctors and nurses in Riga’s City Health Department learn to 
speak Russian and Latvian within one year.1040 Berklavs acknowledged that ‘maybe it was not 
necessary to specify a period of time for learning the language’. Then Berklavs contested the 
validity of information in the inspection report declaring that he never opposed the placement of 
Soviet troops in Latvia or heavy industrial development. He also testified that he never made 
remarks about the ‘Russian influx’ at LSU, and claimed there were six hours of daily Russian 
radio broadcasting, rather than the 20 minutes referenced in the report.1041 Lebedev took issue 
with the replacement of non-Latvian cadres, deploring a decision on 24th May 1959 by Riga’s 
Moscow raikom to replace senior officials, engineers and technicians in the rail and road 
transport enterprises with Latvian specialists, especially because Latvians already occupied 
41.8% of these leadership positions despite non-Latvians comprising 58.6% of the 
workforce.1042 Lebedev implied persecution of Russians was designed to promote Latvian 
domination of industry. Berklavs denied there was a plan to systematically replace Russians and 
that there was ‘no reason to replace non-Latvians with Latvians’. Berklavs was obviously 
conflicted. Suddenly, he had chosen to disavow core national communist policies. As the 
pressure, mounted Berklavs contradicted himself. ‘We need to address the issues of improving 
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living conditions’, he said, ‘therefore we should not forcibly increase the number of workers to 
boost industrial development’.1043  
On the second day, Mukhitdinov spoke briefly about Berklavs. On this occasion, he 
demonstrated less patience towards Berklavs, berating him for creating a situation ‘where, 
essentially, the Latvian border was closed’ to Soviet citizens who could not speak Latvian. He 
joined Lebedev in criticising Latvia’s education amendment and accused Berklavs of 
overstepping his role. ‘Why have you allowed yourself to promise free textbooks only to 
Latvian students at public expense?’ Mukhidinov asked. ‘You are not the head of state, you do 
not represent the Party… Why are you so contemptuous of other people?’ Berklavs evaded the 
question, maintaining that the policy was harmless.1044 In Berklavs’s ‘rebellion against heavy 
industry’, Mukhitdinov accused him of ‘Right deviation’ and compared him to Stalin’s 1930s 
opponent Nikolai Bukharin, as the report did. 1045  According to Berklavs and Krūmiņš, 
Mukhitdinov supposedly compared Berklavs to Beria and inferred he might share the same 
fate.1046 If Mukhitdinov said this, it indicates that he believed Berklavs was a force to contend 
with, and therefore the threat of physical violence could be induced. This likely had an effect on 
Berklavs’s wavering allies. At this point, Mukhitdinov gave up trying to force Berklavs’s 
capitulation. Berklavs reflected: ‘I had a gun barrel at my temple. Of course, the Muscovites, 
Kalnbērziņs and Pelše would be very happy if I confessed my guilt and condemned my previous 
activities. But I did not think that the Muscovites were still hoping for my capitulation’.1047 
Mukhitdinov shifted his focus to Berklavs’s colleagues. As Prigge says, ‘the threat of losing 
one’s post, perhaps even one’s life, was undoubtedly implicit and explicit’.1048 Though Prigge 
exaggerates about the potential for executions, he makes a valid point. Pavel Pizāns, Berklavs’s 
friend, came to see him during a break in the proceedings. In hysterics, he demanded Berklavs 
recognise that the faction was defeated: 
Pizāns: ‘Comrade Berklavs, admit it, admit it! You heard what they are saying’. 
Berklavs: ‘Do you want me to slander myself? All of us? Our lives?’ 
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Pizāns: ‘It doesn’t matter! It doesn’t matter! It doesn't matter, we didn’t win!’ 
Berklavs: ‘Get the hell out of here, coward!’1049 
After the break, Pizāns regained his composure and denounced Berklavs. 
During the speeches, both Lebedev and Pelše mentioned several points that Khrushchev 
later repeated. This indicates that through the investigation process and report, Pelše influenced 
Khrushchev’s opinions. Pelše likened Berklavs’s policies to those of independent Latvia’s 
President Kārlis Ulmanis with his slogan ‘Latvia for the Latvians’. He claimed that in the press 
the former Latvian Social-Democratic Party leader Fricis Menders praised Berklavs’s 
‘endeavours for the Latvians’.1050 Pelše aired his long-standing grievances about Berklavs for 
interfering in CC affairs, and attacked him for errors in cadres and national policies when he 
was Riga gorkom First Secretary. Pelše also began to position himself to succeed Kalnbērziņš. 
Mukhitdinov recalled that Pelše ‘spoke sharply about Kalnbērziņš, saying that he didn’t have a 
firm hand and didn’t lead the struggle against shortcomings’. Pelše blamed Kalnbērziņš for the 
leadership’s inability to correct their policies to satisfy Moscow. While Mukhitdinov was keen 
to prevent the discussion descending into a squabble across bitter factional divides, Pelše 
undermined the First Secretary, claiming that ‘Kalnbērziņš cannot cope with the situation, he is 
soft and lacks principles. Therefore, he must be released from his work’.1051 
Humility and samokritika, the Soviet formula whereby communists were obliged to 
engage in self-criticism by ritual recantation, for the collective mistakes of the bureau was 
expected. Pelše, however, displayed only a minimum of self-criticism. This did not satisfy 
subsequent speakers, particularly because of his vociferous criticism of others. Pelše only 
admitted collective guilt, saying that all bureau members were at fault because they ‘did not 
promptly correct Berklavs. We were sometimes conciliatory, tolerant and showed 
liberalism’.1052 Pelše strategically deflected blame for his personal inaction by admitting to 
minimal mistakes, then launching attacks on other bureau members. Nikolai Saleev, Pelše’s 
only firm bureau ally, completely agreed with the investigation report. In his speech, he was 
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even more critical than Pelše, perhaps confident knowing that his position was secure as the 
bureau’s only Russian. Saleev described Berklavs, Pizāns, Pinksis and Bissenieks as a 
conspiratorial group bent on taking over Latvia. Saleev similarly attacked Kalnbērziņš for his 
weak resolve. Saleev, however, also criticised Pelše: ‘you’re guilty as well’, Saleev told him. 
‘Today you are correct and principled… You’re an experienced worker and theorist, you know 
the republic perfectly well, but in addressing questions you are timid. It’s your serious 
drawback. I believe that in ideological questions you committed a grave mistake’.1053 It is likely 
that this ‘soft criticism’ was planned. It ensured Pelše shared blame without having to endure a 
serious attack. Secretary for Industry Ādolfs Miglinieks complained that the national 
communists portrayed Latvia’s membership in the USSR as ‘the Russian occupation of Latvia’. 
Miglinieks was a prime example of a Russified Latvian. He provoked Mukhitdinov’s scorn 
because he had not learned the Latvian language or culture, despite living there for 15 years. He 
added that the ‘nationalists’ viewed the ‘strengthening of political, economic and cultural ties 
with the Russian people as Russification’.1054 
National communists Krūmiņš, Bissenieks, Pizāns, Straujums, Nikonov and Ozoliņš, 
along with Plūdonis and Miglinieks, all spoke against Berklavs. Straujums abandoned Berklavs, 
saying that he did not understand why Berklavs did not admit his mistakes. Nikonov agreed that 
‘Berklavs had done a lot of stupid things’.1055 Bissenieks blamed Pinksis and Berklavs for their 
‘wrong decisions’, which led to ‘strained relations between the bureau and some Russian 
comrades’. ‘Berklavs’ Bissenieks said, ‘divided communists along national lines. When he 
worked in the Riga gorkom, he always had a pocket full of different references, different 
statistics; he juggled with these figures’.1056  
Only Pinksis remained loyal to Berklavs. He defended his position as Trade Union 
Chief. ‘There are enterprises’ he explained, ‘in which the majority of workers are Latvians but 
the management, Komsomol and trade union leadership does not know Latvian and that does 
not strengthen the friendship between peoples’. Pinksis referenced VEF, where 70-80% of Party 
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organisation secretaries were Russians who could not speak Latvian. Latvian workers who did 
not acquire sufficient Russian language skills were unable to participate in Party events at the 
factory because they were held in Russian, which kept them from active participation in the 
Party. This, Pinksis added provocatively, meant that ‘Latvian workers did not join the Party’.1057 
At the meeting’s conclusion, Berklavs spoke again, though his demeanour was even 
more subdued. He was meek, compliant and resigned to his fate. He admitted there were 
manifestations of nationalism in Latvia and that he was to blame. 
In some cases, obviously, I was not clever. I was tactless and wrong. I must 
admit and recognise that my harshness, my lack of thought caused resentment 
and dissatisfaction. I undoubtedly harmed the important cause of peoples’ 
friendship. I’m sorry about this. I love the Latvian and Russian people 
equally… Wherever I happen to be I will always try to serve the Party and the 
people. Believe me.1058 
Berklavs’s uncharacteristic speech showed the effect of the meetings’ assault. Unsurprisingly, 
the desertion of his friends had a significant impact upon him. 
Mukhitdinov accepted the criticisms about Berklavs but complained about Pelše’s lack 
of self-criticism. Pelše, not Mukhitdinov, proposed that Berklavs be stripped of his bureau 
seat. 1059  Mukhitdinov noted that ‘this idea resonated amongst the bureau’s members’.1060 
Underscoring Khrushchev’s preference for an internal solution, Mukhitdinov stressed that 
Latvians needed to agree on specific measures to correct their position. Thus far, the Latvians 
were unable to meet this expectation. But when the meeting ended, Berklavs’s dismissal was 
not a foregone conclusion. Kalnbērziņš proposed a commission to solve the ‘nationalist 
problem’ or lack thereof. Crucially, Pelše was selected as its chairman.1061 This put Pelše in 
charge of the only mechanism in Latvia that could prevent a purge. The formulation of a 
detailed proposal outlining how the Latvian bureau would rectify its nationality policy problems 
could have prevented outside interference. Mukhtidinov was anxious because the Latvians did 
                                                      
1057 LVA-PA f.101, apr.22, l.48a, lp.170, 175. 
1058 LVA-PA f.101, apr.22, l.48a, lp.230-31. 
1059 LVA-PA f.101, apr.22, l.48a, lp.155. 
1060 Mukhitdinov, ‘1959 god v Latvii’, 89. 
1061 Mukhitdinov, ‘1959 god v Latvii’, 89. 
  255 
‘not propose or agree upon specific measures to correct their position’, which was the rationale 
behind his mission to Latvia.1062  
Later that evening, 21st June, Lācis summoned Berklavs to his office. Kalnbērziņš, 
Pelše and the CPSU CC team joined them. They telephoned Khrushchev, asking permission to 
arrest Berklavs. Khrushchev, demonstrating he was against a purge, declined to have Berklavs 
arrested because a trial would generate too much ‘noise’.1063 Khrushchev repeatedly stated his 
concern about the potential public relations fallout a purge could generate and wished to 
minimise the impact of the whole affair. Furthermore, Khrushchev wished to avoid presenting 
the Latvian émigré community with a propaganda opportunity. Berklavs then spoke with 
Khrushchev. Presumably, Khrushchev wanted to avoid dismissing Berklavs and asked him to 
accept that he made mistakes in order to keep his position. Berklavs refused, and knowing he 
had lost, reiterated his position to the others. According to Pelše, Khrushchev told Berklavs that 
his immigration policy was misguided and needed to stop. Berklavs adamantly objected.1064 
Berklavs’s refusal to atone complicated the situation because other Latvian leaders had admitted 
wrongdoing. At this point, Berklavs’s position was apparently hopeless. Yet, Khrushchev 
repeatedly declined to move against Berklavs. 
 Following his return from Latvia, Mukhitdinov reported to the Presidium on 22nd June. 
The protocol notes that at the meeting ‘there were critical statements about Kalnbērziņš. Lācis is 
well respected but he is ill [and will likely retire soon]. Krumiņš and Berklavs are [effectively] 
in charge’. Mukhitdinov believed that the national communists had taken over the leadership. 
He was not wrong. In many ways, because the national communists formulated and shaped 
policy, this was the case from April 1958, when Krūmiņš became Second Secretary and 
Berklavs returned to the Council of Ministers. By this point, Khrushchev had made his decision. 
The Presidium chose to ‘kick’ Kalnbērziņš upstairs to the nominal head of state position of 
Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and ‘elect Pelše as First Secretary. Conduct a 
Presidium meeting during the 24th-29th June CPSU CC plenum and exchange opinions’.1065 This 
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was the first indication that the Presidium intended to replace Kalnbērziņš with Pelše, most 
likely to restore order. Even before Khrushchev relaxed in his attitude towards Berklavs, there 
was no mention of his removal. This is because Berklavs’s removal and Pelše’s promotion were 
two separate decisions. At this point Khrushchev hoped only the latter was necessary. 
 
5.2 The 24th-29th June CPSU CC Plenum 
Latvia’s senior most leaders were in Moscow to attend the CPSU CC plenum between 24th and 
29th June. The bureau did not meet during this period, which played into Pelše’s hands. Back in 
Riga, he surely preferred decisive intervention from Moscow (and his allies), rather than 
squabbling on the bureau where he was an unlikely candidate to replace Kalnbērziņš. At the end 
of June, Pelše phoned Suslov and said that ‘the commission could not develop a draft 
resolution’ despite having two investigators at his disposal.1066 As commission chairman, Pelše 
decided whether there would be a decision. In ensuring no resolution was made, Pelše tried to 
force Moscow to make the decision where the Suslov-Shelepin faction would suggest punitive 
measures. That Pelše directly telephoned Suslov further demonstrates their close relationship 
and reveals that Suslov was responsible with the Presidium for resolving the Latvian crisis. The 
Presidium met again, probably on 28th June. Suslov emphasised the Latvian government’s 
incompetence, ‘the Latvians cannot even prepare a draft’, he said, and alerted the Presidium to 
Pelše’s wish for the Presidium to discuss the Latvians’ cadres and nationality policy problems 
(where Suslov could shape events).1067 Mukhitdinov claims that he opposed this proposal. He 
thought the Latvians could resolve their problems without deferring to the Presidium, and he 
knew that given the opportunity Suslov would propose intervention. ‘I said that this should not 
be done’, Mukhitdinov recounted. ‘These questions should be decided through the Council of 
Ministers, especially because we’ve already held bureau discussions... So let them decide - it is 
a strong organisation of highly cultured people’.1068  
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It appears that Khrushchev wavered at this Presidium meeting. His actions 
demonstrated his oscillating feelings about the Latvian situation, not least because the Latvians 
(in reality Pelše) failed to commit to concrete measures. Khrushchev later admitted that at first, 
he ‘felt the need to make an organisational intervention’.1069 Mukhitdinov’s suggestion, to allow 
the Latvians to resolve the issue, won out and the Presidium decided to meet with Latvia’s 
leaders on 1st July. 
 Despite not revealing it to the bureau, Khrushchev had grown more concerned by what he 
learnt during his visit to Latvia. After considering what to do with Berklavs, Khrushchev 
publicly declared his decision on 29th June as he concluded the CPSU CC plenum. At this point 
Khrushchev was still undecided about an overhaul of the Latvian leadership. Regarding 
industrial development, Khrushchev questioned the national communists’ motivations for 
avoiding machine-building development. ‘They don’t have coal or metal, so they think they 
don’t need it. They think: We have few workers, and if we develop [heavy industry], we’ll need 
Russians, Belarusians etc. Consequently, the percentage of Latvians will change’. Khrushchev 
pointed out (as Pelše had) that Ulmanis promoted a similar policy, the current situation being 
‘only slightly veiled in nationalist powder. What is it good for?’ Khrushchev also reversed his 
initial decision to allow the Latvians to hold the Līgo Midsummer festival.1070 Yet, in his final 
remarks Khrushchev relented. He wanted to inform the wider Party that these mistakes were 
uncovered, but decided to allow the responsible persons (several of them were in the audience) 
to rectify them on their own. 
Khrushchev: ‘All of these are very serious questions. Maybe sometime we will 
put them to a plenum and discuss it, but now we should not pass a resolution. 
Initially, when we discussed the question on Latvia at the Presidium, we wanted 
to adopt a resolution. If it were passed, then you probably would have 
supported us. However, after thinking it over I decided it should not be done, 
because if we pass such a resolution now, some will say the Latvians almost 
rebelled against Soviet power. In Latvia, as I said, we’ve got three or four black 
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sheep who want to muddy the waters. Perhaps these worked up individuals will 
spoil the whole wonderful picture of the commonwealth of nations of our great 
Soviet Union’. 
From the audience: ‘Right!’ 
Khrushchev: ‘We cannot [allow] that. I think that the Latvians themselves can 
cope with this matter’.1071 
Khrushchev remained conflicted about how to solve the problems in Latvia. In this speech, he 
was thinking aloud about his reservations. 
 
5.3 The 1st July Presidium Meeting 
Khrushchev’s speech at the CPSU CC plenum ended on a conciliatory note, but he evidently 
remained concerned about the situation in Latvia. Latvia’s leaders remained in Moscow as 
requested for an expanded Presidium meeting on 1st July. The four highest-ranking Latvian 
leaders: Kalnbērziņš, Lācis, Krūmiņš and Ozoliņš, attended. The Presidium discussed the 
situation in Latvia and Azerbaijan, the other recalcitrant republic that failed to implement 
Khrushchev’s education reform. 
This meeting brought matters to a head. While it was not a trial, it resembled one.  
Krūmiņš described the Latvians sitting a little way ahead, on ‘a kind of bench of the 
accused’.1072 In November 1959, Kalnbērziņš, Lācis, Ozoliņš (and Krūmiņš in February 1960) 
lost their positions directly because of this meeting. Despite his reconsideration at the 
conclusion of the plenum two days previously, the volatile Khrushchev was still upset when the 
meeting began. Krūmiņš remarked later that ‘it seemed as if there were two Khrushchevs. The 
first - impulsive to the extreme - ready to smash everything’, the other placated.1073 Khrushchev 
reprimanded the Latvian leaders complaining, as Pelše did at the 21st June meeting, about 
former Social-Democratic Party leader Fricis Menders’s newspaper article ‘praising incorrect 
opinions about the national question. Menders conducts policy, he has Berklavs in the 
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government’.1074  In his characteristically belligerent bluster, Khrushchev declared that ‘the 
Latvian Party can be dissolved, we have enough power’.1075 By this extraordinary remark, he 
meant that he could remove the Latvian leadership rather than actually dissolving the Party. 
Khrushchev then interrogated the Latvians. In his crude manner, Khrushchev questioned 
Kalnbērziņš about the national communist initiative of restricting non-Latvian speaking Russian 
medics from working in Latvian hospitals, one of the points in Demin and Saleev’s complaint 
letters. 
Khrushchev: ‘Will Russian hospital attendants be accepted in Latvian hospitals 
now?’ 
Kalnbērziņš: ‘Yes, this was reported to me today. We have also fixed the 
problem about registration’. 
Khrushchev: ‘If a Latvian goes to hospital, a Russian can give him an enema?’ 
Kalnbērziņš: ‘He can’.1076 
Kalnbērziņš and Lācis confirmed that national communist policies were reversed even before 
the purge began with the repeal of residency restrictions.1077 This law was officially cancelled 
on 15th July; the week after the purge commenced.1078 This suggests that Pelše exploited the 
national communists’ paralysis after the episode at the airport on 13th June to begin dismantling 
national communist initiatives even before he emerged victorious from the struggle. 
Khrushchev wanted Kalnbērziņš to explain how the nationalist affair had been allowed 
to happen. Kalnbērziņš admitted his failings. 
I’m very guilty personally, more than other comrades. I depended on them to 
correct me in proper time. I have not found an excuse to explain why we failed 
in national policy… What I should do next? I think I can implement the Party 
line and can meet [your] demands. But I failed to justify the Party’s hopes. 
Therefore, I deserve the most severe punishment of the Party.1079 
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Kalnbērziņš was a spent force. He tried to shift the blame to the national communists, stating 
that everything was fine before 1956. He blamed Berklavs and Krūmiņš for misleading him: 
‘The national problem in Latvia is not solved. They came to my office and started to step on us 
old people, to press us about the fact that Latvian is not widely spoken and that few Latvians are 
promoted’. Khrushchev was unsympathetic, ‘It’s your fault you let the young people go crazy, 
he retorted’. 1080  Finally, Kalnbērziņš suggested purging the national communists and 
recommended that Russians fill their positions. 
My mistake was that I didn’t realise the anti-Party nature of the subject. I 
realised that only after your criticism while you were leaving Riga. I realised 
where that was going and what it could lead to. After this discussion, I think it 
is necessary to remove the unstable ones, give them lower positions and let 
them grow up. It is necessary to introduce some strength into the bureau, 
Russian comrades in particular, and we have the staff. They used to work in the 
CC. We have Comrade Litvinov.1081 
Krūmiņš explains that ‘this subterfuge did not help’, and Kalnbērziņš’s penitence ‘only threw 
branches onto the fire’, presumably because it emphasised his own inadequacies.1082  
On the subject of language, Khrushchev criticised Kalnbērziņš, as he did throughout the 
meeting. During Khrushchev’s visit, they stopped at a factory where Kalnbērziņš made a speech 
in Russian. At the Presidium, Khrushchev told Kalnbērziņš that he should have spoken in 
Latvian. Khrushchev displayed a more conciliatory attitude towards the language question at 
this meeting. ‘I believe that for you Latvian is the official language’, he said. Krūmiņš joined 
the attack on Kalnbērziņš by mentioning the pervasive rumours that Kalnbērziņš would soon be 
retiring. Krūmiņš said ‘Kalnbērziņš won’t work for long because he’s old and young ones have 
to come. I heard that many times’.1083 Khrushchev then decided Kalnbērziņš’s fate.  
Kalnbērziņš is the guiltiest… He’s an absolutely flawless communist. [But] he 
is not the core of the leadership. I thought that, [but] maybe not now, 
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Kalnbērziņš should be relieved of his duties. He cannot be a Secretary because 
nowadays another approach is required… Frankly, there is no real First 
Secretary in Latvia now. Kalnbērziņš is not a Secretary, he does not organise 
people and he does not try to do this.1084 
Kalnbērziņš made no objections. Though Khrushchev intended to use Kalnbērziņš as the 
scapegoat, Khrushchev did not want Kalnbērziņš to be retired in disgrace. This contradicts 
Prigge’s assertion that ‘Khrushchev had nothing but contempt for Kalnbērziņš’.1085 Khrushchev 
valued Kalnbērziņš, calling him ‘brother’ and repeatedly asking if he was offended. ‘In my 
opinion’ Khrushchev said, ‘Kalnbērziņš is and always has been perfect. The matter of his 
mistakes is not ideological but because of his age. However, we believe that Kalnbērziņš is 
worthy of our support’.1086 After the meeting, Khrushchev instructed Kalnbērziņš to ‘work 
quietly, correct your position, but consider everything that was said’.1087 Khrushchev did not 
want to replace Kalnbērziņš until the dust settled over the affair, which is why Kalnbērziņš kept 
his position for another five months. Ultimately, Kalnbērziņš received Ozoliņš’s position as 
Presidium Chairman exactly as the 22nd June Presidium protocol recommended. He also 
retained his CPSU CC Presidium candidate membership until October 1961 and his seat on the 
Latvian bureau until 1970. 
Lācis also admitted his guilt. ‘I’m ready to take any punishment inflicted on me,’ he 
said. ‘I will consider it the right one. I will meet expectations and will not make mistakes again’. 
In a rambling and contradictory statement, Ozoliņš timidly attempted to pretend all was well. 
Ozoliņš: ‘I must say that there is no national question in Latvia and there is no 
national question among the people’.  
Khrushchev: ‘That’s incorrect, there certainly is’. 
Ozoliņš: ‘There is one among some groups at the top. Among the general 
public there is no such problem like there is in the leadership. One cannot say 
there is a national question in the factories. Some of the population have 
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nationalist moods and our biggest flaw is that it we supported them with 
silence. That’s our political blindness but we can cure the blindness and become 
sighted. We should get what we deserve for our mistakes, the bureau must be 
reorganised… Will we be able to fix the situation? Yes. If we can’t then it’s 
necessary to find people who will’.1088 
Ozoliņš believed a purge was unavoidable. In light of Khrushchev’s statements about the 
elderly Kalnbērziņš, Ozoliņš intended to use this opportunity to prove to Khrushchev that he 
was trustworthy and capable. 
When it was Krūmiņš’s turn, he justified the leadership’s policies, stating Latvian youth 
were fluent in Russian and at MGU they tested better in Russian than those from other 
republics. He explained that without knowing Latvian it was impossible to build Soviet power 
in Latvia. According to Krūmiņš, Khrushchev appeared to accept this and his attitude suddenly 
changed. Krūmiņš rationally explained the Latvian perspective: that the root of the affair was 
the language question. Krūmiņš insisted his words made sense because in his previous visits to 
Latvia, Khrushchev ‘did not find manifestations of “bourgeois nationalism”’.1089 Afterwards, 
Khrushchev pronounced his judgement:  
[Berklavs] was in the Komsomol, he’s a good man. Now he repents. He’s not 
an enemy… He snapped at me [at the airport] and said ‘I was in the 
underground, I looked death in the eye’. You [Kalnbērziņš and Lācis] are to 
blame for giving your young people the opportunity to go crazy. I do not 
consider him an enemy. We have to heal, and not destroy… The Latvians 
themselves need to find “home remedies” as the treatment. I’m against arbitrary 
punishment. We can return them [to Latvia] to strengthen the Party’s position. 
If you fight [against us], then we would not stop before dissolving the Latvian 
Communist Party... No one thinks, [however], that should be done; it would be 
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foolish to exaggerate the power of our enemies. I think that the Latvians 
themselves can cope with this situation and straighten it out.1090  
Mukhitdinov agreed, and expressed the opinion that the Latvians could correct the situation 
themselves and take the right decisions.1091  Krūmiņš probably overstates his part in this 
decision, but it appears Khrushchev rethought his position: he returned to his initial 
understanding of the processes in Latvia: as acceptable korenizatsiia, not nationalism, though 
his interpretation was malleable. In any case, the change in Khrushchev’s mood was palpable. 
During the subsequent break, some Presidium members joined Krūmiņš now that he was no 
longer a pariah. Krūmiņš saw that Khrushchev stood ‘in the doorway and watched our circle 
with apparent approval’.1092 
After the break, Khrushchev recalled his visit to Latvia in a wholly different light. ‘[On 
the last day] I was in Riga’, he said, ‘I felt the urge to dismiss left and right and then I flew to 
Moscow, I had a think, I calmed down’.1093 Khrushchev mentioned his exchange with Berklavs 
at the airport. ‘I gave him a healthy scolding’, he explained, ‘but later on the plane I thought - 
you know, this guy is straightforward and honest... but stubborn as a bull’.1094 Reflecting the 
more relaxed atmosphere and illustrating his confidence and trust in the Latvians, Khrushchev 
said that the result of the meeting was that they had emerged ‘from the sauna clean, and with 
our pores open to breathe normally’.1095 Khrushchev’s initial irritation faded and he decided 
against dismissing Berklavs. It is noteworthy that Suslov was absent for this meeting. He was 
on a trip to France.1096 The other Presidium members were Khrushchev’s clients and held no 
particular animosity towards the national communists. Had Suslov been at the table, we can 
surmise that it would have been more difficult for the Latvians to appease Khrushchev. 
Khrushchev had nonetheless decided on a new First Secretary, according to the 22nd 
June protocol. He wanted to probe the others’ reaction to Pelše’s potential candidacy.  
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We must think about the First Secretary. There are some worthy cadres among 
the Latvians. But not now. They [referring to Suslov’s recommendation] told 
me about Pelše. I don’t know him personally. If he’s really good then we can 
appoint him. I have been told he’s a flawless man; he has always taken a 
principled position. But you need to think about this yourselves.1097 
None of the others responded, so Khrushchev concluded the meeting, reiterating his decision. 
Khrushchev: ‘Maybe no dismissals are necessary and the whole leadership can 
remain the same. Let the people who have made mistakes take part in fixing 
them’. 
Anastas Mikoian: ‘And if they do not fix things, we will dismiss them’. 
Khrushchev: ‘Yes. These people are the best of the best Latvian cadres. I think 
this will be the better way’. 
Voices: ‘Right’. 
Khrushchev: ‘Enemies abroad could make use of a purge so it should not be 
done… We would humiliate ourselves if we show that we have let this situation 
happen in Latvia. We should not give our enemies a gift with speeches about 
some crisis and problems in national policy… We should fix things by bringing 
other nationalities into the leadership. So I think we should let the Latvians 
decide for themselves’.1098  
Here Khrushchev again emphasised his preoccupation with preventing the affair from becoming 
public because it could be exploited in the West. 
Subsequently, as First Secretary, Pelše did as Khrushchev suggested and by February 
1960, two more Russians were on the Latvian bureau. According to Prigge, Khrushchev’s 
decision to retain Berklavs and the national communists was a practical decision. ‘Ignoring the 
obvious nationalism of the Berklavs faction’, Khrushchev emphasised his desire to retain ‘these 
dynamic communists’. Prigge is correct in that Khrushchev wished to preserve this young, 
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energetic generation.1099 Khrushchev desperately needed younger cadres. In 1940, 57% of 
CPSU CC secretaries were under 35 but in 1959, only 13.7% were under 40.1100 During the 
meeting, Khrushchev explained ‘these people are young. If we throw them out now, we will 
harm them’.1101 
Both Krūmiņš and Mukhitdinov cite the Presidium’s resolution as evidence that a purge 
was not forthcoming. There was not a single sentence referring to nationalism, no order to 
swiftly organise a plenum for the following week; only one instruction ‘to entrust the Latvian 
CC, taking into account the views expressed at the Presidium, to make necessary corrective 
measures in their work’.1102 Mukhitdinov agrees that ‘the Presidium made no decision to 
intervene, which showed great confidence in the Latvian Party’. Mukhitdinov insists there was 
no intention within the Presidium to intervene because all letters and complaints to Moscow 
were supposedly transferred to the LCP CC, though few survive in the Latvian archives.1103 It is 
plausible that most were removed under Pelše’s instructions because many of the authors were 
his associates in the military and Party using pseudonyms. In light of the Presidium meeting, 
Krūmiņš was convinced that Khrushchev did not order the purge, because ‘after all, almost 
every summer Khrushchev holidayed in Latvia, how could he miss these supposed “nationalist 
tendencies?”’1104 In his memoirs, Krūmiņš remarked that Khrushchev could not have imagined 
that within two days of the Presidium meeting, the real ‘hunt for wreckers’ would begin.1105 
Pelše used the free hand the Latvians were granted to organise a plenum to oust Berklavs. 
When Latvia’s leaders returned to Riga, they assumed that Khrushchev’s decision not to 
purge the national communists would the end the affair, so long as they brought their Party into 
line. Yet, the outcome of the Presidium meeting was far from certain. Regardless, Pelše had 
begun plans to purge Berklavs three weeks previously, following the airport incident. Krūmiņš 
recalled when he returned from Moscow Pelše came unexpectedly to his dacha that evening, 
wanting to know the details of the meeting. According to Krūmiņš, Pelše had already written 
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the report to be delivered on 4th July by Kalnbērziņš, which denounced Berklavs and announced 
a plenum to remove him.1106 Pelše wanted to know the general tenor in Moscow. Krūmiņš told 
him that the meeting ‘started out poorly but was better by the end’. Pelše then disingenuously 
repeated some words Krūmiņš said earlier: ‘Don’t worry, these are just a few Russians who are 
angry. You know - they’re like Spanish bulls, they only see the red kerchief - nationalism’. 
Pelše continued his preparations, and a few days later, as Krūmiņš put it, ‘diligently played the 
role of furious internationalist’ at the plenum.1107 
 
5.4 The Presidium in Deadlock 
It appears that after returning to Latvia, Kalnbērziņš concluded he no longer had the 
leadership’s confidence and therefore could not solve Latvia’s problems and unify the bureau. 
He informed Frol Kozlov, CPSU CC Secretary for Cadres. There was a final Presidium meeting 
on the subject on 2nd or 3rd July. This was the Presidum’s sixth meeting about Latvia between 8th 
June and 4th July. Khrushchev wanted a further discussion about Kalnbērziņš’s replacement, 
although the meetings on 22nd June and 1st July indicated Pelše was the preordained candidate. 
Mukhitdinov supported Krūmiņš and suggested his candidacy at the meeting. Privately, 
Khrushchev appears to have preferred Krūmiņš. Mukhitdinov described his ‘good impression of 
the Second Secretary. He has ideas on how to improve the situation; he is a respected comrade; 
he acted with restraint and consideration [during the crisis]. Krūmiņš even praised Berklavs: he 
says, he was an able Komsomol worker, he made a mistake and must now correct it’.1108 
In Soviet politics, purges rarely offered the opportunity of survival, there were only 
victors and vanquished. Prigge notes that ‘Krūmiņš had always been, at least publicly, more 
moderate and appealing to Moscow; thus, he abandoned his friend because he probably hoped 
(or was told by the Pelše faction) that in doing so, his own position would remain secure, and 
the purge would be limited’.1109 Yet, according to Mukhitdinov, there was a distinct possibility 
that Krūmiņš could have survived and emerged victorious because he was Khrushchev’s 
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apparent preference. Perhaps he was too tainted by national communism to keep his position, 
and Pelše possessed more powerful friends than Mukhitdinov. At the Presidium meeting on 2nd 
or 3rd July, Suslov recommended Pelše because he was ‘the most active in the leadership’. 
Suslov highlighted Pelše’s role in providing information to, and discussing critical issues with, 
the investigation team. The Presidium meeting concluded with a decision ‘to study this 
question, but not to force it; to let comrades in Latvia decide’.1110 
This was the third Presidium meeting in five days related to this issue. It demonstrates 
the tug-of-war between Khrushchev and Suslov over the Latvian leadership. Furthermore, it 
shows Khrushchev unwillingly became embroiled in this internal conflict between different 
Latvian factions. The Presidium was deadlocked over a course of action, caught in a cycle in 
which the Latvian bureau repeatedly deferred to the Presidium, which attempted to delegate the 
decision to the Latvians. Ultimately, the Presidium thrust the decision back to the Latvian 
bureau in early July. The standoff within the Presidium broadcast contradictory signals. Sergei 
Kruk found that this allowed the Latvian leadership to decide ‘their own internal struggle for the 
favour of the “King”. Pelše seemed able to interpret what was happening in his favour’.1111 
Pelše worked diligently throughout June to engineer support for Berklavs’s removal. From 21st 
June, the Latvian bureau was paralysed. Many leaders were in Moscow and Berklavs was 
resigned to his fate. Pelše gambled everything on organising a plenum to criticise the national 
communists and Kalnbērziņš, relying on Suslov’s support in Moscow to champion his 
candidacy for First Secretary. This was a risky strategy that Khrushchev could have overruled at 
any time, hence Pelše’s nervousness when Mukhitdinov visited and when Krūmiņš returned 
from Moscow. Pelše succeeded because he broke the national communist alliance, sowing 
discord within the faction, which was under immense pressure from Moscow. This caused its 
disintegration as individuals attempted to save themselves. If they had presented a united 
opposition at the crucial 20th and 21st June meetings, focussing on Pelše’s culpability or refuting 
the charges instead of bickering, Pelše’s plans might have come to naught. Bleiere agrees that 
the national communists did not know how to interpret the signals from the 1st July Presidium 
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meeting. They missed the opportunity to use Khrushchev’s conciliatory tone and statement that 
the ‘Latvians will be able to solve their own problems’ using ‘home remedies’ as an argument, 
complacently assuming that was the end of the affair. Moreover, their failure to manipulate the 
issue of nationalism, allowed Pelše to seize the initiative using what Bleiere termed ‘police 
tactics’.1112 
It is unclear whether Pelše specifically offered to spare individual national communists 
from dismissal or disgrace if they recanted, but if so it was a hollow promise. In any case, 
Kalnbērziņš’s weakness was decisive. The affair broke him and forced the decision on the 
appointment of a future replacement ahead of the plenum, empowering Pelše. Moscow insisted 
on vetting First Secretaries. With Suslov angling for Pelše in the Presidium and the only other 
candidate, Krūmiņš, tainted by nationalist affiliation, Pelše’s candidacy was assured and a wider 
purge of the ‘nationalists’ could be pursued. With authority in Riga effectively concentrated in 
Pelše’s hands, he exploited the situation, mobilising his allies while the national communists 
descended into an acrimonious rabble. Thus, Pelše was able to swiftly arrange the plenum, 
filling the rostrum with his cronies. 
 
5.5 The 4th July Latvian Bureau Meeting 
On 4th July, the Latvian bureau met for the first time since 21st June. Pelše’s aim was to have his 
commission report (which he created before the 1st July Presidium meeting) ratified. This would 
allow the 7th plenum to criticise the national communists. Critically, Khrushchev’s leniency on 
1st July did not translate into concrete orders, the decision was merely returned to the Latvians. 
At the meeting, Berklavs was completely abandoned and vociferously criticised by the other 
national communists. Bissenieks conceded that his vote in defence of Berklavs’s ‘Conversation 
from the heart’ article was incorrect. He admitted that the registration law was discriminatory, 
but pointed out that it also prevented Latvians from registering. He tried to distance himself 
from Berklavs, claiming most of his policies were enacted when Berklavs was Riga gorkom 
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First Secretary and they had little contact. He concluded that he did not think he was alone in 
his opinions.1113 
The meeting was characterised by Krūmiņš’s brief, yet radical reversal. Flushed with 
confidence in the belief that Khrushchev’s decision was final and the national communists 
would be spared, he balanced his criticism of Berklavs. He maintained that he agreed with the 
residency restrictions in principle because it halted the population influx. He also agreed, 
however, that it caused ethnic problems. Both Krūmiņš and Berklavs reiterated Pelše’s 
agreement to these measures in the bureau. What Krūmiņš failed to understand was that 
Khrushchev only ordered the Latvians to sort out their ‘deficiencies’ themselves. He made no 
personal intervention on behalf of the irredeemable Berklavs. The other bureau members rallied 
behind Pelše. Plūdonis and Miglinieks expressed their surprise at Krūmiņš volte-face.1114  
Saleev led the charge at this meeting. He claimed that the CPSU CC and Khrushchev 
agreed that ‘Berklavs took an openly nationalistic line’. Krūmiņš challenged Saleev to explain 
this. He declined, replying ‘it is written and we cannot change that. Now we go to the plenum 
and we have to go as a united front and present a united position’, which is what Pelše required. 
Saleev criticised Krūmiņš for ‘twisting’ and ‘softening’ the commission report. Krūmiņš 
retorted that Saleev was ‘scared of his own shadow’. Later, however, Krūmiņš recognised his 
precariousness and backed down, agreeing that Berklavs was out of line. Krūmiņš was in 
Moscow while Pelše’s commission drafted the report proposing a plenum. He was anxious 
because Khrushchev had not intervened. ‘I’m just surprised’, he said dejectedly, ‘how this can 
be after the meeting with Khrushchev’.1115 
In his defence at his final bureau meeting, Berklavs took issue with Pelše’s report. 
Berklavs claimed he had not spoken against the Party line and that the language policies were 
not directed against any one particular group.1116 With Krūmiņš’s assent, the bureau discussed 
whose names should be included for criticism in the commission report and therefore, at the 
plenum. Saleev conceded that Bissenieks need not be included, but the bureau agreed to criticise 
                                                      
1113 LVA-PA f.101, apr.22, l.48a, lp.235. Stenogramma zasedaniia biuro TsK KPL, 4 iiulia 1959. 
1114 LVA-PA f.101, apr.22, l.48a, lp.243-44, 246. 
1115 LVA-PA f.101, apr.22, l.48a, lp.251, 253-54. 
1116 LVA-PA f.101, apr.22, l.48a, lp.237-39. 
  270 
Pizāns and Pinksis. Finally, the members voted to adopt the commission report. Berklavs 
refused to vote, and because of the accusations in Pelše’s commission report withdrew his 
resignation from 15th June in protest, saying he would ‘take it back with pleasure’. The meeting 
concluded with bureau deciding to use Pelše’s report to brief the raikom and gorkom secretaries, 
thus establishing it as the plenum’s foundation.1117 Pelše successfully ensured that the bureau 
resolved to correct the mistakes in Latvia according to the investigation team’s report and 
deflected Krūmiņš’s attempt to convince the bureau otherwise. 
 
5.6 The 7th LCP CC Plenum, 7th-8th July 1959  
The plenum on 7th-8th July represented the culmination of Pelše’s efforts to discredit Berklavs. 
In effect, the plenum resembled a trial, and the national communists who recanted at 20th June 
bureau meeting acted as witnesses against Berklavs. The day before the plenum, the CC 
convened. The CC was briefed and, according to Berklavs, received instructions to ‘be ready to 
energetically and ruthlessly combat any nationalist manifestations’.1118 Berklavs described the 
plenum as following a ‘thoroughly developed plan. A well-coordinated choir joined in my 
condemnation’.1119 Pelše had quietly organised the plenum from around 20th June, once he was 
certain that Berklavs’s position was untenable. He worked vigorously to find suitable speakers, 
though hasty open preparations only began around 4th July. Every aspect of the July plenum was 
stage-managed to isolate the national communists and prevent them from using the structures of 
power to save themselves. The plenum nominated Voss as Chairman of the editing commission 
that drafted the plenum’s decision, and Saleev his deputy. Krūmiņš notes that this was unusual, 
as the Second Secretary normally drafted the plenum’s decision.1120 Pelše further isolated 
Krūmiņš from the proceedings by declining to show him his keynote speech, which ignored 
protocol. Krūmiņš attests he was prevented from participating in organisational work for the 
plenum even though it was his duty as Second Secretary.1121 At this stage, Pelše had not been 
confirmed as Kalnbērziņš’s replacement. Therefore, by ensuring Krūmiņš received a stern 
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rebuke at the plenum, Pelše avoided taking responsibility for bureau decisions and sidelined his 
main rival. 
 Pelše decided to interpret the Presidium’s decision that the Latvians correct their own 
affairs as necessitating Berklavs’s political annihilation. To circumvent the Presidium’s 
leniency, Pelše relied on the inspectors’ report that he co-authored. This deliberately permitted a 
vague interpretation of the Presidium’s decision. He presented the report to the plenum as 
evidence that the Presidium trusted the LCP to rectify its own mistakes. LSU Rector Jānis 
Yurgens insisted that Berklavs was the one who misinterpreted the Presidium decision.1122 
Pelše’s strategy was to justify Berklavs’s dismissal as the sacrifice designed to reassure 
Khrushchev and repentant national communists that no expanded purge was forthcoming. By 
focusing the plenum on denouncing and dismissing Berklavs (and not the larger corps of 
national communists), Pelše appeared to spare those who articulated their own and Berklavs’s 
guilt. The plenum would establish, however, the link between Berklavs and the surviving, 
contrite national communists, which provided Pelše the opportunity to subsequently expand the 
purge. 
Speakers at the plenum made for an odd composite. Of 28 speakers, eight were national 
communist bureau members, five of whom spoke against Berklavs. Two raikom secretaries 
(Pēteris Strautmanis and Bogdanov) spoke, while others were from Gosplan (Augusts Čulitis 
and Vitālijs Rubenis), the Public Utilities Ministry (Roberts Ķisis) and even pensioners from the 
Council of Ministers Party organisation (Jānis Ostrovs). Time at the rostrum was distributed 
between low-ranking anti-national communists who would be catapulted into the leadership 
void once the purges began. Pelše choreographed the plenum to publicly isolate the national 
communists. By stacking the roster with his allies, Pelše drowned out any national communist 
resistance.  
Kalnbērziņš opened the plenum. Krūmiņš claims that Pelše wrote Kalbērziņš’s speech. 
While this is unsubstantiated, it bears mentioning that Kalnbērziņš’s speech was a more detailed 
version of the investigation report. It contained the same statistics and methodically explained 
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each national communist transgression in the same terminology as the report.1123 Kalnbērziņš 
began by lambasting national communist policies. He insinuated that the real goal of Berklavs’s 
language law was to force out cadres of other nationalities, referencing the criterion that they 
did not know Latvian. Similarly, he claimed Riga’s residency restrictions aimed to exclude non-
Latvian residents of Latvia. He noted that the national communists forbade the phrase 
‘bourgeois nationalism’ in Party documents and in print. Kalnbērziņš held the national 
communists accountable for ideological failures, despite ideology falling under Pelše’s 
jurisdiction, implying that he hoped to heap these concerns upon the embattled national 
communists. Kalnbērziņš accused them of failing to rebuff émigré propaganda efforts in radio 
broadcasting and hostile literature, and paying insufficient attention to the Russians’ exemplary 
role in the October Revolution and in liberating Latvia from Nazi occupation. Kalnbērziņš 
charged the national communists with having ‘an addiction to the national question’ at the 
expense of promoting friendship among peoples, Soviet patriotism and proletarian 
internationalism.1124 
Kalnbērziņš provided a flimsy explanation of the bureau’s failure to correct Berklavs’s 
actions. Despite being fully aware of his ‘nationalist policy’, he said the bureau supported 
Berklavs because they held him in high regard.1125 Similarly, Lācis claimed that Berklavs’s 
stubborn and abrupt personality helped him push through ‘small’ policies that went 
unnoticed.1126 Lācis excused his own actions by pointing to his extensive ailments and his 
absence for much of the period in the ceremonial position of Soviet of Nationalities Chairman 
in Moscow. Lācis, like Kalnbērziņš, struggled to explain how his deputy Berklavs created major 
policies at the bureau unchallenged. Until the crisis began in May 1959, both leaders favoured a 
neutral management style, remaining above the struggle between the Berklavs and Pelše 
factions. With neutrality no longer possible, at the July plenum, Lācis finally withdrew his 
support for an extra year of schooling in Latvia and threw in his lot with the Pelše faction.1127  
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The July plenum symbolised the shift in power that was to come. Once the dust settled, 
it was apparent that Pelše had taken the reins and would create and shape an entirely new 
generation of leaders for Latvia. After the 1st July Presidium meeting, Kalnbērziņš recognised 
he would be replaced once the crisis subsided. Accepting his fate, he declared that he ‘deserved 
the most severe punishment for such a liberal attitude towards the wrong formulation of 
questions’.1128 Though Lācis’s fate was not decided at the 1st July Presidium, the 22nd June 
Presidium protocol acknowledged he was infirm. At the July plenum, similar to Kalnbērziņš, 
Lācis admitted that the day of his retirement had likely come. 
Even Pelše’s bureau wing, including Miglinieks (who had joined Pelše’s cause) and 
Saleev, received a mild reproach from Kalnbērziņš. They primarily held the correct position, but 
did not act against the majority decision.1129 Certainly, Pelše and his allies adopted a wait-and-
see attitude during the phase of national communist bureau control; in this, they were little 
different from neutral members criticised for passivity. There is an explanation for Pelše’s 
inaction. In his speech, Pelše accepted Kalnbērziņš’s criticism and admitted that as Agitprop 
Secretary he had not fought nationalism effectively. Yet, Pelše still triumphantly denounced 
Berklavs as the ‘standard bearer of nationalism’ to shouts from the audience of ‘right! That’s 
right!’ 1130  With Berklavs’s defeat assured, Pelše was able to direct criticism towards 
Kalnbērziņš. He began to do this at the 20th June meeting while manoeuvring himself to take 
Kalnbērziņš’s position. Pelše ridiculed Kalnbērziņš’s leadership style, describing him as 
kowtowing to the hardliners and the national communists for ‘peace at any cost’.1131 It was clear 
to the Party that Pelše had emerged victorious from the internecine struggle. Even Ķisis, who 
was no friend of Pelše’s, recognised this and denounced the national communists, performing a 
volte-face from his speech in 1953 (in which he condemned the repression of Latvian culture.) 
This ensured there would be no general support for the national communists from the CC.1132 
Krūmiņš, Nikonov, Bissenieks, Pizāns and Ozoliņš likewise recognised the inevitable. 
The plenum was characterised by the denunciation of Berklavs not by his enemies but by his 
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friends. At the 20th June meeting, these men had abandoned Berklavs in a closed bureau session. 
At the July plenum, they were required to apologise for their actions and distance themselves 
from Berklavs in front of the wider Party leadership. Krūmiņš denounced the language law and 
apologised for his errors in cadres policy, especially his support for native cadres’ promotion at 
the October 1958 plenum. Typically, he attempted to justify himself. He did not admit complete 
blame and added that no bureau member ever challenged his decisions. Krūmiņš and the other 
repentant national communists repeated their disparaging remarks from the 20th June meeting in 
an attempt to further distance themselves from Berklavs. Interestingly, most speakers accepted 
Krūmiņš’s repentance and agreed that if he permanently broke ties with Berklavs, he could 
correct his mistakes. Yet, seven months later, despite his submission, Pelše stripped Krūmiņš of 
his post and bureau seat. 
The plenum’s choreographed nature is evident from the pattern followed by most 
speakers. They criticised penitent national communists for being too close to Berklavs but 
concluding their speeches, stated that those individuals could fix their errors. Likewise, 
repentant national communists went through the motions of admitting to mistakes. Sometimes 
they rejected particular criticism but always focused the blame on Berklavs, ultimately and 
promised that they and the Party could correct themselves. Hardliners and apologetic national 
communists alike attacked Kalnbērziņš for failing to prevent the crisis. Generally, the national 
communists concluded their speeches by proclaiming that they were ‘all equally guilty’, 
spreading culpability evenly across the leadership. Notably, national communists who repented 
and included criticism of Berklavs in their speeches received applause. The only speeches not 
applauded at the plenum were by Bissenieks, Pinksis, Pizāns and Straujums, who were singled 
out for particular criticism alongside Berklavs. Berklavs was angered by the charges against him 
and decided that rather than resign quietly he would use this opportunity to address the CC for a 
final time. 
Berklavs, however, was alone. The plenum symbolised his gradual isolation, beginning 
with his confrontation with Khrushchev at the airport and completed at the July plenum. Not a 
single speaker defended Berklavs’s actions. Only Pinksis and Straujums remained personally 
loyal to Berklavs. They avoided rebuking him, although they admitted there had been general 
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mistakes in national communist policies. At the plenum’s conclusion, Pinksis pleaded ignorance 
about the residency law and restrictions on university attendance in an attempt to save 
himself. 1133  Nevertheless, Pelše did not have carte blanche at the plenum. Krūmiņš and 
Nikonov, as well as ordinary speakers who reproached Berklavs also made derisory comments 
about Pelše. Bissenieks blamed Berklavs and Pelše for the situation. He said Berklavs had split 
the Party along ethnic lines, but accused Pelše of failing in his position as Agitprop 
Secretary.1134 Most of the complaints about Pelše focussed on his passivity while the bureau 
embarked on a national communist agenda. The enmity Berklavs received from friend and foe 
alike reached a fever pitch at the plenum. Pigalev’s presence underscored the Moscow faction’s 
supervision. Delivering the keynote address, Pigalev declared the speakers’ accusations correct. 
He did not descend into the fratricidal struggle, but represented the centre’s (though not 
Khrushchev’s) encouragement for the CC to remove Berklavs. 
 The plenum’s resolution formally revoked all national communist legislation. It 
dismissed the June 1953 plenum decisions as ‘imposed by Beria’. The decision repealed the 
language law in favour of the Leninist principle of voluntarism in language learning. The 
plenum reversed Krūmiņš’s explicitly nativist cadres policy. It reverted to the original Seven-
Year Plan predating the national communists’ modifications. The resolution instructed 
enterprises to hire without discrimination and ordered the correction of ideological errors with a 
focus on promoting proletarian internationalism.1135 
At this stage, most national communists had sufficiently publicly repented to avoid the 
purge’s first wave. The plenary decision included formal rebukes and punishments for some 
leaders. The decision warned Bissenieks to correct his work, accusing him of acting 
unscrupulously. All national communists were charged with actively supporting Berklavs’s 
incorrect actions. Pizāns received a formal warning for the ‘manifestation of instability on many 
politically sensitive issues and publishing ideologically perverse materials in Cīņa’.1136 Pinksis 
was blamed for the ‘manifestation of instability on the Party’s national policy and a politically 
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incorrect speech’ on 20th June. Pinksis lost his bureau candidacy. Besides Berklavs, he was the 
only person to lose his seat at the plenum.1137 The plenum decision also asked the bureau to 
consider sacking Dzērve, Cherkovsky, Kalpiņš and Pinksis because of their nationalist 
tendencies.1138 This set the stage for their future dismissal. 
 Pelše acknowledged Krūmiņš’s split with Berklavs, and this saved him from reprimand 
in the plenary decision.1139 After several audience members spoke out against the formal 
rebukes of other leaders, none were included in the original decision.1140 Yet, subsequent 
amendments to the resolution included minor criticism of Straujums, Nikonov, Krūmiņš, 
Ozoliņš, Lācis and Kalnbērziņš. The amended resolution deemed Straujums responsible for 
perverting Leninist nationality policy in the Riga gorkom and breaching Party principles in 
cadres selection and placement. Ozoliņš and Lācis, because of their association with the national 
communists, received reprimands for their silence and passive behaviour on the bureau.1141 
These amendments appeared as part of Pelše’s strategy to expose the mistakes of those who 
avoided persecution in the original resolution. Between November 1959 and February 1960, 
each of these men lost their bureau seats and Kalnbērziņš was demoted. 
Berklavs was the plenum’s ultimate casualty. A unanimous vote stripped him of his 
Deputy Chairmanship and bureau seat. Ķisis and Pelše favoured expelling him from the Party 
altogether. The plenary decision concluded that ‘if Berklavs does not change his anti-party 
views then his Party affiliation would be revisited’.1142 With Berklavs’s removal, the purge 
could begin in earnest. According to Krūmiņš, the plenum’s consequences were so far-reaching 
that they accounted for the upheavals of the late 1980s because the plenum heralded three more 
decades of forced industrialisation, Slavic migration and Latvian linguistic and cultural 
marginalisation.1143 The July plenum represented the abrogation of the 20th CPSU Congress 
decisions, the end of the Latvian Thaw, and signalled the early onset of Brezhnevite 
conservatism in Latvia. 
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5.7 Conclusion 
The Soviet military played an important role in ousting Berklavs. This was eclipsed, however, 
by Pelše’s seizure of the initiative following Khrushchev’s visit and unilateral organisation of 
the July plenum based on his interpretation of the signals emanating from Moscow. General 
Demin, likely chosen because of his association with Khrushchev, stoked the flames as a 
member of the anti-Berklavs group that visited Khrushchev the night before the Premier left 
Riga. The Soviet military carried great influence in the post-war USSR and national communist 
policies rankled many BMD generals. Berklavs told Prigge he believed that Khrushchev had to 
consider the Russian military in the republics.1144 Non-Latvians in the Soviet military stationed 
in Riga perceived the language and immigration laws as an affront that hampered their 
privileges. He stepped on the toes of military personnel. For example, Admiral Arsenii Golovko 
recalled that Berklavs told him ‘We cannot allow a soldier’s boots to trample on Riga’.1145 The 
Pelše faction used these comments to turn moderate officers like General Batov against the 
national communists. King concurs with this change of heart after 20th June bureau meeting, and 
reveals that Batov reportedly felt that ‘by July 1959 anti-Russian sentiment in Latvia was 
endangering Soviet authority there’.1146 Consequently, Berklavs was widely despised within the 
BMD. 
 The purge’s circumstances were shrouded in mystery. Even in 1960 within the Presidium, 
USSR Culture Minister Yekaterina Furtseva told Krūmiņš ‘what actually happened in Latvia we 
have yet to grasp’.1147 In his 1990 interview, Mukhitdinov dismissed the notion that the purge of 
the national communists originated in Moscow. Instead, he claimed the Latvian leadership 
pursued the purge of its own accord, though he admitted it was surprising. Mukhitdinov could 
not have known how the Shelepin-Suslov faction influenced events. Instead, Pelše was 
responsible for the purge’s organisation, giving the appearance that the conflict was internally 
resolved without intervention from Moscow. Yet, Pigalev played a key role in personally 
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directing the course of the investigation and the plenum within Latvia.1148 Unaware of these 
factors, into his old age Berklavs remained convinced that Khrushchev personally dismissed 
him. Berklavs stated: ‘In 1959, after Khrushchev read these letters of accusation, not checking 
any facts, he made conclusions as to whether I was honest or an enemy. He sent his people, 
decided I was an enemy, and that I should be deported from the republic’.1149 Pelše’s actions 
demonstrate that he preferred central arbitration to solve the matter. Deadlock within the 
Presidium, however, coupled with Khrushchev’s unwillingness to personally intervene, 
prevented Suslov and Shelepin from taking decisive action against the national communists. 
Therefore, it appears Pelše was reacting to events with no grand plan apart from ringing alarm 
bells about nationalism, which would account for his nervousness throughout June.  
 Though concerned about the potential problems Berklavs’s removal might create, 
ultimately Khrushchev did not expend political capital to save the irredeemable Berklavs. 
Unlike Imre Nagy in Hungary in 1956, Berklavs’s removal did not bring the Latvian people out 
onto the streets demanding his reinstatement. Publicly, the only mention of Berklavs’s removal 
was a three-line notice that he was relieved of his duties as of 15th July in Sovetskaia Latviia and 
Cīņa.1150 Prigge concludes that ‘Khrushchev could do little to save Berklavs once the process 
began’ and questions the extent of his power over the republics. While Prigge correctly 
challenges Latvian historiography and the notion of a monolithic Moscow, my research 
indicates that Khrushchev gave Berklavs numerous chances to repent, and when he repeatedly 
refused to do so, there was little more Khrushchev could do.1151 Therefore, direct intervention in 
July 1959 was out of the question. Both Prigge and Krūmiņš assert that Khrushchev’s failure to 
prevent a purge in July 1959 marked the beginning of his own downfall, but this is too bold.1152 
Khrushchev did not rely on Latvia’s national communists for support in the way he relied on his 
Ukrainian powerbase. Generally considered the zenith of Khrushchev’s power after the defeat 
of the Anti-Party group, the period between 1959 and 1961 was the high point in Khrushchev’s 
tenure before the Cuban Missile Crisis and the disastrous bifurcation of the Party apparatus in 
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1962. It was not a question of Khrushchev’s weakness and inability to help Berklavs; rather, 
Berklavs’s intransigent refusal to recant left no other option than his removal. 
Historians should interpret the purge of the national communists as the Stalinist reaction 
(both inside and outside Latvia) to the 20th Party Congress. The national communists capitalised 
on the atmosphere fostered by the Congress to facilitate their agenda, but the Anti-Party group’s 
defeat in 1957 threatened Stalinists everywhere by ending the balance of power in Moscow, 
forcing them into a battle for survival.1153 In conversation with Khrushchev, Krūmiņš recalled 
the Soviet leader reflecting on his perplexing situation: ‘So you remember the courage of the 
Twentieth Congress. But do you think it’s easier for me now?’ Krūmiņš explains that 
Khrushchev felt ‘the Stalinists did not give up, and were only hiding’. Krūmiņš recognised the 
significance of this: ‘I realised how dangerous this was for him, of course, but above all - for the 
country’.1154 In Latvia, the Berklavs faction was ‘in constant conflict with the older generation 
of Stalinists as long as both held power’.1155 Thus, the end of de-Stalinisation in Latvia under 
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Conclusion 
 
In Soviet Latvia between 1953 and 1959, nationalism coexisted uneasily with Soviet socialism. 
The fusion of the two, attempted by the national communists, proved to be impossible. National 
communism failed to bring about a rapprochement between the people and the Party. The 
population after 1953 were no longer hostile to Soviet rule by force of arms; after the failed 
Hungarian Uprising they realised that the Soviet Union would endure. They adopted a realistic 
attitude, cooperating with the authorities to a limited degree, but shunned enthusiastic 
participation in the Party and believed the system unreformable after the failure of national 
communism. Despite Prigge’s assertions, public opinion in the USSR was not decisive as a 
catalyst for change.1156 After all, the Soviet Union under Khrushchev remained a one-party 
state. 
 The national communists did not succeed in creating a viable and enduring variant of 
socialism in Latvia that prioritised Latvian conditions, culture, traditions, language and 
economic characteristics. Though the national communists were committed to incorporating 
such an identity into the existing political structure of Khrushchev’s USSR, after their early 
reforms, the nature of their programme led to conflict between incompatible Latvian and Soviet 
interests. The national communists’ aim to redress the balance of centre-periphery relations was 
at the core of their resistance to central initiatives such as the education reform. They unleashed 
a nationalist programme that became too bold, and pushed beyond the ill-defined limits of 
Khrushchev’s Thaw. This continued only until an alliance of those who had the most to lose 
under national communist policies coalesced and successfully pigeonholed the national 
communists as nationalists intent on a path of autarky and seclusion. This culminated in the 
purge that ended Latvian national communism by rooting out and removing its representatives 
across Latvian state and society. 
 After Berklavs’s removal and the onset of the purge, national communist policies were 
swiftly reversed: Riga’s residency and language laws were scrapped and native Latvians were 
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barred from the leadership, in favour of Russian-Latvians and Russians. Berklavs recognised the 
failure of national communism, 13 years after his defeat, in the 1972 ‘Protest Letter’, when he 
revealed the extent of Russification in Latvia. 1157  Nevertheless, it is still important to 
acknowledge that Latvian national communism briefly gained measurable traction and 
significantly contributed to de-Stalinisation in Latvia, and for this reason the national 
communists’ opponents considered them a serious threat. 
 My thesis on Soviet Latvia offers two unique contributions to our understanding of 
Soviet politics in the 1950s. Firstly, I investigate the evolution, struggles and downfall of an 
identifiable faction concerned primarily with national interests inside the CPSU. I demonstrate 
how nationalism was a force for popular mobilisation in Khrushchev’s USSR and how it briefly 
existed at the helm of a Soviet republic. In terms of adding to our understanding of Latvian 
history and the history of national communism, my argument provides fresh insight into the 
workings, structure and policies of this faction and evaluates the historiography on the subject 
in three languages. I also assess the impact of external events in Eastern Europe and Moscow to 
show how they shaped developments within the republic. 
Secondly, I show how the national communists sought a renegotiation of centre-
periphery relations throughout their period of influence upon Latvian politics. Centre-periphery 
relations in the 1950s were at their most fragile since the 1920s. I analyse how the centre-
periphery relationship functioned and deteriorated in relation to Latvia. I demonstrate precisely 
what was, and what was not, permissible for the republics’ leaderships in the Khrushchev era. 
Unlike the only other contemporary work on this topic, my thesis does not present a unilateral 
analysis of the relations between Moscow and Riga. Instead, it complements the examination of 
the national communists with an analysis of Moscow’s reaction to national communism and its 
distinctive hesitation in how to respond to such a challenge. I provide a view from both inside 
and outside of Latvia. The detailed analysis of the power struggle between national communists 
and the conservative ‘old guard’ in the Latvian republic’s leadership paralleled the struggle in 
the Kremlin, offering a case study in the processes of de-Stalinisation. Additionally, I explain 
how Khrushchev’s mishandled reforms by either provoking the republics (for example the 
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education reform) or inadvertently transferring more powers than intended (as in the case of the 
sovnarkhoz reforms) and led to the rise of conservatives within the Soviet leadership, who 
purged the Latvian national communists, and eventually deposed Khrushchev himself. 
 
i. Latvia’s Baltic Neighbours 
The Latvian experience of national communism, its causes and consequences, can inform our 
understanding of why other republics in the USSR did not have strong national communist 
movements. Latvia was extraordinary in that it had an organised reformist faction within its 
local Party, but it was not the first or last instance of national communism. Though Latvian 
historians are fond of highlighting the large number of Russians who arrived in Latvia, there 
was more pronounced and rapid post-war Slavic migration to other republics. In 1959, Latvia 
had the third highest percentage of Slavs living in the republic at 31%. Yet, Slavs in Kirghizia 
comprised 37%, almost outnumbering the Kirgiz; and in Kazakhstan, Slavs were the majority at 
52.4%, dwarfing native Kazakhs at 30%.1158 Demographically, Latvia was not an exception, but 
it was politically. In this context, Latvia’s comparison to its Baltic neighbours is relevant. 
In 1931, Russian inhabitants in Lithuania constituted 2.4% of the population. By 1960, 
they totalled 8.5%. Yet, the balance of Lithuanian inhabitants decreased only minutely from 
80.6% to 79%.1159 Lithuania had greater success in resisting Russian migration for several 
reasons. Firstly, within the Russian Empire, Riga’s port and railway network made it an 
attractive area for industrialisation. In comparison, Lithuania remained an agrarian region.1160 
For the same imperatives, the Soviets invested in Latvian industrial reconstruction, which 
required large labour inputs. In comparison to Latvia, Lithuania received just a fraction of 
migrant workers from Russia. Secondly, the Lithuanian fertility rate remained higher and family 
sizes larger than in Latvia, generating a sufficiently large surplus of rural labour.1161 Thirdly, the 
Lithuanian leadership was not riven by intra-Party feuding as in Latvia. This is partially because 
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the leadership was far more homogenous but also because of First Secretary Antanas Sniečkus, 
who saw himself as the defender of Lithuania’s cultural and economic interests against some 
central policies. 1162  Sniečkus benefitted from these favourable historical and economic 
circumstances. The Lithuanian case supports the argument that migration to Latvian contained 
no clandestine motive in Moscow but was primarily a consequence of economic necessity; 
otherwise, recalcitrant Lithuania would have been a more imperative area to secure by 
colonisation than Latvia. 
The leadership of Sniečkus is a major reason Lithuania avoided sharing Latvia’s fate. 
Lithuania experienced considerable nationalist activity. The fiercest resistance during the armed 
insurrection in the Baltic between 1945 and 1953 was in Lithuania (this also discouraged 
Russian migration). Later, on the eve of the Latvian purge, at the Presidium meeting on 1st July 
1959, Khrushchev remarked that ‘Comrade Sniečkus has a situation which is not better than 
Latvia. And the situation in Estonia is not better as well’.1163 On several occasions, the Kremlin 
vented its frustrations and attempted to remove Sniečkus. Yet, Sniečkus endured. This was 
because the local apparatus was loyal to the titular Party over the CPSU. When Moscow’s 
inspectors visited, the leadership displayed a united front and defended Sniečkus.1164  The 
Lithuanian leadership proved cohesive, unlike the national communists who fell apart under 
Moscow’s sustained pressure. Yet, Sniečkus had a reputation for carrying out Moscow’s orders 
to the letter. He supervised the burning of history books and was allegedly responsible for the 
destruction of a national monument in Kaunas.1165 Sniečkus also had powerful friends in 
Moscow. From his time on the Lithuanian Orgburo, Suslov was acquainted with Sniečkus and 
could to vouch for him in the Presidium, unlike the national communists in Latvia, who Suslov 
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deeply mistrusted.1166 As such, Sniečkus enjoyed Moscow’s confidence, which the national 
communists never achieved. Therefore, he was permitted a degree of flexibility to pursue his 
increasingly independent policies.1167 This was similar to the situation in Estonia with its First 
Secretary Johannes Käbin (even though he was a so-called Yestonian, a Russian-Estonian).1168 
The reasons that the Estonian and Lithuanian communist parties were better able to protect their 
republics’ interests was because they were not dominated by Russians or Russified Balts who 
had spent the interwar period in the USSR, unlike their counterparts in Latvia. In 1959, 
Lithuanians constituted 55.7% of their Party, Estonians 47.5% of the Estonian Party, while 
Latvians comprised just 37.4% of the Latvian Party.1169 Krūmiņš comes to the same conclusion, 
arguing that after the national communists’ removal, the Latvian Party slavishly attempted to 
please Moscow at the expense of national interests. ‘After all, we did not have their Sniečkus 
who largely managed to defend the interests of his people. But our leaders - Pelše and Voss - 
took a conciliatory, opportunistic position’, wrote Krūmiņš.1170 The differing composition of the 
Lithuanian and Estonian parties and their leaderships coupled with a greater willingness and 
ability to successfully balance national interests and the wishes of Moscow offers a stark 
contrast with the Latvian Party. For example, one only has to look at the top three Latvian 
leaders during the period covered by this thesis - the pliant Kalnbērziņš, the Russified and 
obsequious Pelše and the maverick Berklavs. Sniečkus and Käbin knew how to play all these 
roles at once. 
 
ii. Consequences of the Latvian Purge 
Though he did not support a purge in Latvia, the Latvian affair stretched the irascible 
Khrushchev’s patience beyond its limit. He was convinced that his acquiescence was 
encouraging other republics to act independently and that the republics could not be trusted with 
the powers decentralised to them. An article in Voprosy Filosofii (Questions of Philosophy) 
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from June 1963, after the Latvian purge’s completion, listed three main elements discovered in 
recent years in a number of republics and sternly condemned by the Party as marking the causes 
of recent local resistance. These were: ‘opposition to the expansion of the non-titular 
population; to the exchange of cadres; and to the voluntary principle in the study of national 
languages’.1171 These transgressions were all applicable to Latvia. Over fears of spreading 
nationalism, Moscow decided to rein in the republics. In December 1958, First Secretary 
Sukhan Babaev was dismissed in Turkmenia. Limited purges, which swiftly removed high-
ranking cadres, occurred in a string of republics, notably Azerbaijan in summer 1959; some 
ministers were removed in Lithuania in August 1959, in Kazakhstan in October 1959 and in 
Moldavia in September 1959 with Moldavian First Secretary Zinovie Serdiuk replaced by Ivan 
Bodiul in May 1961.1172 This wave of dismissals and expulsions of leading Party functionaries 
continued in the republics with interruptions until 1961. In December 1960, Jacov Zarobian 
supplanted Suren Tovmasian in Armenia. The Uzbek leader Sobir Kamalov was sacked in 
March 1959 and his replacement Sharif Rashidov purged the Uzbek Party; in Kirghizia 
Turdakun Usubaliev replaced Iskhakh Razzakov in purges between 1959 and 1960; in April 
1961, Tajik leader Tursun Uldzhabaev was dismissed. In all, ten republics were affected, 
including all six Muslim republics. The remaining non-Russian republics, Georgia and Estonia, 
had already suffered purges in the Mingrelian Affair of 1951-1952, and in 1950-1951 
respectively; notably only the three Slavic Republics, Ukraine, Belorussia and the Russian 
Federation did not experience purges.  
The other purges in the USSR between 1958 and 1961 were different to Latvia. In 
Latvia, the purge emanated from inside the republic and forced Moscow’s approval not the 
other way around. That they were small, limited and upper echelon ‘precision scalps’ (whereas 
in Latvia the purge went far deeper) suggests that they originated in Moscow. My limited 
research on the other purges only allows me to determine that this was the case for Azerbaijan. 
If these purges were centrally manufactured, Swain argues that the success of the Latvian purge 
allowed Suslov to set the parameters for other purges in the run up to the 1961 Party 
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Programme.1173 Yet, the purges began as early as December 1958. Therefore, it seems that the 
Thaw in the republics was already drawing to a close and the Latvian and Azerbaijani 
leaderships were swimming against the current and ultimately only hastened the end of 
Khrushchev’s reforms by proving themselves to be disruptive in the eyes of reformers and 
conservatives alike. The purges demonstrated that the period of concessions was over and 
Moscow was reasserting central control to recentralise the country following the failure of 
decentralisation, evidenced by the transfer of an unsettling amount of decision-making control 
to the republics through the sovnarkhoz and resistance to the education reform.. How directly 
Khrushchev was involved is unclear and necessitates studies on these individual purges. The 
Latvian affair played a significant role in changing Khrushchev’s attitude. As a consequence of 
these peripheral purges, Khrushchev lost the support he had cultivated in the national republics 
from 1956.1174 The Latvian purge also directly assisted the Moscow faction (the driving force in 
the purge of the Azerbaijani Communist Party and probably others) in their struggle against 
Khrushchev, demonstrating that his acquiescence in the republics permitted the growth of 
nationalism. 
When the Thaw in nationalities policy ended, two of its architects in the Presidium lost 
their positions at the centre of power: Aleksei Kirichenko and Nuritdin Mukhitdinov. Both were 
associated with events in Latvia. Khrushchev’s protégé, Kirichenko supported the national 
communists. Like the national communists, he was a beneficiary of Beria’s nationality policy, 
becoming the indigenous First Secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party in 1953. In his 
speech to the 21st Party Congress in February 1959, he advocated self-government for the Soviet 
republics.1175 As the Presidium member responsible for cadres, he permitted Krūmiņš’s October 
1958 plenum on cadres policy, which emphasised the need for Latvian-speaking cadres and 
revived the June 1953 plenum decisions. It is plausible that Kirichenko’s fall, beginning with 
the stripping of his duties in November 1959, was due at least in part to his support for the 
national communists. Conquest agrees that alleged softness on nationalism might explain 
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Kirichenko’s sudden removal in May 1960.1176 The loss of Khrushchev’s heir presumptive 
within the Presidium weakened the Premier and made Suslov the effective Second Secretary. In 
the following years, Suslov established a trend of successfully removing Khrushchev’s allies on 
the Presidium, increasing his isolation. Mukhitdinov was one of these casualties. Khrushchev’s 
stalwart ally, he lost his responsibilities on the Presidium at the 22nd Party Congress in October 
1961. It is possible this was connected with his failure to resolve the Latvian crisis peaceably. 
According to Smith, the Latvian purges contributed to a slowdown in the promotion of non-
Russians in the central leadership after Kirichenko’s dismissal.1177 
 
iii. The 1961 Party Programme 
The Party Programme adopted at the 22nd Party Congress in October 1961 was a comprehensive 
rebuff to local aspirations, especially those personified by the national communists. It 
represented diminishing tolerance in the centre towards localism. The Programme asserted that 
the Soviet republics would gradually dissolve: ‘Full-scale Communist construction constitutes a 
new stage in the development of national relations in the USSR in which the nations will draw 
still closer together until complete unity is achieved’. The Programme specifically refuted 
initiatives that the national communists instituted in Latvia. It called for the acceptance of 
population shifts: ‘The appearance of new industrial centres. The growth of transport increases 
the mobility of the population and promotes greater intercourse between the peoples of the 
Soviet Union. The boundaries between the Union Republics are increasingly losing their 
significance’. The Programme reversed previous policy on the importance of indigenous cadres, 
calling for ‘the continuous exchange of trained personnel among nations. Manifestations of 
national aloofness in the education and employment of workers of different nationalities in the 
Soviet Republics are impermissible’. This implied the further denationalisation of local Party 
and State leaderships and a reaffirmation of the role of the Russians as reliable Soviet citizens at 
the apex of the Soviet system. Finally, the Programme reaffirmed the Party’s commitment to the 
‘free development of the languages of the peoples of the USSR and the complete freedom for 
                                                      
1176 Conquest, Russia After Khrushchev, 210. 
1177 Smith, Red Nations, 213-14. 
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every citizen of the USSR to speak and to bring up and educate his children, in any language’. 
This implied it was a citizens’ right to decide whether or not to learn a language, the so-called 
‘voluntary principle’. The Programme also boldly asserted the place of the Russian language as 
‘the common medium of interaction and cooperation between all the peoples of the USSR’.1178 
The Programme enshrined policies the Latvian national communists had struggled against. It 
seems likely that the shift in Moscow’s relationship with the republics, evidenced by the new 
Programme, was influenced by events in Latvia. Although the centre was reasserting itself, the 
Programme sought to avoid outright provocations and toned down the threat posed to non-
Russian languages. As Alexander Titov puts it, ‘a shaky balance was maintained between the 
proclaimed ideal of a single internationalist culture in the distant future, a single Soviet people 
in the immediate future and the need to take into account the concerns of the non-Russian 
nationalities for the present’.1179  
It is likely that the national communist debacle contributed towards the Presidium’s 
decision to begin recentralisation of the economy in the 1960s. In May 1961, the country was 
divided into 19 large regions with coordinating councils for long-term planning and integrated 
economic development. The Western Economic Region was comprised of the Baltic Republics. 
Indirectly referring to the national communist episode, Voldemārs Leiņš, the Latvian CC 
Secretary for Industry explained the purpose of the new system as follows: ‘The closer the 
interaction between republics and the greater the understanding of state tasks, the more 
successfully manifestations of localism and national egoism are overcome’.1180 Perhaps Moscow 
learned some lessons from the centre-periphery challenge posed by the national communists, 
implicitly recognising the new Party Programme as ideological bluster rather than something to 
be brought about through concrete policies. This was the wider impact of the experience of 
Latvian national communism on Soviet politics. 
  
                                                      
1178 Conquest, Russia After Khrushchev, 208-09. 
1179 Alexander Titov, ‘The 1961 Party Programme and the fate of Khrushchev’s reforms’, in Melanie Ilic 
and Jeremy Smith (eds.), Soviet State and Society Under Khrushchev, (Oxon: Routledge/BASEES, 2009), 
15. 
1180 Voldemārs Leiņš, ‘Sovetskaia pribaltika - Edinyi krupnyi ekonomicheskii raion strany’, Kommunist 
Sovetskoi Latvii, 10 (1961), 30-31. 
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Appendix A. Tables 
Table 1.1181 A labour balance analysis of gross migration to Latvia produced by the Economics 
Institute in 1963 (in thousands). 
 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 
Gross 
migration 
29 24 21 39 19 4.5 11.6 18.4 15.3 16.5 
 
Table 2.1182 Net migration to Latvia between 1950 and 1965. 















                                                      
1181 LVA f.693, apr.1-s, d.486, l.20. Doklad Instituta ekonomiki na balance trudovykh resursov v Latvii, 8 
iiunia 1963. 
1182 Dreifelds, ‘Latvian National Demands’, 148. 







Table 3.1183 Latvian SSR Central Statistical Administration report on average net migration by 
five-year periods. 


















                                                      
1183 LVA f.270, apr.1-s l.1905, lp.13, ‘Materialy o razmeshchenii naseleniia i trudovykh resursov v LSSR 
v poslevoennyi period i v blizhaishuiu perspektivu, vypolnenii narodnokhoziaistvennogo plana 1968’, 
Zamestitel’ predsedatelia LSSR Tsentral’nogo statisticheskogo administratsii, Ia. Rudzatis, 11 aprelia 
1968. 
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during the year 
1957 53,948 11.1% 18,922 35.1% 3,988 
1958 57,305 6.2% 20,971 36.6% 4,600 
1959 61,414 7.2% 23,009 37.4% 5,095 
1960 65,947 7.4% 25,252 38.3% 4,744 
1961 72,519 10% 27,604 38.1% 5,039 
1962 78,219 7.9% 29,667 37.9% 4,330 
1963 81,986 4.8% 31,416 38.3% 5,952 
 
Table 5. 1185  Percentage of the total number of industrial workers employed in different 
categories of work. 
Branch of Industry: 1940 1958 1960 1965 
Machine-building and 
metalworking 
14.5% 25.7% 25.6% 31.1% 
Light 24.3% 24.3% 24.5% 21.5% 
Food 17.6% 13.4% 13.8% 13.5% 
Timber, woodworking and 
pulp and paper 
28.3% 19.7% 18.8% 15.4%* 
* Figure for 1964. 
                                                      
1184 RGANI f.77 (Otdela organizatsionno-partiinoi raboty), op.1, d.10, 1.41, 100, 166; d.11, l.35, 93, 172; 
d.12, l.35, ‘Svodnye statisticheskie otchety: O sostave KPSS seti mestnykh partiinykh organov otchetakh 
i vyborakh za 1957-1963’; Šilde, Bez tiesībām un brīvības, 39. Within the historiography, there are 
significant discrepancies in the figures given for LCP membership and the number of Latvians within the 
Party. This is due to a lack of access to archival materials. Consequently, general figures are used and 
include Latvians in the RSFSR. This is the case for Trāpans, ‘Latvian Communist Party Membership’, 31, 
and King, Economic Policies, 180-83. For further reliable figures on Party size and ethnic composition 
see: Misiunas and Taagepera, Years of Dependence, 359-60 and Thomas Remeikis, ‘Berücksichtigung 
der nationalen und verwaltungsmässigen Interessen der Unionsrepublik im Rahmen des zentralistischen 
Sowjetsystems, dargestellt am Beispiel Litauens’, Acta Baltica, 10 (1970), 121-56. 
1185 Dreifelds, ‘Latvian National Demands’, 143; Widmer, ‘Nationalism and Communism’, 452. 
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Table 6.1186 Size of the labour force in Latvia in comparison to the 1940 level. 

























                                                      
1186 Stephen Dunn, Cultural Processes in the Baltic Area under Soviet Rule, (Berkley: University of 
California, 1966), 36. 
1187 Widmer, ‘Nationalism and Communism’, 446. 
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Table 8.1188 Average annual growth rate percentage of gross production by industrial branches 
over five-year periods. 
Industry 1951-1955 1956-1960 1961-1965 
Machine-building and 
metalworking 
20 18 18 
Chemicals 25 21 26 
Construction materials 18 13 11 
Food 11 15 8 
Light 15 11 4 
Table 9.1189 Interwar Latvian census and Soviet census data. Numbers and percentage share of 
population by major nationalities. 
Ethnic group 1935 1959 1970 
 Number % Number % % considering 
their ethnic 




Latvians 1,472,612 75.5% 1,297,881 62% 98.3% 1,341,805 56.8% 
Russians 206,499 10.6% 556,448 26.6% 98.4% 704,599 29.8% 
Belarusians 26,867 1.4% 61,587 2.9% 42.6% 94,898 4% 
Poles 48,949 2.5% 59,774 2.9% 55.3% 63,045 2.7% 
Ukrainians 1,844 0.1% 29,440 1.4% 42.8% 53,461 2.3% 
Lithuanians 22,913 1.2% 32,383 1.6% 76.5% 40,589 1.7% 
Jews 93,479 4.8% 36592 1.8% 47.9% 36,680 1.6% 
Soviet Slavic 
total 
235,210 12.1% 647,475 30.9%  852,958 36.1% 
                                                      
1188 Ibid., 450. 
1189 1935 - Widmer, ‘Nationalism and Communism’, 575; 1959 - RGAE f.1562, op.36, d.3, l.8; 1970 - 
RGAE f.1562, op.36, d.3998, table 7; Šilde, Bez tiesībām un brīvības, 398. For Riga: In 1939 the city was 
68% Latvian, in 1959 45% Latvian, and in 1970 40% Latvian, Riekstiņš, Against Russification, 433; 
LVA f.102, apr.17, l.12, lp.175. 
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Total 1,950,502  2,093,458   2,364,127  
Table 10. Percentage of Latvians claiming Russian as their first or second language in the 1970 
Soviet census.1190 Lithuanian and Estonian figures included for comparison. 
Age Group Latvians Lithuanians Estonians 
0-10 12.02% 3.42% 3.94% 
11-15 38.44% 23.87% 13.51% 
16-19 67% 61.12% 41.74% 
20-29 75.76% 71.26% 60.06% 
30-39 68.78% 56.70% 46.51% 
40-40 52.34% 40.74% 28.06% 
50-59 39.18% 25.07% 16.45% 
Over 60s 40.33% 20.79% 22.24% 
Total 47.19% 35.01% 28.29% 
 
  
                                                      
1190 Dreifelds, ‘Latvian National Demands’, 139. 
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Appendix B. The Latvian National Communists 








First Secretary of the Riga 
gorkom 
Deputy Chairman of the Council 





Second Secretary Deputy Chairman of the Council 
of Ministers, Komsomol First 
Secretary, First Secretary of the 





Chairman of the 
Presidium of the Supreme 
Soviet 
Deputy Chairman of the 




First Secretary Riga 
gorkom 





Chairman of the Council 
of Trade Unions 
Komsomol First Secretary, First 
Secretary of the Liepāja obkom, 





CC Secretary for 
Agriculture 





Minister of Agriculture Third Secretary 1918 41 
Pauls Dzērve Head of the Economics 
Institute 
Deputy head of the Economics 
Institute, head of Komsomol 
Department for Schools 
1918 41 










Deputy Minister of 
Culture 
Deputy Head of the Komsomol 




Minister of Culture Minister of Foreign Affairs 1916 43 
Oswalds 
Darbiņš 
Editor of Rigas Balss  1905 54 
Benjamiņš 
Treijs 
Deputy Head of the 
Economics Institute 
 1914 45 
Visvaldis 
Vallis 
Deputy Minister of 
Agriculture 





Deputy Head of the CC 
Agitprop Department 





Editor of Zvaigzne Editor of Padomju Jaunatne 
(1944-1952) 
1929 30 
I. Brencis Second Secretary 
Komsomol 
   
Jānis 
Prombergs 
Deputy Minister for 
Health 
 1927 32 
Vilis 
Samsons 
Minister of Education  1920 39 
                                                      
1191 Year in which open conflict with the orthodox communists begins. Average age of known national 
communists with available data (38 persons) in 1959 - 46.7 years old. 
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Jānis Kacens Head of the CC 
Department for 
Administration, Trade and 
Finance 
 1909 50 
E. Liberts Minister of Transport  1909 50 
Jānis 
Auškāps 
Deputy Head of the 
sovnarkhoz 
Minister for Construction 1894 64 
Vilhelm 
Lecis 
Head of Riga gorispolkom 
(1952-1957) 
Manager of State Bank 1898 61 
Victor 
Kreituss 
First Deputy Head of the 
Riga gorispolkom 





Deputy Head of the Riga 
gorispolkom 
 1905 54 
Ēriks 
Baumanis 
Head of the Riga 
gorispolkom (1958-1962) 
   
Arnolds 
Zandmanis 
Council of Ministers 
Party Organisation 
Secretary for Cadres  
 1905 54 
Vladislavs 
Ruskulis 
Komsomol First Secretary   1929 30 
Pēteris 
Plēsums 
Chairman of the Party-
State Control Commission 
Deputy Chairman of the 




Deputy Head of the CC 
Department for 
Administrative Organs 
   
Rekšna Deputy Head of the CC 
Department for 
Agriculture 
   
Kokān First Assistant Secretary 
of the CC 
   
Emma 
Ērenštreite 
Senior advisor for the 
Council of Ministers 
 1912 47 
Jānis 
Gibietis 
Head of the Education 
Department of the Riga 
gorispolkom 
Riga gorkom member   
Milda 
Vernere 
Director of 49th School, 
Riga 
 1918 41 
Marta 
Duskina 
Head of the Education 
Department of the Riga 
gorispolkom (1945-1951) 
Director of 3rd School, Riga 1901 58 
Albert 
Tseplis 
Head of the Department 
for the Riga gorkom 
 1915 44 
Anton 
Luriņš 
Head of the CC 
Department for 
Agriculture 
 1911 48 
Skrabo First Secretary of the 
Skrunda raikom 
   
Pavlovsky First Secretary of the 
Jelgava raikom 
   
Mecheslav 
Matsulevich 
Chief of the Riga City 
Militia Administration 
 1916 43 
Emīlia 
Veinberga 
Deputy Minister of 
Justice 
 1896 63 
Juris Sprogis Deputy Prosecutor Head of the Justice Department of 
the Presidium of the Latvian 
Supreme Soviet 
1919 40 
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Vēra Kacena Contributor to Literatūra 
un Māksla 
 1912 47 
Kristaps 
Kaugurs 
Editor of Padomju 
Jaunatne (1953?-1959) 
   
Fricis  
Deglavs 
Head of Gosplan Head of the Economics Institute 1898 Died 
in 
1957 
Z. Mincs Daugavpils correspondent 
for Cīņa 
   
Arnolds 
Deglavs 
Deputy Chairman of the 
Riga gorispolkom 
Chairman of the Riga 
gorispolkom 
1904 55 
J. Jansons Minister for Trade    
Ella Ankupe Head of the CC 
Department for work with 
Women 
 1908 51 
 
National communists known 
to have been born in Latvia 
National communists known 
to have been born outside 





Berklavs Treijs (Samara guberniia) Nikonov (Russian) 
Krūmiņš Blūms (Karlsruhe, Baden-
Wurtemburg) 
Matsulevich (Belarusian) 
Dzērve Kalpiņš (Smolensk) Cherkovsky (Belarusian) 
Ozoliņš Nikonov (Pskov) Blūms (Jewish) 
Pizāns Tseplis (Yaroslavl) Z. Mincs (Jewish) 
Pinksis Zandmanis (Bashkiria) Favišs Frīdmans (Jewish) 
Bissenieks  Darbiņš (Jewish) 
Mūkins   
Cherkovsky   
Plēsums   
Ruskulis   
Erenštreites   
Prombergs   
Matsulevich   
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Appendix C. The Opponents of Latvian National 
Communism 





Arvīds Pelše First Secretary Secretary for Ideology 1899 60 
Augusts Voss Chairman of the CC 
Department of Party 
Organs 











Head of the CC Department 
for Agriculture, Chairman of 
the Council of Ministers 
1919 40 
Jānis Bumbiers Head of the 
Economics Institute 
Head of Agitprop, Editor of 
Bolshevik Sovetskaia Latviia 
  
Nikolai Saleev Editor, Sovetskaia 
Latviia 
 1914 45 
Major-General 
Nikolai Demin 
Head of the Political 
Department of the 
BMD 
 1910 49 
General Aleksandr 
Gorbatov 
Commander, BMD  1891 68 
General Pavel 
Batov 
Commander, BMD  1897 62 
Nikolai 
Ponomarev 
Minister of Light 
Industry 
Minister for the Food Industry 1908 51 
Aleksandr 
Aleksandrov 
Deputy Chairman of 
the Department for 
Party Organs 
 1918 41 
Ivan Veselovs Head of Agitprop  1915 44 
Fedor Titov Second Secretary  1910 49 
Augusts Čulitis Chairman of 
Gosplan 
 1900 59 
Yuri Rudometov First Secretary of 
Daugavpils gorkom 
Head of the CC Department 
for Heavy Industry, First 
Secretary of the Liepāja 
gorkom 
1918 41 
Victor Zhigarkov Daugavpils gorkom 
member 
 1919 40 
Ivan Lebedev Second Secretary  1907 52 
Antons Ozolings Chairman of the 
State Control 
Committee 











Rector of the Agricultural 
Academy, Deputy Head of 
Gosplan, Chairman of the 
Supreme Soviet 
1907 52 
                                                      
1192 Average age: From available data for 43 persons - 49.3 years. Pelše promoted many young cadres 
not involved with the national communists. Including neutral bureau members, the average age of non-
national communists rises to 50.6 years. 




Head of the CC 
Department for 
Administration, 
Trade and Finance 
Komsomol Head of Sector for 
Party Cadres 
  
Vladislavs Azāns First Secretary of 
the Riga gorkom 
Head of Latvia’s DOSAAF   
Jānis Vēvers Chairman of the 
KGB 
 1899 60 
Jānis Ostrovs Minister of Culture Minister of Foreign Affairs 1896 63 
Roberts Ķisis Minister for Public 
Utilities 
Chairman of the Party Control 
Commission 
1896 63 
Georgijs Gaile Head of the 
sovnarkhoz 
Director of VEF 1905 54 
Elmārs Bēmanis Komsomol First 
Secretary 
Chairman of the Party-State 
Control Committee, Chairman 
of the Department for Party 
Organs 
1926 33 
Vitalijs Rubenis Head of the CC 
Department for 
Agriculture 
Chairman of the Council of 
Ministers 
1914 45 
Nikolai Muravevs Head of the CC 
Department for 
Science and Culture 
Deputy Head of the CC 
Department for Science and 
Culture 
1909 50 
Ivan Biniatian Head of the CC 
Department for the 
Riga gorkom 
Deputy Chairman of the Riga 
gorispolkom, Second Secretary 
of the Riga gorkom 
1915 44 
Leontina Lapina Head of the 
Department for 
Science and Culture 
 1916 43 
Fillip Kashnikov Second Secretary Deputy Chairman of the Party 
Organs Department 
1904 55 
Ādolfs Miglinieks CC Secretary for 
Industry 
Head of the CC Department 
for Heavy Industry 
1903 56 
Kārlis Voltmanis Chairman of the 
Council of Trade 
Unions 
 1898 51 
Pavel Litvinov Minister for Public 
Utilities 
Chairman of the Department 
for Party Organs, Head of the 
Department for Construction 
1900 59 
I.A. Davydov Editor, Sovetskaia 
Latviia 
   
Longins 
Avdiukevich 
Chairman of the 
Department for 
Party Organs 
 1916 43 
Augusts Zitmanis Komsomol First 
Secretary 
 1929 30 
Voldemārs Leiņš CC Secretary for 
Industry 





Deputy Chairman of 
the Council of 
Ministers 
Head of the Department for 
Science and Culture 
1923 36 
Ilmārs Ivert Editor, Cīņa Correspondent for Pravda  1924 35 
Iosif Gusakovsky Commander, BMD  1904 55 
Nikolai Shatalin Head of the 
Orgbureau for 
Latvia 
 1904 55 
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Vasilii F. 
Riazanov 
Head of the 
Orgbureau for 
Latvia 
 1904 55 
Pēteris Valeskalns Academician-
Secretary of the 
Academy of 
Sciences of the 
Latvian SSR 
Chairman of the Supreme 
Soviet, Chairman of the Union 
of workers in higher education 
and research institutions 
1899 60 
Jānis Jurgens Rector of Riga State 
University 
Third Secretary 1900 59 
Mikhail Gribkov Second Secretary  1909 50 
Viktors Bliūms Chairman of the 
Council of Trade 
Unions  
 1923 36 
 
Neutrals 
Name Primary position Other posts held Date of Birth Age in 1959 
Jānis Kalnbērziņš First Secretary Chairman of the 
Presidium of the 
Supreme Soviet 
1893 66 
Vilis Lācis Chairman of the 
Council of 
Ministers 
 1904 55 
Jānis Peive President of the 
Academy of 
Sciences 




Matiss Plūdonis First Deputy 
Chairman of the 
Council of 
Ministers 
CC Secretary for 




Opposition outside the Latvian SSR 
Name Primary position Other posts held 
Mikhail Polekhin Head of the Baltic Sector of 
the CC Department for 
Soviet Republics 
Secretary for Primorskii kraikom 
Mikhail Gavrilov Head of the Baltic Sector of 
the CC Department for 
Soviet Republics 
Secretary for Kursk obkom  
Petr Pigalev Deputy Head of the CC 
Department for Soviet 
Republics 
Second Secretary for Molotov (Perm) 
oblast, CPSU CC Inspector, Head of 
sector for the Department for Soviet 
Republics 
Aleksandr Shelepin Chairman of the KGB First Secretary of the CPSU CC 
Komsomol, Head of the CC 
Department for Soviet Republics 
Vladimir Semichastnyi Chairman of the CC 
Department for Soviet 
Republics 
First Secretary of the CPSU CC 
Komsomol, Chairman of the KGB 
Mikhail Suslov CPSU CC Presidium 
member 
Chief ideologue of the CPSU 
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Appendix D. Phases of the Purge of the National Communists 








New position (and 






of the Council of 
Ministers 
8th July 1959 Chief of the 
regional film rentals 
office of Vladimir, 
RSFSR, 1968 










Director of the 
Natural History 
Museum 





the Academy of 
Sciences, 13th June 
1960; posted to an 
electro-technical 





Chairman of the 




Chief of a road 
construction unit for 
Madona District 
 






































24th February 1961 







Chairman of the 




Deputy Chairman of 
the Presidium, 

































Deputy Minister of 
Culture 
28th July 1959 Editor of the 
Latvian agricultural 
encyclopaedia at the 
Latvian State 
 




First Secretary of 
the Riga gorkom 
17th February 
1960 
Chairman of the 
Moscow (region of 
Riga) raiispolkom, 











Head of the 
agricultural sector 


















Chairman of the 
Party-State Control 
Commission 











































Head of the CC 
Department for 
Agriculture 
28th April 1960 Manager for the 
Academy of 
Sciences at a citric 
acid factory 
 
Jānis Kacens Head of the CC 
Department for 
Administration, 
Trade and Finance 
April 1960   







Deputy Head of the 
sovnarkhoz 
June 1960 Pensioned off  
Vilhelm 
Lecis 
Manager of the 
State Bank 
1972   
Victor 
Kreituss 
First Deputy Head 




On the design 





Head of the Riga 
gorispolkom 








1960 Director of J. 
Misiņa library and 
pensioner 
 

















Deputy Minister of 
Agriculture 



















of the Riga 
gorispolkom 






Chief of the Riga 
City militia 
administration 





Deputy Head of 
Agitprop 
January 1960 Deputy Chief of 




Head of the CC 
Department for the 
Riga gorkom  
6th April 1960   
Emīlia 
Veinberga 
Deputy Minister of 
Justice 
1959   
Juris Sprogis Deputy Prosecutor 1962   
Emma 
Ērenštreite 
Senior advisor for 
the Council of 
Ministers 
1959?   
Milda 
Vernere 
Director of Riga’s 
49th School 
1962   
 













First Secretary 25th November 
1959 
Chairman of the 
Presidium of the 
Supreme Soviet 
until 5th May 1970 
 









Jānis Peive Chairman of the 
Council of 
Ministers 
23rd April 1962 Remained 
Chairman of the 






Second Secretary 27th March 
1963 





Head of Agitprop November 
1961 




Georgijs Bureau member 3rd August Possibly remained Member of the 
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Gaile and Chairman of 
the Sovnarkhoz 
1962 Chairman of the 
sovnarkhoz until 






and First Deputy 






Removed from the 
bureau on 7th 
December 1962 
Deputy 
Chairman of the 
Council of 
Ministers, 





Ilmārs Ivert Candidate bureau 
member and Editor 
of Cīņa 
Removed the 
from bureau on 
7th December 
1962 
Remained editor of 





and First Secretary 
of the Riga gorkom 
Removed from 
the bureau on 
23rd April 1962 
Remained First 
Secretary of the 
Riga gorkom until 
3rd June 1963 










the bureau in 
late 1962 















Head of the 
Department of 
Political Economy 
at Riga State 






of the Department 
for Party Organs 












Brought out of 
retirement to be 
Deputy Chairman 
of the Presidium of 

















1961   
Jānis 
Vevēris 




Chairman of the 
Committee for the 
Press 
 
Jānis Vanags Minister for 
Agriculture and 
Chairman of the 
Supreme Soviet 
4th April 1962 Remained 
Chairman of the 
Supreme Soviet 
until 20th March 
1963 
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Appendix E. Bureau Candidate Membership 1944-1952 (non-voting)
Seat 1944 1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952
Chairman of the 
Council of Trade 
Kārlis Voltmanis Voltmanis Voltmanis Voltmanis Voltmanis Voltmanis Voltmanis Voltmanis Voltmanis
Minister of Internal 
Affairs
Augusts Eglītis Eglītis Eglītis Eglītis Eglītis Eglītis Eglītis N/A N/A
First Secretary of the 









Chairman of the 
Department for Party 
Organs
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Nikolai 








Editor of Cīņa N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Pavel Pizāns 
(from 13/11/51)
Total 2 2 2 2 2 4 4 1 2
Grand Total (full 
and candidates)
15 16 16 16 15 17 17 16 13
Total of non-Latvian 
members
6 7 7 7 6 6 6 5 4
National Communist 
or supporter
2 2 2 3 3 3+2 3+2 5 3+1
Key - Allegiances
Yellow - National 
communist/supporter




Note: A position is only included in the tally if it was occupied for a minimum of six months in any given year
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Bureau Candidate Membership 1953-1963 (non-voting)
Seat 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963
Chairman of the 
Council of 
Trade Unions
Voltmanis Voltmanis Voltmanis Voltmanis Voltmanis
Indriķis 

























































































of the Riga 
gorkom
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Aleksandrs 




restored to full 
17/02/60

















Appendix F. Full Bureau Membership 1944-1963 
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Seat 1944 1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951
First Secretary Jānis Kalnbērziņš Kalnbērziņš Kalnbērziņš Kalnbērziņš Kalnbērziņš Kalnbērziņš Kalnbērziņš Kalnbērziņš
Chairman of the Council 
of Ministers
Vilis Lācis Lācis Lācis Lācis Lācis Lācis Lācis Lācis
Second Secretary Ivan Lebedev Lebedev Lebedev Lebedev Lebedev Fedor Titov 
(from January)
Titov Titov
Chairman of the Presidium
Augusts 
Kirhenšteins Kirchenšteins Kirchenšteins Kirchenšteins Kirchenšteins Kirchenšteins Kirchenšteins Kirchenšteins





Kalnbērziņš Kalnbērziņš Kalnbērziņš Kalnbērziņš Kalnbērziņš Kalnbērziņš
Nikolai Bissenieks 
(from 17/04/51)
Third Secretary Jānis Jurgens Jurgens Jurgens                 
(until September)




Arvīds Pelše Pelše Pelše Pelše Pelše Pelše Pelše Pelše
Secretary for Cadres Fedor Titov Titov Titov Titov Titov Pavel Litvinov Litvinov





Alfons Noviks Noviks Noviks Noviks Noviks Noviks Noviks Noviks




Minister of Agriculture N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Aleksandr Nikonov 
(from January)
Editor of Sovetskaia 
Latviia
Ivan Davydov Davydov Davydov Davydov Davydov Davydov Davydov Davydov
Editor of Cīņa Karlis Ozoliņš Ozoliņš Ozoliņš Ozoliņš Ozoliņš Ozoliņš Ozoliņš Ozoliņš                     
(until 13/11/51)
Commander of the Baltic 
Military District Ivan Bagramian Bagramian Bagramian Bagramian Bagramian Bagramian Bagramian Bagramian
Chairman of Gosplan Fritzis Deglavs Deglavs Deglavs Deglavs Deglavs Deglavs Deglavs
Deglavs,             
position abolished 
September 1952
VKP(b) CC Orgburo for 
Latvia
Nikolai Shatalin Shatalin V.F. Riazanov        
(from February)
Riazanov Position abolished 24/03/47
Second Secretary of the 
Riga gorkom
N/A K.A. Novikov 
(from 07/03/45)
Novikov Novikov Novikov Novikov Novikov Position abolished 
January
Total 13 14 14 14 13 13 13
15 (including Krūmiņš 
when counting 4 
months of 1952)
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Seat 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958
First Secretary Kalnbērziņš Kalnbērziņš Kalnbērziņš Kalnbērziņš Kalnbērziņš Kalnbērziņš Kalnbērziņš
Chairman of the Council of 
Ministers
Lācis Lācis Lācis Lācis Lācis Lācis Lācis
Second Secretary Valentin Yershov      
(from 26/08/52)
Vilis Krūmiņš     
(from 23/06/53)
Krūmiņš Krūmiņš Fillip Kashnikov 
(from 20/01/56)
Kashnikov
VACANT (20/01/58 - 
16/04/58), Vilis Krūmiņš 
(from 16/04/58)
Chairman of the Presidium Karlis Ozoliņš      
(from 11/04/52)
Ozoliņš Ozoliņš Ozoliņš Ozoliņš Ozoliņš Ozoliņš
First Secretary of the Riga 
gorkom
Edgars Apinis 
(from 01/03/52) Apinis Apinis Apinis
Eduards 
Berklavs      
(from 20/01/56)
Berklavs
Berklavs                        
(until 16/04/58)
Third Secretary Krūmiņš               
(until April)
N/A
Arvīds Pelše         
(merged with Secretary 
for Ideology, 11/02/54)
N/A N/A N/A N/A
Secretary for 
Ideology/Agitprop
Pelše Pelše Pelše Pelše Pelše Pelše Pelše
Secretary for Agriculture N/A N/A Nikolai Bissenieks     
(from 17/05/54)
Bissenieks Bissenieks Bissenieks Bissenieks
Secretary for Industry N/A N/A N/A N/A
Ādolfs 
Miglinieks    
(from 20/01/56)
Miglinieks Miglinieks
First Deputy Chairman of 
the Council of Ministers
N/A N/A Matiss Plūdonis Plūdonis Plūdonis Plūdonis Plūdonis
Deputy Chairman of the 
Council of Ministers 
(Culture)
N/A N/A N/A N/A
Vilis Krūmiņš 
(from 20/01/56) Krūmiņš






N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Minister of Agriculture Nikonov Nikonov Nikonov Nikonov Position abolished 20/01/56 Nikonov (from July)
Editor of Sovetskaia Latviia Davydov Davydov Davydov Position abolished 02/03/55
Editor of Cīņa Pavel Pizāns      
(from 22/07/52)
Pizāns Pizāns Pizāns Position reduced to candidate 20/01/56




Plūdonis          
(concurrently),           
(until 08/07/58)
Commander of the Baltic 
Military District Bagramian Bagramian
Aleksandr Gorbatov 
(from 05/05/54) Gorbatov Gorbatov Gorbatov
Gorbatov                     
(until July 1958)





Deglavs Position abolished February
Total 11 11 12 11 11 11 11
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Seat 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963
First Secretary Kalnbērziņš                           
(until 27/11/59)
Arvīds Pelše Pelše Pelše Pelše
Chairman of the Council of 
Ministers
Lācis                                          
(until 27/11/59)
Jānis Peive Peive Vitaljs Rubenis 
(from 23/4/62)
Rubenis
Second Secretary Krūmiņš Mikhail Gribkov 
(from 17/02/60)
Gribkov Gribkov Nikolai Belukha 
(from March)
Chairman of the Presidium Ozoliņš                                  
(until 27/11/59)
Jānis Kalnbērziņš Kalnbērziņš Kalnbērziņš Kalnbērziņš
First Secretary of the Riga 
gorkom








Pelše Augusts Voss     
(from 17/02/60)
Voss Voss Voss
Secretary for Agriculture Bissenieks
Pēteris Strautmanis 
(from 17/02/60) Strautmanis Strautmanis Strautmanis
Secretary for Industry Miglinieks Miglinieks






First Deputy Chairman of 
the Council of Ministers
Plūdonis Plūdonis Plūdonis Plūdonis         
(until 07/12/62)
?
Deputy Chairman of the 
Council of Ministers 
(Culture)
Berklavs                                  
(until 15/07/59)
N/A Vitaljs Rubenis                    
(from 30/03/61)
Rubenis            
(until 23/04/62)
?
Minister of Agriculture Nikonov Position merged with Secretary for Agriculture
Chairman of the  sovnarkhoz N/A Georgijs Gaile     
(17/02/60)
Gaile Gaile              
(until 03/08/62)
?
Commander of the Baltic 
Military District




Khetagurov       
(from March)
Second Secretary of the 
Riga gorkom
Position restored Voldemārs Leiņš                     
(from 30/03/61)
Leiņš Leiņš
Total 10 11 12 12 10
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Appendix G. Bureau Composition Chart 1944 - 1962
1944 1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962
Pelše faction 9 10 10 9 8 8 8 7 6 5 5 4 5 4 3 2 15 16 17
Neutral / 
Unknown
4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 0 0 0
National 
communist
2 2 2 3 3 5 5 5 4 6 5 5 5 5 8 8 0 0 0
















Appendix H. Ethnic Composition of the Bureau
1944 1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960
Latvians 9 9 9 9 9 11 11 11 9 11 11 11 11 10 14 13 12
Non-Latvian 
members
6 7 7 7 6 6 6 5 4 3 3 2 3 3 1 1 3















Appendix I. The Nomenklatura and Leadership of the Latvian SSR 1944-1962
First Secretary
Jānis Kalnbērziņš    
1940 - 27/11/59





Chairman of the Council 
of Ministers
Vilis Lācis              
1940 - 27/11/59






April 1944 -        
Jan 1949
























Chairman of the 















Deputy Chairman of the 
Presidium of the 
Supreme Soviet
Pēteris Plēsums 
























Straujums      
22/05/58 - 23/02/60
Vladislavs 
Azāns        
17/02/60 - 
03/06/63
Second Secretary of the 
Riga gorkom
K. Novikov 























Deputy Chairmen of the 
Riga gorispolkom






1954 - September 
1959
Arnolds Deglavs 
May 1958 - April 
1960




1944 - July 1946
Aleksandr Nikonov 









CC Secretary for 
Ideology/Agitprop
Arvīds Pelše      





CC Secretary for Cadres
Fedor Titov 
August 1944 - 
1949
Position abolished
CC Secretary for 
Agriculture
Nikolai 
Bissenieks      











Chairman of the 
Supreme Soviet
Aleksandrs 













First Deputy Chairman 














Deputy Chairman of the 










Deputy Chairman of the 
Council of Ministers 
(Culture)










Deputy Chairman of the 
Council of Ministers 
(Construction)
Konstantin 
Novikov        
17/04/51 - 
15/04/52
Pavel Litvinov         
April 1952 - 30/07/58
Deputy Chairman of the 






Deputy Chairman of the 
Council of Ministers 
(Trade)
A.I. Vīndedz     
until 04/09/58
Deputy Chairman of the 





Deputy Chairman of the 






of the Council of 
Ministers
Jānis Kļaviņš    
1946 - ?
Victors Krastiņš    
1958-1971





(Deputy)                 
Anna Mūkina                 





(Deputy)              
Velta Lācis
Hugo Rukšāns






November 1953? - 
22/09/59
M.J. Kārkliņa 
1959? -               
June 1963




August 1946 - 
27/01/53
Karl M. Tolmadzhev 
1953-1961
V. Karaluņs         
1961-1966?





02/03/55 - Jan 1956
Nikolai Saleev 




Editor of Cīņa (Struggle)
Kārlis Ozoliņš 
1940 - 1944
Pavel Pizāns          
August 1944 - 
February 1945
Ozoliņš              
1945 - 1951
Pizāns                
July 1951 - 
17/02/60
Ilmārs Ivert       
17/02/60 - 
15/06/1972
Editor of Literatūra un 
Māksla (Literature and 
Art)






August 1946 - 
July 1951
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First Secretary of the 
Komsomol
Indriķis Pinksis 
March 1944 - 
May 1946
Eduards Berklavs 

















Second Secretary of the 
Komsomol










Cherkovsky        
02/09/52 - 03/03/53
Chairman of the 
Department for Party 
Organs/Department for 





















Deputy Chairman of the 






Aleksandrov     
18/05/54 - 07/05/63
Minister of Agriculture




Vanags           
22/03/61 - 
04/04/62
Deputy Minister of 
Agriculture
Nikolai 
Bissenieks        
March 1947 - 
25/03/47
Jānis F. Vanags      
1951 - 1953
Pēteris 
Strautmanis      
1957-1958
Visvaldis Vallis 
1958? -      
October 1959




December 1944 - 
19/04/60 or 
04/10/60







27/04/60 - Nov 1961
I.A. Anderson 
March 1962 - 
December 1962
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Deputy Head of the CC 
Department for Agitprop
Jānis Bumbiers 
03/03/46 -          
Aug 1946
Jānis Ostrovs       
1944 - 1947
Herberts Valters 
December 1958 - 
January 1960
Head of the CC 






Head of the CC 















30/03/62 -      
April 1970
Head of the CC 
Department for Science, 
Schools and Culture
Augusts Voss 
August 1953 - 
May 1954
Victors Krūmiņš 
11/05/54 - Nov 
1956/57
Nikolai Muravev 
Nov 1956/57 - 
25/01/58
Leontina Lapiņa 
25/01/58 -         
Dec 1962
Deputy Head of the CC 











Drozdov       
(1955) -       
August 1958
Jānis Kacens          
August 1958 -      
April 1960
F.F Sokurenko 
April 1960 - 
December 1963
Head of the CC 
Department for 
Agriculture


























Head of the Education 












Chairman of the 





A.M. Trelib      
04/04/58 - 19/09/63
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Minister of Building 
Materials
Jānis Auškāps        
? - 20/10/55
K.O. Egor        
20/10/55 - 05/06/57
Minister of Urban and 
Rural Construction
B.F. Bezel                
? - 26/08/63
























A.F. Vonda                
06/09/61 - 27/08/69
Minister of State Control 
(Chairman of the 
Commission for Soviet 






Committee in 1963 
Elmārs Bēmanis 
1963 - ?





















Minister of Meat and 
Dairy Industry
Aleksandrs 






Mishutin        
1944 - 1950
Deputy Prosecutor: 





Jablonskis      
1940 - 1951
























Minister of Foreign 
Affairs













Chairman of the 



























August 1940 - 
April 1951





Deputy Chairman of 
Gosplan
R. Ansons       
1950 - 1953






Director of the 
Economics Institute
Jānis Bumbiers 














Deputy Director of the 
Economics Institute
Fritzis Deglavs 




















Georgijs Gaile        
1957 - July 1958
Jānis Auškāps 
July 1958 -     
June 1960












Rector of the 
Agricultural Academy
Jānis Peive        
1944 - 1950






President of the 
Academy of Sciences
Paulus Leiņš       
1946 - 1951
Jānis Peive        
17/04/51 - 23/11/59
Karl Plaude      
1960 - 1970
Vice-President of the 
Academy of Sciences
Fritzis Deglavs 
April 1951 - 
14/04/52
Augusts Kirhenšteins 
14/04/52 -          
December 1958
VKP(b) CC Orgburo for 
Latvia
Nikolai Shatalin 
1944 -       
February 1946
V.F. Riazanov 





Commander of the 
Baltic Military District
Ivan Bagramian 
July 1945 -       
May 1954
Aleksandr Gorbatov 
May 1954 -     
April/July 1958
Pavel Batov 
April/July 1958 - 
November 1959
Iosif Gusakovsky 
November 1959 - 
01/03/63
Georgii Khetagurov 
March 1963 -       
June 1971



























Ivan Zujāns       
23/05/53 - 31/01/63
Vladimirs Sēja 
Jan 1963 - ?
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Deputy Ministers of 
Internal Affairs 




Jānis Piesis    
1946 - 1948
Deputy Minister 
for Police:      
Ivan Ivanov      
16/03/51 -      
April 1953
MVD Police Chief









Second Secretary:     






















Bissenieks         
April 1952 -      
June 1953
On Obkom:          
Edgars Mūkins           
18/04/52 - 02/06/53











* Between January and April 1958 the Second Secretary position remained vacant. The duties of the position were fulfilled by Kalnbērziņš.
Sources for all charts include Widmer, ‘Nationalism and Communism’;  LVA-PA fonds 101 and 15500;
Grey Hodnett and Val Ogareff, Leadership in the Soviet Republics 1955-1972, (Canberra: Australia National University, 1973), 209-37.
Key: Allegiances
Yellow - National 
communist/supporter








GARF (Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii) f.7523, op.78 
LVA (Latvijas Valsts arhīvs) f.270, apr.1-s 
LVA f.290, apr.1 
LVA f.693, apr.1-s 
LVA f.1400, apr.4 
LVA-PA (Latvijas Valsts arhīvs - Partija arhīvs) f.101, apr.16, l.9 
LVA-PA f.101, apr.16, l.10 
LVA-PA f.101, apr.17 
LVA-PA f.101, apr.19 
LVA-PA f.101, apr.20 
LVA-PA f.101, apr.21 
LVA-PA f.101, apr.22, l.15 
LVA-PA f.101, apr.22, l.48a 
LVA-PA f.101, apr.23 
LVA-PA f.101, apr.24 
LVA-PA f.102, apr.14 
LVA-PA f.102, apr.17 
LVA-PA f.108, apr.16 
LVA-PA f.2369, apr.1 
LVA-PA f.15500, apr.2 
LZAA (Latvijas zinātņu akadēmija arhīvs) f.1, apr.1 
LZAA f.1, apr.15 
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RGAE (Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv ekonomiki) f.1562, op.36 
RGANI (Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv noveishei istorii) f.2, op.1, d.374 
RGANI f.5, op.15, d.445 
RGANI f.5, op.16 
RGANI f.5, op.30, d.6 
RGANI f.5, op.31, d.59 
RGANI f.5, op.31, d.123 
RGANI f.77, op.1 
RGASPI (Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv sotsial’no-politicheskoi istorii) f.17, op.89 
RGASPI f.600, op.1 
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